Case Information
*3 Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, McKEE, RENDELL, BARRY, AMBRO, FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 24, 2007) * Honorable Franklin S. Van Antwerpen assumed senior status on October 23, 2006 after the case was initially argued and continues to participate in the matter pursuant to I.O.P 9.6.4. Michael C. Walters [ARGUED] Office of Attorney General of New Jersey *4 Division of Law
P.O. Box 112
25 Market Street
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ 08625
Counsel for Appellants
Stephen M. Latimer
Loughlin & Latimer
131 Main Street, Suite 235
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Elizabeth A. Athos [ARGUED] Education Law Center
60 Park Place, Suite 300
Newark, NJ 07102
Rebecca K. Spar [ARGUED - en banc] Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman & Leonard 25 Main Street - Court Plaza North P.O. Box 800
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, we reexamine our holding in
W.B. v.
Matula
, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995), that an action can be
maintained against school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq
. We do so in light of the
*5
Supreme Court’s reasoning in
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.
Abrams
,
The District Court, relying on Matula , held that the alleged violations of plaintiff’s rights were actionable under § 1983 and denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, concluding that plaintiff’s cause of action could be maintained and there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendants violated clearly established federal law. We will reverse.
I. Background
In January 2001, A.W., a dyslexic former student of the Jersey City Public Schools (“JCPS”), filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. A.W. alleged that New Jersey officials failed to comply with federal law and, as a result, deprived him of a free, appropriate public education. In addition to suing JCPS and its officials, A.W. also brought claims against Barbara Gantwerk, Director of the Office of Special Education Programs for the New Jersey Department of Education (“NJDOE”), and Melinda Zangrillo, Coordinator of Compliance at NJDOE, in their personal capacities. [1]
With respect to Gantwerk and Zangrillo, A.W. asserted that, in response to his December 1997 complaint alleging that he had unidentified and untreated dyslexia, Gantwerk and Zangrillo conducted an inadequate investigation and provided *6 no relief to A.W., despite ample evidence of A.W.’s disability. In A.W.’s amended complaint, [2] he sought to hold Gantwerk and Zangrillo personally liable under § 1983 for violations of A.W.’s rights under the IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Following the completion of all discovery other than expert depositions, defendants moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds, including qualified immunity and a challenge to the use of § 1983 to remedy the alleged violations of the IDEA and Section 504. On April 21, 2005, the District Court struck A.W.’s claim for declaratory relief and denied summary judgment to the defendants on all other bases. The Court found that the IDEA could be enforced through an action under § 1983 based on our decision in W.B. v. Matula , 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995), wherein we specifically reasoned that § 1983 was available to redress a violation of a student’s rights secured by the IDEA. The District Court also rejected defendants’ argument that individuals could not be sued under § 1983 for alleged violations of the IDEA and Section 504 because these statutes impose liability only on entities that *7 receive federal funding. Finally, the Court denied defendants qualified immunity because A.W. adduced sufficient proof that defendants had violated A.W.’s clearly established rights under the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act. Gantwerk and Zangrillo now appeal.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343. Its order denying
qualified immunity comes to us as a “final” order for review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
See Mitchell v. Forsyth
,
We will engage in plenary review of a district court’s
summary judgment ruling on qualified immunity,
Kopec v. Tate
,
III. Discussion
A. Qualified Immunity for Statutory Violations
The first issue we confront is whether we should decide the availability of § 1983 relief for the alleged violations of A.W.’s statutory rights as part of the qualified immunity inquiry that is the basis for the appeal before us. We conclude we can, and should.
We have jurisdiction to decide this question because it arises in the course of our analysis of defendants’ request for qualified immunity. Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), a court analyzing a claim of qualified immunity must first ask the “threshold” question: whether the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201. If the plaintiff’s allegations establish the violation of a constitutional right , the violation is necessarily actionable and the court can then proceed to the second inquiry in the Saucier analysis: whether the right was “clearly established.” [3] Id.
