Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary‘s County, Maryland v. Barbara and Christopher Aiken, et al.
No. 28
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND
June 20, 2023
September Term, 2022
Opinion by Hotten, J.
Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.
We apply “basic principles of contract interpretation” when “construing the language of a deed[.]” Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 62, 985 A.2d 565, 575 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When the language of the deed “is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed.” Id. at 63, 985 A.2d at 576 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In doing so, we “consider the deed as a whole, viewing its language in light of the facts and circumstances of the transaction at issue as well as the governing law at the time of conveyance.” Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 123, 733 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1999). “Unless a contrary intention appears by express terms or is necessarily implied, every grant of land passes a fee simple estate.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Thornton Mellon, LLC, 478 Md. 396, 414, 274 A.3d 1079, 1089 (2022) (citation omitted).
A landowner conveyed property to the State by way of a deed in 1945. The plain, unambiguous language of the deed demonstrates that the property was conveyed in fee simple absolute. Nothing in the deed suggests a limitation, reversionary interest, or conveyance other than an interest in fee simple absolute. Property that is conveyed by deed for a public purpose does not debase or limit the estate conveyed. Gilchrist v. Chester, 307 Md. 422, 426, 514 A.2d 483, 485 (1986) (citation omitted); Stuart v. City of Easton, 170 U.S. 383, 394, 18 S. Ct. 650, 654 (1898) (citation omitted). Rather, the deed‘s relevant language, “forever in fee simple,” “all our . . . interest,” “all the land,” indicates the intent of the landowner to convey a fee simple absolute interest. See
REAL PROPERTY — DEDICATION BY DEED — CREATION OF A PUBLIC ROAD
In Maryland, public roads are established by: (1) public authority, (2) dedication, or (3) prescriptive easement. Clickner v. Magothy River Ass‘n Inc., 424 Md. 253, 269, 35 A.3d 464, 474 (2012) (citation omitted). This case does not involve establishment by public authority, which requires an exercise of eminent domain, or by prescriptive easement, which was not raised before this Court. See
A public road was established by a completed common-law dedication by the landowner‘s offer and the State‘s subsequent acceptance. The landowner offered to dedicate property “for public convenience[]” and “for a public highway” “forever in fee simple[.]” The deed language and the recordation of the plats constitute evidence of the landowner‘s offer to dedicate property to “public use[.]” Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass‘n, Inc. v. Gunby, 402 Md. 317, 330-31, 936 A.2d 365, 372-73 (2007). The State accepted the landowner‘s offer to dedicate property by “assuming control” of the property and recording the deed and plats. The State‘s acceptance is further confirmed by a subsequent deed from the State to St. Mary‘s County. Additionally, the State‘s subsequent conveyance to the County reflected that the State conveyed the entirety of the property in question as “a county road” for a “transportation purpose” pursuant to its statutory authority. Accordingly, the circuit court erroneously concluded that no public road was created.
Case No.: C-18-CV-18-000489
Argued: March 3, 2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND*
No. 28
September Term, 2022
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ST. MARY‘S COUNTY, MARYLAND
v.
BARBARA AND CHRISTOPHER AIKEN, ET AL.
Fader, C.J.,
Watts,
Hotten,
Booth,
Biran,
Gould,
Eaves,
JJ.
Opinion by Hotten, J.
Filed: June 20, 2023
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2023-06-20 14:31-04:00
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
*During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, seeking declaratory judgment to determine their rights with respect to the Property and whether the Property is a public road. The Circuit Court for St. Mary‘s County denied Wilkinson‘s motion for summary judgment and granted the County‘s motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim, finding that the County owns the Property in fee simple absolute and that no public road exists on the Property.
The Appellate Court of Maryland1 affirmed that the County owned the Property in fee simple absolute, but concluded that the circuit court erred in determining that there was no public road over the Property. Wilkinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs of St. Mary‘s Cnty., 255 Md. App. 213, 270, 279 A.3d 1052, 1087 (2022). Given the Appellate Court‘s conclusion that a public road was established over the Property, the court vacated and remanded the case to the circuit court for a consideration of certain claims filed by the
- Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the County owns the Property in fee simple absolute?
