Bedford v. StateBedford v. State
Million Bedford and Yaheed Brooks were tried together and convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Johnny Jackson.1 On appeal, they each contend
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed that the appellants’ co-indictees, Shauntequia Bell, Emily Prescott, and Sanantonio Young, devised a
On April 8, 2017, Bell texted Jackson that she would come over that evening. Jackson‘s ex-wife testified that Jackson was intoxicated that day, and his neighbors testified that he canceled their plans to have a fish fry because he said that he would be hosting a female guest. Bell, Prescott, and Young arrived at Jackson‘s house after 7:00 p.m. Bell testified that she went inside while Young and Prescott remained in Young‘s car. Around 7:50 p.m., Jackson and Bell drove Jackson‘s truck to a nearby convenience store. While inside the store, Bell advised Prescott and Young via text message to begin robbing Jackson‘s house, but when Bell and Jackson returned to Jackson‘s house, Young and Prescott were neither inside the house nor waiting outside.
Instead, Young and Prescott were headed to Statesboro where
Bell testified that while she was with Jackson in the bedroom, Young texted her that the robbery was about to occur and that she should distract Jackson. After searching for money, Bedford, Brooks, and Prescott went into the bedroom, where Bedford pulled out a gun. Surprised, Jackson asked who they were and what they were doing in his house, and Brooks told Bedford to hit Jackson with
Jackson‘s neighbor testified that she heard loud booms coming from Jackson‘s house between 9:15 and 9:20 p.m., and about five minutes later, she saw a car that matched the description of Young‘s car speed off from where it had been parked. Bell and Prescott testified that the five split the money they stole, which was between four and five hundred dollars. Young, Bedford, and Brooks dropped off Bell and Prescott at their shared apartment. Jackson‘s son discovered his father‘s body the next day with four gunshot wounds and injuries to his face from blunt force trauma.2
On appeal, a criminal defendant is no longer presumed innocent, and we review whether the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “Under this review, we must put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.” Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450, 452-53 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Under
Prescott testified that she, Young, and Bell devised a plan to rob Jackson. On the evening of the crimes, she and Young dropped off Bell at Jackson‘s house, picked up Bedford and Brooks, and drove them to Jackson‘s house, where she, Bedford, and Brooks entered to search for money. After they went into Jackson‘s bedroom to ask
Although we do not condone the prosecutor‘s statements, which were not based on the evidence presented at trial, it is not necessary to resolve whether the trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial. Because Bedford and Brooks moved for a mistrial after, not
3. Separately, Bedford contends that the trial court erred by improperly considering his prior juvenile record in determining whether his pretrial statement in this case, made when he was 16 years old, could be admitted at trial under Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). However, any error in inquiring about the juvenile record was harmless because the trial court
About five weeks after the shooting, Bedford‘s aunt, a probation officer, dropped Bedford off at a police station, where he was interviewed by two GBI agents. The agent went through a Miranda3 waiver form with Bedford, asked him about the night of Jackson‘s murder, and informed him of the warrant issued for his arrest for the murder. The agent testified that Bedford was not in distress or injured during the interview, which was less than an hour long, and that he appeared to understand the questions asked. Bedford did not ask for anyone to be present during the interview until, at its conclusion, he invoked his right to an attorney.
Bedford filed a motion to suppress his statements from this interview on the grounds that the statements were not knowingly and voluntarily made. At the hearing on the motion, Bedford‘s counsel advised the trial court of the nine-factor test under Riley for evaluating whether a juvenile defendant knowingly and voluntarily
In evaluating whether a juvenile defendant knowingly and
(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.
Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 85 (2) (849 SE2d 425) (2020) (citing Riley, 237 Ga. at 128). Although we independently apply the law to the facts, the trial court‘s determinations and factual findings must be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 86 (2).
Even if the trial court improperly probed into Bedford‘s juvenile history, this inquiry was harmless because the trial court
4. Separately, Brooks asserts that he was denied a fair trial when a GBI agent improperly bolstered Young‘s credibility by commenting twice on the truth of Young‘s prior statements. But because Brooks did not object to the detective‘s testimony at trial,4 this issue was not preserved for ordinary appellate review and
Young changed his story multiple times throughout the investigation and trial, alternatively naming as the shooters unidentified people, as well as Bedford and Brooks, and also taking the blame himself. At trial, when defense counsel cross-examined the GBI agent who interviewed Young, counsel suggested that Young only told the story implicating Bedford and Brooks and minimized his own involvement because he hoped to obtain a favorable plea deal. In response, the GBI agent said:
Um, . . . he was telling more of the truth at that time based off of the corroboration of the . . . other witnesses. . . . [W]e never went back and told the young ladies exactly what he said. We had them to regurgitate what they knew at that time. And the last interview that we had with him on
May 24th his story was very consistent with the girls‘. We didn‘t tell him what the girls said . . . . [T]hey flowed and it was corroborated with like, say, for instance, money being needed to go get the gas, having to have cash, things of that nature just was consistent with the interview. It was -- the truth stays very similar.
