E. J. T., a minor, by and through his Conservator, InTRUSTment, Northwest, Inc., Plaintiff, υ. JEFFERSON COUNTY, a public body; Tyler W. Anderson, in his individual capacity; and Arjang Aryanfard, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
No. 320CV1990JR); (SC S068846)
Supreme Court of Oregon
September 22, 2022
370 Or 215 | 518 P3d 568
FLYNN, J.
Argued and submitted March 7, certified questions answered September 22, 2022. En Banc.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant Jefferson County and others in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon after he suffered catastrophic brain damage at the hands of his mother‘s boyfriend. Plaintiff alleged that he had suffered abuse from the boyfriend before, that medical personnel had reported those injuries to defendants, and that defendants had failed to take certain actions required by
The certified questions are answered.
En Banc
On certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; certified order dated August 27, 2021, certification accepted October 14, 2021.
Erin K. Olson, Law Office of Erin Olson, PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for plaintiff.
Robert E. Franz, Jr., Law Office of Robert Franz, Jr., Springfield, argued the cause and filed the brief for defendants Jefferson County and Tyler W. Anderson.
Jonathan Henderson, Davis Rothwell Earle & Xóchihua, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant Arjang Aryanfard. Also on the brief were Daniel Hasson and William G. Earle.
Ashley L. Vaughn, Dumas & Vaughn, LLC, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
Jane Paulson, Paulson Coletti Trial Attorneys, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae National Center for Victims of Crime. Also on the brief was Laura E. Laughlin, Freiwald Law, PC, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
FLYNN, J.
The certified questions are answered.
FLYNN,
This case reaches us on two certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Plaintiff, through a conservator, brought this action in the district court after he suffered catastrophic brain damage at the hands of his mother‘s boyfriend. Plaintiff alleged that those injuries were caused by the failure of defendants—Jefferson County, Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff Anderson, and Warm Springs Police Department Officer Aryanfard—to respond to an earlier report of child abuse in the manner that Oregon law requires. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that he had suffered abuse from the boyfriend a month earlier, that medical personnel had reported those injuries to defendants, and that defendants had negligently failed to take certain actions required by Oregon statutes that govern the reporting of child abuse,
We accepted the questions under
based on the acts or omissions of officers, employees, or agents of the public body acting within the scope of their employment or duties. With respect to “statutory liability,” we slightly reframe the question that the district court has certified to reflect the nature of “statutory liability” in Oregon: We ask whether the legislature intended to create statutory liability, i.e., a statutory private right of action, to address violations of a duty that the child-abuse-reporting statutes imposed on defendants. See Deckard v. Bunch, 358 Or 754, 759-60, 370 P3d 478 (2016) (describing the threshold requirements of a claim for statutory liability). And we conclude that the legislature did not intend to create a statutory private right of action to address violations of the duties that the child-abuse-reporting statutes plausibly may have imposed on defendants in this case: duties that apply to law enforcement agencies that have received, and personnel who are investigating, an existing report of child abuse.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff was two years old when he suffered permanent catastrophic brain damage after an assault by his mother‘s live-in boyfriend, Mendoza.2 Plaintiff lived with his mother and Mendoza in the town of Madras, in Jefferson County, Oregon, and his mother occasionally left plaintiff in Mendoza‘s care. Plaintiff also spent time with his father, who was a member of the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs. A month and a half before the assault that caused plaintiff‘s catastrophic brain damage, plaintiff‘s mother had taken him to the hospital in Madras with bruising around his genitals. The attending nurse had reported the injury as suspected child abuse to local Jefferson County law enforcement and, later, to the Warm Springs Police Department.
Anderson responded to that report of abuse on behalf of the Jefferson County Sheriff. Before arriving at the hospital, Anderson notified dispatch that he had spoken by phone to the nurse and had been told that plaintiff had been abused two days earlier while staying at his father‘s home. At the hospital, Anderson asked plaintiff‘s
mother where plaintiff‘s father lived, and, upon learning that he lived on the Warm Springs reservation, Anderson told plaintiff‘s mother that he had no jurisdiction and left the hospital without taking any other investigatory steps and without notifying the Department of Human Services (DHS) that the sheriff‘s office had received a report of child abuse. Anderson reported to dispatch that the abuse had occurred in Warm Springs and that “[d]ispatch is giving the call to them.”
