DAKOTA, MINNESOTA & EASTERN RAILROAD d/b/a Canadian Pacific, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR LOUISA COUNTY, Defendant.
No. 15-1456
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Filed June 30, 2017
895 N.W.2d 127
HECHT, Justice.
William Scott Power of Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Engberg & Helling, P.L.C., Burlington, for defendant.
HECHT, Justice.
An injunction was issued by judgment in 1977 against the owner of a railroad right-of-way directing it to reconstruct a dike designed to channel creek water under the railroad‘s bridge and away from adjacent farmland. Nearly forty years later, a drainage district that was joined as a defendant in the earlier litigation asked the district court to hold a subsequent purchaser of the right-of-way in contempt for willfully violating the injunction. The district court found the subsequent purchaser in contempt for failing to reconstruct and maintain the dike. In this certiorari proceeding, we must determine whether a 1977 judgment granting an injunction of unspecified duration against a former owner of the right-of-way is enforceable nearly forty years later through a contempt action against a subsequent purchaser. Because we conclude the 1977 judgment expired under
A. Whiskey Creek and Bridge 110.
Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad (DM & E) purchased the railroad right-of-way and bridge that is the subject of this dispute in 2008. Initially owned by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad (CRI & P), the right-of-way runs in a generally east-west direction through Muscatine and Louisa Counties in Eastern Iowa. In 1872, CRI & P built a bridge in Louisa County, referred to in the record as Bridge 110,1 to allow the railroad tracks to pass over Whiskey Creek,2 a natural stream flowing east from the Mississippi River bluffs, along the northern edge of the right-of-way, past Bridge 110, and into the Muscatine Slough.3 At times in the past, a dike turned the creek water under Bridge 110 and across farmland to the south until it drained into the Muscatine Slough.
B. The Drainage Problem.
In the 145 years since Bridge 110 was constructed, the creek water has not consistently passed under the bridge and drained to the south. Whiskey Creek “has a steep grade” as it leaves the bluffs. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, 163 Iowa 283, 285, 143 N.W. 1083, 1084 (1913). Especially during heavy rains, it carries significant quantities of sediment and debris that plug the channel under Bridge 110, causing water to flood and damage fields north of the bridge. In addition, the dike constructed to direct water under the bridge has repeatedly failed, causing water and debris to move parallel to the bridge, instead of under it, until it eventually drained into the slough.
Silt and debris flowing through Whiskey Creek are deposited in the Muscatine Slough, inhibiting the flow of water into and through that waterway. Over the course of a season or occasionally after a single substantial rain, the silt and debris plug the Muscatine Slough, causing water to flood and damage crops in fields north of the plugs. The drainage district has repeatedly cleared the plugs and enabled the water to again empty into the slough.4
C. Prior Drainage Litigation.
The responsibility for maintaining drainage in the vicinity of Bridge 110 and the surrounding area within the drainage district has been a subject of recurring litigation for more than a century. In 1907, CRI & P closed the channel under Bridge 110, which had
1. 1911 injunction. In 1911, CRI & P filed an action against landowners on both sides of the bridge, seeking a declaration that CRI & P was no longer obligated to maintain the flow of water under Bridge 110 because the natural flow of Whiskey Creek had changed.5 Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, No. 6304, at *2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 1911). The district court ruled against CRI & P, determining the natural flow of Whiskey Creek remained through the railroad‘s right-of-way and to the south under Bridge 110. Id. The district court ordered CRI & P and the landowner to the south of the railroad‘s right-of-way to promptly,
remove from the old bed of said creek on their respective lands all obstructions to the natural flow of the water down and through [Bridge 110], and [directed they] shall not further or hereafter permit upon their respective properties such conditions of obstruction to exist[] and [shall] take such steps and perform such acts as will in a proper manner provide against the further or future diversion from its natural channel [under Bridge 110].
Id. at *3. We affirmed the district court‘s decision, but modified it to allow CRI & P and the owner of the land south of the bridge ninety days to remove the obstructions to the free flow of water through their properties. Lynch, 163 Iowa at 289-90, 143 N.W. at 1086.
