Lead Opinion
[¶ 1] Mаry Blomdahl appeals from a district court order denying her motion to find Russell Blomdahl in contempt for failing to comply with a 1993 divorce judgment awarding her personal property. We affirm the district court’s order, concluding the district court did not err in denying her motion because a contempt of court motion cannot be maintained based on a divorce judgment that expired after ten years without being renewed.
I
[¶ 2] Russell Blomdahl and Mary Blomdahl entered a stipulation that was incorporated into a February 1993 divorce judgment, which provided:
“9. Retirement Accounts. [Mary Blomdahl] shall have sole and exclusive use, control and possession of the retirement, savings, and checking accounts currently held solely in her name.[Russell Blomdahl] shall have sole and exclusive use, possession and control of the retirement, savings, checking, and insurance accounts solely in his name with the exception that [Mary Blom-dahl] will have a 90 percent interest in [Russell Blomdahl’s] retirement accounts with Piper, Jajfray, and Aid Association Lutherans.... ”
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 3] Between the entry of the divorce judgment and 2009, Mary Blomdahl did not execute on the judgment, commence a separate action on the judgment, or obtain a qualified domestic relations order. In January 2009, Mary Blomdahl demanded the 90 percent interest in the retirement accounts, and Russell Blomdahl refused. In April 2009, Mary Blomdahl moved the district court for an order to show cause under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 to find Russell Blomdahl in contempt and to enforce the distribution of the interest in the retirement account awarded in their 1993 divorce judgment. Russell Blomdahl resisted her motion based on arguments that in February 1993, he and Mary Blomdahl entered into a separate out-of-court agreement; he contended that the funds had been transferred, commingled into other accounts, or used up over time; and he asserted he was no longer required to do so due to the passage of time. The district court found that Mary Blomdahl had not agreed to return to Russell Blomdahl any retirement accounts including those in Piper, Jaffray and Aid Association Lutherans. The court did not address Russell Blom-dahl’s contention regarding the current status of the retirement accounts, and instead ruled the divorce judgment was no longer enforceable.
[¶ 4] The district court denied Mary Blomdahl’s contempt motion. The court held the February 1993 divorce judgment ceased to be enforceable for distribution of the retirement accounts after ten years, absent renewal of the judgment. Relying on N.D.C.C. §§ 28-20-13, 28-20-23, and 28-20-35, the court held the provision awarding Mary Blomdahl an interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement accounts was no longer enforceable due to the passage of time. The court concluded that since the divorce judgment granting her the property was entered in February 1993, in the absence of a renewal, she no longer could enforce that portion of the judgment since her motion was “well beyond the ten year time period.”
II
[¶ 5] Mary Blomdahl arguеs her contempt motion under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 is not an “action” under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15, which provides a ten-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a judgment or decree.” Alternatively, she argues that if her motion is an “action” under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15, the ten-year limitations was tolled until the obligation and award accrued, matured or otherwise ripened. She asserts the award did not mature until she either reached retirement age or discovered Russell Blomdahl had taken full distribution of the specified retirement accounts, depriving her of her 90 percent interest.
[¶ 6] Mary Blomdahl brought her motion for contempt under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1, which provides that “[flailure to comply with the provisions of a separation or divorce decree relating to distribution of the property of the parties constitutes contempt of court.” We have held that provision provides continuing jurisdiction for contempt proceedings to enforce divorce judgments. See Giese v. Giese,
[¶ 7] North Dakota law distinguishes between “actions” and “special proceedings.” Section 32-01-01, N.D.C.C., states that “[rjemedies in the courts of justice are divided into: 1. Actions. 2. Special proceedings.” Section 32-01-02, N.D.C.C., defines an action as “an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or proteсtion of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.” (Emphasis added.) Section 32-01-04, N.D.C.C., provides that “[a] special proceeding is any remedy other than an action.” (Emphasis added.) See N.D.R.Civ.P. 81 and “Table A” (designating contempt proceedings under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-10, as “special statutory proceedings,” excepted from the rules “insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by these rules”).