Violations of federal statutes, however, are not always
actionable.
See Davis v. Scherer,
In fact, we cannot imagine a qualified immunity inquiry
involving statutory rights that does not include an inquiry into
the availability of relief and the existence of a cause of action
along with an inquiry into the existence of the violation itself.
This would be a useless act. We cannot conceive of why we
should subject the state actors here to a trial when the right of
*10
the plaintiff to sue is questionable. It makes little or no sense.
[6]
The privilege of qualified immunity is “effectively lost if a case
is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”
Saucier
,
Here, the District Court followed our decision in
Matula
,
where we held that violations of IDEA-created rights are
actionable under § 1983.
[7]
Matula
, 67 F.3d at 494. Concluding
that it was bound by
Matula
to so rule, the District Court noted
that “only one judicial body is able to overrule Third Circuit
precedent, and this Court is not it.”
A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.
Schs.
, No. 01-140, slip op. at 14 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2005). In light
of the recent, clear guidance provided by the Supreme Court in
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams
,
B . W.B. v. Matula
Matula involved the precise issue before us: can school officials be sued pursuant to § 1983 based on alleged violations of a child’s rights secured by the IDEA. In addressing this question, we strove to determine Congress’ intent, noting the distinction regarding the use of § 1983 to redress statutory, rather than constitutional, violations:
When the rights at issue are statutory, however, a § 1983 action is impermissible when “Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement.” Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987). Such an intent is generally found either in the express language of a statute or where a statutory remedial scheme is so comprehensive that an intent to prohibit enforcement other than by the statute’s own means may be inferred. Id.
Matula
,
In
Matula
, we concerned ourselves with
the
jurisprudential and legislative directives regarding the
availability of relief for IDEA violations. We noted that in
Smith v. Robinson
,
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.
(“IDEA”) in 1990. See Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141 (1990). To avoid confusion, we refer to the statute throughout this opinion as the IDEA.
20 U.S.C. § 1415( l ). [9]
In an attempt to ascertain the significance of Congress’ addition of this provision, we reviewed its legislative history in some detail:
The Senate Report [on § 1415( l )] discussed Smith at length, including quoting favorably from the Smith dissent, see S.Rep. No. 99-112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799 (“Senate Report”). The House Conference Report stated “[i]t is the conferees’ intent that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are governed by [§ 1415( l )].” H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 99-687, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1809. In addition, the House Report made explicit that “since 1978, it has been Congress’ intent to permit parents or guardians to pursue the rights of handicapped children through EHA, section 504, and section 1983 . . .. Congressional intent was ignored by the U.S. Supreme Court when . . . it handed down its decision in Smith v. Robinson. ” H.R.Rep. No. 99- 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) (“House Report”) (first emphasis added). Section 1415[( l )] was thus enacted to “reaffirm, in light of [ Smith ], the viability of section 504, 42 U.S.C 1983, and other statutes as separate vehicles for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.” Id.
Id. at 494. In Matula , we concluded that “[f]ar from inferring a *14 congressional intent to prevent § 1983 actions predicated on IDEA then, we conclude that Congress explicitly approved such actions.” Id.
Also underlying our ruling in Matula was the Supreme Court’s statement in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992), that “we presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” Given this presumption, we searched for some “clear direction” in the text or history of the IDEA indicating that we were to limit the relief available and, finding none, we held that:
the traditional presumption in favor of all appropriate relief is not rebutted as to § 1983 actions to enforce IDEA. Defendants have identified no “clear direction” in the text or history of IDEA indicating such a limitation, and indeed there is strong suggestion that Congress intended no such restriction. Certainly the plain language of § 1983 authorizes actions at law or equity, and our prior holding in Diamond compels the conclusion that, as a matter of law, an aggrieved parent or disabled child is not barred from seeking monetary damages in such an action.
Id. at 495. We should note that we were not alone in this view at the time, as we cited to numerous other courts’ opinions that approved § 1983 actions to enforce IDEA rights. See id . (collecting cases).
