WINKELMAN, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND LEGAL GUARDIANS, WINKELMAN ET UX., ET AL. v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
No. 05-983
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 27, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007
550 U.S. 516
Jean-Claude Andre argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
David B. Salmons argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Kim, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, David K. Flynn, Gregory B. Friel, and Kent D. Talbert.
Pierre H. Bergeron argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Christina Henagen Peer.*
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Some four years ago, Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman, parents of five children, became involved in lengthy administrative and
Jacob has autism spectrum disorder and is covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Act or IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended,
ment could not be reached, to participate in administrative proceedings including what the Act refers to as an “impartial due process hearing.”
The disagreement at the center of the current dispute concerns the procedures to be followed when parents and their child, dissatisfied with the outcome of the due process hearing, seek further review in a United States
I
Respondent Parma City School District, a participant in IDEA‘s educational spending program, accepts federal funds for assistance in the education of children with disabilities. As a condition of receiving funds, it must comply with IDEA‘s mandates. IDEA requires that the school district provide Jacob with a “free appropriate public education,” which must operate in accordance with the IEP that Jacob‘s parents, along with school officials and other individuals, develop as members of Jacob‘s “IEP Team.” Brief for Petitioners 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The school district proposed an IEP for the 2003-2004 school year that would have placed Jacob at a рublic elementary school.
own behalf and on behalf of Jacob, a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In reliance upon
The District Court granted respondent‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding it had provided Jacob with a free appropriate public education. Petitioners, proceeding without counsel, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Relying on its recent decision in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School Dist., 409 F. 3d 753 (2005), the Court of Appeals entered an order dismissing the Winkelmans’ appeal unless they obtained counsel to represent Jacob. See Ordеr in No. 05-3886 (Nov. 4, 2005), App. A to Pet. for Cert. 1a. In Cavanaugh the Court of Appeals had rejected the proposition that IDEA allows nonlawyer parents raising IDEA claims to proceed pro se in federal court. The court ruled that the right to a free appropriate public education “belongs to the child alone,” 409 F. 3d, at 757, not to both the parents and the child. It followed, the court held, that “any right on which the [parents] could proceed on their own behalf would be derivative” of the child‘s right, ibid., so that parents bringing IDEA claims were not appearing on their own behalf, ibid. See also
se). As for the parents’ alternative argument, the court held, nonlawyer parents cannot litigate IDEA claims on behalf of their child because IDEA does not abrogate the common-law rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from representing minor children. 409 F. 3d, at 756. As the court in Cavanaugh acknowledged, its decision brought the Sixth Circuit in direct conflict with the First Circuit, which had concluded, under a theory of “statutory joint rights,” that the Act accords to parents the right to assert IDEA claims on their own behalf. See Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School Dist., 346 F. 3d 247, 249, 250 (CA1 2003).
Petitioners sought review in this Court. In light of the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a nonlawyer parent of a child with a disability may prosecute IDEA actions pro se in federal court, we granted certiorari. 549 U. S. 990 (2006). Compare Cavanaugh, supra, with Maroni, supra; see also Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527 (CA7 2006); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225 (CA3 1998); Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576 (CA11 1997).
II
Our resolution of this case turns upon the significance of IDEA‘s interlocking statutory provisions. Petitioners’ primary theory is that the Act makes parents real parties in interest to IDEA actions, not “mer[e] guardians of their children‘s rights.” Brief for Petitioners 16. If correct, this allows Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman back into court, for there is no question that a party may represent his or her own interests in federal court without the aid of counsel. See
base their аrgument on a comprehensive reading of IDEA. Taken as a whole, they contend, the Act leads to the necessary conclusion that parents have independent, enforceable rights. Brief for Petitioners 14 (citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 60 (2004)). Respondent, accusing petitioners of “knit[ting] together various provisions pulled from the crevices of the statute” to support these claims, Brief for Respondent 19, reads the text of IDEA to mean that any redressable rights under the Act belong only to children, id., at 19-40.
