Daniels v. StateDaniels v. State
A Muscogee County jury found Kevonta Daniels guilty of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Kenneth Moore; the aggravated assaults of Jai Williams, Jamal Williams, and James Williams; the theft of vehicles belonging to Jamal Williams, Marcus Jones, and Alvin Walker; and other offenses. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Daniels argues on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting statements he made to the police into evidence at trial. Daniels, who was 14 years old at the time of the crimes and when he was interviewed by the police, specifically argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights before speaking with the police and that his statements should also have been excluded
Moore returned home while Daniels and Render were still inside, and he was shot twice, once in the abdomen and once in the shoulder. Daniels later told Devin Burden that both he and Render fired shots at Moore. Around 10:30 a.m., police officers responded to a 911 call. They found Moore inside his house injured from gunshot
Moore spent 13 days in the hospital, underwent two surgeries, and eventually died on January 1, 2018. The medical examiner determined that Moore‘s death was caused by a series of blood clots in his lower extremities resulting from his two gunshot wounds and that the manner of death was homicide.
At some point, Daniels gave Jones‘s truck to Burden, who knew that it had been stolen. On December 21, 2017, the truck was found by the police.
On December 24, Alvin Walker went outside to start his 2004 Acura MDX at his home on Muriel Street. After starting the car, Walker went inside for about three minutes, leaving his car unlocked and unattended. While Walker was inside, Daniels got into the running Acura and drove it away. When Walker came back outside, the Acura was gone. Later that night, Walker saw someone drive the Acura by his house.
The next day, December 25, Jamal Williams drove to his parents’ house on Dirk Way. After he arrived, Jamal left his Buick
Inside the house, Jamal‘s father, James Williams, grabbed his gun and James, Jamal, and Jamal‘s brother, Jai Williams, went after the Buick in James‘s car. They followed the Buick to Belvedere Park.
When they saw the Williamses approaching, Render and Burden drove away in the stolen Acura to retrieve weapons. Daniels fired a shot which shattered the glass of James‘s car and hit Jamal. James and Jai fired multiple shots back at Daniels. Jai recovered the Buick after the shootout and drove it back to James‘s house.
The Columbus police recovered Walker‘s Acura a few days later. Inside the Acura, officers recovered a Charter Arms .38-caliber revolver. There was also a shell casing on the floorboard. Although the Williamses stated that no shots had been fired at them from the
Daniels was arrested at his home around 9:45 a.m. on January 11, 2018, and was taken to a Columbus police station. Through the use of an advice-of-rights form designed specifically for juveniles, Daniels was given Miranda warnings2 by Detective Jason Carden at 11:40 a.m.3 Detective Carden then interviewed Daniels regarding some vehicle break-ins unrelated to this case.4 When Detective Carden concluded his questioning, Investigator Ray Harralson asked Daniels about the thefts of a Toyota Tacoma and an Acura and some other thefts unrelated to this case. Investigator Harralson testified at trial that Daniels confessed to being involved in the
At some point that afternoon, Daniels was moved to a different
(a) Daniels first argues that his statements to the police should have been excluded because the officers who arrested and interviewed him did not comply with
A person taking an alleged delinquent child into custody, with all reasonable speed and without first taking such child elsewhere, shall . . . [b]ring such child immediately before the juvenile court or promptly contact a juvenile court intake officer.
a law enforcement officer may detain an alleged delinquent child for a reasonable period of time sufficient
to conduct interrogations and perform routine law enforcement procedures including but not limited to fingerprinting, photographing, and the preparation of any necessary records.
Daniels argues that his detention for questioning violated these provisions of the Juvenile Code because he was not brought before a juvenile court until the next day.
Daniels did not object to the admission of his incriminating statements on this basis at trial. He did so for the first time in his amended motion for new trial. Thus, his claim is subject to review on appeal only for “plain error[] affecting substantial rights.”
First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant‘s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327 (3) (781 SE2d 772) (2016).