- Did the Appellate Court err in holding that, as a matter of law, a public road was established on the Property by dedication?
We answer these questions in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
Relevant Facts
A. Factual Background
1. The Property
The Property at issue is located within a subdivision known as “Scotland Beach” on a peninsula that borders and extends on the shore of the Chesapeake Bay. Scotland Beach was recorded at Liber EBA No. 19, Folio 408 and 409, on January 29, 1921, in the land records for St. Mary‘s County. The Chesapeake Bay lies to the east and Tanner Creek is along the west. A copy of the Scotland Beach plat appears in Appendix A of this opinion. The Property is approximately 0.196 acres and “eighty (80) feet long at its greatest length, forty (40) feet wide at its widest point, and approximately ten (10) feet wide at its narrowest point.”3
In 2005, Chesapeake Trails Surveying, LLC, prepared a full boundary survey of the Property, which is included in Appendix B. DH Steffens Company, a surveying consultant company, also prepared an exhibit plat “for informational and display/visualization purposes.” An excerpt of DH Steffens’ exhibit plat below depicts the disputed portion of the Property, which is represented by the dashed lines in the yellow-shaded area:
The exhibit plat shows that the Property bisects Wilkinson‘s property on Lots 17, 18, and 19, and shows Wilkinson‘s property outlined in bold lines.
2. The Bay Front Drive Project
As noted above, the Scotland Beach subdivision was established in the early 1920s. In the 1940s, the State Roads Commission of Maryland, a predecessor agency to the State Highway Administration (the “State“), proposed a series of road projects to construct a seven-mile-long highway, known as “Scotland Beach to Point Lookout,” running through the peninsula. The highway was intended to follow along the northern and eastern boundaries of the Scotland Beach subdivision, eventually turning south toward Point Lookout. In addition, the State and the County agreed to extend and improve an internal road, formerly known as “Ed‘s Road,” through the middle of the Scotland Beach
In October 1944, the State prepared and recorded Plats 1918 and 1919 to “lay out,” “establish,” and “construct” Bay Front Drive. Plat 1918 reflects the northern half of Bay Front Drive, starting at Scotland Beach Road, formerly Route 415, to Station Marker 10. Plat 1918 appears in Appendix C to this opinion. Plat 1919 reflects the southern half of Bay Front Drive, which continues from Station Marker 10 and extends into Scotland Beach Road. Plat 1919 appears in Appendix D to this opinion. Plats 1918 and 1919 were initially recorded on June 19, 1952, and again on March 26, 1986.
To construct Bay Front Drive, the State acquired property through conveyances and condemnation proceedings from Scotland Beach lot owners, including “Wilkinson‘s predecessor in interest, Joan Brady.” On July 21, 1945, Ms. Brady deeded portions of her property—Scotland Beach subdivision lots 17, 18, and 19, which includes the Property—to the State for the construction of Scotland Beach to Point Lookout highway and the extension of Bay Front Drive (the “Brady Deed“). The Brady Deed, recorded at CBG 15, folio 137, provided that:
WHEREAS, the State Roads Commission of Maryland, acting for and on the behalf of the State of Maryland, finds it necessary to acquire land, easements, and or rights, etc., shown and or indicated on State Roads Commission of Maryland‘s Plat No. 1919 which is duly recorded, or intended to be recorded, among the Land Records of St. Mary‘s County in the State of Maryland in order to lay out, open, establish, construct, extend, widen, straighten, grade and improve, etc., under its Contract BM-154-1-811 and or improve in any manner a highway and/or bridge, together with the appurtenances thereto belonging known as the Scotland Beach to Point Lookout, as a part of the Maryland State Roads System, and, thereafter use, maintain and/or further improve said highway and/or bridge, and
WHEREAS, the laying out of said highway and/or bridge and their appurtenances, in addition to being required for public convenience, necessity and safety, is a material benefit to the undersigned.