[¶ 8] Section 27-10-01. l(l)(g), N.D.C.C., says contempt is any other act specified by law as a ground for contempt. When N.D.C.C. §§ 14-05-25.1 and 27-10-01.1(1) and N.D.C.C. ch. 32-01 are construed together, a contempt proceeding brought under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 is a special statutory proceeding rather than a separate “action” upon a judgment for purposes of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15(1). Cf. City of Fargo v. Annexation Review Comm’n,
[¶ 9] It is axiomatic that for a contempt finding under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1, as further contemplated in N.D.C.C. ch. 27-10, a violation of a valid and existing court order, judgment or decree must exist. See State v. Sevigny,
[¶ 10] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal. M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
[¶ 11] Section 28-20-35, N.D.C.C., provides for the cancellation of a judgment which has nоt been renewed: “After ten years after the entry of a judgment that has not been renewed, or after twenty years after the entry of a judgment that has been renewed, the judgment must be canceled of record.” Under N.D.C.C. § 28-20-13, once entered and docketed,
“[t]he judgment is a lien on all the real property, except the homestead, of every person against whom the judgment is rendered, which the person may have in any county in which the judgment is docketed at the time of docketing or which the person thereafter acquires in the county, for ten years from the time of docketing the judgment in the county in which it was rendered.”
(Emphasis added.) Additionally, under N.D.C.C. § 28-20-23, a judgment may be renewed upon the entry and docketing of an affidavit of renewal of а judgment, extending the lien for an additional ten years.
[¶ 12] This Court’s decision in Leifert v. Wolfer,
[¶ 13] Relevant to the present case, the Court in Leifert held that although the defendant had a judgment against her husband for $364, which had become a lien on his property, the execution issued thereunder and subsequent sale and confirmation did not give the defendant any interest in the real property sold. Id. The Court held the judgment could not be executed upon because it had expired after ten years without renewal and had become extinct. Id. The Court also observed that expiration of the judgment lien did not alter the alimony obligation and that the court had continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony. Id. Thus, the Court in Leifert refused to enforce a monetary award by execution in a divorce judgment when the divorce judgment had expired. See also Fuson v. Schaible,
[¶ 14] Here, the district court held there was no contempt because the provision of the divorce judgment, which had awаrded her personal property as opposed to a continuing support obligation, had expired. Because the February 1993 judgment awarding Mary Blomdahl the retirement accounts expired after ten years without being renewed, the district court was without an enforceable judgment to
Ill
[¶ 15] Our disposition makes it unnecessary to address Mary Blomdahl’s issue whether the time for bringing a contempt motion is tolled. Further, it would be advisory to determine whether a separate action arose based on Russell Blomdahl’s conduct subsequent to entry of the divorce judgment or whether a separate action can be maintained on an expired judgment. Cf. Union Nat. Bank of Grand Forks v. Ryan,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
[¶ 17] I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion the ten-year statute of limitation on enforcement of judgments precludes Mary Blom-dahl from bringing a contempt motion against Russell Blomdahl for his failure to pay her the ninety percent interest in his retirement accounts. Majority, at ¶ 14. I am of the opinion that the ten-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until Russell Blomdahl’s actual retirement some time in 2003, making the February 1993 divorce judgment enforceable as of Mary Blomdahl’s April 2009 contempt motion. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further findings on whether Russell Blomdahl’s failure to pay Mary Blomdahl her ninety percent interest in his retirement accounts constitutes “contempt of court” under N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.1.
I
[¶ 18] The partiеs’ divorce action commenced in October 1991. The trial court held a divorce hearing in February 1993 and entered a divorce judgment, which incorporated the parties’ stipulated agreement regarding the distribution of the parties’ retirement accounts:
9. Retirement Accounts. [Mary Blom-dahl] shall have sole and exclusive use, control and possession of the retirement, savings, and checking accounts currently held solely in her name. [Russell Blom-dahl] shall have sole and exclusive use, possession and control of the retirement, savings, checking and insurance accounts solely in his name with the exception that [Mary Blomdahl] will have a 90 percent interest in [Russell Blom-dahl’s] retirement accounts with Piper, Jaffray, and Aid Association Luthеrans.
(Emphasis added.) The only evidence in the record indicating the value of the Piper Jaffray and Aid Association Lutherans retirement accounts is an “Agreement for the Equitable Division of Property of Russell [and] Mary Blomdahl,” dated October 1991. The agreement indicates that, as of October 1991, Russell Blomdahl had $20,834 in his Piper Jaffray retirement account and $97,970 in his Aid Association Lutherans account, for a total of $118,804. In addition, Russell Blomdahl had $12,238 in a number of miscellaneous retirement accounts, solely in his name, in which Mary Blomdahl was not awarded any interest.
