Thе Juvenile Justice Center appeals from a temporary or partial award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission in which it affirmed its administrative law judge’s decision that Lois Marston’s claim for compensation wаs not barred by the statute of limitations. Marston filed her claim after expiration of the limitation period set out in § 287.430. 1 Because the limitation period in this case is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, the commission erred in deciding that Marston’s claim could proceed. We reverse the commission’s award.
On September 10, 1995, Marston was employed at the Boone County Juvenile Justice Center when she allegedly sustained a work-related injury. Marston took sick leave and received treatment for depression. She waited until January 11, 1996, to tell her supervisor that she be *536 lieved that her injury was related to her job. The report of injury required by § 287.380 was timely filed with the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
Marston did not file a claim for compensation with the division until June 1, 1998, approximately two years and nine months after the date of alleged injury. On October 5, 1998, the Juvenile Justice Center filed an amеnded answer and asserted for the first time that the claim appeared to be “time-barred by Section 287.430, RSMo.”
On September 14, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Hannelore D. Fischer convened a hearing to determine whether or not thе statute of limitations barred the claim. She determined that the claim was not barred because the center did not establish that it filed its answer on time and, therefore, waived the affirmative defense. The center aрpealed that decision to the commission, which rendered a “temporary or partial award” affirming and adopting its ALJ’s decision. The center appealed to this court.
We have no jurisdiction in a workers’ сompensation case unless the General Assembly provides for it by statute.
Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corporation,
This is an appeal from a “temporary or partial” — rather than final — award and generally no appeal would lie from it.
Id.
A well-recognized exception, however, allows us to review the issue of liability when an employer claims that it is not liable for the payment of compensation.
Korte v. Fry-Wagner Moving & Storage Company,
The center argues that the commission erred in deciding that Marston’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because the record establishes that she filed her claim after the two-year period fоr doing so had expired. The center contends that Marston’s claim did not fall within any statutory exception and should be deemed barred.
Marston responds that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that the cеnter waived when it did not assert it in its answer. General authority supports this proposition.
2
See, e.g., Storage Masters-Chesterfield, L.L.C. v. City of Chesterfield,
*537
The parties, however, overlook a more basic issue: Is a statute of limitations that has expressly been made one of “extinction” simply an affirmative defense that can be waived, or is it jurisdictional and therefore non-waivable? In
Longhibler v. State,
Although we have cited
Longhibler
as firmly establishing the rule that statutes of limitations are non-jurisdictional and waivable,
Dice v. Darling,
Section 287.430 provides, “The statute of limitations contained in this section is one of extinction and not of repose.” A statute of repose eliminates a cause of action altogether after the passage of a prescribed period and without regard for whether or not a cause of action has accrued.
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc.,
The history of § 287.430 and its statutory predecessors provides cogent guidance as to what the General Assembly intended by “extinction.” In
Wentz v. Price Candy Company,
The limitation imposed in a certain class of statutes has been held to operate on the right rather than on the remedy. Courts have distinguished between ordinary statutes of limitation and statutes creating a right with a special limitation appended to the exercise of the right on the ground the special limitation extinguishes the right rather than extinguishing the remedy. “A wide distinction exists between statutes providing for a limitation upon the remedy, and special statutory limitations enacted in qualification of a given right. * ⅝ * The second class of statutes are more [than mere limitations on the remedy], for they create a right of aсtion condi *538 tioned upon its enforcement within a prescribed period, the theory being that the lawmaking body which has the power to create the right may affix the conditions under which it is to be enforced, so that a compliance with those conditions is essential. In other words, where time is made the essence of the right created, the limitation is an inherent part of the statute out of which the particular right arises, so that there is nо right of action whatsoever independent of the limitation, and a lapse of the statutory period operates to extinguish the right altogether. 37 C.J. 686.” Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Product,224 Mo.App. 304 ,25 S.W.2d 529 , 532. And see the discussion in Barker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co.,91 Mo. 86 ,14 S.W. 280 .
Id.
at 854 (brackets in original). Before 1943, the courts regarded the workers’ сompensation statute of limitations as operating to extinguish the statutory right itself, such that the time limitation was deemed jurisdictional.
See, e.g., Higgins v. Heine Boiler Company,
The
Wentz
court reached its holding by reasoning that “[n]owhere does the statute say the right of recovery shall be deemed extinguished if no claim is filed within the period. Nowhere does it pronounce such right a nullity under such circumstances.”
Id.
at 855.
See also Welborn v. Southern Equipment Company,
In 1980, the General Assembly added the extinction language that the
Wentz
court found lacking. Effective August 13, 1980, the legislature amended § 287.430 to say that the “[t]he statute of limitations ... is one of extinctiоn and not of repose.” When the General Assembly amends a statute, we presume that it was aware of the courts’ interpretation of the statute.
Kilbane v. Director of Department of Revenue,
The change made by the legislature indicates [its] intention to change the construction of the statute which Wentz held was one of repose. The statute as it currently reаds, defining itself as a statute of extinction, must have been intended by the legislature to extinguish not only the remedy but also the statutorily given right after a period of two years. It is, therefore, not merely procedural as a statutе of limitations ordinarily is, but is substantive as declaring the time period a condition upon the existence of the right.
The limitation in § 287.430 is substantive and jurisdictional rather .than procedural and waivable. As such, we hold that the commission’s jurisdiсtion is inextricably connected to the time limitation of § 287.430. The commission, therefore, cannot consider claims filed after the period expires.
One of the most fundamental tenets of administrative law is that an agency, such as the commission, has only such jurisdiction or authority as the Gen
*539
eral Assembly confers on it.
Carr v. North Kansas City Beverage Company,
The commission erred in deciding that Marston’s claim was not barred. Because we determine that the commission is without jurisdiction to consider Marston’s claim, we reverse the commission’s temporary or partial award.
Notes
. All citations to statutes refer to the 2000 Revised Statutes.
. Marston’s argument and the rule she would have apply are grounded in large part on the requirements of Rule 55.08. Marston cites several rules of civil procedure and alludes to others as controlling practice before the commission. Among her arguments, she asserts that the rules do not provide for the аssertion of the statute of limitations by an amended answer that was filed out of time and without motion for leave. Generally, however, the rules of civil procedure do not apply to workers’ compensation actions.
Elking v. Deaconess Hospital,
. We added the emphasis.