NOW, THEREFORE, THIS DEED AND RELEASE WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the above premises, One Dollar ($1.00) and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we do hereby grant and convey unto the State of Maryland, to the use of the State Roads Commission of Maryland, its successors and assigns, forever in fee simple, all our right, title, and interest, free and clear of liens and encumbrances, in and to all the land, together with the appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining, lying between the lines designated “right of way line” as shown and/or indicated on the aforesaid plat, all of which plat is made a part hereof, so far as our property and/or our rights may be affected by the said proposed highway and/or bridge and the appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining; and, we, for ourselves, our heirs and assigns, do further release the State [] and the State Roads Commission of Maryland . . . from any and all claims or demands . . . for any damages and/or injuries whatsoever caused directly or indirectly by the taking, and use, or improvement, etc., of the land, easements, and/or rights, etc., for a public highway and/or bridge and their necessary appurtenances, arising out of or caused by the laying out, opening, establishing, constructing, . . . etc., of the said State Highway and/or bridge and their necessary appurtenances within the area of the land[.]
(Emphasis added). The Brady Deed conveyed Ms. Brady‘s property to the State “forever in fee simple, . . . free and clear of liens and encumbrances, in and to all the land, . . . lying between the lines designated ‘right of way line’ as shown and/or indicated on the aforesaid plat [No. 1919.]” The “right of way line[s]” are depicted on Plats 1918 and 1919, an excerpt of which are shown below:
The northern portion of Bay Front Drive was constructed, ending around Station Marker 14. In 1954, severe storms, primarily Hurricane Hazel, resulted in severe erosion along the Scotland Beach shoreline. The storms caused large portions of the peninsula and Scotland Beach subdivision, including portions of the Property, to become submerged into the Bay. The construction of the southern portion of Bay Front Drive, notably the planned intersection into Scotland Beach Road, was not completed as a result of the erosion and storm damage. In July 1974, Wilkinson‘s predecessors in interest granted the County an easement to build and maintain a stone revetment along the shoreline to protect it from further erosion.
3. Conveyance to the County
As noted above, the State never completed its highway project. On September 22, 1988, the State conveyed “all right, title and interest . . . in and to all the land, . . . lying between the lines designated ‘right of way line’ as shown and/or indicated on . . . plats numbered 6016 [], 1918 and 1919,” to the County (the “1988 Deed“). The 1988 Deed, entitled “Road Conveyance Deed,” provides in part:
WHEREAS, the State Highway Administration has agreed, for good and valuable considerations, to convey unto the “GRANTEE(S)” herein, certain land, hereinafter described, which the “Grantor” has determined is no longer needed by it in connection with the construction, operation, maintenance, use and protection of the State Highway Systems[.]
* * *
THE GRANTORS DO HEREBY GRANT AND CONVEY unto St. Mary‘s County, Maryland all right, title and interest of the Grantors in and to all the land, together with the appurtenances thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, lying between the lines designated “right of way line” as shown and/or indicated on the State Roads Commission of Maryland‘s plats numbered 6016 (revised 4-25-45), 1918 and 1919, recorded or intended to be recorded among the Land Records of St. Mary‘s County, Maryland.
CONTAINING: 1.38 acres plus or minus.
BEING ALL OF THE BED of the road known as Bay Front Drive (formerly Ed Road). . . .
BEING PART OF THE BED of the road known as Scotland Beach Road. . . .
* * *
BEING ALL OF THE LAND which by deed recorded August 14, 1945 among the Land Records of St. Mary‘s County . . . was conveyed by Joan K. Brady to the State of Maryland to the use of the State Roads Commission of Maryland.4
* * *
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, TO EACH AND EVERY RESERVATION, RESTRICTION, CONDITION, COVENANT AND CONTROL SET FORTH IN THIS INSTRUMENT OF WRITING.
(Emphasis added). The 1988 Deed was recorded on December 22, 1988.
Beyond the sign, there is a short gravel area across the Property that is used as a pedestrian footpath to the beach. The County has also utilized the Property and easement to access and maintain the revetment.
