Blomdahl v. Blomdahl

[un]willing Aсcordingly, or unable to case. “unusually we conclude the trial Wolff finding proved by control his behavior.” court’s the State clear and convincing evidence Wolff has serious disagreed with Dr. Dr. Riedel difficulty controlling his behavior is not conclusion Wolff has serious dif- Sullivan’s clearly erroneous. ficulty controlling opined his behavior. He your is “much more like common Wolff IV ... than he is a sex offender who

criminal 25- [N.D.C.C. meets the standards affirm [¶ 15] We the trial court’s order 03.3-01(8) that, even He testified ].” denying petition Wolffs for discharge and though “very good Wolff is not at control- continuing his a sexually commitment as behaviors, ling” his antisocial he has shown dangerous individual. ability in controlling

reasonable his sexual Accordingly, WALLE, behavior. Dr. Riedel con- GERALD W. VANDE C.J., CROTHERS, likely cluded is not to re-offend if DANIEL J. DALE Wolff V. court, however, reject- SANDSTROM, released. The trial and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., opinion, explaining Dr. Riedel’s ed concur.

although Dr. Riedel tested exten- Wolff

sively, adequately he did not consider actual behavior and lack of prog-

Wolffs

ress in sex offender treatment. give great 14] We deference to

[¶ credibility

trial court’s determinations of expert ‍‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‍weight witnesses and the to be 2011 ND 78 A.O., given testimony. their v. Whelan BLOMDAHL, E. Plaintiff ¶ 26, 5, 2011 ND 471. We Appellee consistently have held the trial court credibility best evaluator cases of con flicting testimony and have refused to sec Mary BLOMDAHL, Ellen Defendant ond-guess credibility its determination. Appellant.

See, e.g., Hanenberg, Matter No. 20100053. ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d 62. We have further ex that a plained permis choice between two Supreme Court of North Dakota. weight views of sible evidence is April 2011. A.M., clearly erroneous. Matter of 163, 21, ND Dr. 787 N.W.2d 752. testimony supports Sullivan’s the trial finding difficulty

court’s Wolff has serious

controlling likely his behavior and is to re- if community.

offend released to the Under clearly

our modified erroneous standard

review, we conclude sufficient evidence ex support finding

ists to court’s

State showed a nexus between Wolffs an personality

tisocial disorder and his lack of

control, distinguishes him from

typical ordinary recidivist in an criminal (argued) Morgenstern

Clint Derrick and (on brief), Thomas V. Omdahl Grand Forks, N.D., plaintiff appellee. and Mark Grainger, ‍‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‍Andrew East Grand Forks, MN, for defendant and appellant. CROTHERS, Justice. appeals Blomdahl from a denying

