E. J. T. v. Jefferson County, 518 P.3d 568

A two-year-old (plaintiff) suffered catastrophic brain injury after an assault by his mother’s boyfriend (Mendoza).
A month and a half earlier the child was treated for bruising; medical staff reported suspected abuse to Jefferson County and the Warm Springs Police Department.
Jefferson County deputy Anderson and Warm Springs officer Aryanfard responded but took minimal investigatory steps, did not notify DHS, and did not complete required investigatory actions; the child remained in the abuser’s care and was later severely injured.
Plaintiff sued Jefferson County, Deputy Anderson, and Officer Aryanfard alleging violations of Oregon’s child-abuse-reporting statutes (ORS 419B.005–419B.055) and a claim under the Vulnerable Person Act (ORS 124.100–124.140).
The federal district court certified two questions to the Oregon Supreme Court: (1) whether a Vulnerable Person Act (VPA) claim is available against public bodies, and (2) whether violations of the child-abuse-reporting statutes give rise to statutory (private) liability.
The Oregon Supreme Court accepted certification, answered both questions, and declined to resolve potential common-law claims at this time.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a Vulnerable Person Act (ORS 124.100–124.140) claim can be brought against a public body	VPA creates a private right of action against persons who cause or permit abuse; where an employee committed that tort within scope, the public body should be liable	OTCA’s exclusive-remedy framework bars bringing ORS 124.100 claims directly against public bodies or their employees outside OTCA limits	VPA claims are ‘‘torts’’ under the OTCA; a public body may be sued under the OTCA for a VPA tort committed by an employee acting within scope, subject to OTCA limitations
Whether violations of Oregon’s mandatory child-abuse-reporting statutes (ORS 419B.005–.055) create a statutory private right of action	The reporting statutes impose mandatory duties on law enforcement; plaintiff urges an implied private right of action to enforce those duties	Legislature did not create an express private right; statutes’ immunity and penalty provisions suggest the legislature did not intend a separate private statutory remedy	Statutes plausibly imposed mandatory duties on responding law enforcement, but the legislature did not expressly or impliedly create a statutory private right of action to enforce the investigatory/notification duties governing law enforcement’s response to an existing report

Sherman v. Dept. of Human Services, 368 Or 403 (recognizes VPA and explains OTCA interaction)
Deckard v. Bunch, 358 Or 754 (framework for identifying statutory private rights of action)
Griffin v. Tri-Met, 318 Or 500 (statutory cause of action can be a "tort" under OTCA)
Scovill v. City of Astoria, 324 Or 159 (consideration of immunity and implied statutory liability in emergency-duty context)
Doyle v. City of Medford, 356 Or 336 (analysis of legislative intent for statutory liability)