Love v. StateLove v. State
Antavian Love was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Enrique Trejo.1 On appeal, Love, who was 16 years old at the time the crimes were committed, asserts that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement and in sentencing him as a juvenile to serve life without parole. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, the record shows that Trejo was the general manager at the El Charro restaurant located on Covington Bypass Road in Newton County. When he did not return home on the evening of June 18, 2016, his wife went to the restaurant looking for him. The restaurant‘s surveillance cameras showed Trejo locking up the restaurant, entering his vehicle, and driving away as usual around 11:30 p.m. Police also obtained surveillance video from a nearby gas station that showed Trejo pull into the parking lot and enter the store. When he exited, three individuals got into his vehicle with him.
Early on the morning of June 19, a driver reported what appeared to be a body lying on the side of Lower River Road. When officers responded, they observed broken safety glass, consistent with that from a car window, in the roadway. A trail of blood led from the broken glass to the side of the rоad where Trejo was lying face down in a ditch, dead from multiple gunshot wounds. Officers also located a spent .40-caliber Smith & Wesson casing on the other
Around 9:00 p.m. that evening, a Covington Police Department officer observed a dark-colored Ford Expedition at an intersection and attempted to catch up with it. The vehicle continued at a high rate of speed, but the officer was eventually able to get close enough to run the tag and confirm that it was Trejo‘s stolen vehicle. After the officer activated his lights and sirens, the vehicle continued through a neighborhood, running through stop signs, until it reached a dead end, where the vehicle‘s four occupants fled on foot. The officer attempted to pursue them through the woods while directing backup. He then received a call that another officer had detained two individuals, including Love, at gunpoint on the other side of the woods.
After informing Love of his rights under Miranda,2 officers
interviewed
C. M., who was 12 years old at the time of the incident, testified
1. Love does not dispute the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Love guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).3
“Even where, as here, a juvenile is involved, the question of whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding a police interrogation.” Heard v. State, 287 Ga. 554, 556 (2) (697 SE2d 811) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 675 (2) (653 SE2d 23) (2007) (“Even assuming that OCGA § [15-11-501] was violated by the failure to contact a parent or guardian, there is no automatic exclusion of a juvenile‘s statement if the parent is not separately advised; instead
the accused‘s age and education; his knowledge of the charge and his constitutional rights; his ability to consult with family, friends, or an attorney; the length, method, and time of the interrogation; and whether he previously had refused to give a statеment or repudiated the statement later.
Norris v. State, 282 Ga. 430, 431 (2) (651 SE2d 40) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Moreover, “[i]n reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the trial court‘s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo[,] . . . constru[ing] the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s factual findings and judgment.” White v. State, 307 Ga. 601, 602 (2) (837 SE2d 838) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted). In addition, we will generally limit our consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court. See id.
to the other juvenile during the ride,6 the officer could not make out their conversation, only hearing Love laugh at times.
Two Newton County Sheriff‘s Office investigators interviewed Love at approximately 11:15 p.m. after advising him of his rights using a form designed for juveniles that included the right to have a parent or guardian present. The interview, which lasted just under one hour, was recorded, and the recording showed that Love stated that he understood and initialed next to each right before signing the waiver-of-rights form. He did not ask for his mother to be present, nor did he invoke his rights to remain silent or to have an attorney. At the beginning of the interview, Love indicated that he thought he was there for a curfew violation, which the investigators did not initially correct. However, 16 minutes into the interview, officers told Love he was under investigatiоn for murder and
Love also testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing and claimed that he asked both the initial detaining officers and the transporting officer to call his mother, and each time, he was told they would make it happen. He also claimed that while he was waiting to be escorted to the interview room, he again asked for his mother to be
After independently reviewing the audio and video recording of Love‘s interview and considering the testimony offered at the Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court credited the testimony of the officers over Love‘s and specifically found that Love was informed of the right to have a parent present but did not invoke that right. In denying the motion, the trial court also found that Love, after knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights under Miranda, provided his statement to law enforcement without the slightest hope of benefit or fear of injury.9
The trial court was also authorized to reject Love‘s claim that he was not aware of the charges on which he was being detained.
Thus, under the totality of the cirсumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Love knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and in denying the motion to suppress. See Allen, 283 Ga. at 306 (2) (b) (trial court did not err in finding 16-year-old knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights
3. Love also asserts that the trial court erred in sеntencing him to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole because the evidence did not support a finding that Love was irreparably corrupt. We are not persuaded.
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (II) (132 SCt 2455, 183 LE2d 407) (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that in considering whether to sentence a juvenile convicted of murder to life without parole consistent with the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the trial court must “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” The Court specifically noted the following characteristics of children:
First, children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their families and peers; they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child‘s character is not as well-formed as an adult‘s; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.
Id. at 471 (II) (citations and punctuation omitted). The Court subsequently explained that a sentence of life without parole “is excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___ (III) (136 SCt 718, 193 LE2d 599) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). Relying on Miller and Montgomery, this Court held in Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 701-03 (5) (d) (784 SE2d 403) (2016), that in order to ensure that principles of proportionality are satisfied under the Eighth Amendment, a trial court must make a “distinct determination on the record” that the defendant is an “exceptionally rare” juvenile who is “irreparably corrupt” or “whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” before imposing a sentence of life without parole (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted).10
Here, the State presented the following evidence in aggravation at the sentencing hearing. In September 2014, Love was adjudicated delinquent for committing aggravated battery after breaking another child‘s jaw and knocking him unconscious. In 2015, Love was adjudicated delinquent for committing burglary
After confessing to the shooting in this case, Love laughed at Trejo‘s accent and joked that the smell of Trejo‘s uniform made him hungry and that “bro could take some bullets.” And after he was convicted of murder, Love was involved in a jail fight in which he was the primary aggressor. When guards ordered Love to the ground, he ignored the command and continued striking his cellmate until guards subdued him with a Taser. Love‘s educationаl records revealed that he lied to a teacher about entering the girl‘s restroom, faked having a gun and ordered everyone to get down to
At the conclusion of the hearing and in its lengthy order denying Love‘s motion for new trial, the trial court stated that it considered the sentence in light of Miller, Montgomery, and Veal and recognized that children are constitutionally different from adults because of a child‘s diminished culрability and greater prospects for reform. The trial court also explained that it was mindful that whether a juvenile should be subject to such a sentence turns on whether he is irreparably corrupt, exhibiting such irreparable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible. The trial court then noted Love‘s school records showing a history of incidents involving physical violence and his juvenile record showing a criminal propensity that had accelerated, including after his conviction in this case, despite regulаr supervision and visits by a juvenile probation officer, community service, and family counseling with his mother.
With respect to the circumstances of the underlying crimes, the
We conclude that the record evidence the trial court carefully
4. Love also argues that, although Georgia law currently permits a juvenile to be sentenced to life without the possibility of
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (III) (B) (130 SCt 2011, 176 LE2d 825) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted), and Love has pointed to certain states, foreign laws, and international treaties and customs that do not impose life without parole sentences for juveniles, the Supreme Court has nevertheless permitted courts to sentence juveniles who have committed homicide to life without parole, subject to a determination by the sentencing court that the juvenile is “irreparably corrupt.” See Montgomery, 577 U.S. ___; Miller, 567 U.S. 460. We see no reason to depart from that precedent.
Moreover, although Love claims that a number of states and the District of Columbia have banned life sentences without the possibility of parole fоr juvenile offenders,
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J., not participating.
Decided September 28, 2020.
Murder. Newton Superior Court. Before Judge Ozburn.
Jason Kang, for appellant.
Layla H. Zon, District Attornеy; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Alex M. Bernick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.