David Behlmann v. Century Surety Company
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12795
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Behlmann was injured in a car accident; billed $89,884.79 for medical care and needed $38,298.77 to pay those bills after discounts; he settled with the tortfeasor for $50,000 and sued his insurer, Century Surety, for underinsured-motorist (UIM) benefits claiming damages over $50,000.
- Century defended by arguing Behlmann’s medical treatment cost less than $50,000 and was partly from preexisting conditions; Century introduced a stipulation of both the billed amount and the $38,298.77 amount needed to pay the bills under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.715.5.
- During voir dire Century used a peremptory strike on Juror 4, the only African-American venireperson; Behlmann objected under Batson and later sought a new trial on that ground and on the admissibility of the $38,298.77 figure.
- The district court admitted the stipulated “amount needed to pay” under § 490.715.5 and denied Behlmann’s Batson challenge after concluding Century offered race-neutral reasons for the strike; the jury returned a verdict for Century.
- On appeal, Behlmann argued (1) § 490.715.5 does not apply to UIM contract actions that do not include the tortfeasor and therefore the “amount needed to pay” was inadmissible collateral-source evidence; and (2) Century impermissibly struck Juror 4 on account of race.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it held § 490.715.5 applies to UIM suits because the insurer’s liability is derivative of the tortfeasor’s negligence, and it found no clear error in the district court’s Batson analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of "amount needed to pay" medical bills under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.715.5 | § 490.715.5 is limited to tort actions where the tortfeasor is a party; in a contract UIM suit against an insurer the exception does not apply, so the amount is inadmissible collateral-source evidence | § 490.715.5 applies to "all causes of action" and to situations where insurer liability is derivative of a non-party tortfeasor; insurer effectively stands in the tortfeasor’s shoes so the exception applies | Affirmed — § 490.715.5 applies; district court did not abuse discretion in admitting the stipulated amount |
| Batson challenge to peremptory strike of sole African-American venireperson | The strike was racially motivated; Century’s proffered reasons are pretextual | Century offered race-neutral grounds: long auto-industry employment, failures to disclose auto work and prior litigation; these provide legitimate bases for the strike | Affirmed — no clear error; trial court reasonably credited Century’s race-neutral explanations |
Key Cases Cited
- Burris v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard for reviewing district court denial of new trial under Rule 59)
- Minn. Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2006) (federal review of state statutory interpretation uses state construction rules)
- Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536 (Mo. banc 2010) (discussing § 490.715 as codification of the collateral-source rule)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishes three-step test prohibiting race-based peremptory strikes)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (Batson framework and credibility evaluation guidance)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (deference to trial court credibility/demeanor determinations in Batson analyses)