2. 1922 covenant restriction. In 1922, Lynch—the owner of land situated northwest of the railroad‘s right-of-way—conveyed land to CRI & P to be used for the fortification of the dike directing water under the railroad‘s bridge. The deed from Lynch to CRI & P included the following conditional language:
This Deed made on the further condition that [CRI & P] will at all times protect and compensate the Grantor, M.F. Lynch, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns for failure to reasonably maintain a channel of sufficient capacity to give free flow to the water under the ordinary conditions, and to be of no less capacity than the channel of Whiskey Hollow Creek immediately above and below where said Creek channel enters and leaves the property of [CRI & P].
CRI & P maintained the course of Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110 for several decades thereafter by maintaining the dike that turned the flow south and under the bridge, raising the elevation of the rails, and repeatedly dredging the creek bed southeast of Bridge 110. The dike occasionally ruptured, however, and in 1973, CRI & P stopped repairing it.
3. 1976 judgment. Another lawsuit—cause no. 14926—was commenced in 1973. The plaintiffs, the Downers and the Baars, who owned property northwest of Bridge 110 sued Dutton, the owner of land on the north and south side of the railroad right-of-way. The plaintiffs alleged Dutton had built a dike south of Bridge 110 and redirected the flow of Whiskey Creek across
In late 1976, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court concluded the railroad‘s right-of-way impeded the natural flow of water to the south and east according to the laws of gravitation, and instead redirected it to the north and east along the right-of-way. The court determined the railroad, by constructing an elevated right-of-way, assumed an obligation “not to obstruct the free passage of surface water.” This obligation, the court concluded, requires a passageway that is “reasonably sufficient for the passage of water[,] taking into consideration” that “[t]he creek has always carried silt, sand, mud, trees, stumps and limbs” and “has always had a tendency to fill with silt and sand.” The court further concluded CRI & P had a duty to construct opportunities at reasonable intervals for the water to cross its right-of-way, meaning “more bridges [may be] required.”6 Noting that Lynch, the Downers’ and Baars’ predecessor-in-interest, had conveyed real estate to CRI & P on the condition it be used for the construction of a dike, the court concluded the plaintiffs were “entitled to an injunction against CRI & P restraining it from continuing to allow the flowage of Whiskey Creek upon plaintiffs’ land and requiring it to reconstruct its collapsed dike so as to channel the creek under bridge 110.” The court also concluded the plaintiffs were “entitled to a prescriptive easement for the flow of Whiskey Creek under bridge 110.”
In early 1977, the court entered judgment against CRI & P enjoining it “from continuing to allow the flowage of Whiskey Creek upon plaintiffs’ land” and requiring it “to reconstruct the collapsed dike in order to channel the Creek under Bridge 110.” The court also granted the plaintiffs “a prescriptive easement for the flow of Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110.”
D. 1984 Contempt Proceeding Against Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (Milwaukee Road).
After the entry of the 1977 judgment, CRI & P began to rebuild the dike. The structure washed out again, however, before the project was completed. Meanwhile, CRI & P filed a bankruptcy petition, and in 1982 ownership of the railroad right-of-way was transferred to the Milwaukee Road.
In 1984, the drainage district filed an application in cause no. 14926—the court file in which the 1976 judgment was rendered—asking the district court to find the Milwaukee Road in contempt for failing to
E. Acquisition by DM & E.
Soon after it was rebuilt by the Milwaukee Road, the dike failed yet again. Ownership of the railroad right-of-way was transferred several times thereafter. The dike had not yet been rebuilt when the Iowa, Chicago, and Eastern Railroad Company (IC & E) took ownership in 2002. During the period of IC & E‘s ownership, counsel for the trustees of the drainage district corresponded with IC & E, notifying it of the injunctions entered against prior owners of the right-of-way. The correspondence also communicated the drainage district‘s view that the dike was not functional and urged prompt repairs to restore the flow of the creek, consistent with the 1977 injunction. When DM & E acquired ownership of the railroad right-of-way and Bridge 110 in December 2008 through a merger with IC & E, the dike was still in disrepair and the drainage problem in the vicinity of the bridge had not been solved.