However, following Matula , reasonable minds have differed as to the correctness of our interpretation of the congressional reaction to Smith v. Robinson embodied in § 1415( l ). In addition, over the past decade, the Supreme Court *15 has further refined its guidance as to how we should decide whether § 1983 relief is available for violations of statutory rights, most recently in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams , 544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005). All of these developments since Matula have informed our analysis in a way that requires us to reconsider our view.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth Circuits
have taken issue with our reading of § 1415(
l
) and discernment
of Congress’ intent in enacting it. They note that the provision
does not refer to § 1983; rather, it focuses on substantive
rights.
[10]
In
Sellers v. School Board of Manassas, Virginia
, 141
F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998), and
Padilla v. School District No. 1
,
By preserving rights and remedies “under the Constitution,” section 1415[( l )] does permit plaintiffs to resort to section 1983 for constitutional violations, notwithstanding the similarity of such claims to those stated directly under IDEA. But section 1415[( l )] does not permit plaintiffs to sue under section 1983 for an IDEA violation, which is statutory in nature. Nothing in section 1415[( l )] overrules the Court’s decision in Smith to the extent it held that Congress intended IDEA to provide the sole remedies for violations of that same statute.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court further disagreed with the notion that the legislative history reveals the requisite intent to permit § 1983 suits merely because § 1983 is referred to in the House Reports. Id. at 531. The court concluded that insofar as one of the specific substantive provisions preserved in § 1415( l ) is the Constitution, it was not surprising that the legislative history referenced § 1983, which provides a vehicle for redressing violations of constitutional rights. Id. “When construed in their most natural form, the excerpts demonstrate the unremarkable proposition that Congress intended section 1415[( l )] to restore the ability of disabled children and their parents or guardians to utilize section 1983 to protect constitutional rights.” Id. [11]
*17
In
Padilla
, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
noted that the issue had created a circuit split.
Padilla
, 233 F.3d
at 1273 (comparing
Sellers
with
Matula
and
Marie O. v. Edgar
,
Were we deciding this case in the year 2001, after these
courts had voiced their disagreement with
Matula
, we might be
conflicted as to whether to revisit the issue. On the one hand,
the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth Circuits offered
the convincing arguments, noted above, as to how Congress’
enactment of § 1415(
l
) did not provide for § 1983 as a remedial
tool here, and as to how our analysis with respect to the
availability of relief in
Matula
was incomplete in light of other
Supreme Court cases. On the other hand, several other courts
had expressed views similar to ours in
Matula
, or had assumed
§ 1983 to be available.
[12]
While the former may have tipped the
unambiguous. The court found a lack of the requisite clarity, in
that § 1415(
l
) does not state or imply that § 1983 suits may be
brought for IDEA violations.
allow recourse to § 1983 to remedy IDEA violations have based
their reasoning on the same reading of the legislative history of
*18
scales somewhat towards rethinking
Matula
even then, the
Supreme Court’s discussion of the availability of § 1983 as a
vehicle for redressing violations of federal statutory rights in
Rancho Palos Verdes
, 544 U.S. 113, has tipped them
definitively, and we are now convinced that our ruling in
Matula
the IDEA that we adopted in
Matula
.
See Marie O. v. Edgar
,
C. Rancho Palos Verdes
Rancho Palos Verdes,
The Supreme Court held many years before
Matula
that
violations of certain federal statutory rights are actionable under
§ 1983.
See Maine v. Thiboutot
,
In [
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
*20
National Sea Clammers Ass’n
, 453 U.S. 1
(1981)], an intent to foreclose resort to § 1983
was found in the comprehensive remedial scheme
provided by Congress, a scheme that itself
provided for private actions and left no room for
additional private remedies under § 1983.
Similarly,
Smith v. Robinson,
It was not until after our decision in
Matula
that the
Supreme Court offered us more precise guidance as to
restrictions on the availability of § 1983, stating that “[e]ven if
a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an
individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the
right is enforceable under § 1983.”