In July 1995, John and Susan Wilkinson purchased Lots 17, 18, and 196 and transferred their interest to the Wilkinson Trust in May 2016. In 2004, the Aikens purchased undeveloped lots to the south of Wilkinson‘s property and the Property and subsequently transferred their interest to the Aiken Family Trust in May 2016. After the Aikens purchased their property, disputes arose between the Aikens and Wilkinson concerning the Aikens’ right to use the Property for ingress and egress. Wilkinson placed barriers on the Property to prevent the Aikens from traversing it. In December 2007, Wilkinson petitioned the County “to close, or not to open,” the Property as a road. Specifically, Wilkinson argued that the Property was: (1) not suitable to be used as a road because of the constant flooding and (2) within the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area and in a Limited Development Area Overlay District.
The County held a public hearing on November 15, 2016 “to close a portion of . . . Bay Front [Drive].” In August 2017, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2017-23 titled “[AN ORDINANCE] TO CLOSE BAY FRONT DRIVE (EXTENDED), LOCATED IN THE FIRST (1ST) ELECTION DISTRICT OF ST. MARY‘S COUNTY, MARYLAND” (the “2017 Ordinance“) to close Bay Front Drive. In the recitals contained in the 2017 Ordinance, the County noted that it is “authorized to open, alter or close certain public roads” within the County pursuant to
Legal Proceedings
A. Circuit Court Proceedings
On November 13, 2018, Wilkinson filed suit against the County in the Circuit Court for St. Mary‘s County, asserting ownership of the Property based upon theories of adverse possession, abandonment, and estoppel. In May 2019, Wilkinson amended his complaint, retaining only a claim for declaratory judgment. The County filed a counter-complaint against Wilkinson, seeking a declaratory judgment that it owns the Property in fee simple.
In 2019, the Aikens intervened as defendants and filed a combined cross and counter complaint, asserting various causes of action against both the County and Wilkinson. The Appellate Court provided the following succinct summary of the Aikens’ claims:
Count I sought a declaratory judgment that the Aikens have a right to use Bay Front Drive to access their own property, to “require the County to keep the entire remaining width of Bay Front Drive open for ingress and egress,” and to prohibit Wilkinson from interfering with the Aikens’ right to use the [] [P]roperty. Count II sought to quiet title to the Aikens’ property (alleged to be Lots 23, 24, and 25) and for the court to “declare that the Aikens are the absolute owners in fee simple of all of the Aiken property, subject only to the County‘s easements.” Count II also admitted that the County “maintains an easement over the Aiken property in order to maintain the erosion control systems on the property.” Count III sought injunctive relief, requiring the County to keep the alleged public road over the [] [P]roperty
“open for ingress and egress” and prohibiting Wilkinson from blocking the alleged public road. Count IV alleged that, if the County “caused the public‘s and the Aiken‘s easement over Bay Front Drive to be lost,” this constitutes a taking and that the Aikens should be compensated for the loss of value to their property. Count V asserted interference with easement, which sued the County in tort for allegedly failing to consistently remove barriers repeatedly erected by Wilkinson on the alleged public road and sued Wilkinson for compensatory and punitive damages for interference with the Aikens’ alleged easement.
Wilkinson, 255 Md. App. at 234-35, 279 A.3d at 1065-66.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in September 2019. The circuit court conducted a motions hearing on October 11, 2019. Following the hearing, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order on June 19, 2020. The court determined that there were “no material facts in dispute” and that it “may decide all issues presented as a matter of law.” The court granted the County‘s motion for summary judgment with respect to Wilkinson‘s claim for declaratory judgment. The circuit court further granted the County‘s motion for summary judgment with respect to all claims asserted by the Aikens against the County (Counts I, III, IV, and V). As between Wilkinson and the Aikens, the court denied the Aikens’ motion for summary judgment on Count II (quiet title) and dismissed the claim without prejudice. With respect to the Aikens’ claims against Wilkinson in Counts III and V, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Wilkinson. As relevant here, the circuit court determined that: (1) the County owns the Property in fee simple, “free and clear of any and all claims, easements, liens[,] and encumbrances“; (2) “[n]either [Wilkinson] nor the Aikens ha[ve] any private property interest in or with respect to the [] [P]roperty[;]” and (3) the Property is “not a public road, as a matter of law.” Regarding the public road, the court determined that “[t]here was no
B. Opinion of the Appellate Court of Maryland
On July 28, 2022, the Appellate Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings. Wilkinson, 255 Md. App. at 270, 279 A.3d at 1087. The Appellate Court held, in relevant part, that the circuit court: (1) “did not err in determining that the County owns the [] [P]roperty in fee simple [absolute]” and (2) “erred in determining that there was no public road south of Station Marker 14[.]” Id. at 270, 279 A.3d at 1087.