(emphasis supplied). On appeal, Brooks argues that the GBI agent‘s two references to “the truth” of Young‘s prior statements constituted improper bolstering.
Starting with the second reference to “the truth,” the State contends, and we agree, that, in context, the testimony did not speak directly to Young‘s truthfulness. Rather, it addressed whether Young‘s statements were consistent with other evidence and established that from an investigative standpoint, statements consistent with other evidence are generally considered more accurate. Thus, that reference did not constitute improper bolstering, and there was no plain error in admitting that testimony. See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 460-61 (2) (b) (807 SE2d 369) (2017) (statement that “in interviewing suspects, oftentimes ‘it‘ll take several hours to get to the actual ultimate truth‘” was not bolstering
In contrast, the State does not contest that the first reference to “the truth” improperly bolstered the credibility of Young‘s prior statements. However, even assuming that the trial court clearly erred by permitting the testimony, Brooks must also meet the other prongs of the plain error test to obtain relief, and that he cannot do. Young‘s pretrial statements that Bedford and Brooks were responsible for shooting Jackson were cumulative of strong, independent evidence of their guilt from Prescott and Bell‘s testimony. Under these circumstances, because it was unlikely that the GBI agent‘s comment on the truthfulness of Young‘s prior statements affected the outcome of the trial, we conclude that the
5. Finally, Brooks asserts that the trial court erred in not permitting him to add claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to his motion for new trial. Brooks‘s trial counsel filed a bare-bones motion for new trial, which was amended by motion-for-new-trial counsel. At the hearing on the amended motion, Brooks‘s trial counsel was called to testify, but when the court asked Brooks‘s new counsel whether there were any claims of trial counsel‘s ineffective
On February 17, motion-for-new-trial counsel emailed the trial court and requested that the court reconsider its denial of Brooks‘s motion for new trial “and/or” permit her to file, and then immediately deny, a supplement to the motion for new trial raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel as an additional ground. Counsel acknowledged that she had declined to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, but in her email, she stated, “I myself was ineffective for failing to raise this issue and would argue it against myself if the law permitted me to do so.” On February 20, she filed a motion seeking leave to supplement the motion for new trial to add the ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, attaching a supplement explaining why trial counsel was allegedly ineffective.
On March 3, the trial judge responded to motion-for-new-trial counsel by email and told her that she needed to file a motion for
(a) First, Brooks argues that the trial court erred by not ordering an evidentiary hearing in response to Brooks‘s motion seeking leave to supplement his motion for new trial because, until a notice of appeal was filed, the trial court still had jurisdiction to allow amendments to the motion for new trial, despite its prior denial of the motion. Although Brooks is correct that the trial court retained jurisdiction over the case at that time, see Hood v. State, 295 Ga. 664, 664 (763 SE2d 487) (2014), the trial‘s court continuing jurisdiction does not answer whether Brooks was entitled to supplement his motion for new trial at that time. We conclude that
(b) Brooks further asserts that his motion for leave was in substance a motion to reconsider or vacate because it “put the court on notice as to the problem, the remedy sought, and the court‘s obligation to afford appellant a hearing and due process as a result thereof,” and therefore the trial court erred in not ruling on it. As an
(c) Next, Brooks argues that he did not waive his claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because his failure to raise his trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness was due to the ineffective
Although Brooks argues that his motion-for-new-trial counsel‘s ineffective assistance precluded him from asserting the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a claim alleging the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel must not be “merely a camouflaged claim of ineffectiveness by trial counsel.” Elkins v. State, 306 Ga. 351, 362 (4) (c) (830 SE2d 217) (2019). Although Brooks has raised his motion-for-new-trial counsel‘s ineffective
we do not allow a defendant to resuscitate a specific claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that was not raised at the motion-for-new-trial stage by recasting the claim on appeal as one of ineffective assistance of motion-for-new-trial counsel for failing to raise the specific claim of trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness. Indulging such bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest practicable moment and would promote serial appellate proceedings. If Appellant wishes to pursue a claim that his motion-for-new-trial counsel was ineffective in this regard, he must do so through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 362 (4) (b) (cleaned up).
Therefore, we discern no error by the trial court in not permitting Brooks to amend his motion for new trial to add claims of ineffective assistance of counsel after denying the motion for new trial, even though Brooks asserts that motion-for-new-trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise those claims in a timely fashion.5
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both Bedford‘s and Brooks‘s convictions.
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.