district court order her motion to find Russell Blomdahl in fail- ing to comply with a 1993 divorce ment awarding personal property. order, We affirm the district court’s con- cluding the district court did not err in denying a her motion because court motion cannot be maintained based expired on a after being renewed. without [¶ 2] Russell Blomdahl stipulation entered a that was incorporated into a 1993 divorce provided: “9. [Mary Retirement Accounts. sole and shall have exclusive Blomdahl] use, possession control and of the retire- ment, checking savings, and accounts currently solely in her held name. sole and the retirement years, shall have accounts after ten Blomdahl] [Russell use, possession and control of absent renewal of the Relying exclusive retirement, 28-20-13, 28-20-23, savings, checking, §§ 28-20-35, solely in his name the court provision insurance held the [Mary awarding that exception Mary with the Blomdahl an interest percent a 90 interest in will have Russell Blomdahl’s retirement dahl] ac- longer Blomdahl’s] was no enforceable due to the pas- [Russell Piper, Jajfray, sage counts with and Aid As- of time. The court concluded that ” judgmеnt sociation Lutherans.... since the divorce granting her February was entered in added.) renewal, in the absence of a she no Between the of the divorce [¶ 3] longer could enforce that portion Mary Blomdahl did judgment since her motion was “well be- commence a judgment, not execute on yond year period.” the ten separate action on the or obtain qualified domestic relations order. In II January Mary Blomdahl demanded Mary argues Blomdahl her [¶ 5] in the retirement § contempt motion under N.D.C.C. 14-05- accounts, Blomdahl refused. and Russell not an 25.1 is “action” under N.D.C.C. April Mary Blomdahl moved the 28-01-15, § provides ten-year which district court for an order to show cause statute of limitations for action upon “[a]n § under N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1 to find Rus- Alternatively, or decree.” she in contempt sell Blomdahl and to enforce argues that if her motion is an “action” the distribution of the interest the re- 28-01-15, ten-year § under N.D.C.C. tirement account awarded in their 1993 until obligation limitations was tolled Blomdahl re- accrued, and award matured or otherwise that arguments sisted her motion based on ripened. asserts the award not She did February Mary he and Blomdahl either mature she reached retirement agree- into a out-of-court separate entered age or discovered Russell Blomdahl had ment; that had he contended the funds specified taken full distribution of the re transferred, commingled been into other accounts, depriving her of her 90 tirement accounts, time; up or used ovеr and he percent interest. longer required he no to do asserted was passage so due to the of time. The district Mary brought Blomdahl her [¶ 6] that Blomdahl had not court found § under 14- motion agreed to return to Russell Blomdahl 05-25.1, provides that “[flailure including Pip- retirement accounts those provisions separation with the er, Jaffray and Aid Association Lutherans. relating to or divorce decree distribution court Russell Blom- did address parties constitutes con regarding dahl’s contention the current provi tempt of court.” We have held in- status of the retirement continuing jurisdiction for provides sion ruled the divorce was no stead to enforce divorce contempt proceedings longer enforceable. Giese, judgments. See Giese ¶¶ 6-7, 794. “Civil con court denied district tempt requires The court a willful and inexcusable motion. a court order.” Id. at 8. held the 1993 divorce intent to violate un- essentially argues that ceased to enforceable for distribution of be Nonetheless, 14-05-25.1, ery though rule. even her der N.D.C.C. upon action “[a]n Blomdahl’s motion is not action motion is not “[a]n conclude the district judgment,” we ment,” of limi- under 28-01-15(1). motion. denying court did not err tations in N.D.C.C. distinguishes North Dakota law It is axiomatic that for proceed- “special “actions” and between 14-05- contempt finding under N.D.C.C. N.D.C.C., 32-01-01, states ings.” Section 25.1, in N.D.C.C. contemplated as further “[rjemedies justice are in the courts of 27-10, existing ch. a violation of a valid and pro- Special order, into: 1. Actions. 2. divided ex or decree must N.D.C.C., 32-01-02, 211, ceedings.” Section Sevigny, State v. 2006 ND ist. See ¶ (“Intentional proceed- ordinary 37, action as “an defines an 722 515 disobe N.W.2d justice, by party which a ing in a court of of a court order constitutes con dience showing for the enforce- a that an order prosecutes tempt, another and absent frivolous, protection right, transparently of a the redress invalid or ment or is stayed wrong, punish- obeyed a or the order must be or re prevention or of review.”); by orderly Long v. public (Emphasis a offense.” add- versed ment of cf. Brooks, 963, 242, ed.) N.D.C.C., 32-01-04, Kan.App.2d 6 636 P.2d provides Section (1981) (former not be spouse 245 could special any remedy is proceeding “[a] added.) for to contempt failing held other than an action.” extinguishеd judg settlement in (desig- A” See N.D.R.Civ.P. 81 “Table (2005) ment); § 27C C.J.S. Divorce 950 proceedings under nating (“A punished for con spouse cannot be 27-10, statutory “special N.D.C.C. ch. as tempt failing obey for a void order as to excepted from the rules “in- proceedings,” or a that has been they sofar as are inconsistent or conflict totally extinguished.”). “In its usual procedure practice provided with the sense, a contempt comprehends despising rules”). by these authority, justice, dignity of a l(l)(g), 27-10-01. Section Dyke Dyke, v. 538 court.” Van Van N.D.C.C., any act says contempt is other (N.D.1995). 