David BEHLMANN, Plaintiff--Appellant v. CENTURY SURETY COMPANY, Defendant--Appellee
No. 14-2786
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
July 24, 2015
Rehearing Denied Sept. 2, 2015
794 F.3d 960
Submitted: June 9, 2015
Finally, Huynh attempts to establish pretext “by showing that he was treated differently than other employees who were similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Austin v. Long, 779 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir.2015). He asserts that he was denied a transfer to another facility after he failed to certify, while seven of his white classmates were allowed to transfer even though thеy had also failed to certify. At “the pretext stage, the test for determining whether employees are similarly situated to a plaintiff is a rigorous one.” Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 956 (8th Cir.2012). That is, the “individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and еngaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Id.
Five of the seven putative comparators transferred through the Article 61 process which must be initiated by air traffic manager Nelson. Huynh asserts that Nelson treated him differently from other similarly situated white trainees by allowing them to proceed through that process but denying him the same opportunity. The record shows however that air traffic managers like Nelson determine whether to initiate the Article 61 process based on written training reports authored by a trainee‘s immediatе supervisors, and all five of the Article 61 transferees identified by Huynh “are not valid comparators because they had different immediate supervisors.” Bone, 686 F.3d at 956.
The two remaining putative comparators transferred through the ERR process, and Huynh admits that his supervisors did not control whethеr a receiving facility would accept such a transfer. The fact that “different decision makers are involved” in accepting each transfer through the ERR process is “strong evidence of noncomparability.” See Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir.1992). Huynh nevertheless argues that supervisor Santer wrote a recommendation letter for one of the two white comparators who then successfully secured an ERR transfer, but refused to write a similar letter for him. The summary judgment record indicates that recommendation letters are not required for ERR transfers and are not ordinarily рart of the ERR process. Furthermore, Santer‘s decision to write a letter for one trainee does not change the fact that each ERR transfer involves “different decision makers,” Jones, 973 F.2d at 676, and Huynh has not identified coworkers “who were similarly situated in all relevant respects.” See Austin, 779 F.3d at 525. This аrgument by Huynh thus fails, and we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the government because Huynh has not shown that the DOT‘s stated reason for firing him was a pretext for racial discrimination.
For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
After a car accident, David Behlmann sued his insurer, Century Surety Co., for underinsured motorist benefits. The jury found for Century. Behlmann requested a new trial, challenging the evidencе on the value of his medical treatment and the strike of the only African-American venireperson. The district court1 denied a new trial. Behlmann appeals. Having jurisdiction under
I.
Behlmann‘s car was hit by a car driven negligently by Craig Sheffer. Behlmann was billed $89,884.79 for medical treatment. To рay the bills, he needed $38,298.77 (due to insurance discounts/payments). Behlmann settled with Sheffer for $50,000, the limit of Sheffer‘s policy. Claiming injuries over $50,000, Behlmann sued Century for underinsured motorist benefits.
At trial, Century argued that Behlmann‘s medical treatment cost less than $50,000 and resulted from pre-existing conditions. Century introduced a stipulation of the amount billed to Behlmann ($89,884.79) and the amount needed to pay the bills ($38,298.77). The court admitted the stipulation under
The jury found for Century, denying Behlmann benefits. Behlmann requested a new trial based on the strike and the introduction of the amount needed to pay his bills. The district court denied a new trial.
II.
Behlmann seeks a new trial, claiming that the amount needed to pay his medical bills was improperly admitted under seсtion 490.715. This court reviews the denial of a new trial for a “clear abuse of discretion,” reversing only “to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Burris v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir.2015), considering
Section 490.715 generally bars the introduction of collateral-source evidence.
Behlmann argues subsection 5 applies only in tort actions and only when the tortfeasor is a plaintiff or defendant in the suit. See
Interpreting state statutes, this court applies that state‘s rules of stаtutory construction. See Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep‘t of Corr. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir.2009). In Missouri, the “primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the General Assembly‘s intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue. This Court looks to canons of statutory interpretation only when the meaning of a statute is ambiguous оr would lead to an illogical result that defeats the purpose of the legislation. This Court interprets statutes in a way that is not hyper-technical, but instead, is reasonable and logical and gives meaning to the statute.” Ben Hur Steel Worx, LLC v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Nothing in the statute limits it to tort actions. Section 490.715 appliеs to “all causes of action,” according to another section of the law enacting subsection 5. H.B. 393, § 2, 2005 Mo. Laws 655. See also H.B. 700, § 45, 1987 Mo. Laws 810, 812 (stating section 490.715, as originally passed, applies to “all causes of action“), codified at
In tort and non-tort actions, subsection 5 permits the introduction of evidence on the value of medical treatment only when that treatment resulted from the negligenсe of “any party.” Behlmann reads “party” to mean the plaintiff or defendant in the lawsuit. True, this is one definition of “party.” See Black‘s Law Dictionary 1297 (10th ed.2014) (providing as one definition of “party“: “One by or against whom a lawsuit is brought; anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the procеedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse judgment; litigant <a party to the lawsuit>“).