We agree that the text of IDEA resolves the question presented. We recognize, in addition, that a proper interpretation of the Act requires a consideration of the entire statutory scheme. See Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). Turning to the current version of IDEA, which the parties agree governs this case, we begin with an overview of the relevant statutory provisions.
A
The goals of IDEA include “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate publiс education” and “ensur[ing] that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.”
IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for each child with a disability, see
The Act defines a “free appropriate public education” pursuant to an IEP to be an educational instruction “specially designed ... to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,”
appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved.” Ibid. The instruction must, in addition, be provided at “no cost to parents.”
When a party objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the construction of the IEP, or some related matter, IDEA provides procedural recourse: It requires that a State provide “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint ... with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”
IDEA sets standards the States must follow in conducting these hearings. Among other things, it indicates that the hearing officer‘s decision “shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education,”
“(I) impeded the child‘s right to a freе appropriate public education;
“(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or
“(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” Ibid.
If the local educational agency, rather than the state educational agency, conducts this hearing, then “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.”
IDEA, finally, provides for at least two means of cost recovery that inform our analysis. First, in certain circumstances it allows a court or hearing officer to require a state agency “to reimburse the parents [of a child with a disability] for the cost of [private-school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.”
B
Petitioners construe these various provisions to accord parents independent, enforceable rights under IDEA. We agree. The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.
The statute sets forth procedures for resolving disputes in a manner that, in the Act‘s express terms, contemplates parents will be the parties bringing thе administrative complaints. In addition to the provisions we have cited, we refer also to
Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent who has exercised his or her own rights from statutory protection the moment the administrative proceedings end. Put another way, the Act does not sub silentio or by implication bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights accorded to them once the time comes to file a civil action. Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite result.
Respondent, resisting this line of analysis, asks us to read these provisions as contemplating parental involvement only to the extent parents represent their child‘s interests. In respondent‘s view IDEA accords parents nothing more than
“collateral tools related to the child‘s underlying substantive rights—not freеstanding or independently enforceable rights.” Brief for Respondent 25.
This interpretation, though, is foreclosed by provisions of the statute. IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking “to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.”
Further provisions confirm this view. IDEA mandates that educational agencies establish procedures “to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.”
Defending its countertextual reading of the statute, respondent cites a decision by a Court of Appeals concluding that the Act‘s “references to parents are best understood as accommodations to the fact of the child‘s incapacity.” Doe v. Board of Ed. of Baltimore Cty., 165 F. 3d 260, 263 (CA4 1998); see also Brief for Respondent 30. This, according to respondent, requires us to interpret all references to parents’ rights as referring in implicit terms to the child‘s rights—which, under this view, are the only enforceable rights accorded by IDEA. Even if we were inclined to ignore the plain text of the statute in considering this theory, we disagree that the sole purpose driving IDEA‘s involvement of
parents is to facilitate vindication of a child‘s rights. It is not a novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of their child. See, e. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925) (acknowledging “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control“); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399-401 (1923). There is no necessary bar or obstacle in the law, then, to finding an intention by Congress to grant parents a stake in the entitlements created by IDEA. Without question a parent of a child with a disability has a particular and personal interest in fulfilling “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.”
We therefore find no reason to read into the plain language of the statute an implicit rejection of the notion that Congress would accord parents independent, enforceable rights concerning the education of their children. We instead interpret the statute‘s references to parents’ rights to mean what they sаy: that IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children.
A variation on respondent‘s argument has persuaded some Courts of Appeals. The argument is that while a parent can be a “party aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer‘s findings and decision, he or she cannot be a “party aggrieved” with respect to all IDEA-based challenges. Under this view the causes of action available to a parent might relate, for example, to various procedural mandates, see, e. g., Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233, and reimbursement demands, see, e. g.,
with regard to any claim not implicating these limited matters.