Aryanfard responded to the nurse‘s report on behalf of the Warm Springs Police Department. He interviewed plaintiff‘s mother briefly over the phone and advised her that he had spoken with plaintiff‘s father. At the Warm Springs Police Department, Aryanfard took photographs of plaintiff and spoke again with plaintiff‘s mother. He promised plaintiff‘s mother that he would figure out what had happened, but Aryanfard did nothing more to investigate the abuse. He did not continue the investigation or write any report, and he did not notify DHS that his police department had received a report of child abuse.
Over the next month and a half, plaintiff‘s mother continued to leave plaintiff in Mendoza‘s care. Ultimately, Mendoza assaulted plaintiff, causing the serious physical injuries that are at issue in this case, including a traumatic brain injury resulting in permanent
After plaintiff filed his complaint in federal district court, Jefferson County and Anderson (the Jefferson County defendants) moved to dismiss under
the legislature had not created a civil cause of action for violation of those statutory duties. In opposing the motion, plaintiff confirmed defendant‘s understanding that the complaint was alleging a claim for statutory liability based on violations of the child-abuse-reporting statutes. Plaintiff argued that the Jefferson County defendants’ motion had identified two unsettled questions of Oregon law and that the district court should consider certifying those questions to this court. The district court granted the request for certification, and it denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice, pending this court‘s response to the certified questions. This court accepted certification.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Claim for Abuse of a Vulnerable Person Against a Public Body
The second certified question—which we answer first—asks whether a claim for abuse of a vulnerable person under
In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendants are liable under Oregon‘s Vulnerable Person Act because they permitted another person—Mendoza—to engage in physical abuse of plaintiff.4 There is no dispute that the legislature has created a statutory private right of action for a vulnerable person injured under those circumstances. See
The Jefferson County defendants argue, however, that the OTCA—specifically the “exclusive remedy” provision of the OTCA—precludes plaintiff from pursuing his Oregon‘s Vulnerable Person Act claim against a public body or its employees.5 They rely on
Plaintiff responds that a claim for abuse of a vulnerable person is a tort claim that may be brought against a public body through the OTCA when the claim is based on the actions of a public body‘s officers, employees, or
Through the OTCA, the legislature has “waive[d] the immunity to which public bodies are otherwise entitled and ma[de] ‘every public body *** subject to civil action for its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties.’” Sherman v. Dept. of Human Services, 368 Or 403, 406, 492 P3d 31 (2021) (quoting
The role of the “exclusive remedy” provision is to ensure that a tort claim against a public body is subject to the limitations that the legislature has attached to the waiver of immunity. See Sherman, 368 Or at 406 (explaining that the “OTCA waives the immunity to which public bodies are otherwise entitled,” but, “[i]n doing so, the OTCA also provides limitations on tort actions against public bodies” that would not apply if the same claim were brought against a private defendant);
For purposes of the OTCA, a “tort” is “the breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law, other than a duty arising from contract or quasi-contract, the breach of which results in injury to a specific person or persons for which the law provides a civil right of action for damages or for a protective remedy.”
was a “tort,” so subject to the notice requirement of the OTCA).
For similar reasons, we conclude that the statutory cause of action that the legislature has provided for abuse of a vulnerable person is a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA. As set out above, plaintiff‘s claim under Oregon‘s Vulnerable Person Act is one for which the legislature has provided a civil right of action for damages to a person who is injured by a breach of one of the legal duties specified in the act. 370 Or at 220 (describing
We briefly turn to, and reject, one additional argument that the Jefferson County defendants have raised in this court: that plaintiff cannot bring his Oregon‘s Vulnerable Person Act claim under the OTCA because the OTCA‘s limitations are in “direct conflict” with the cause of action that the legislature has created under Oregon‘s Vulnerable Person Act. Assuming the validity of the premise, the conclusion is not sound. When a tort claim falls within the scope of the OTCA, then it is controlled by the limitations that the OTCA imposes on tort actions against a public body, even if the same action against a private party would not be subject to those limitations. See Sherman, 368 Or at 406 (OTCA “provides limitations on tort actions
against public bodies” that would not apply in an action against a private defendant); see also Griffin, 318 Or at 507, 515 (for unlawful employment practice claim subject to the OTCA, statutory attorney fees were limited by the OTCA‘s liability limit).
