DELAWARE CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plаintiff-Appellant -vs- DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees
Case Nos. 23 CAE 09 0055, 0056
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
April 23, 2024
2024-Ohio-1565
Hon. John W. Wise, P.J., Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J., Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. 23 CVF 060363, 060364; JUDGMENT: Affirmed
For Plaintiff-Appellant
MARK H. GILLIS
KELLEY A. GORRY
Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLC
5747 Perimeter Drive, Suite 150
Dublin, Ohio 43017
For Appellees BOR and Auditor
MICHAEL P. CAVANAUGH
Assistant County Prosecutor
145 North Union Street, 3rd Floor
P. O. Box 8006
Delaware, Ohio 43015
For Defendant-Appellee BNL OF Sawmill Pointe Holdings, LLC
JOSEPH R. DURHAM
ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON
Eastman & Smith LTD.
250 Civic Center Drive, Suite 280
Columbus, Ohio 43215
SCOTT A. JOHNSON
Eastman & Smith LTD.
One SeaGate, 27th Floor
550 N. Summit Street
Toledo, Ohio 43604
ANDREW C. CLARK
COLLEEN R. VANCE
SAMANTHA M. LEWIS
Onda LaBuhn Ernsberger & Boggs Co. LPA
35 North Fourth Street, Suite 100
Columbus, Ohio 43215
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Delaware City Schools Board of Education appeals the decision of the Delaware County Cоurt of Common Pleas dismissing its Complaints challenging the 2022 tax value of certain real property.
{¶2} Defendants-Appellees are Delaware County Auditor, Delaware County Board of Revision, and the following property owners: Parkwood Investors II, LLC, BNL OF Sawmill Pointe Holdings, LLC, Northport Place, LLC, and PSLC Enterprises, LLC.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶3} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:
{¶4} In 2022, Delaware City Schools Board of Education filed numerous original valuation Complaints with the Delaware County Board of Revision for tax year 2022, challenging the true value of certain real property and seeking an increase in the value of properties owned by the Property Owners Appellees herein.
{¶5} The Board of Revision did not hold a hearing on the Board of Education‘s Complaints and issued decisions dismissing thе Board of Education‘s complaints “due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction” for noncompliance with
{¶6} The Board of Education appealed these decisions to the Delaware County Common Pleas Court as an administrative appeal pursuant to
{¶7} Shortly after commencing its appeals to the Common Pleas Court, the Board of Education moved the court to stay its appeals based on an action pending before the Board of Tax Authority in a related appeal by a third-party taxpayer complainant, and a declaratory judgment action pursuant to
{¶9} The trial court denied Appellant‘s motions for a stay and granted the Property Owners’ mоtions to dismiss, finding that Appellant lacks statutory standing to file an appeal with the Common Pleas Court under
{¶10} Appellant Delaware City Schools Board of Education filed an appeal in each case with the following identical assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶11} “I. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
{¶12} “II. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN CITING JRB HOLDINGS, HAMER, AND NKANGINIEME AS SUPPORT FOR ITS HOLDING THAT
{¶13} “III. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A BOARD OF EDUCATION LACKED STATUTORY STANDING TO APPEAL PURSUANT TO
I., II., III.
{¶14} The issue before this Court is whether the Delaware County Common Pleas Court erred in holding that a board of education lacks statutory authority to appeal a
Statutory Background
{¶15} This appeal presents an issue of statutory construction occasioned by the passage of H.B.126, which took effect on July 21, 2022. H.B. 126 imposed severe restrictions on the participation of boards of education in ad valorem rеal property tax proceedings and enacted a series of new procedural and substantive requirements for boards of education filing valuation complaints. See
{¶16} Previously,
An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken to the board of tax appeals .... Such an appeal may be taken by the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by
section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints against valuations or assessments with the auditor.
{¶17} In its relevant part, the revisions to
An appeal from a decision of a county board of revisiоn may be taken to the board of tax appeals *** Such an appeal may be taken by the county
auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complаints again valuation or assessments with the auditor, except that a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint under that section with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.R.C. §5717.01 , amended by H.B. 126.
{¶18} It is undisputed that H.B. 126‘s elimination of a board of education‘s right to appeal to the BTA applies to boards of education filing “original complaints” and “cоunter complaints” as those terms are now defined by newly enacted
{¶19} It is also undisputed that H.B. 126 did not amend
{¶20} Appellant herein concedes that prior to the amendment of
Standing
{¶21} It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing to sue. Ohio Contractors Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994).
{¶22} “The right to аppeal an administrative decision is neither inherent nor inalienable; to the contrary, it must be conferred by statute.” Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177, 743 N.E.2d 894, 897 (2001), citing Roper v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Richfield Tp., Summit Cty., 173 Ohio St. 168, 173, 180 N.E.2d 591 (1962).