Although the application of the exception set forth in
Daniels also asserted in his amended motion for new trial and in his brief before this Court that he was first brought before the juvenile court at 1:30 p.m. on January 12, the day after his
For these reasons, Daniels cannot show that the trial court made a clear and obvious error by not excluding his statements at trial due to a violation of the Juvenile Code. Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.
(b) (i) Daniels also argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights before making the incriminating statements and that they should have been excluded by the trial court under the test set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). We see no error in the trial court‘s admission of these statements on that basis.
In evaluating whether a juvenile defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights during an interrogation, the State bears the burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that the juvenile understood and waived his rights under the totality of the circumstances[.]
(Punctuation omitted.) Bedford v. State, 311 Ga. 329, 334 (3) (857 SE2d 708) (2021). We have said that courts are to consider nine factors in making that determination:
(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends[,] or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether [or not] the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.
Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 85 (2) (849 SE2d 425) (2020) (citing Riley, 237 Ga. at 128).9
(ii) On Daniels‘s motion, the trial court held two Jackson-Denno hearings10 regarding the admissibility of Daniels‘s statements to the police. According to the evidence presented in the
Following his arrest, Daniels gave a series of interviews with several detectives that day. At the hearing, Detective Odom testified that he assisted another detective with the investigation of the home
Detective Odom testified that he was trying to build a “rapport” with Daniels and that he made no threats, promises, or offers of rewards and gave no hope of benefit or inducements to get Daniels to speak with him. In the interview, Daniels first told Detective Odom that he had nothing to do with the burglary at Curry Street and then suggested that some other people had been involved. Detective Odom said that he did not believe Daniels and explained that he had evidence that Daniels and Render were involved in the Curry Street burglary. Detective Odom then told Daniels that he should “think about” his mother and whether, if someone burglarized her house, he would want that person to tell the truth about what happened. After that exchange, Daniels admitted that he was involved in the burglary but accused Render of shooting Moore. Detective Odom then told Daniels that Moore had died. Daniels said that the burglary was a “random lick.” He and Detective Odom then discussed what Daniels and Render did with the proceeds of the robbery.
At the conclusion of the first Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court ruled from the bench that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Daniels‘s statements to Detective Odom were made after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, noting specifically that it had considered “the mode, method, duration, manner, and conditions of interrogation, the defendant‘s educational level, and the evidentiary record that Mr. Daniels has chosen to provide.” Based on that determination, the court ruled that, subject to other objections, Daniels‘s incriminating statements
The next day, following the presentation of the State‘s first two witnesses, the trial court held a second Jackson-Denno hearing. In that hearing, Detective Carden was called to testify, and a video recording of Detective Carden advising Daniels of his constitutional rights and completing an advice-of-rights form was played for the trial court. The advice-of-rights form was admitted into evidence at the hearing. Detective Carden began interviewing Daniels around 11:40 a.m. on January 11, 2018, and he spoke with Daniels for about 20 minutes. Detective Carden testified that Daniels did not appear to be under the influence of any substances at the time and did not appear to be confused about what was happening when Detective Carden advised him of his rights. Detective Carden testified that he did not threaten, coerce, or force Daniels to make any statements and that he did not make any offers of rewards or inducements to him. Detective Carden testified that he never told Daniels he would
When Detective Carden began interviewing Daniels, two other detectives were in the room, but one of them left following the giving of the Miranda warnings.13 Detective Carden informed Daniels that each of the detectives had charges against him that they wanted to discuss and showed him folders containing several arrest warrants. Daniels indicated that he was 14 years old and was in the ninth grade at the time of the interview. Detective Carden asked Daniels if he had problems reading or writing, and Daniels said he did not.
