Patrick Alan NEY, Appellant, v. John Glenn NEY, Appellee.
No. 16-1323
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Filed March 10, 2017
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Hecht and Zager, JJ., who take no part.
Joseph L. Fitzgibbons and Matthew T.E. Early of Fitzgibbons Law Firm, L.L.C., Estherville, for appellee.
HECHT, Justice.
Two brothers stipulated to the entry of an order enjoining them from having con-
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Patrick Alan Ney and John Glenn Ney are brothers with an acrimonious relationship. In April 2012, Patrick filed a “Petition for Injunctive Relief” seeking a temporary injunction against John. The petition alleged that John had a history of assaulting Patrick, trespassing on his property, and harassing him and his family. Patrick alleged he had requested law enforcement‘s help multiple times to no avail. The petition further alleged John had recently broken into Patrick‘s house while drunk but fled before law enforcement arrived.1 In support of his claim for a temporary injunction, Patrick alleged the ongoing harassment by John caused irreparable damage that law enforcement officers had not been able to prevent. The prayer for relief requested John be prohibited from entering Patrick‘s property or threatening, assaulting, stalking, molesting, attacking, harassing, or communicating with Patrick and his family.
On June 25, 2012, the parties entered into a “Stipulation and Agreement” asking the court to incorporate the terms of their agreement in an order for injunctive relief. The parties agreed they would,
- Not threaten, аssault, stalk, molest, attack, harass, or otherwise abuse one another;
- Stay away from each other‘s residences and not be in each other[‘]s presence except in a courtroom during court hearings;
- Not communicate with each other in person or through any means including third persons [except].... through legal counsel;
- Not communicate with any mеmber of each other[‘]s family[,] [including] spouses, children, grandchildren, and in-laws.
The district court approved the terms of the agreement and issued an order (2012 order) on the same day incorporating the terms of the stipulated agreement and directing that “[t]he parties shall have no further communication with one another.”
On March 30, 2016, Patrick filed an “Application for Cоntempt of Court” alleging John had intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly violated the court‘s 2012 order. In an attached affidavit, Patrick urged the court to find John in contempt of the order because on four separate occasions, John engaged in “abusive contact” against Patrick and his family, including one instance in which John “threatened to pull his firearm out.”
The district сourt found it had personal and subject matter jurisdiction and issued an order to show cause on March 31, 2016. John filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, asserting the 2012 order was void and unenforceable because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the injunction.
In July 2016, after conducting an unrecorded telephonic hearing and reviewing
Patrick filed a notice of appeal on August 4, 2016. We retained the appeal to decide whether the district court erred in concluding the 2012 order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Standards of Review.
We review a district court‘s ruling on subject matter jurisdiction for correction of errors at law. Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Iowa 2013); see also
III. Analysis.
A. The Court‘s Equitable Jurisdiction. We first consider whether the district court had equitable jurisdiction under the Iowa Constitution to grant injunctive relief under the circumstances presented here. The first clause of article V, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution vests district courts with legal and equitable jurisdiction and provides that those jurisdictions “shall be distinct and separate.”
The court‘s equitable jurisdiction is recognized and implemented by the
Petitions for injunctive relief generally invoke the court‘s equitable jurisdiction. See Sear v. Clayton Cty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 590 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa 1999). They may invoke the court‘s statutory jurisdiction, however, if the general assembly has “impose[d] a duty to grant an injunction by specifying conditions in a statute.” Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., 621 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 2001). “When this is done, the conditions
A court exercising equitable jurisdiction generally has the power to identify the relevant equities and fashion an appropriate remedy. See In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 1995). Yet courts of equity are cautious in granting injunctive relief. See Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 122. Generally, a party seeking an injunction must prove “(1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial injury or dаmages will result unless the request for an injunction is granted; and (3) that there is [not another] adequate [means of protection] available.” Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515.
Under the first prong, a party seeking an injunction must prove intervention is necessary to protect rights cognizable in equity that have been invaded or threatened with invasion. In re Langholz, 887 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Iowa 2016); Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 123. We have previously recognized personal interests suсh as freedom from harassment and stalking as rights cognizable in equity and eligible for protection through injunctive relief upon proper proof. See Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597, 605 (Iowa 2003) (affirming injunctive relief restraining former friend from harassing the plaintiff); see also Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 123 (affirming permanent injunction enjoining former boyfriend from stalking and harassing the plaintiff).3
It is also well-established that “a court of equity might properly intervеne and grant a remedy by way of injunction to prevent repetition of [a] trespass, and to stop the unwarranted interference of plaintiff‘s right to the use and possession of his own property” rather than continually “require the plaintiff to continue to institute an action of forcible entry and detainer to remove the defendant from the premises.” Usailis v. Jasper, 222 Iowa 1360, 1363, 271 N.W. 524, 526 (1937); see also Hall v. Henninger, 145 Iowa 230, 237-38, 121 N.W. 6, 8-9 (1909).