197, “Although 203 N.W.2d specified by ground contempt. law as a for courts, are inherent powers §§ 14-05-25.1 and 27-10- When N.D.C.C. legislature ... in North Dakota has 01.1(1) ch. are con- and N.D.C.C. 32-01 categories to which the ] limited! togеther, contempt proceeding strued may apply.” orders Id. See N.D.C.C. brought § under 14-05-25.1 is a 27-10-01.1(1) (defining contempt of special statutory proceeding rather than a court). We therefore consider whether separate upon judgment pur- “action” existing of provision there was valid and 28-01-15(1). City poses of N.D.C.C. Cf. which viola the divorce its Comm’n, Fargo v. Annexation Review may tion considered a con properly be (N.D.1966) (writs 338, 346 148 N.W.2d tempt of court. proceedings certiorari and mandamus are Statutory “special proceedings,” interpretation not included fully purposes). presents question term “actions” for review Be- Fargo v. Pub. appeal. cause we conclude Blomdahl’s con- reviewable on M.M. ¶12, 102, not an actiоn on the No. 2010 ND 783 tempt motion was Sch. Dist. 1, 806; Bank v. judgment, we do not reach her alternate Great Western Will N.W.2d ¶ Co., 50, 7, 780 arguments regarding tolling Poultry of the statute mar 2010 ND objec application primary of limitations and 437. “This Court’s discov- N.W.2d is to ascertain defendant’s husband had interpreting required tive in been ¶ MM, due, (quota pay attorneys’ at for bills legislative intent.” fees and $364 omitted). costs, are construed as a monthly tion “Statutes addition to amount for give harmonized to mean alimony. a whole are child maintenance and Id. at Poul provisions.” to related Willmar ing special N.W.2d at 691. While the exe- ¶ omitted); N.D.C.C. try, (quotation at cution was issued in the 1931 divorce statutes, construing “In we renewed, 1-02-07. not been expiring had ‘the context of the statutes and consider in 1941. Id. at 24 N.W.2d at 696. they were enact purposes for which case, present Relevant to the ” ¶ Poultry, (quoting at ed.’ Willmar although Court held that Leifert ¶ State, Falcon v. judgment against defendant had a her hus- 719). construe statutes to We $364, band for which had become a lien on illogical results. See absurd or avoid property, his the execution issued thereun- M.M., 12; County Stutsman subsequent der and sale and confirmation Soc’y, Historical State give did not the defendant (N.D.1985). 325 the real property sold. Id. Court 28-20-35, N.D.C.C., pro- Section [¶ 11] held judgment the could not be executed a judgment the cancellation of vides for upon expired because it had after ten which has not been renewed: “After ten years without renewal and had become entry judgment after of a that yеars the extinct. Id. The Court also that observed renewed, twenty after has not been or expiration judgment of the lien did not entry judgment years after the alimony obligation alter the and the renewed, judgment must be has been the continuing jurisdiction modify court had of N.D.C.C. canceled record.” Under Thus, alimony. Id. the in Court Leifert docketed, 28-20-13, once entered and monetary refused to enforce a award judgment is a lien on all the real judgment “[t]he execution in a divorce when the homestead, the of ev- property, except judgment expired. divorce had See also ery against Schaible, whom the person Fuson v. 494 597 N.W.2d rendered, (N.D.1992) (“Renewal person may is which the have requirements could any county in in which the ... a apply to a divorce fixed docketing docketed at the time of amount in division of or set- debts.”). person acquires thereafter Although tlement of Blom- county, years ten from the time contempt motion is not an dahl claims her docketing county of statute of action barred limitations, in which it was rendered.” argument misconstrues court’s decision. district added.) Additionally, under 28-20-23, judgment may a be Here, held the district court [¶ 14] entry docketing renewed provi- there was no because a judgment, an affidavit of renewal of ex- judgment, which had sion of the divorce an tending the lien for additional ten opposed as personal awarded her years. obligation, a had ex- continuing support February 1993 pired. This decision in Because the Court’s Leifеrt 746, 759-60, the retire- Wolfer, awarding 74 N.D. 24 ment (1946), expired accounts after 696 is instructive. was ment Leifert renewed, quiet being title action and involved execution without the district an enforceable based on a divorce in which the was without finding Russell Blomdahl an order enter under N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1. action com- divorce 1991. The trial court