But the “reasonable and logical” interpretation of subsection 5 gives “party” a broader meaning. Century‘s liability is derivative of Sheffer‘s. The insurance policy limits damages to those Behlmann is “legally еntitled to recover as compensatory damages” from Sheffer. At trial, Behlmann had to prove Sheffer‘s negligence caused more than $50,000 in damages. See Jury Instruction 7-9 (defining negligence and explaining verdict must be for Behlmann if Sheffer‘s negligence caused damages in excеss of $50,000). See also Amato, 213 S.W.3d at 208 (“Under Missouri law, an insured is required to establish liability ... on the part of the other driver in order for the insured to be ‘legally entitled to collect’ and thus prevail on a claim for underinsured-motor-vehicle coverage.” (citing, e.g., Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 583 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. banc 1979))). Litigating Sheffer‘s liability, Century may raise the defenses Sheffer сould have raised--including introducing value-of-medical-treatment evidence under subsection 5. See Charles v. Consumers Ins., 371 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo.App.2012) (“In the uninsured-underinsured motorist context, when the insurer seeks intervention, it steps into the shoes of the alleged tortfeasor and assumes an adversarial position to that of the insured.“).
Behlmann‘s reading of the statute leads to unreasonable and illogical results. It gives Behlmann a greater recovery from Century than he would receive from Sheffer in a tort action. See Wendt v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo.App.1995) (en banc) (noting “the underlying purpose of underinsured motorist coverage--to place thе insureds in the position they would have been in had the tortfeasor been adequately insured“). Behlmann‘s reading also applies subsection 5 arbitrarily. For example, the statute would not apply here, but would apply had Century intervened if Behlmann had sued Sheffer. Cf. Charles, 371 S.W.3d at 898 (“[A]n uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier has an absolute right to intervene in a lawsuit brought by its policyholder against an uninsured or underinsured motorist.“). The statute also would apply if Century argued comparative fault (which it pled here but did not pursue at trial), since the negligence
The district court did not err in applying subsection 5 to admit the amount needed to pay Behlmann‘s bills.2
III.
Behlmann challenges the strike of Juror 4, an African American. The Equal Protection Clause оf the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits striking a juror solely on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Whether a strike is improper under Batson is a three-step inquiry:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.
Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 454 (8th Cir.2012), quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003). This court reviews a Batson ruling for clear error. Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.2009).
The district court, assuming a prima facie case, determined Century had race-neutral reasons for the strike. It conсluded Behlmann did not show purposeful discrimination. Behlmann, claiming Century‘s reasons are pretext for discrimination, contends the court erred at step three of the Batson analysis.
Century offers three reasons for the strike: (1) Juror 4 was a long-time autoworker; (2) he failed to disclose he was аn autoworker despite relevant questioning; and (3) he failed to disclose involvement in prior litigation.3 Behlmann argues each reason is pretextual.
First, he contends that Century never expressed concern about Juror 4‘s tenure as an autoworker. Century did not state specifically that it believed Juror 4‘s experience in the automobile industry would make him sympathetic to Behlmann. But during voir dire it explained, separately from the failures to disclose, that one reason for the strike was that Juror 4‘s “information sheet from the Court indicates he worked a long time as a retired auto worker.” This shows that Juror 4‘s tenure concerned Century.
Second, Behlmann disputes the court‘s characterization of Juror 4 as “not forthcoming” about being an autoworker. The court stated that “the most significant thing is there were a number of questions about asking people about their involvement with thе auto industry with auto
Third, Behlmann argues Juror 4‘s alleged failure to disclose involvement in other litigation is based on speculation. He claims Century did not confirm that a plaintiff in past asbestos litigation, with the same name as Juror 4, was actually Juror 4. Bеhlmann provides no reason to believe that the plaintiff was not Juror 4 and cites no failure in Century‘s apparently good-faith investigation. See id. at 859 (noting party challenging strike has “ultimate burden of establishing purposeful discrimination“).
The district court did not clearly err in denying Behlmann‘s Batson challеnge because Behlmann did not show Century‘s reasons for striking Juror 4 were pretext for purposeful racial discrimination.
The judgment is affirmed.
BENTON
CIRCUIT JUDGE