Under the seсond prong, a district court generally may not issue an injunction unless substantial injury will result from the invasion of the right or if substantial injury is to be reasonably apprehended to result from a threatened invasion of the right. Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 122. “Before granting an injunction, the court should carefully weigh the relative hardship which would be suffered by the enjoined party upon awarding injunctive relief.” Id.; see also Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515.
The third prong requires a party seeking an injunction to prove there is not another adequate means of protection available. See Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515. This limiting principle teaches that an injunction can only issue if the available legal remedies are inadequate to avoid the substantial injury. Berry Seed Co. v. Hutchings, 247 Iowa 417, 422, 74 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1956); see also Martin v. Beaver,
We conclude the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief enjoining Patrick and John from entering each other‘s property or otherwise contacting each other. As noted above, the court‘s pоwer to issue the injunction was incident to its equitable jurisdiction. See Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515.
Although the injunction was issued within a consent judgment, it was still within the district court‘s equitable jurisdiction. See World Teacher Seminar, Inc. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 N.W.2d 173, 176-77 (Iowa 1987) (upholding injunctive relief that “dispose[d] of the controverted issues within the litigation“).4 When an injunction is issued pursuant to a consent judgment, the relevant inquiry is “whether the provisions upon which the parties have agreed constitute an appropriate and legally approved method of disposing of the contested issues in the litigation.” Id. at 176. “It is not necessary in order to uphold the validity of a consent decree that the solutions therein contained be those the court itself would have adopted if it were adjudicating the controversy.” Id.
Here, Patrick pled a prima facie cаse for an injunction in his petition for injunctive relief; John consented to the imposition of Patrick‘s requested injunctive relief; and the district court granted the requested relief by issuing a consent judgment. Thus, the district court properly issued the injunction in this case.
In his 2012 petition for injunctive relief, Patrick alleged John violated his personal right to be free from harassment and physical аssault and his property right to be free from trespass. As we noted above, the personal right to be free from harassment and physical assault and the property right to be free from trespass are both rights cognizable in equity, and a
Patrick also claimed a substantial injury under the second prong of our analysis. His petition for injunctive relief claimed John had grabbed Patrick by the throat, physically assaulted him, repeatedly trespassed, threatened the plaintiff and his family, invaded Patrick‘s home while drunk, and harassed Patrick and his family. Because these injuries alleged by Patrick were significant, extensive, and ongoing, we conclude they were substantial and satisfied the second prong of the analytical framework for the exercise of the court‘s equitable jurisdiction.
Finally, Patrick‘s 2012 petition asserted the absence of an аdequate remedy at law under the third prong of our analytical framework. Despite the previous involvement of law enforcement officers responding to Patrick‘s complaints, John persisted in his troublesome actions, thus evidencing that the general deterrence provided by our criminal laws was not adequate to protect Patrick. Moreover, had Pаtrick separately litigated each of John‘s torts, it would have resulted in “a multiplicity of suits or interminable litigation.” Martin, 238 Iowa at 1148, 29 N.W.2d at 558. Thus, there was a sufficient basis to conclude Patrick lacked an adequate remedy at law for John‘s conduct. Accordingly, we conclude the third prong of our analytical framework was also satisfied when the 2012 consent order was entered.
The district cоurt had equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in the 2012 order. Because Patrick pled a prima facie case for an injunction and John stipulated to the imposition of the requested injunctive relief, the district court had authority to grant injunctive relief through a consent judgment.
B. Effect of Section 664A.2(2). We next turn to the question of whether
This distinction is important because although a statute cannot deprive a court of its constitutionally granted subject matter jurisdiction, it can affect the jurisdiction of the case by prescribing specific parameters of the court‘s authority to rule on particular types of matters. See Max 100 L.C., 621 N.W.2d at 181 (“[T]he legislature may impose a duty tо grant an injunction by specifying conditions [under which an injunction must be granted] in a statute. When this is done, the conditions specified in the statute supersede the traditional equitable requirements.” (Citation omitted.)); see also Mensch v. Netty, 408 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa 1987) (“[C]ourts of equity are bound by statutes and follow the law in absence of fraud or mistake.“). Further, while parties cannot waive the
In this case,
[1] a protective order issued pursuant to chapter 232, [2] a court order or court-approved consent agreement entered pursuant to chapter 236, including a valid foreign protective order under section 236.19, subsection 3, [3] a temporary оr permanent protective order or order to vacate the homestead under chapter 598, or [4] an order that establishes conditions of release or is a protective order or sentencing order in a criminal prosecution arising from a domestic abuse assault under section 708.2A, or [5] a civil injunction issued pursuant to section 915.22.
Notably, the civil contexts in the definition of “protective order” are the same ones listed in
When a party requests a protective order under Iowa Code chapters 232, 236, 598, and 915, the district court is bound to follow the statutory framework established in chаpter 664A. See Max 100 L.C., 621 N.W.2d at 181 (noting “conditions specified in [a] statute supersede the traditional equitable requirements“). But this case does not involve a protective order issued under any of those Code chapters. Accordingly,
C. Conclusion. We conclude the 2012 order was within the district court‘s equitable jurisdictiоn. The district court erred in concluding
REVERSED AND REMANDED.