Communications continued between DM & E, the drainage district trustees, and affected property owners about the dike‘s condition of disrepair and the persistent disruption of drainage across the railroad right-of-way. DM & E retained an engineering consultant to recommend design alternatives for redirecting and maintaining the flow of Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110. The consultant generated a report proposing three redesign alternatives in December 2010; however, DM & E did not undertake remediation, and more litigation ensued.
F. Application for Order to Show Cause.
On February 25, 2013, the drainage district initiated this proceeding against DM & E—again in cause no. 14926. The drainage district‘s application asserted the 1977 judgment imposed upon DM & E “a continuing obligation to keep the collapsed dike adjacent to Bridge 110 in good and proper repair.” The drainage district alleged DM & E was a “successor” to the Milwaukee Road with actual or constructive knowledge of “its continuing obligation to channel Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110” and urged the court to order the railroad to “take immediate action in compliance with the [1977] order requiring [DM & E] to keep the collapsed dike adjacent to Bridge 110 in good and proper repair” and “assess fines and/or orders” deterring DM & E from future noncompliance. The district court issued a rule to show cause ordering DM & E to appear before the court and demonstrate “wh[y] [it] should not be held in contempt.”
DM & E filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, contending a civil action, rather than a summary contempt proceeding, “is the proper means of establishing the legal rights and responsibilities related to a decades-old railroad bridge and a dike that washed out many years ago.” DM & E raised several other arguments in support of its motion, including that (1) the 1977 judgment was against CRI & P, a different railroad and named party; (2) DM & E was not a party to the action in which the injunction was issued and is not a corporate successor of the enjoined railroad; (3) the 1977 district court decision appears in the court‘s records as a “judgment entry” and was described as a judgment in the 1984 contempt citation; (4) the
On September 30 and October 1, 2014, the court held a hearing on the application for rule to show cause. In an order filed July 31, 2015, the district court found DM & E was in contempt for violating the injunction granted by the 1977 judgment against a prior owner of the right-of-way, CRI & P. The court determined DM & E was under a legal duty to comply with the 1977 judgment enjoining CRI & P because DM & E is a successor in interest to CRI & P and the Milwaukee Road, because DM & E stands in privity with the prior owners of the right-of-way, and because DM & E had actual notice of the 1977 judgment and injunction well before the rule-to-show-cause proceeding was commenced. The court found DM & E in contempt because it concluded the drainage district had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that DM & E willfully failed to reconstruct the collapsed dike, channel Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110, and prevent Whiskey Creek from flowing onto the property of adjacent private landowners. The court ordered DM & E to file a plan for purging itself of contempt by September 4, 2015.
G. Subsequent History.
DM & E filed an application for interlocutory review and alternatively a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the district court‘s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order finding contempt. We granted certiorari review and stayed further proceedings below. See
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
“Although there is no statutory right to appeal from an order to punish for contempt, the proceeding may, in the proper case, be reviewed by certiorari.” In re Inspection of Titan Tire, 637 N.W.2d 115, 131 (Iowa 2001). We review a certiorari action for correction of errors at law because it is an action at law. Id. Under this standard, we accept the district court‘s well-supported factual findings as binding but give no deference to its legal conclusions. State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 886 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 2016).
III. Analysis.
Among other arguments, DM & E asserts that under
A. Background Principles.
The power to grant and enforce injunctive relief is inherent in the constitutionally vested equitable jurisdiction of a district court but may also arise by statute. See
At equity, a permanent injunction could last in perpetuity, “so long as the conditions which produce the injunction remain” in effect. Condura Constr. Co. v. Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL, 8 Wis. 2d 541, 99 N.W.2d 751, 755 (1959). The duration of a permanent injunction, however, may also be subject to time limits imposed by court order or statute. See, e.g.,
B. Iowa Code Section 614.1(6) .
DM & E asserts that
When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the legislature‘s intent. See Exceptional Persons, Inc. v. Iowa Dep‘t of Human Servs., 878 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 2016). In so doing, we interpret what the legislature said, not “what it should or might have said.”