menced October hearing held Ill judgment, which and entered a divorce it disposition makes unnec- Our agree- incorporated parties’ stipulated Mary Blomdahl’s issue essary to address par- regarding the distribution bringing the time for whether ties’ retirement accounts: Further, it would be tolled. motion is [Mary 9. Retirement Accounts. Blom- advisory separate whether to determine use, have sole and exclusive dahl] shall action arоse based retirement, possession control and subsequent to conduct savings, checking currently separate action ‍‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‍can judgment or whether solely in her name. Blom- [Russell held expired judgment. be maintained on use, have and exclusive shall sole dahl] Bank Forks v. Union Nat. Grand retirement, possession and control of the Cf. 486-87, Ryan, N.D. N.W. savings, checking and insurance ac- (1912). The district court order is solely excep- counts in his name with the [Mary tion that will have a Blomdahl] affirmed. [Russell Piper, retirement accounts with dahl’s] SANDSTROM, DALE [¶ Y. 16] Jaffray, and Aid Association Luther- KAPSNER, JJ., CAROL RONNING ans. concur. added.) only in evidence indicating Piper record value of MARING, Justice, dissenting. Jaffray and Aid Association Lutherans re- I respectfully dissent. dis- “Agreement is an tirement accounts majority’s conclusion the agree with Property Equitable Division of Rus- ten-year statute of limitation on enforce- Blomdahl,” Mary sell dated [and] October judgments precludes Mary ment of Blom- that, agreement 1991. The indicates as of bringing dahl from motion 1991, October Russell Blomdahl had against Russell Blomdahl for his failure to $20,834 Piper Jaffray in his retirement ninety pay percent her the interest in his $97,970 account and in his Aid Association Majority, retirement accounts. at 14. I account, $118,804. Lutherans for a total of opinion ten-year am of the that the statute addition, $12,238 Russell Blomdahl had begin of limitations did not to run until in a of miscellaneous retirement number Russell Blomdahl’s actual retirement some accounts, name, solely in his in which 2003, in making 1993 in- Mary Blomdahl was not awarded enforсeable as of terest. April Blomdahl’s 2009 motion. 25, 2009, During August con- Therefore, I would trial reverse the court’s tempt proceedings hearing, Russell Blom- findings decision and remand for further began transferring money dahl testified he on whether Russell Blomdahl’s failure to between the retirement accounts in 1994in pay Mary ninety percent Blomdahl order to increase their value. He further interest in his retirement accounts consti- actually begin drawing testified he did not “contempt tutes of court” under N.D.C.C. specified on the two accounts the di- 27-10-01.1. vorce until some time