[¶ 19] During the August 25, 2009, contempt proceedings hearing, Russell Blom-dahl testified he began transferring money between the retirement accounts in 1994 in order to increase their value. He further testified he did not actually begin drawing on the two accounts specified in the divorce judgment until some time in 2003,
II
[¶ 20] The trial court found Mary Blomdahl “was immediately entitled to establish exclusive use and control over” the ninety percent interest in Russell Blom-dahl’s retirement accounts awarded to her by the 1993 divorce judgment. The court reasoned she could have established control by obtaining a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) or by “taking legal or other action to assert that control, even if that meant some financial penalty for early withdrawal.” In addition, the trial court concluded that “[u]nlike a pension plan that had not yet matured, these [two retirement] accounts could have been accеssed and exclusively controlled by Mary [Blomdahl] at the time of judgment.” Neither the law, the record, nor public policy supports the trial court’s conclusion.
[¶ 21] Our Court has held that when a divorce judgment provides for payments of child or spousal support in installments, “the right to enforcement accrues upon each installment as it matures, and [ ] the statute of limitations begins to run against each installment from the time fixed for its payment.” Fuson v. Schaible,
[¶ 22] In In re Weber, the Montana Supreme Court addressed a factual situation similar to the оne presented here. The parties terminated their marriage and, in a January 1992 divorce decree, the trial court awarded the wife an equal share in her former husband’s retirement benefits. Weber,
[¶ 23] The Montana Supreme Court rejected the husband’s argument and upheld the trial court’s decision to grant the wife’s motion to enforce the judgment. Weber,
[¶ 24] Similarly here, I am of the opinion the ten-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until Russell Blomdаhl reached pay status, which, according to his trial testimony, was some time in 2003. Once Russell Blomdahl began drawing benefits from the two retirement accounts, Mary Blomdahl became entitled to her ninety percent interest in those benefits employing the value as of the date of the divorce judgment. Russell Blomdahl’s failure to pay Mary Blomdahl the benefits she was rightfully due under the divorce judgment was sufficient ground for her to bring a motion for contempt. Mary Blom-dahl moved for contempt in April 2009, only six years after she became entitled to seek enforcement of her interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred in deny
[¶ 25] Moreover, the trial court based its erroneous conclusion on findings not supported by the record. The trial court found Mary Blomdahl was “immediately entitled to establish exclusive use and control” over her ninety percent interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement accounts because “[ujnlike a pension plan that had not yet matured, these accounts could have been accessed and immediately controlled by Mary [Blomdahl] at the time of judgment.” The record, however, is void of any evidence establishing Mary Blomdahl had immediate access to the two retirement accounts. The parties’ 1993 divorce judgment simply states that Mary Blom-dahl is entitled to a ninety percent interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement accounts in Piper Jaffray and Aid Association Lutherans. The judgment does not set forth the amount of money in the accounts, the type of retirement accounts, or the method of distribution. It does not require an acceptable qualified domestic relations order. Yet, despite the lack of any direction in the 1993 divorce judgment regarding the distribution of the retirement accounts, the trial court concluded Mary Blomdahl could have accessed the accounts at the time of judgment by obtaining a QDRO or “taking legal or other action ... even if that meant some financial penalty for early withdrawal.” I cannot agreе with the trial court’s conclusion.
[¶ 26] In Giese v. Giese, we held that a former wife’s right to receive a twenty percent portion of her former husband’s retirement benefits was created by the divorce judgment and was not contingent upon effecting an acceptable QDRO.