C. Discussion.
We turn first to the question of whether an application to show cause used to enforce an injunction initiates an “action” under
The decision-making process initiated by an application to show cause constitutes an “action” because it is a procedural means for seeking redress from a court that has previously ordered the remedy sought and thus a “proceeding” within the plain-meaning of the word. See
At common law, contempt proceedings were either criminal or civil. Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa 1986). Criminal contempt was an “[o]ffense[] against the dignity or process of the court, whether committed in or out of the presence of the court.” Knox v. Mun. Ct., 185 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Iowa 1971). Civil contempt was an “[o]ffense[] against the party for whose benefit a court order was made.” Id. Under early Iowa law, civil contempt was a proceeding of a special character, meaning the procedural rules that applied to civil actions also applied to contempt proceedings in the absence of specific statutory requirements to the contrary. Kramer v. Rebman, 9 Iowa 114, 118 (1859) (citing
Thus, we conclude the decision-making process initiated by an application to show cause is an “action” under the Iowa Code and subject to any relevant limitations periods in
The 1977 judgment underlying this contempt action was entered by the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, a court of record. See Marsh, 219 Iowa at 684, 259 N.W. at 226. It constitutes a “final pronouncement which adjudicate[d] and determine[d] the issues in the case and define[d] and settle[d] the rights and interests of the parties so far as they relate to the subject-matter of the controversy.” Van Gorden, 192 Iowa at 858, 185 N.W. at 606. This contempt action seeks judicial enforcement of an injunction granted in that judgment. Thus, this action is one that is founded on a judgment entered by a court of record.
Finally, we must assess whether this contempt proceeding qualifies for a “specially declared” exception under
We conclude the drainage district‘s application for order to show cause filed in February 2013 was an action seeking enforcement of the judgment entered in 1977. It was therefore an action subject to the twenty-year statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments under
Our conclusion is not inconsistent with our determination in Bear that an injunction is enforceable in a contempt proceeding thirteen years later if the order creating the injunction did not limit its duration. Bear, 540 N.W.2d at 441-42. That case concerned the scope of our equitable authority to enforce an injunction that was well within the twenty-year statutory period to enforce judgments. See id. Our statements in that case suggesting a permanent injunction is not limited by the passage of time are correct statements of the principles of equity that govern injunctions, see id. at 441, but they are subject, of course, to limitations imposed by statute, see Ney, 891 N.W.2d at 450-51 (noting that statutory requirements supersede equitable requirements). Because the statute of limitations on judgments was not at issue in Bear, our reasoning in that case is not inconsistent with our holding today.
We acknowledge that an Illinois court has decided a similar issue differently. In People ex rel. Illinois State Dental Society v. Norris, the court rejected an argument that a writ of injunction lapsed under a statute of limitations on judgments, stating,
On appeal the defendant first argues that the 1968 writ of injunction lapsed and became unenforceable because the injunction judgment had not been renewed by the plaintiffs through scire facias or other proceedings within seven years of its issuance. The defendant further contends that since the injunction expired prior to November of 1976, he should not have been subjected to contempt proceedings for acts allegedly committed in November and December of that year. We disagree. An injunction remains in full force and effect until it has been vacated or modified by the court which granted it or until the order or decree awarding it has been set aside on appeal. Such a decree or order must be obeyed, even if erroneous, until it is overturned or modified by orderly processes of review. An injunction can be modified or dissolved when the court finds that the law has changed or that equity no longer justifies a continuance of the injunction.
Id. at 1168 (citations omitted). Because we believe our statutory framework requires a different outcome, we do not find the Illinois court‘s decision persuasive.
“Limitation periods for causes of action are legislative pronouncements of policy barring actions for various policy reasons regardless of the merit of the action.” Hamilton, 661 N.W.2d at 842. Limitations statutes’
represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that “the right to be free of stale claims in time
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)). The Iowa legislature has expressly constrained the duration of judgments by prescribing that “[a]ctions may be brought within the times herein limited . . . and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared.” See
IV. Conclusion.
The contempt proceeding in this case was an untimely action brought by the drainage district to enforce the 1977 judgment. Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of this appeal, we do not discuss or decide the other issues raised and argued on appeal. Accordingly, we sustain the writ and vacate the contempt order against DM & E.
WRIT SUSTAINED; CONTEMPT ORDER VACATED.