This argument is contradicted by the statutory provisions we have recited. True, thеre are provisions in IDEA stating parents are entitled to certain procedural protections and reimbursements; but the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on the implications to be drawn when other entitlements are accorded in less clear language. We find little support for the inference that parents are excluded by implication whenever a child is mentioned, and vice versa. Compare, e. g.,
We consider the statutory structure. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA‘s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child‘s educational program. Among other things, IDEA requires the IEP Team, which includes the parents as members, to take into account any “concerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their child” when it formulates the IEP.
The statute also empowers parents to bring challenges based on a broad range of issues. The parent may seek a
hearing on “any matter relating to the identification, evaluаtion, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”
These provisions confirm that IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs impliсated by this process but also in the substantive decisions to be made. We therefore conclude that IDEA does not differentiate, through isolated references to various procedures and remedies, between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents. As a consequence, a parent may be a “party aggrieved” for purposes of
Our conclusion is confirmed by noting the incongruous results that would follow were we to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. The statute‘s procedural and reimbursement-related rights are intertwinеd with the substantive adequacy
of the education provided to a child, see, e. g.,
The bifurcated regime suggested by the courts that have employed it, moreover, leaves some parents without a remedy. The statute requires, in express terms, that States provide a child with a free appropriate public education “at public expense,”
reimbursement. Otherwise the adequacy of the child‘s education would not be regarded as relevant to any cause of action the parent might bring; and, as a result, only the child could vindicate the right accorded by IDEA to a free appropriate public education.
The potential for injustice in this result is apparent. What is more, we find nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress required States to provide adequate instruction to a child “at no cost to parents,” it intended that only some parents would be able to enforce that mandate. The statute instead takes pains to “ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.”
We conclude IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights, which are not limited to certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the parents’ child.
C
Respondent contends, though, that even under the reasoning we have now explained petitioners cannot prevail without
41. Respondent contends that because IDEA is, at best, ambiguous as to whether it accords parents independent rights, it has failed to provide clear notice of this condition to the States. See id., at 40-49.
Respondent‘s reliance on Arlington is misplaced. In Arlington we addressed whether IDEA required States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. “[W]hen Congress attaches conditions to a State‘s acceptance of federal funds,” we explained, “the conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.‘” 548 U. S., at 296 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981)). The question to be answered in Arlington, therefore, was whether IDEA “furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue.” 548 U. S., at 296. We found it did not.
The instant case presents a different issue, one that does not invoke the same rule. Our determination that IDEA grants to parents independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on Stаtes they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery, moreover, is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Were we considering a statute other than the one before us, the Spending Clause argument might have more force: A determination by the Court that some distinct class of people has independent, enforceable rights might result in a change to the States’ statutory obligations. But that is not the case here.
Respondent argues our ruling will, as a practical matter, increase costs borne by the States as they are forced to defend against suits unconstrained by attorneys trained in the law and the rules of ethics. Effects such as these do not suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause. Furthermore, IDEA does afford relief for the States in certain cases. The Act empowers courts to award attorney‘s feеs to a prevailing educational agency whenever a parent
has presented a “complaint or subsequent cause of action ... for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”
III
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Parents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. The decision by Congress to grant parents these rights was consistent with the purpose of IDEA and fully in accord with our social and legal traditions. It is beyond dispute that the relationship between a parent and child is sufficient to support a legally cognizable interest in the education of one‘s child; and, what is more, Congress has found that “the educаtion of children with disabilities can be made more effective by ... strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate
In light of our holding we need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument, which concerns whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child‘s claims pro se.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I would hold that parents have the right to proceed pro se under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
or redress for violations of their own procedural rights, but not when they seek a judicial determination that their child‘s free appropriate public education (or FAPE) is substantively inadequate.