Blessing v. Freestone
, 520
U.S. 329, 341 (1997). In
Blessing
, the Court noted that there
could be an “implied” foreclosure of a § 1983 right of action if
the statute contains a “comprehensive enforcement scheme that
is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.”
Id.
at 341 (citing
Livadas v. Bradshaw
,
Then, in Rancho Palos Verdes , 544 U.S. 113, the Supreme Court examined whether Congress meant the remedy available under § 1983 to coexist with the remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [13] for the alleged violations of the plaintiff’s rights under the Act. Id. at 120-21. The plaintiff in Rancho Palos Verdes had applied to the City Planning Commission for a permit to allow commercial use of his radio antenna. Id. at 1456. After the permit application was denied, the plaintiff sued for injunctive relief under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) of the Communications Act and for money damages and attorneys’ fees under § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 118. The Supreme Court concluded that § 1983 was not available to redress the alleged violations of the plaintiff’s statutory rights.
The Court reiterated that to sustain a § 1983 action for the
violation of a statutory right, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
*22
the federal statute creates an individually enforceable right in the
class of beneficiaries to which he belongs.
Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe
,
In discussing its prior decisions on the availability of § 1983 as a remedy for violations of statutory rights, the Court noted that in all of the cases in which it found § 1983 available to provide a remedy for a violation of statutory rights, the statute at issue did not contain a private judicial remedy (or, in most of the cases, even a private administrative remedy). Id. at 121. The Court also reminded us yet again that it had found that § 1983 was not an available remedy for violation of statutory rights in only two prior cases: Sea Clammers and Smith . In both of those cases, express, private means of redress were provided for in the statutes themselves. Id. at 121.
The Court noted the significance of Congress’ inclusion of private remedial provisions in the statute: it is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not intend “to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.” Id. However, the “ordinary inference that the remedy provided in the statute is exclusive” can be overcome by “textual indication, express or implicit, that the remedy is to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983.” Id. at 122. In framing the issue in this way, the Court seems to have upended the Blessing “presumption,” with the inclusion of a private remedy being the pivotal factor. The inclusion of a private remedy gives rise to a presumption that this remedy is to *23 be exclusive. This presumption may be defeated by a “textual” showing that the remedy was not intended to be comprehensive.
The Court found that the Telecommunications Act did provide an express, private judicial remedy and that there was no textual indication that the remedy provided was meant “to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983.” Id. The Court also noted that the remedy made available by the Telecommunications Act “adds no remedies to those available under § 1983, and limits relief in ways that § 1983 does not.” Id. at 122. The Court finally dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that the “savings clause” in the Telecommunications Act was an express statement of Congress’ intent not to preclude an action under § 1983. Id. at 126. The Court concluded that the clause did not require a court to permit enforcement of the Act under § 1983, but rather underscored Congress’s intent that “the claims available under § 1983 prior to the enactment of the [Communications Act] continue to be available after its enactment.” Id .
1. The IDEA
Guided by the method of analysis outlined in
Rancho
Palos Verdes
, we now look to the IDEA to determine whether
Congress intended to allow rights granted by the IDEA to be
remedied through a § 1983 action. For purposes of this appeal,
the parties do not dispute that the IDEA creates individually
enforceable rights in the class of beneficiaries to which A.W.
belongs. Therefore, we presume that Congress intended § 1983
to be an available remedy for violations of the IDEA.
Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe
,
Under the IDEA, any aggrieved party may “present a
complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child,
or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The party may elect to have the
complaint investigated by the state educational agency,
see
34
C.F.R. § 300.661, or avail itself of an “impartial due process
hearing,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Any party aggrieved by the
outcome of the due process hearing “shall have the right to bring
a civil action with respect to the complaint presented . . . in a
district court of the United States, without regard to the amount
in controversy.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). This action must
be initiated within 90 days from the date of the hearing officer’s
decision. § 1415(i)(2)(B). The district court is authorized to
grant “such relief as the court determines is appropriate,”
including attorneys’ fees, reimbursement for a private
educational placement, and compensatory education.