First, Wilkinson argued that the Brady Deed was “ambiguous” and “granted an easement to construct and maintain Scotland Beach Road and Bay Front Drive[.]” Id. at 238, 279 A.3d at 1068. In the alternative, Wilkinson asserted that the Brady Deed “was conveyed in fee simple determinable rather than fee simple absolute.” Id., 279 A.3d at 1068. The County maintained it owns the Property in fee simple absolute and that Wilkinson‘s fee simple determinable argument “was not preserved.” Id., 279 A.3d at 1068.
The Appellate Court rejected the arguments advanced by Wilkinson that the Brady Deed conveyed to the State an interest less than fee simple absolute. Id., 279 A.3d at 1068. The Appellate Court considered the express language in the Brady Deed and concluded
The Appellate Court extensively discussed the manner in which a public road is created by dedication. Id. at 248, 279 A.3d at 1073-79 (noting that “a completed common law dedication requires an offer and acceptance.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (cleaned up)). To the court, the Brady Deed and Plat 1919, which was incorporated into the Brady Deed, “constitute[d] clear and unequivocal evidence of an offer” by Ms. Brady to dedicate the Property for public use. Id. at 250, 279 A.3d at 1075. The Appellate Court determined that the State “accepted the offer to dedicate the [] [P]roperty to public use[,]” and the 1988 Deed “further [] support[s]” this conclusion. Id. at 252-53, 279 A.3d at 1076-77. The Appellate Court explained that:
The State . . . assumed control of the [] [P]roperty via the [Brady] [D]eed. The [] [P]roperty was conveyed to the State . . . “as part of the Maryland State Roads System,” to “use, maintain and/or further improve said highway and/or bridge.” The [] [P]roperty remained in the State‘s control until 1988, when it transferred its obligations to the County.
Consequently, the Appellate Court held the circuit court erred in granting the County‘s motion for summary judgment with respect to the Aikens’ Counts I, III, IV, and V because those claims “are premised on the existence of a public road.” Id., 279 A.3d at 1079-80. For the same reason, the court determined that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Wilkinson as to the Aikens’ Counts III and V. Id., 279 A.3d at 1079-80. Accordingly, the Appellate Court “vacate[d] and remand[ed] for further proceedings on the Aikens’ Counts I and III as against both the County and Wilkinson, County IV as against the County, and Count V as against Wilkinson.” Id., 279 A.3d at
The County filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted on November 18, 2022. Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs of St. Mary‘s Cnty. v. Aiken, 482 Md. 143, 285 A.3d 849 (2022).
The Contentions of the Parties
A. The County
The County agrees with the Appellate Court that the Brady Deed conveyed the Property to the State in fee simple absolute. The County asserts that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the 1988 Deed created a “dedication of a public road” based on the deed‘s language, intent, and surrounding facts and circumstances. To the County, the Appellate Court “[m]isconstrued” that the “land was conveyed for a transportation purpose[.]” Rather, the County contends the offer was “to deed the leftover land from a former State road project that was no longer possible to the County. Thus, the County could not have accepted a dedication as a ‘public road’ by accepting the [1988] [D]eed.” Finally, the County argues that the 2017 “Ordinance was unnecessary and immaterial[]” because it “could not ratify something that never occurred[.]” The County, therefore, asks
this Court to reinstate “the [circuit] court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County with respect to the Aikens’ claims in Counts I (declaratory judgment), III (injunctive relief), and IV (inverse condemnation), which were all premised on the existence of a public road on the [] [P]roperty.”B. Wilkinson
Wilkinson first argues that the circuit court and Appellate Court erred in determining that the Brady Deed conveyed title to the Property to the State in fee simple absolute. Wilkinson asserts that “the Brady Deed is ambiguous[]” and the circuit court should have considered “extrinsic evidence[.]” To Wilkinson, the Brady Deed “conveyed an easement for a specific purpose: to extend Bay Front Drive to connect with Scotland Beach Road, which was later made impossible due to storms and erosion.” Alternatively, Wilkinson maintains that, even if the Brady Deed granted a conveyance in fee simple, “the conveyance was made in fee simple determinable, not in fee simple absolute.” Finally, Wilkinson asserts that the Property “was never a public road and cannot be made one now[]” because “there is insufficient dry land remaining to create a road.”