{¶23} “Because one cannot appeal an administrative order absent statutory аuthority, the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a case unless authority to appeal is granted by statute.” Alesi v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Commrs, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2013-12-123, CA2013-12-124, CA2013-12-127, CA2013-12-128, CA2013-12-131, and CA2013-12-132, 2014-Ohio-5192, 24 N.E.3d 667, ¶17. Therefore, standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite that cannot be waived. Id.
{¶24} “The burden of proof to establish standing lies with the party seeking to appeal and therefore that party must ensure that the record supports his or her claim of standing.” Safest Neighborhood Assn. v. Athens Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 12CA32 thru 12CA35, 2013-Ohio-5610, ¶ 20; Kurtock v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100266, 2014-Ohio-1836, ¶10; Alexis Entertainment, L.L.C. v. Toledo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1028, 2013-Ohio-3946, 2013 WL 5210309, ¶ 9, citing Kraus v. Put-In-Bay Tp. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-04-011, 2004-Ohio-4678, 2004 WL 1949428, ¶12.
{¶25} Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court is a question of law, which we review de novo. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 20, citing Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23.
Analysis
{¶26} Thе cardinal rule of statutory construction requires a court to first look at the specific language of the statute itself and, if the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, further interpretation is not necessary and a court must apply the statute as written. State v. Jordan, 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492, 733 N.E.2d 601 (2000), quoting Statе ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). Ambiguity exists only if the language of a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, and the facts and circumstances of a case do not permit a court to reаd ambiguity into a statute. Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16. ” ‘[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce the statute as written, making neither additions to the statute nor subtractions therefrom.’ ” State v. Knoble, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009359, 2008–Ohio–5004, ¶ 12, quoting Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002–Ohio–6718, ¶ 14. “Thus, inquiry into legislative intent,
{¶27} “It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that ‘the General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.’ ” State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347 (1997), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 479, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959); See also New Albany-Plain Local Schools Bd. of Education v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-732, 2023-Ohio-3806, 226 N.E.3d 1035, ¶ 35.
{¶28} As set forth above, revised
{¶29} We find no ambiguity in either
{¶30} Appellants concede that they no longer have a right to appeal to the BTA but argue instead that because of said changes, they now have a right to appeal to the common pleas сourt under
{¶31}
{¶33} “All statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read in pari materia, and construed together, so as to give the proper force and effect to each and all such statutes.” (Emphasis sic.) In re K.J., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1050, 2014-Ohio-3472, 2014 WL 3936867, ¶ 21, citing State v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 120, 2010-Ohio-6305, 942 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 45.
{¶34} Upon review, we find that the General Assembly expressed its intent to deny boards of education a right to appeal a decision of a board of revision by removing said right under
R.C. §2506.01
{¶35} Appellant herein argues that it now has a right to appeal under
{¶36}
{¶37} We look to the language of
(A) Except as otherwise provided in
sections 2506.05 to2506.08 of the Revised Code, and except as modified by this section andsections 2506.02 to2506.04 of the Revised Code, every final order, adjudication, or decisiоn of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission,department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is loсated as provided in Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.(B) The appeal provided in this section is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by law.
(C) As used in this chapter, “final order, adjudication, or decision” means an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person, but does not include any order, adjudication, or decision from which an appeal is granted by rule, ordinance, or statute to a higher administrative authority if a right to a hearing on such appeal is рrovided, or any order, adjudication, or decision that is issued preliminary to or as a result of a criminal proceeding.
{¶38} This Court recognizes that
{¶40} Rather, that authority must arise from another statutory provision. See also Hamer v. Danbury Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1210, 2020-Ohio-3209, 155 N.E.3d 218, ¶10 (“jurisdiction over an administrative appeal is improper unless granted by
{¶41}
A special statutоry provision which applies to a specific subject matter constitutes an exception to a general statutory provision covering
other subjects as well as the specific subject matter which might otherwise be included under the general provisiоn. (State, ex rel. Steller et al., Trustees, v. Zangerle, Aud., 100 Ohio St. 414, 126 N.E. 413, and paragraph one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Elliott Co., v. Connar, Supt., 123 Ohio St. 310, 175 N.E. 200, approved and followed.)
{¶42} See also Ruprecht v. City of Cincinnati, 64 Ohio App.2d 90, 92–93, 411 N.E.2d 504, 507 (1st Dist.1979).
{¶43} We further find that the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s holdings in Nuspl v. City of Akron and Anderson v. City of Akron, 61 Ohio St.3d 511, 575 N.E.2d 447 (1991), Sutherland–Wagner v. Brook Park Civil Service Commission, 32 Ohio St.3d 323, 512 N.E.2d 1170 (1987) and Walker v. Eastlake (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 273, 275, 400 N.E.2d 908, 909-910, provide that “an appeal is available from a final order of a commission of a political subdivision of the state unless another statute, enacted subsequent to the enactment of
{¶44} Here, we find that
{¶45} Having found Appellant is without standing to appeal pursuant to
By: Baldwin, J.
Wise, P. J., and
King, J., concur.