[¶ 27] In addition, I cannot agree with the trial court’s conclusion Mary Blomdahl could have taken “legal or other action” to establish exclusive control over her interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement account, “even if that meant some financial penalty for early withdrawal.” The trial court fails to specify what kind of “legal or other action” Mary Blomdahl could have taken to enforce her interest in the retirement benefits. She clearly could not have sent a certified copy of the divorce judgment to Piper Jaffray or Aid Association Lutherans demanding payment of ninety percent of Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits. See, e.g., Jordan,
[¶ 28] Finally, the trial court’s conclusion Mary Blomdahl could not collect her ninety percent interest in Russell Blom-dahl’s retirement accounts, awarded to her by the parties’ divorce judgment, runs afoul of public policy. The trial court’s denial of Mary Blomdahl’s motion for contempt on the ground the ten-year statute of limitations makes the judgment unenforceable focuses only on finality and ignores the realities of divorce judgments. Many of these judgments contemplate obligations that are paid over extended periods of time or do not even become due and payable during the entire ten years permitted for renewal. The primary examples are life insurance benefits and retirement benefits, which are often included in property divisions. The trial court’s decision in the present case implies “public policy favors allowing unsatisfied judgments tо die on the vine for the sake of completion.” Dahlin v. Kroening,
Ill
[¶ 30] The majority holds the trial court did not err in denying Mary Blom-dahl’s contempt motion because the judgment awarding her an interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits expired after ten years, thus leaving the trial court “without an enforceable judgment to enter an order finding Russell Blomdahl in contempt under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1.” Majority, at ¶ 14. The trial court concluded, and the majority seems to agree, that “[i]f there is no longer any legal authority to execute on the judgment or to bring an action on the judgment, it stands to reason that it cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings either.” I cannot agree.
[¶ 31] The North Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 in 1985 “to correct the law because of a decision by the [S]upreme [C]ourt.” Hearing on H.B. 1486 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 49th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1985) (testimony of Senator Wayne Stenehjem) [“Hearing on H.B. 1486”]. Section 14-05-25.1 provides, in part: “Failure to comply with the provisions of a separation or divorce decree relating to distribution of the property of the parties constitutes contempt of court” and was obviously enacted with the intent to correct this Court’s decision in Seablom v. Seablom,
[¶ 32] In Seablom, this Court held that civil contempt was an improper remedy for the enforcement of a distribution of property in divorce cases.
[¶ 33] Our public policy of encouraging settlements in divorce proceedings is con
[¶ 34] Here, the divorce judgment incorporated the parties’ stipulatеd agreement, which included the division of Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits. At trial, Mary Blomdahl testified she did not ask Russell Blomdahl for her ninety percent interest in the retirement accounts until January 2009. When asked why she waited until 2009, she explained:
Well mostly because I had looked at their originals of those that we had decided on, the Pipper-Jaffray and AAL, and it said “this is what it’s worth at age 70.” And so I thought, well when it— when I’m 62, and can draw social security, and he will be 70 after that. So, it’s just sort of a good time to do it.
Mary Blomdahl’s testimony shows she entered into the settlement agreement with the understanding she would not be able to collect on Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits until he reached the age of seventy. The trial court entered a divorce judgment cоnsistent with that agreement. Precluding Mary Blomdahl from collecting on her interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits now would discourage, not encourage, settlements. We can encourage settlements, however, if we ensure that when a party fails to comply with a provision in a divorce judgment related to the distribution of property in the future, the aggrieved party will have a remedy that will extend beyond the ten years allowed for executing on the judgment. The absence of a time limit for initiating civil contempt proceedings to enforce provisions distributing property is, therefore, consistent with our policy of encouraging the peaceful settlements of property distribution in divorce cases.
[¶ 35] In addition, nоthing in the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 suggests that the aggrieved party’s right to bring a contempt action for failure to comply with a divorce judgment is contingent on whether the ten-year statute of limitations, applicable to actions for the enforcement of judgments, has expired. In fact, to hold that the remedy of civil contempt under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 is available only within the ten-year statute of limitations prescribed for actions upon a judgment, or within twenty years if the judgment is renewed, would defeat the legislature’s intent to provide parties to a divorce judgment with the additional remedy of civil contempt. M.M. v. Fargo Public School Dist. No. 1,
[¶ 36] Further, we have stated that “[s]tatutes relating to the same subject matter shall be construed together and should be harmonized, if possible, to give meaningful effect to each, without rendering one or the other useless.” N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson,
IV
[¶ 37] Based on the applicable law, the record, and public policy considerations, I would reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further findings on whether Russell Blomdahl’s failure to pay Mary Blomdahl her ninety percent interest in his retirement accounts constitutes “contempt of court” under N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.1.
[¶ 38] MARY MUEHLEN MARING