After the advisement of rights, Detective Carden explained to Daniels that he could help himself by being truthful and then explained to Daniels that although he had “a lot of charges” he could be “exceptionally cleared.” Detective Carden explained to Daniels that “exceptionally cleared” is when the police find a person who is
Daniels interrupted Detective Carden‘s explanation and said, “So what you‘re saying is, ‘If I help you, you help me.‘” Detective Carden replied, “Yes, that‘s what I‘m saying.” Detective Carden then explained that “near every detective up here” had cases on Daniels. Detective Carden next asked Daniels about a number of vehicle break-ins that were unrelated to this case. As Detective Carden was wrapping up his questioning, he said, “That pretty much clears up my entering autos.” Daniels then said, “Like we said, if I help you, you help me.” Detective Carden replied,
Yes, sir, we will. You‘re not going to get charged with breaking into any cars at these other two apartment complexes. The stuff I‘ve got charged on you now, that‘s
there. We‘ll help you out with that in court. We‘ll make our recommendation to the district attorney, and all that stuff. OK. That‘s gonna be my case. Between me and her we‘ll talk about it, and we‘ll figure out something for you. But any of this stuff you‘ve been telling us about this stuff you‘ve been doing, I have no qualms — I‘m not gonna charge you with it.
Detective Carden then asked Daniels about some other thefts unrelated to this case. Detective Harralson was present during that questioning and, as Detective Carden was leaving the room, began questioning Daniels about the theft of a Toyota Tacoma and an Acura and other thefts unrelated to this case.
At the Jackson-Denno hearing, Detective Carden testified that “[e]xceptionally cleared is when we just choose to not prosecute on certain cases due to the number of property crimes.” Detective Carden further testified that the police sometimes “have people confess to 30 or 40 [crimes]. And we exceptionally clear some of them and move forward with the rest of them.” Detective Carden later stated that this discussion with Daniels was a way of asking Daniels
Detective Carden further testified as follows. When Daniels was arrested, “pretty much the entire burglary and theft unit,” or “roughly nine detectives,” came to Daniels‘s house because they were looking for several people at the time in connection with a series of property crimes. Detective Carden approached the house in a “ready position,” meaning that his weapon was drawn but not necessarily pointed at anyone. Daniels was called out of one of the back bedrooms of the house, was eventually handcuffed, and was then transported to a police station. Detective Carden testified that officers are required to feed suspects and give them bathroom breaks when they are being held for questioning.
At the close of the second Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial
Daniels again challenged the admissibility of his statements in his amended motion for new trial, which he filed through new counsel. There, Daniels argued that additional evidence about the interrogations that came out at trial, including the fact that Daniels was interrogated by as many as six investigators or detectives throughout the day on January 11, showed that Daniels‘s waiver of his rights was not knowing and voluntary.15
(iii) On appeal, Daniels again argues that the trial court erred by not outlining specific findings as to the Riley factors in its verbal rulings and in its order denying Daniels‘s motion for new trial. However,
we generally do not require trial courts to make specific, on-the-record findings about each aspect of the totality of
the circumstances they evaluate or to make explicit factual findings or credibility determinations on the record. Indeed, unless clearly erroneous, a trial court‘s credibility determinations and factual findings relating to the admissibility of a confession, whether explicit or implicit, must be upheld on appeal, although we independently apply the law to the facts.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lester, 310 Ga. at 86 (2). So long as the record is “sufficient to support the court‘s conclusion that [the] defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and that his statements were properly admitted at trial under the Riley test,” the trial court need not detail its application of the Riley factors. (Citation omitted.) Id.
Here, despite Daniels‘s contention to the contrary, it is clear from the record of the Jackson-Denno hearings, the hearing on Daniels‘s motion for new trial, and the trial court‘s order denying that motion that the trial court was aware of and considered the Riley factors in making its determination. See Bedford, 311 Ga. at 334-335 (3). Daniels‘s Jackson-Denno motion cited Riley, and Daniels‘s trial counsel and the prosecutor outlined the State‘s burden of proof and the nine Riley factors for the trial court during
(iv) Daniels also argues at length that the trial court misapplied the Riley factors in reaching its conclusion that his statements were admissible. We disagree.