That analysis resolves the certified question regarding Oregon‘s Vulnerable Person Act: The private right of action that the legislature has created for causing or permitting the abuse of a vulnerable person is a tort for which a public body may be named as a defendant, under the OTCA, when the complaint alleges that an officer, employee, or agent of the public body committed that tort while acting within the scope of the person‘s employment or duties.6
B. Statutory Liability for Violation of Child-Abuse-Reporting Statutes
We turn to the remaining certified question, which asks whether statutory liability can be based on a violation of Oregon‘s mandatory child-abuse-reporting statutes. As explained above, we have reframed the court‘s certified question to ask whether the legislature intended to create a statutory private right of action to address violations of a duty that Oregon‘s mandatory child-abuse-reporting statutes imposed on defendants. 370 Or at 218. We have reframed the question in that way because statutory liability is a legislative creation; “[s]tatutory liability arises when a statute either expressly or impliedly creates a private right of action for the violation of a statutory duty,” i.e., a statutory claim “that exists independently of” any claim for
common-law negligence that might also exist. Deckard, 358 Or at 757, 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim for statutory liability requires the plaintiff to establish that
“(1) a statute imposed a duty on the defendant; (2) the legislature expressly or impliedly intended to create a private right of action for violation of the duty; (3) the defendant violated the duty; (4) the plaintiff is a member of the group that the legislature intended to protect by imposing the duty; and (5) the plaintiff suffered an injury that the legislature intended to prevent by creating the duty.”
Id. at 759-60. In other words, whether violation of a statutory duty supplies a basis for statutory liability turns on legislative intent. Doyle v. City of Medford, 356 Or 336, 344-45, 367, 337 P3d 797 (2014).
Here, we understand the certified question to put at issue primarily the first two steps that Deckard describes for establishing statutory liability: (1) whether the child-abuse-reporting statutes imposed a duty on defendants; and (2) whether “the legislature expressly or impliedly intended to create a private right of action” for violations of a duty imposed on defendants. See 358 Or at 759-60. We conclude that some of the duties imposed under the child-abuse-reporting statutes plausibly apply to defendants but that the legislature did not intend to create a statutory private right of action to enforce violations of those duties.
1. Whether the legislature imposed a duty on defendants
The “threshold inquiry” in our analysis of statutory liability is whether the mandatory child-abuse-reporting laws imposed a duty on defendants under the circumstances alleged in the complaint. See Deckard, 358 Or at 765 (describing “threshold inquiry”). The statutes set out at
512 P3d 432 (2022) (discussing the statutory scheme).
To give effect to that policy, the child-abuse-reporting statutes impose a variety of duties that are determined in part by the circumstances under which a person becomes aware of child abuse. For example, “[a]ny public or private official” who has “reasonable cause to believe that any child with whom the official comes in contact has suffered abuse” must “immediately report or cause a report to be made” to law enforcement or to DHS.
The need to identify the pertinent duties is particularly critical to evaluating legislative intent in this case because the group of statutes that we refer to collectively as the “child-abuse-reporting statutes,”
chapter 419B); Or Laws 2007, ch 674 §§ 3, 5 (imposing specific duties on “a person conducting an investigation”).
Here, plaintiff‘s complaint alleges violations of two statutes that impose duties on “a law enforcement agency” and two that impose a duty on “a person” investigating a child abuse report: failing to notify DHS that the law enforcement agency has received a report of abuse, as required by
Each of the cited statutes identifies an action that the agency or person “shall” take.
shall *** [e]nsure that a designated medical professional” conducts an assessment of the child within 48 hours);
Plaintiff also points to the duty that the reporting laws impose on a lengthy list of “public and private officials” to make a report of child abuse—to DHS or a law enforcement agency—when the individual has “reasonable cause to believe that any child with whom the official comes in contact has suffered abuse or that any person with whom the official comes in contact has abused a child.” See
under this section, or by reason of a proceeding arising out of a report made under this section,” if that person “reasonably believes that the information is already known by a law enforcement agency or [DHS]”). Thus, given the facts that plaintiff has alleged, we answer the first inquiry in Deckard by concluding that the child-abuse-reporting statutes plausibly imposed on defendants the duties that plaintiff has alleged—duties that govern the law enforcement response to an existing report of child abuse.