655 “[f|t may begins have been 2005 when statute of limitations to run although against each installment from the officially Russell time fixed for its retired.” Whether [he] Schaible, payment.” Fuson v. 494 or in how- Blomdahl retired (N.D.1992) 593, 597 еver, (addressing when the enforceability of impact does not begins statute limitations to run on purposes the 1993 divorce judgments support for child payments); contempt proceedings. (stating judg see N.D.C.C. 14-08.1-05 if of limitations Even may ments for child support not be can would have started to run 2003 when 28-20-35); celed under N.D.C.C. see began drawing Russell Blomdahl first Richter, also Richter v. 126 N.W.2d money on two (N.D.1964) (addressing when the stat statute of limitations would not have ex- begins ute of limitations to run on judg April as of 2009 when Blom- pired spousal ments for support payments). We contempt proceedings. initiated her dahl long have cautioned that having the statute Therefore, opinion I am of the the trial begin running limitations when the di concluding Mary erred in court may vorce produce entered could not enforce the 1993 divorce the absurd situation of “a of action by contempt proceedings because may be barred before the cause of precluded executing would be from “she Richter, action has accrued.” suing on the under North Dako- Simmons, (quoting Simmons v. ta law.” (1940)); S.D. 290 N.W. see Starrett, also Starrett v. 24 S.W.3d II (Dowd, J., (Mo.Ct.App.2000) concur found ring) (explaining that “life insurance bene immediately Blomdahl “was entitled to es- pensions fits and are often included exclusive use and control over” the tablish settlements, are, yet by their na ninety ture, ongoing payment may begin dahl’s retirement accounts awarded to her during ten-year period following judg by judgment. the 1993 divorce The court ment”). Here, the trial cоurt’s conclusion reasoned she could have established con- Mary Blomdahl should have moved to en by obtaining a rela- qualified trol domestic payment ninety percent force of her inter (“QDRO”) legal “taking tions order or est Russell Blomdahl’s retirement bene control, or other action to that even assert yet fits when he had to retire and receive if that financial penalty meant some similarly himself reaches a benefits addition, early trial withdrawal.” deprives Mary absurd result because it court concluded that a pension “[u]nlike interest in the retirement her matured, yet that had not these plan [two payments payments before these became accounts could have been ac- retirement] Jоrdan, 147 due. See Jordan v. S.W.3d exclusively cessed and controlled (Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (citing Duha judgment.” at the time of Nei- [Blomdahl] Duhamel, 754, 756, 729 mel v. 188 Misc.2d record, public nor policy ther the (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2001)) (holding N.Y.S.2d trial supports the court’s conclusion. begin not to the statute of limitations does Our Court has held that when a spouse pay