Whether parents may bring suits under the IDEA without a lawyer depends upon the interaction between the IDEA and thе general pro se provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The latter, codified at
As both parties agree, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; Brief for Respondent 37, “party aggrieved” means “[a] party entitled to a remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person‘s actions or by a court‘s decree or judgment,” Black‘s Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004); see also ante, at 529-530. This case thus turns on the rights that the IDEA accords to parents, and the concomitant remedies made available to them. Only with respect to such rights and remedies are
parents properly viewed as “parties aggrieved,” capable of filing their own cases in federal court.2
A review of the statutory text makes clear that, as relevant here, the IDEA grants parents only two types of rights. First, under certain circumstances “a court or a hearing officer may require the
The Court goes further, however, concluding that parents may proceed pro se not only when they seek reimbursement or assert procedural violations, but also when they challenge the substantive adequacy of their child‘s FAPE—so that parents may act without a lawyer in every IDEA case. See ante, at 527-533. In my view, this sweeps far more broadly than the text allows. Out of this sprawling statute the Court cannot identify even a single provision stating that parents have the substantive right to a FAPE. The reason for this is readily understandable: The right to a free appropriate public education obviously inheres in the child, for it is he who receives the education. As the IDEA instructs, participating States must provide a “free appropriate public education ... to all children with disabilities....”
thus have the power, at the administrative stage, to litigate all of the various rights under the statute since at that stage they аre acting not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of their child as well. This tells us nothing whatever about whose rights they are.5 The Court‘s spraying statutory sections about like buckshot cannot create a substantive parental right to education where none exists.
Harkening back to its earlier discussion of the IDEA‘s “text and structure” (by which it means the statute‘s procedural protections), the Court announces the startling
differentiates between the rights accorded to parents and their children. See Emery v. Roanoke City School Bd., 432 F. 3d 294, 299 (CA4 2005) (“[P]arents and children are distinct legal entities under the IDEA” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As even petitioners’ amici agree, “Congress specifically indicated that parents have rights under the Act that are sеparate from and independent of their children‘s rights.” Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 18. Does the Court seriously contend that a child has a right to reimbursement, when the statute most definitively provides that if “the parents of a child with a disability” enroll that child in private school, “a court ... may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment“?
The Court believes that because parents must prove the substantive inadequacy of a FAPE before obtaining reimbursement,
own right. Congress has used the phrase “party aggrieved,” and it is this Court‘s job to apply that language, not to run from it.
The Court further believes that a distinction between parental and child rights will prove difficult to administer. I fail to see why that is so. Before today, the majority of Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have allowed parents to sue pro se with respect to some claims, but not with respect to the denial of a FAPE. See Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527, 532 (CA7 2006); Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233; Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123, 126 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576, 581, n. 17 (CA11 1997). The Court points to no evidence suggesting that this majority rule has caused any confusion in practice. Nor do I see how it could, since the statute makes clear and easily administrable distinctions between parents’ and children‘s legal entitlements.
Finally, the Court charges that the approach taken by the majority of Courts of Appeals would perpetrate an “injustice,” ante, at 533, since parents who do not seek reimbursement or allege procedural violations would be “without a remedy,” ante, at 532. That, of course, is not true. They will have the same remedy as all parents who sue to vindicate their
out without the assistance of plaintiff‘s counsel is much more difficult and time consuming. In both categories of pro se parental suit permitted under a proper interpretation of the statute, one or the other of these burdens is reduced. Actions seeking reimbursement are less likely to be frivolous, since not many parents will be willing to lay out the money for private education without some solid reason to believe the FAPE was inadequate. And actions alleging procedural violations can ordinarily be disposed of without the intensive record review that characterizes suits challenging the suitability of a FAPE.
*
*
*
Petitioners sought reimbursement, alleged procedural violations, and requested a declaration that their child‘s FAPE was substantively inadequate. Ante, at 521. I agree with the Court that they may proceed pro se with rеspect to the first two claims, but I disagree that they may do so with respect to the third.