C. The Aikens
The Aikens largely agree with the Appellate Court, asserting that it correctly determined that “[t]he County took title via a ‘Road Conveyance Deed‘” to the Property and that a public road exists south of Station Marker 14. The Aikens, however, assert that the dedication analysis of the Appellate Court “added an unnecessary analytical layer . . . by incorrectly focusing on dedication[.]” Rather, the Aikens ask this Court to “save future parties, counsel and courts a great deal of unnecessary money and ink” by holding that
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the [moving] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
A. The Appellate Court Correctly Held that the County Owns the Property in Fee Simple Absolute.
We begin by reviewing the principles that govern the interpretation of deeds. We apply “basic principles of contract interpretation” when “construing the language of a deed[.]” Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 62, 985 A.2d 565, 575 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 351, 833 A.2d 536, 545 (2003); Snider, 373 Md. at 38, 816 A.2d at 865. The language of the deed “itself is of foremost importance[.]” Claggett, 412 Md. at 62, 985 A.2d at 576 (citation omitted). “The principles of deed construction require [] consideration of ‘the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution[.]‘” Id. at 63, 985 A.2d at 576 (quoting Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 123, 733 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1999)). To determine the “extent of an estate or interest granted by a deed,” we construe the deed “so as to best effectuate the intention of the parties.” Green v. Eldridge, 230 Md. 441, 447, 187 A.2d 674, 677 (1963); Snider, 373 Md. at 46, 816 A.2d at 870; Cnty. Comm‘rs of Charles Cnty. v. St. Charles Assocs. Ltd. P‘ship, 366 Md. 426, 463, 784 A.2d 545, 567 (2001) (“Likewise, there is an equal abundance of Maryland case law directing the Court to strongly consider the intention of the parties.” (citations omitted)). In doing so, we “consider the deed as a whole, viewing its language in light of the facts and circumstances of the transaction at issue as well as the governing law at the time of conveyance.” Chevy Chase Land, 355 Md. at 123, 733 A.2d at 1062; Brown v. Reeder, 108 Md. 653, 71 A. 417, 419 (1908)
When the language of the deed “is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed.” Claggett, 412 Md. at 63, 985 A.2d at 576 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a deed is unambiguous, then we construe it without examining extrinsic evidence. See Dumbarton Improvement Ass‘n, Inc. v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co., 434 Md. 37, 56, 73 A.3d 224, 235 (2013); Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass‘n, Inc. v. Gunby, 402 Md. 317, 332 n.9, 936 A.2d 365, 373 n.9 (2007) (“As we have found no ambiguity, however, consideration of extrinsic documents is unnecessary.“); Gilchrist v. Chester, 307 Md. 422, 425, 514 A.2d 483, 484 (1986) (“[I]f the deed in question [is] clear and unambiguous, in the absence of fraud and mistake,” then there is “no need to construe it through the use of extrinsic evidence.“). Extrinsic evidence should only be used if the language in the deed is rendered ambiguous. Dumbarton Improvement Ass‘n, 434 Md. at 56, 73 A.3d at 235 (citation omitted). Accordingly, “the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give [way] to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean.” White, 403 Md. at 32, 939 A.2d at 176 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“The Real Property Article of the Maryland Code sets forth the language to be included in a deed when a grantor conveys a fee simple interest in property to a grantee.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Thornton Mellon, LLC, 478 Md. 396, 414, 274 A.3d 1079, 1089 (2022) (citation omitted). “Unless a contrary intention appears by express terms or is necessarily implied, every grant of land passes a fee simple estate.” Id., 274 A.3d at 1089 (citation omitted);