[¶ 21] run reaches a owning until the Weber, judgment provides payments status); see also In re 322 Mont. installments, (2004) spousal support (stating child or 95 P.3d begin not to run upon “the to enforcement accrues statute of limitations does matures, holding and former payment each installment as it and is due [ ] 27-2-201(1) (providing Ann. action to en- Code commence an could not wife awarding period prescribed her a for the commence- forcе a divorce retirement upon husband’s of an action portion of former actually and the he retired years) benefits before is within ten with N.D.C.C. decree due); 28-01-15(1) Patricia A.M. benefits became that an action (providing 1012, 1015-16, W.M., 24 Eugene Misc.3d be or a decree must (2009) (holding former 885 N.Y.S.2d 178 years). within ten commenced of action accrued wife’s cause re- Supreme The Montana Court pay failure to her the former husband’s jected argument upheld the husband’s to which his retirement benefits portion of grant the wife’s the trial court’s decision entitled, no earlier than which was she was Weber, motion to enforce the retirement). actual the date of his wife’s Analogizing P.3d at 698. Weber, In In re the Montana action actions for enforcement of child a factual situa- Supreme addressed Court Supreme the Montana support payments, presented to the one here. tion similar ten-year of limita- Court held the and, marriage terminated their parties to run until the obli- begin tions did not decree, January 1992 divorce the trial in a ex- gation became due. Id. Court equal wife an share court awarded the was not to her plained the wife entitled retirement benefits. her former husband’s former husband’s retirement share Weber, at 696. At the time of the 95 P.3d early until the husband retired benefits decree, neither had retired. Id. him- began collecting 2002 and the benefits began drawing The husband retired otherwise, To hold the Court self. Id. early retirement account in on his noted, “would reach the absurd cоnclusion notify not his former wife of his but did deprived be [the wife] should any pay- and did not make the benefits were due her.” benefits before required by ments her as the decree. Id. result, As a the wife moved to Id. here, Similarly opin- I am of the decree, portion enforce that of the divorce did ion the statute of limitations a share in her former which awarded her begin to run until Russell Blomdahl husband’s retirement benefits. Id. The status, which, pay according reached to his granted trial the wife’s motion to testimony, was some time in 2003. explained enforce the began drawing Once Russell Blomdahl the statute of limitations was not a bar to benefits from the two retirement her action because “while some time had Mary entitled to her Blomdahl became 1992, ... еlapsed since the Decree was ninety in those benefits interest intended to extend to the relevant issue- employing the value as of the date of the recently retirement-which had occurred.” Blomdahl’s divorce omitted). ap- (quotation Id. The husband pay Mary failure to Blomdahl the benefits arguing his former wife’s motion to pealed, rightfully she was due under the divorce judgment the divorce was time- enforce judgment ground was sufficient for her to barred. Id. at 698. He asserted the Mary bring contempt. a motion for Blom- motion to enforce was stale because his April for dahl moved former did not the motion until wife and, only years six after she became entitled to eleven after the divorce decree enforcement of her interest Russell judg- under all on seek Montana actions There- brought Blomdahl’s retirement benefits. ments and decrees must be within fore, 698; clearly deny- erred in years. compare Mont. Id. correctly found the plained the trial court for motion ing Mary Blomdahl’s willfully husband in for former the 1993 divorce ground on judgment by receiv- violating the divorce the ten- under longer no enforceable was ing retaining the full retirement bene- limitations on enforcement year statute retired, fits, denying thus once he his judgments. interest in twenty percent former wife her Moreover, the trial court based Similarly, Id. the record those benefits. findings not erroneous conclusion its in- ninety percent shows The trial court by the record. supported retirement terest Russell Blomdahl’s “immеdiately Mary Blomdahl was found by parties’ was awarded benefits use and con- to establish exclusive entitled not made con- and was interest ninety percent trol” over her QDRO. “A obtaining tingent upon accounts Russell Blomdahl’s decree, order, QDRO is a or “[ujnlike that had pension plan because support, relating ‍‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‍support, spousal to child matured, accounts could have yet these not rights, which creates or marital immediately controlled accessed and been existence of an alternate recognizes time of at the [Blomdahl] portion to receive all or a payee’s right however, record, is void of ment.” The par- to a payable respect the benefits establishing Mary any evidеnce Id. The ultimate ticipant plan.” under a access to the two retire- had immediate entry necessary of a responsibility of 1993 divorce ment accounts. court, not the QDRO lies with the trial judgment simply states Neb.App. parties. Fry