2. Whether the legislature intended to create a statutory private right of action
Having identified the duties that the child-abuse-reporting statutes plausibly imposed on defendants in this case, we turn to the second Deckard inquiry: whether the legislature “expressly or impliedly intended to create a private right of action” for a violation of those duties. Id. at 760. Plaintiff recognizes that the child-abuse-reporting statutes do not expressly create a private right of action. But plaintiff argues that the legislature impliedly intended to create statutory liability to enforce violations of the child-abuse-reporting statutes. See Deckard, 358 Or at 760 (explaining that, “when a statute prescribing a duty does not expressly indicate whether the legislature intended to create statutory liability to enforce the duty, we consider whether such intent is implied”). Because the issue is one of legislative intent, we employ our usual framework for construing statutes. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (describing analytical framework). Under that framework, we examine the text and context of the particular provisions that are at issue and consider the legislative history of those provisions “where that legislative history appears useful to the court‘s analysis.” Id.; see also Deckard, 358 Or at 760 (emphasizing that “the proper methodology for determining whether the legislature *** intended to create a right of action for enforcement of a statutory duty is the familiar holistic framework applicable to all statutory interpretation problems—careful examination of the statutory text, context, and legislative history”).
As plaintiff points out, the legislature has created numerous mandatory statutory duties for the purpose of
protecting children. But, as we have previously observed, “many statutory obligations are enacted without any legislative intent to confer a private right of action on a person who is harmed by a violation of the statute.” Doyle, 356 Or at 367. Thus, “[t]he mere existence of a statutory duty alone does not furnish a shortcut through the analysis” of whether the legislature intended to create a statutory cause of action. Id. We must assess whether, beyond creating mandatory notification and investigatory duties, the legislature intended to “confer a private right of action on a person who is harmed” when those duties are violated. See id.
Plaintiff‘s arguments also rely heavily on an analogy to Scovill, 324 Or 159, which Doyle characterized as a case in which this court “discerned an implied legislative intent to create statutory liability” for violation of a statutory duty, in part based on the existence of an immunity provision related to that statutory duty. See Doyle, 356 Or at 366-67 (discussing Scovill, 324 Or at 168-69). In Scovill, a visibly intoxicated woman was struck and killed by an oncoming car after police officers allowed her to leave the police station and walk into the street. 324 Or at 162. On behalf of the woman‘s estate, the plaintiff alleged that the woman had died as a result of the police officer‘s violation of a statutory duty to take any intoxicated person to “an appropriate treatment facility” when they “have reasonable cause to believe the person is dangerous to self.” Scovill, 324 Or at 162-63 (quoting former ORS 426.460(1) (1989), renumbered as
In considering whether the legislature had created statutory liability to enforce violations
stated [in the immunity provision] did not apply.” Id. at 169. Then, in a portion of the opinion that we have subsequently characterized as dicta, we observed that “[p]ermitting a tort action in the circumstances alleged in this case is consistent with and serves to enforce the legislated duty imposed by [former] ORS 426.460(1) [(1989)], which does not specify other means for its enforcement.” Scovill, 324 Or at 172; see Doyle, 356 Or at 361 (clarifying that, after concluding that the legislature intended to create a private right of action, “it was inappropriate” and “unnecessary” for the court to further analyze whether to recognize a common-law claim).