See
20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (attorneys’ fees);
Burlington Sch.
Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ.
, 471 U.S. 359, 470 (1985)
(reimbursement)
; Lester H. v. Gilhool
,
A.W. argues that the “ordinary inference that the remedy
provided in the statute is exclusive” is overcome by the “textual
indication” in § 1415(
l
) of the IDEA that the remedies provided
for in the statute are “to complement, rather than supplant, §
1983.”
Id
. However, finding the reasoning of
Sellers
and
*25
Padilla
convincing, we do not agree that § 1415(
l
) shows that
Congress intended the remedies in the IDEA to complement,
rather than supplant, § 1983. Just like the savings clause in
Rancho Palos Verdes
, this provision merely evidences
Congress’ intent that “the claims available under § 1983 prior to
the enactment of the [Act] continue to be available after its
enactment.”
Id
. at 126. We also reject A.W.’s contention that
the references to § 1983 in the legislative history of § 1415(
l
)
[14]
show that Congress intended to preserve the availability of §
1983 to remedy violations of IDEA-created rights, as we concur
with the explanation of those references provided in
Sellers
.
See
Sellers
,
We agree with the reasoning of the Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, to say nothing of that of the
*26
Supreme Court in
Smith
, regarding the comprehensive nature of
the IDEA’s remedial scheme. The holding in
Smith
, although
superseded in part by the passage of § 1415(
l
) of the IDEA, was
not overruled to the extent that the Court found that the IDEA
provides a comprehensive remedial scheme. Indeed, since
Smith
, the Court has continued to refer to the IDEA as an
example of a statutory enforcement scheme that precludes a §
1983 remedy.
See Rancho Palos Verdes
, 544 U.S. at 121;
Blessing v. Freestone
,
2. Section 504
Similarly, we must examine Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to determine whether Congress intended to allow rights granted therein to be remedied through a § 1983 action. We look first to what means of redress are available under the statute itself.
The Rehabilitation Act adopts the scheme of “remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
et seq
., to remedy alleged
*27
violations of Section 504 by recipients of federal funding.
[15]
29
U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). Title VI provides for federal funding to be
terminated if an entity receiving assistance fails to comply with
its requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Title VI does not,
however, contain an express private right of action. Rather, the
Supreme Court has found an
implied
right of action under the
statute and Congress has acknowledged this right in
amendments to the statute, “leaving it ‘beyond dispute that
private individuals may sue to enforce’ Title VI.”
Barnes v.
Gorman
, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (quoting
Alexander v.
Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001)). “Thus Congress, in
essence, provided a private right of action under Section 504 by
incorporating Title VI’s ‘remedies, procedures, and rights’ into
the statute.”
Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living v. Hous. Auth.
of Pittsburgh
,
The remedies for violation of Section 504 “are
coextensive with the remedies available in a private cause of
action brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”
Gorman
, 536 U.S. at 185. These remedies include
*28
compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and other forms of
relief traditionally available in suits for breach of contract.
See
id.
at 187. Punitive damages are not available.
Id.
Suits may be
brought pursuant to Section 504 against recipients of federal
financial assistance , but not against individuals.
Emerson v.
Thiel Coll.
,
It is beyond question that Section 504’s remedial scheme
is far less detailed than the IDEA’s remedial scheme.
See
Powell v. Ridge
,
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held
that the remedial scheme in Title VI is comprehensive, and that
Congress did not intend to allow violations of Title VI to be
remedied through § 1983.
See Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist.
,
We recognize that two of our sister courts of appeals
have concluded that the remedial scheme in Title IX is not
comprehensive.
See Crawford v. Davis
,
We find the reasoning of the Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh and Second Circuits regarding the nature of the
remedial scheme under Section 504 to be more persuasive.