Fry, ninety percent is entitled to dahl (2009) (holding the ulti- in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement proper that a responsibility mate Jaffray and Aid Association Lu- Piper entered, entry of a decree is does not set forth therans. The QDRO if court determines the situa- accounts, money amount of the trial requires, rests tion so accounts, or the method type of retirement court); Prop- Equit. Distrib. see also require It does of distribution. should (stating § 6:20 trial court erty 3d or- domestic relations acceptable qualified to ensure all measures take reasonable Yet, the lack of direction despite der. as QDROs are drafted and entered regarding in the 1993 divorce entry after of the divorce possible soon as the retirement the distribution of decree). Thus, the trial court erred Mary Blomdahl trial court concluded obtaining a responsibility for shifting the at the accessed the accounts could have trial court that entered QDRO from the QDRO or by obtaining a time of Blomdahl, decree to the 1993 divorce if ... even “taking legal or other action Further, decree. under to the early financial penalty that meant some ERISA, of limitations there is no statute agree with the trial I cannot withdrawal.” Jordan, 147 QDRO. for the See conclusion. court’s ab- (noting the intentiоnal at 260 S.W.3d Giese, we held that a for the In v. of a statute of limitations Giese sence ERISA); twenty also right QDRO receive a under see former wife’s Priess, husband’s of her former v. 99 S.W.3d percent portion Marshall entry of (holding the the (Tex.Ct.App.2002) was created retirement benefits limita- subject statute of contingent QDRO is not judgment and was not divorce judgments); of QDRO. 2004 tions on enforcement effecting acceptable an Ochoa, 596-97 S.W.3d We ex- Ochoa 676 N.W.2d 794. ND (Mo.2002) (en banc) (explaining statutory ability the money to transfer from one presumption is satisfied af- retirement account to another is different prevent ter ten an entry does not of having ability from to access the mon QDRO past ten-year period). Conceiv- ey in those accounts befоre reaching the then, ably such order could be entered requisite Thus, age. based on any at time after the and the record, requiring Mary Blomdahl to court’s conclusion Blomdahl action, any take “even if that meant some immediately should have obtained one fol- penalty withdrawal,” financial early for lowing is in error. only seems not impractical, but also con trary principle to the equitable distribu addition, I cannot agree parties’ property tion of the in divorce the trial court’s conclusion proceedings. generally, See could “legal have taken or other action” to (providing 14-05-24 equitable establish exclusive control over her inter est in distribution the property Russell Blomdahl’s retirement аc and debts of count, if parties). “even that meant some financial penalty early withdrawal.” The trial Finally, the trial court’s conclu- specify court fails to what “legal kind of sion Mary Blomdahl could not collect her other action” Blomdahl could have ninety percent in Russell Blom- taken to enforce her interest in the retire dahl’s retirement awarded to her ment clearly benefits. She could not have divorce runs sent a copy certified judg public afoul of policy. The trial court’s Piper Jaffray ment to or Aid Association denial of Blomdahl’s motion for con- Lutherans demanding payment ninety tempt ground on the percent of Russell Blomdahl’s retirement limitations makes the unen- See, Jordan, e.g., benefits. 147 S.W.3d at only forceable finality ig- focuses 261 (stating the divorce judgment created nores the realities of judgments. wife’s to receive benefits under the Many judgments of these contemplate obli- plan, explaining but wife could not receive gations that paid are over peri- extended benefits plan under the plan ad ods of time or do not even become due and approves ministrator a proposed QDRO). payable during the entire years per- Neither could she an action to re mitted for renewal. primary exam- ceive her share of Russell Blomdahl’s re ples are life insurance benefits and retire- tirement actually benefits before he re benefits, which are often included See, tired and thosе benefits became due. property divisions. The trial court’s deci- Weber, e.g., 95 P.3d at (holding wife sion in present case implies “public could not have moved to payment enforce policy allowing favors unsatisfied judg- of husband’s retirement benefits before ments to die on the vine for the sake of actually husband began retired and receiv benefits). completion.” ing Moreover, Dahlin v. Kroening, 784 nothing in the record 412 (Minn.Ct.App.2010). indicates Russell Blomdahl’s inter However, est as the two retirement Minnesota Court of Ap- accounts was subject peals early explained withdrawal. Kroening, Contra Shav too am of (N.D. er v. Kopp, opinion public policy only encour- 1996) (noting ages finality, that the Kopp encourages “record shows but also meaning- is allowed to employer’s judicial withdraw his judgments, con fulness of such as the tributions, own, time, as well as his one Russell Blomdahl satisfy. failed to subject penalties”). to taxes and Having See id. record, contempt the The Court stated civil and execu Based on 29]