Reviewing the nine Riley factors in order, we first note that the record shows that Daniels was 14 years old when he was interviewed by the police (the interviews took place the day before Daniels‘s fifteenth birthday).16 During his interviews, Daniels told the police
Daniels was given the Miranda warnings twice on January 11 through the use, both times, of an advice-of-rights form designed specifically for juveniles. Both times, he waived his rights by signing the form and answered questions from the officers. Daniels was also advised by Detective Carden at the outset of the interview that he was being questioned in regard to a series of vehicle thefts and break-ins and eventually admitted to Investigators Harralson and Austin that he had been involved in the thefts of a Toyota Tacoma, an Acura, and a Buick, as well as a shootout in Belvedere Park. Similarly, when Detective Odom began questioning Daniels, he advised him that he wanted to know about the break-in at Moore‘s house that culminated in Moore‘s shooting.
Daniels notes that his mother was not present for his
Daniels also asserts that the environment of his questioning was intimidating and threatening. The record shows that Daniels was arrested at his home by a team of officers (at least one of whom had his gun drawn), but the interviews began one to two hours later at the police station and were conducted by officers who were not displaying weapons while questioning him. As noted above, Daniels was questioned by multiple officers in a series of interviews the
The record shows that Detective Carden and Investigators Harralson and Austin interviewed Daniels from 11:40 a.m. until about 1:20 p.m. At some point that afternoon, he was moved to a different interview room at the police station and was interviewed by Detective Odom from 3:25 to 4:00 p.m. The record shows that he then spoke with Detective Carden and Investigators Harralson and Austin in the interview room. Daniels was speaking with Investigator Harralson just before 5:00 p.m. when the recording ended. Although our cases do not suggest that there is a limit on the amount of time for which a juvenile can be questioned, we have noted that an interview was “relatively lengthy” where the juvenile suspect was questioned for two-and-a-half hours and held in an interrogation room for more than four hours. Oubre v. Woldemichael, 301 Ga. 299, 305 (2) (a) (800 SE2d 518) (2017).
According to Daniels‘s mother, he called her “an hour or two”
There is no evidence in the record that Daniels had ever previously refused to voluntarily give a statement to the police or that he ever repudiated the statements he made to the police in this case. See Love, 309 Ga. at 838 (2). Daniels asserts on appeal that entering a plea of not guilty constituted a repudiation of his statements, but we reject that assertion. See Norris, 282 Ga. at 432 (2) (noting that defendant, who pled not guilty, did not recant confession until trial).
Daniels also asserts that the police officers made promises to him in exchange for his statements. First, as to the statement allegedly made by one of the officers that Daniels would be allowed to “come home” if he cooperated with the police, Daniels‘s mother testified that an officer, whom she could not identify, said this to her during Daniels‘s arrest while Daniels was standing a few feet away. But it is not clear that Daniels heard or understood this comment,
We turn next to statements made to Daniels during his interviews at the police station. Detective Carden made several statements to Daniels about being “exceptionally cleared” if Daniels told the truth about “property” crimes Daniels had been involved in. Detective Carden also told Daniels that he would help Daniels with the charges Daniels faced if Daniels told the truth. It was after these statements by Detective Carden that Daniels made inculpatory statements to Investigators Harralson and Austin regarding the
While Detective Carden‘s statements suggested to Daniels that his cooperation and truthfulness regarding the uncharged “property” crimes he had been involved in would result in Daniels being charged with fewer crimes, and thus may have constituted a “hope of benefit” under Georgia law, see
Thus, although some factors weigh against the trial court‘s ultimate determination that Daniels‘s statements were admissible
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Nahmias, C.J., Boggs, P.J., and Warren, J., who concur specially as to Division 2 (b).