Plaintiff analogizes the child-abuse-reporting statutes to the statutes at issue in Scovill. He emphasizes that the child-abuse-reporting statutes also contain an immunity provision,
Deckard‘s application of that framework supplies helpful guidance because it represents this court‘s most recent examination of a statute for indications of an implied legislative intent to create a private right of action. In Deckard, this court considered whether the legislature intended to create a statutory private right of action when it enacted and then amended a statute that specified limited
conditions under which serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated guests or patrons could give rise to liability for damages caused by those guests or patrons. 358 Or at 756 (discussing former ORS 30.950 (1979), amended by Or Laws 1987, ch 774, § 13, renumbered as
We also considered whether we could draw any inference from the fact that the legislature had not provided an “express remedy” in the statutes to address violations of a statutory duty not to serve visibly intoxicated persons. Id. But we reasoned that the legislature‘s
Ultimately, we concluded in Deckard that there was no indication in the text or context of the statute that implied a legislative intent to create a statutory private right of action that would exist independently of the common-law negligence claim for overserving alcohol. Id. at 767. And we found no indication in the legislative history that the legislature had intended to create “statutory liability that was different from common law liability” for overservice. Id. at 785. In fact, the legislative history demonstrated that the legislature‘s purpose had been to limit the circumstances under which alcohol providers could be liable in a common-law negligence claim. Id. at 787.
Although we consider different statutes in this case than the statute that we examined in Deckard, we are again asked to infer legislative intent from the existence of an immunity provision and limited enforcement mechanism. For reasons similar to those that we articulated in Deckard, we conclude that it does not “advance the analysis very far” to consider the inferences that potentially flow from the immunity and enforcement provisions in the child-abuse-reporting statutes. See id. at 760.
With respect to the immunity provision of the child-abuse-reporting statutes, the legislature has guaranteed immunity to “[a]nyone participating in good faith in the making of a report of child abuse and who has reasonable grounds for the making thereof *** with respect to the making or content of such report.”
Moreover, any inference that might be drawn from the legislature‘s grant of immunity with respect to the making of a report of child abuse is particularly tenuous when the question is whether the legislature meant to create a statutory right of action for violating other duties that are not addressed in the immunity provision—the notification and investigatory duties that law enforcement agencies and personnel must satisfy in response to an existing report of child abuse. The statutory immunity has never applied to those notification and investigatory duties.
enforcement” duties at issue in this case and amending a preexisting immunity for “the making of a report” to apply also to the newly enacted “public or private official” reporting requirement, but not to the newly enacted law enforcement notification and investigatory duties).10 So there is no basis on which to assume that the legislature contemplated statutory civil liability with respect to those duties. Thus, plaintiff‘s focus on the immunity provision in
It is equally difficult to draw any meaningful inference about legislative intent from an examination of the enforcement mechanism
Neither inference is more plausible than the other, however. Among other possibilities, the legislature may have understood that existing common-law remedies made it unnecessary to create a statutory private right of action to address violations of the duties of responding law enforcement officials.12 See Deckard, 358 Or at 760, 766-67 (explaining that, in determining whether a statute creates a private right of action, the significance of the legislature‘s failure to provide an express remedy for a violation of a duty can depend on how the legislature understood preexisting common-law remedies). In short, we know only that the legislature expressly provided for a penalty—but not statutory liability—to address violations of the duty to make a report of child abuse. But that bare fact tells us nothing about whether the legislature intended to create statutory liability to address violations of the duties that govern the response of law enforcement agencies and personnel to an existing report of child abuse.
Beyond pointing to the immunity and penalty provisions, which do not advance the analysis in this case, plaintiff identifies nothing in the child-abuse-reporting statutes to persuade us that the legislature intended to create a new statutory right of action that would exist independently of whatever common-law claim the court might recognize. And we have found nothing in the text or context of those provisions to suggest that the legislature impliedly intended to create a statutory private right of action to enforce the notification and investigatory duties that govern law enforcement‘s response to an existing report of child abuse.
In the absence of a textual, or contextual, indication that the legislature impliedly intended to create a statutory
private right of action to address violations of the cross-reporting and investigatory duties, we might still be persuaded that the legislature intended to create a statutory private right of action if the legislative history revealed at least some discussion of that possibility. But, as we explain below, there is no helpful legislative history. See Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 (explaining that, in the construction of a statute, we will consider legislative history “where that legislative history appears useful to the court‘s analysis”).
