This action was commenced by appellant Edward Ruprecht who at the time was a Cincinnati police officer. He appealed a disciplinary action taken by the appointing authority to the Civil Service Commission of the city of Cincinnati. The Commission sustained the action of the ap
The appellate process was initiated January 25,1978, and on October 14, 1978, appеllant resigned from the Cincinnati Police Division. Under most circumstances this would require our dismissal of the case as being moot. However, there are exceptions tо this general rule, and we believe that the issues raised by appellees’ two assignments of error are of sufficient public interest and could conceivably involve the rights of several thousand police and firemen and the appointing authorities in this jurisdiction. We are adopting the reasoning of this court in the case of
Overesch
v.
Campbell
(1953),
“The trial court erred in ruling that a policeman [is] entitled to appeal the loss of five off days.”
R. C. 124.34 sets forth the conditions of tenure of public emplоyees and provides for appeals, in certain instances, to the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Common Pleas, as set forth procedurally in R. C. 119.12. The emplоyment rights of all public employees, including the rights of police and firemen, are limited by the statutory language. It should be noted, however, that police and firemen аre given special rights as distinguished from public employees generally. For example, public employees other than police and firemen may appeal an order of the appointing authority of a reduction in grade, a suspension of more than five working days or a removal from office to the Civil Service Commission or State Personnel Board of Review as is applicable. In the case of fire and police officers, there is no such limitation relating to suspension. They have a right tо appeal to the Civil Service Commission where any period of suspension or demotion or removal is ordered by the appointing authority.
The courts of this state have consistently held that civil service laws are rights created purely by statute, are in derogation of the common law employer-employee relationship, and cannot be extended by the application of common law principles. The statutes have been strictly construed. For example, in the case of
Anderson
v.
Minter
(1972),
“This creature of statute must be striсtly construed and since it affords the right of appeals in instances of ‘more than five working days,’ it must follow that the statute does not apply to this appellant.”
Apрlying these principles, we come then to what we consider to be the nub of the issue presented in the first assignment of error, i.e., does a disciplinary action ordering а loss of off days equate with or become synonymous with a suspension. We are of the opinion that there is a distinct difference. The statute does not provide a right of appeal for all disciplinary actions and, in the case at bar, appellant was not suspended or removed from the payroll but, rather, was ordered to forfeit off days. Given the clear pronouncements of strict interpretation, we are not inclined to expand the statutory limitations. The appellаnt was not suspended, demoted or removed from office and as a consequence he has no right of appeal under the statute. We find the first assignment of errоr to be well taken.
The second assignment of error urges that the trial court erred in ruling that a policeman has an independent right to appeal the loss of five off days under R. C. 2506.01. This court in Klosterman v. Payne, supra, at 4, spoke directly to the issue presented by the second assignment of error. In that case we said:
“R. C. 124.34 must be considered as a special statute specifically dealing with the suspension of civil service employees and their rights of appeal therefrom.”
R. C. 2506.01 is a general statute dealing with appеals from various bodies. Under such circumstances, R. C. 124.34 prevails and is exclusively applicable. We cite, in support of that reasoning, the first paragraph of the syllabus in the case
“A special statutory provision which applies to a specific subject matter constitutes an exception to a general statutory provision covering other subjects as well as the specific subject matter which might otherwise be included under the general provision. (State, ex rel. Steller et al., Trustees, v. Zangerle, And.,100 Ohio St., 414 , and paragraph one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Elliott Co., v. Connar, Supt.,123 Ohio St., 310 , approved and followed.)”
On the authority of Klosterman v. Payne, supra, we sustain the second assignment of error.
For the reasons given above we reverse the decision of the Court of Common Pleas to the extent that the appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled by that court. We therefore take that action which the court below should have taken under the authority of App. R. 12(B) and enter a final judgment for the appellees, granting their motion to dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Judgment reversed.