I join Divisions 1 and 2 (a) of the Court‘s opinion in full. As for Division 2 (b), in which the Court upholds the trial court‘s ruling that Daniels voluntarily waived his Miranda rights under the special Miranda-waiver test for juvenile defendants set forth in this Court‘s Riley decision, I have doubts about how a trial court is to make, and an appellate court is to review, a ruling based on a nine-factor, totality-of-the-circumstances test.21 Applying that test as best
As discussed in footnote 19 of the Court‘s opinion, Daniels has challenged the admissibility of his statements based on a claim regarding the voluntariness of his waiver of Miranda rights, rather than a claim regarding the voluntariness of his actual statements under the Constitution (like the claim made in Oubre) or, even more conspicuously, under Georgia‘s statute rendering inadmissible confessions that are “induced by . . . the slightest hope of benefit,”
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Boggs and Justice Warren join in this special concurrence.
Notes
Burden‘s case was severed from those of the other co-defendants, and he testified as a witness for the State. It appears that he later entered guilty pleas as to Counts 7 through 12. His case is not part of this appeal.
Daniels, Clayton, and Render were tried before a jury from June 17 to June 27, 2019. As to Daniels, Clayton, and Render, the trial court entered a directed verdict of not guilty as to Count 4. The jury found Daniels not guilty of Count 1 and guilty of Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14. Clayton was tried only as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 and found not guilty of each count. The jury found Render not guilty of Counts 1 and 6 but guilty of Counts 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 15. Clayton and Render‘s cases are not part of this appeal.
On August 26, 2019, the trial court sentenced Daniels to life in prison on Count 2; 20 years in prison on Count 8, to be served consecutively to Count 2; ten years in prison on Count 6, to be served concurrently with Count 8; 20 years in prison on Count 9, to be served concurrently with Count 8; 20 years in prison on Count 10, to be served concurrently with Count 9; ten years in prison on Count 12, to be served concurrently with Count 8; five years in prison on Count 13, to be served consecutively to Count 2; and ten years in prison on Count 14, to be served concurrently with Count 10. The trial court merged Counts 3 and 5 into Count 2 for sentencing. The State has not challenged this purported merger, and we decline to address it sua sponte. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696-698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017).
Daniels filed a motion for new trial on June 29, 2019, which he amended through new counsel on November 12, 2020. Following a hearing on December 16, 2020, the trial court denied Daniels‘s motion for new trial, as amended, on February 19, 2021. Daniels filed a notice of appeal on March 3, 2021. His case was docketed to this Court‘s August 2021 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
Detective Carden testified that his investigation involved break-ins that are not part of this case.Exceptionally cleared is when we have somebody say they‘re charged with breaking into, say a hundred cars. We don‘t charge them with all of them. We just charge them with the most serious ones, the entering autos. And basically if they confess to it and they cooperate, we don‘t charge them with all of them. We just charge them with a few of them.
We have suggested that the statute and the Riley test are intertwined such that a violation of the statute weighs strongly toward exclusion of the statements under Riley. See Oubre, 301 Ga. at 306-307 (2) (a). However, although Oubre indicated that the use of aggressive interrogation methods, including providing a hope of benefit, may be the “most significant[]” factor in the Riley analysis, Oubre, 301 Ga. at 306, it did so while considering the Riley factors in the context of a federal due process analysis, rather than whether the juvenile defendant had voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, which is at issue in this appeal.
Moreover, with regard to whether a defendant‘s inculpatory statement (rather than his waiver of his right against self-incrimination) was made voluntarily,
A similar distinction applies in the context of determining whether a juvenile defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda and Riley. Where, as Daniels did in this appeal, a juvenile defendant argues only that a custodial statement should be excluded under the federal constitutional requirements of Miranda and Riley, the court can consider whether the police provided a hope of benefit that induced his confession. Whether the police used aggressive interrogation methods, including providing a hope of benefit, is only one of the many factors that the courts consider under Riley. And as we have stated, no one factor is necessarily determinative in the Riley analysis.