[¶ considerations, mutually procedures tion “are exclusive the ten- for public policy judgment” enforcement of a begin explained limitations did not to year statute of that of “[w]hen actual retire- writ execution is re run until Russell Blomdahl’s unsatisfied, party may in the Feb- turned later exe making some time ment property cute on the debtor’s because judgment enforceable ruary 1993 divorce remedy remains available for 10 April 2009 motion af as of Blomdahl’s judgment.” ter Id. Both contempt. legislative history plain and the lan Ill § guage of N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1 indicate 14-05-25.1, by enacting that section majority The holds the 30] [¶ legislature intended to “correct the law” denying Mary in court did not err by created and to Seablom make civil con because the contempt dahl’s motion remedy tempt proper for the enforce an in Russell awarding her property ment of a distribution of in di af- expired retirement benefits 14,86, Hearing vorce cases. on H.B. See years, leaving thus the trial court ter (testimony Wayne supra Senator Ste- to enter “without an enforceable nehjem) (stating by enacting that N.D.C.C. in con- finding an order Russell Blomdahl 14-05-25.1, § legislature would make § 14-05-25.1.” Ma- tempt under N.D.C.C. contempt it a of court “if one in a concluded, party 14. trial court jority, at divorce does not abide the orders of the agree, that majority “[i]f and the seems to court”); § 14-05-25.1 (providing N.D.C.C. any legal authority to longer there is no party’s comply that a failure to with a bring on or to execute provision relating of a divorce decree to action on the it stands to reason contempt distribution constitutes by contempt it cannot be enforced court). legislative history further agree. I cannot proceedings either.” despite early indicates that some concerns Legislative The North Dakota 31] [¶ about the absence of a time element § Assembly enacted 14-05-25.1 N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1, language of N.D.C.C. the law because of a 1985 “to correct limit legislaturе place chose not to time [S]upreme [C]ourt.” decision provisions contempt actions to enforce Hearing on H.B. the Senate 1486 Before Hearing on of a divorce See Comm., Judiciary Legis. 49th N.D. Sess. Judiciary H.B. the House 1486 Before (Feb. 1985) (testimony of Senator (Feb. Comm., Legis. N.D. Sess. 49th Stenehjem) H.B. Wayne [“Hearing on Shafer) (ex 1985) (testimony of Gerald provides, 14-05-25.1 1486”]. Section lack of a time pressing concern over the comply provi with the part: “Failure proposed language element in the or divorce decree separation sions of 14-05-25.1); see also N.D.C.C. relating to distribution of the then, if a Arguably 14-05-25.1. parties constitutes of court” provi fails to with a divorce decree obviously enacted with the intent and was relating proper to the distribution of sion to correct this Court’s decision Seablom right has the ty, aggrieved party (N.D.1984). Seablom, action and that a civil Seablom, this Court held limitations. subject is not remedy improper civil was an encouraging public policy of prop- a distribution of Our the enforcement of proceedings is con- at 925. settlements erty divorce cases. 348 N.W.2d legislature’s decision to on her interest in Russell Blomdahl’s re- sistent with the discourage, tirement benefits now would contempt actions available to enforce make encourage, not settlements. can en- We judgments without constraints settlements, however, if courage we ensure 28-20-35. See Kramer v. comply ¶ a fails to with a when Kramer, 2006 ND provision judgment in а divorce related to (stating encourages this Court settlements future, the distribution of in the divorcing parties). between We have held aggrieved party remedy will have a parties voluntarily that when to a divorce beyond years that will extend the ten al- particular their stipulate disposition executing judgment. lowed for on the property, marital a trial court should ordi- initiating absence of a time limit for civil narily enter consistent with contempt proceedings provi- to enforce parties’ agreement. settlement Id. is, therefore, distributing property sions many why divorcing There are reasons policy with our encouraging consistent parties choose to structure their property peaceful settlements оf distri- way it settlement a certain is difficult bution divorce cases. imagine that when the settle- addition, nothing In plain ment includes the of retirement division language sug- of N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1 benefits, parties contemplate did not gests aggrieved party’s right that the collecting beyond on those benefits the ten action for failure to collecting money allotted for on a with a divorce is contin- gent ten-year on whether the statute of Here, the divorce in- limitations, applicable to actions for the corporated parties’ stipulated agree- enforcement of judgments, expired. has ment, which included the division of Rus- fact, to hold that remedy of civil sell Blomdahl’s retirement At benefits. under N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1 is trial, Mary Blomdahl testified she not did only availablе within the ask ninety per- Russell Blomdahl prescribed of limitations for actions cent interest in the retirement accounts twenty years within if the January why 2009. When asked she renewed, would defeat explained: waited until she legislature’s provide intent to parties to mostly Well because I had looked at with the additional originals their of those that we had de- remedy contempt. Fargo of civil M.M. v. on, AAL, the Pipper-Jaffray cided Public School Dist. No. 2010 ND and it age said “this is what it’s worth at (citation omitted) 12, 783 N.W.2d 806 70.” I thought, And so well when it— (“This objective primary Court’s in inter- when I’m can draw social securi- preting legislative a statute is ‍‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‍to ascertain So, ty, and he will be 70 after that. it’s intent.”); Gillie, see also McDowell v. just good sort of a it. to do ¶91, 11, (stating 626 N.W.2d 666 testimony shows she en- interprets this Court in a prac- statutes tered into agreement the settlement tical manner and considers the context of understanding she would be able to purpose the statute and the for which it enacted). collect on Russell Blomdahl’s retirement was have repeatedly We stated age benefits until he reached the of seven- that statutes must be construed to avoid ty. The trial court entered a divorce presume absurd results and that we agreement. just consistent with that legislature intended a and reasonable Precluding Mary collecting enacting Cnty. Blomdahl from result a statute. tion, Soc’y, judgment’s presumed the invalidity v. State Historical Stutsman (N.D.1985); 321, 325 N.D.C.C. cannot be contempt viewed as bar to her 1-02-38(3) (4). Yet, majority’s the § §§ proceedings when N.D.C.C. 27-10- 01.1(l)(b) § of N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1 interpretation and 14-05-25.1 are construed to- just illogical an absurd and produces such gether. I am of opinion the N.D.C.C. majority “Because result. The concludes: § provides Mary 14-05-25.1 Blomdahl the awarding right to enforce the distribution of Russell Mary Blomdahl the retirement accounts benefits, Blomdahl’s retirement awarded being without re- expired after ten by decree, to her divorce newed, without an the district court was through contempt proceedings. Applying to enter an order enforceable 27-10-01.1(l)(b), contempt un- finding Russell Blomdahl proceedings dahl is entitled to initiate such Majority, der N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1.” (1) intentionally if: Russell Blomdahl However, to a leaving 14. di- pay ninety to her the percent failed inter- remedy with no after ten vorce benefits, in his est retirement as ordered judgment, years from the by the the divorce decree and renewed, twenty years if the is (2) by when law execution could not be exactly type injustice legisla- is Thus, awarded to collect that sum. even if prevent through ture intended to the en- accept majority’s position I were to actment of N.D.C.C. 14-05-25.1. parties’ judgment expired 1993 divorce af- Therefore, by limiting Mary Blomdahl’s statutes, years, contempt ter ten under our bring contempt right action Blomdahl can still here, majority her of the depriving action to redress Russell Blomdahl’s fail- remedy civil right as comply ure to with that provision of the Russell Blomdahl’s failure to judgment, awarding ninety her portion of the divorce percent interest his retirement benefits. ninety awarding percent benefits, though his retirement even IV specifically given was to her applicable Based on the legislature. considerations, record, public policy Further, we have stated that would reverse the trial court’s decision and relating subject to the same “[s]tatutes findings remand for further on whether together matter shall be construed pay Russell Blomdahl’s failure to harmonized, if possible, give should be ninety interest in his Blomdahl her each, meaningful effect to without render- “contempt constitutes N.D. Fair ing one or the other useless.” § 27-10-01.1. of court” under N.D.C.C. Council, Peterson, Inc. v. Hous. ¶81, 36, 625 N.W.2d 551. 27-10- Section MARY MUEHLEN MARING N.D.C.C., 01.1(l)(b), contempt of defines nonpayment court as the “[i]ntentional WALLE, C.J., W. VANDE GERALD money by the court to be sum of ordered concurs in the result. paid in a case when law execution be the collection cannot atuardedfor added.) Therefore, sum.” if, concludes, majority

even as the longer was no valid at mo-

the time of

Case Details

Case Name: Blomdahl v. Blomdahl

Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date Published: Apr 13, 2011

Citation: 796 N.W.2d 649

Docket Number: 20100053

Court Abbreviation: N.D.