The parties urge us to draw competing inferences from that historical context, but neither is consistent with how this court determines legislative intent. In determining legislative intent, our primary focus is on “the intent of the legislature that enacted the statute” as well as on “any later amendments or statutory changes that were intended by the legislature to modify or otherwise alter the meaning of the original terms of the statute.” Swanson, 351 Or at 290. Here, that focus is on the 1971 Legislative Assembly, which enacted the earliest of the duties applicable to a responding
“law enforcement agency” as part of the first comprehensive statutory scheme to address mandatory child abuse reporting and investigation, and on the 2007 Legislative Assembly, which enacted the duties applicable to “a person conducting an investigation” into a report of child abuse.13 Or Laws 1971, ch 451, § 5; Or Laws 2007, ch 674, §§ 3, 5.
The 1999 effort that failed to “modify or otherwise alter the meaning of the original terms of the statute” is irrelevant to our effort to determine legislative intent. See Swanson, 351 Or at 290. We cannot assume that any intent of the 1999 Legislative Assembly was shared by the 1971 or 2007 Legislative Assemblies. And we cannot assume that the failure of subsequent legislatures to pass a new version of the vetoed bill indicates an endorsement of the position expressed by the governor‘s veto, or of the trial court decisions that prompted the 1999 Legislative Assembly to act. See State ex rel Rosenblum v. Nisley, 367 Or 78, 87, 473 P3d 46 (2020) (observing that “we have repeatedly emphasized” that “‘negative inferences’ from the legislature‘s failure to amend a statute ‘are often unhelpful in statutory interpretation,’ because ‘legislative inaction can stem from a variety of causes, which may or may not relate to the legislature‘s intent as to a particular issue’” (quoting Lake Oswego Preservation Society v. City of Lake Oswego, 360 Or 115, 129, 379 P3d 462 (2016))).
Focusing as we must on the intent of the 1971 Legislative Assembly and the 2007 Legislative Assembly, which enacted the relevant law enforcement duties, nothing in the legislative history supports plaintiff‘s contention that the legislature intended to create a new private right of action
to enforce those duties. Plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the legislative history—and we have identified nothing in that history—to suggest that the
In sum, we agree with plaintiff that the legislature has imposed mandatory duties on law enforcement agencies that have received, and on personnel who are investigating, an existing report of child abuse, but the mandatory duties alone do not establish that the legislature impliedly intended to create a statutory private right of action to address violations of those duties. Nothing in the text or context of the statutes imposing those law enforcement duties suggests that the legislature intended to create a private right of action. And, although plaintiff emphasizes the immunity provision and the penalty provision in the child-abuse-reporting statutes, those provisions do not advance our analysis of legislative intent, because there are too many competing inferences that could be drawn. Finally, the relevant legislative history provides no indication that the legislatures that enacted the duties at issue in this case had any intent to create a private right of action to address violations of those duties. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the legislature expressly or impliedly intended to create statutory liability to address violations of the notification and investigatory duties that law enforcement agencies and personnel must satisfy in response to an existing report of child abuse.
As noted above, in opposing the Jefferson County defendants’ motion to dismiss in the trial court, plaintiff confirmed those defendants’ understanding that the complaint was alleging a claim for statutory liability based on
violations of the child-abuse-reporting statutes. 370 Or at 220. Plaintiff maintains in arguments to this court, however, that he does not want to foreclose the possibility of also pursuing a parallel common-law claim for relief, and he asks this court to advise the parties about all of the ways that the statutory duties might be used to establish the elements of an existing common-law claim. See Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 650, 762 P2d 997 (1988) (explaining that claims based on statutory liability “exist independent of any parallel common-law claim and can be pleaded independently, with or without an accompanying common-law claim” and describing various ways that a statute may be used to support a common-law negligence claim). In addition, he has argued in his reply brief that this court should consider recognizing a new common-law right of action to address violations of the duties imposed by the child-abuse-reporting statutes. See Doyle, 356 Or at 363 (noting that this court may determine whether to create a common-law right of action in the absence of “legislative intent to create or deny a right of action”). Nothing in this opinion should be read as foreclosing the possibility of a common-law claim under the circumstances that plaintiff has alleged. But what plaintiff now requests goes significantly beyond the scope of the certified question, and we decline to answer more than the question that the district court has certified to us.
The certified questions are answered.