Following
Rancho Palos Verdes
, we will ordinarily infer that
when a private, judicial remedy is available for alleged statutory
violations, this remedy is intended to be exclusive.
See Rancho
Palos Verdes
,
IV. Conclusion
A.W. has not alleged an actionable violation of his rights under the IDEA or Section 504. Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District Court denying defendants’ motion for qualified immunity and remand to the District Court for entry of judgment in favor of defendants.
Notes
[1] A.W. reached a settlement with JCPS and its officials in February 2004.
[2] The procedure leading to the amendment of A.W.’s original
complaint was as follows: the NJDOE defendants, including
Gantwerk and Zangrillo, filed a motion to dismiss A.W.’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, based on sovereign immunity and other grounds. A.W.
filed a motion in opposition and also filed a motion to amend his
complaint. On March 18, 2002, the District Court issued an
order denying the motion to dismiss and granting A.W. leave to
file an amended complaint. The defendants appealed this order,
which we affirmed, holding that the various defendants had
waived sovereign immunity from suit under the IDEA and
Section 504 by accepting federal financial assistance.
See A.W.
v. Jersey City Pub. Schs.
,
[3] The official’s conduct in Saucier allegedly violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights and was actionable pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) . The analysis in Saucier is equally applicable to actions for alleged constitutional violations brought pursuant to § 1983. See Scott v. Harris , 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007).
[4] A.W. has not brought claims against defendants directly under the IDEA or Section 504. Appellee Br. 15. We therefore need not address whether defendants could be sued directly under these statutes, rather than under § 1983.
[5] We also think that it can be said that the question of whether
§ 1983 is available to remedy violations of the IDEA and
Section 504 is “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the issue of
qualified immunity, that is, . . . its review is ‘necessary to ensure
meaningful review’ of the qualified immunity issue,” and that
we therefore have jurisdiction over this aspect of the District
Court’s order.
See Walker v. City of Pine Bluff
,
[6] The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a strikingly similar situation has also viewed the issue of the availability of relief as a threshold issue and, concluding that § 1983 was not available to remedy the alleged statutory violations, dismissed an appeal of a denial of qualified immunity as moot. See Morris-Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch. Dist. , 423 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2005). We choose a different approach, ending up with the same result.
[7] The District Court did not specifically address whether the alleged Section 504 violations were actionable under § 1983, perhaps because defendants focused their arguments on the alleged IDEA violations. We address this issue, however, because determining whether an alleged statutory violation is actionable is part and parcel of our “threshold” inquiry into defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
[8] The Smith decision refers to the Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”). Congress changed the name of the statute to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
[9] At the time we decided Matula , this provision was codified at 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(f). Throughout this opinion, we refer to it at its current location in the Code, § 1415( l ).
[10] Several district courts have also made this observation.
See,
e.g., Carney v. Nevada
, No. 05 Civ. 713,
[11] In Sellers , the court also called upon an interpretive rule whereby, because the IDEA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, the statutory response to Smith should not be read to impose liability on state officials unless it is
[13] The Telecommunications Act amended the Communications Act of 1934 to include § 332(c)(7).
[14] The Court’s opinion in
Rancho Palos Verdes
did not address
the legislative history of the Telecommunications Act, nor
discuss whether it is appropriate to consider a statute’s
legislative history as evidence of what Congress intended.
However, Justice Stevens suggested in his concurrence in
Rancho Palos Verdes
that the Court assumed “that the
legislative history of the statute is totally irrelevant” in
discerning whether Congress intended to allow § 1983 actions.
[15] For some employment-related claims, the Rehabilitation Act
incorporates the remedial scheme provided by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, rather than that of Title VI. 29 U.S.C. §
794a(a)(1). Title VII, unlike Title VI, mandates that aggrieved
employees exhaust certain EEOC procedures prior to filing an
action in court. Several of the decisions cited by defendants are
therefore easily distinguishable because they examine the
remedial scheme provided by Title VII, rather than Title VI.
See
Lollar v. Baker
,