The Restatement of Property explains that an estate in fee simple “includes the estate in fee simple absolute . . . and all types of estates in fee simple defeasible[.]” Restatement (First) of Property § 14 cmt. a (1936). An estate in fee simple absolute is “[a]n estate of indefinite or potentially infinite duration[.]” Fee Simple Absolute, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Restatement (First) of Property § 14 cmt. a. “An estate in fee simple defeasible is an estate in fee simple which is subject to a special limitation[,]” including a fee simple determinable. Restatement (First) of Property § 16 cmt. c. “An estate in fee simple determinable is created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land, . . . provides that the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a stated event.” Id. § 44(b). Upon the occurrence of such event, an estate in fee simple determinable “will automatically end and revert to the grantor[.]” Fee Simple Determinable, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 408 Md. 242, 258 n.5, 969 A.2d 284, 293 n.5 (2009) (citations omitted). Thus, the grantor retains a possibility of reverter8 to “re-acquir[e] the land by reason of the occurrence of the contingency named or indicated[.]” Mayor & City Council of Ocean City v. Taber, 279 Md. 115, 128, 367 A.2d 1233, 1240 (1977) (citation omitted); Lovell Land, 408 Md. at 258 n.5, 969 A.2d at 293 n.5. Against this backdrop, our first task is to determine the type of interest conveyed by the Brady Deed.
The plain language of the Brady Deed expressly states that the Property was transferred to the State in fee simple:
NOW, THEREFORE, THIS DEED AND RELEASE WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the above premises, . . . we do hereby grant and convey unto the State of Maryland, to the use of the State Roads Commission of Maryland, its successors and assigns, forever in fee simple, all our right, title, and interest, free and clear of liens and encumbrances, in and to all the land, together with the appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining, lying between the lines designated “right of way line” as shown and/or indicated on the aforesaid plat, all of which plat is made a part hereof, so far as our property and/or our rights may be affected by the said proposed highway and/or bridge and the appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining[.]
(Emphasis added). The relevant verbiage “grant and convey[,]” “forever in fee simple,” “all our . . . interest,” and “all the land,” indicates the intent of the Brady Deed to convey a fee simple absolute interest in the Property. See
Wilkinson further maintains that the Brady Deed conveyed an easement rather than an estate in fee simple. We disagree. As noted above, the language in the Brady Deed clearly and unequivocally conveyed the land to the State in fee simple. The Brady Deed did not convey an easement. “An easement is broadly defined as a nonpossessory interest in the real property of another, . . . and arises through express grant or implication.” Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984) (citations omitted). “An express easement by reservation arises when a property owner conveys part of [their] property to another, but includes language in the conveyance reserving the right to use some part of the transferred land as a right-of-way.” Miller, 377 Md. at 349, 833 A.2d at 544 (citation omitted). Under an easement by reservation, “the land remains the property of the owner of the servient estate, and he is entitled to use it for any purpose that does not interfere with the easement.” Id., 833 A.2d at 544 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, “the terms ‘easement’ and ‘right-of-way’ are regarded as synonymous.” Id., 833 A.2d at 544 (citation omitted). “[W]hen a deed conveying a right-of-way fails to express a clear intent to convey a different interest in land, a presumption arises that an easement was intended.” Chevy Chase Land, 355 Md. at 128, 733 A.2d at 1064. It follows “that where the deed is ambiguous and the granting clause is not specific, references to the interest being conveyed as a right-of-way gives rise to a presumption that an easement was intended.” Id., 733 A.2d at 1064 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the language in the Brady Deed was unambiguous and provided no “presumption that an easement was intended.” Id., 733 A.2d at 1064 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, the Brady Deed simply described the Property as “all the land, together with the appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining, lying between the lines designated ‘right of way line’ as shown and/or indicated on the aforesaid plat [1919 and 1918.]” This language was used as a legal description, not to establish the interest granted.9 Id. at 132, 733 A.2d at 1066-67
Finally, we address Wilkinson‘s argument that, even if the Property was conveyed as a fee simple estate, it was conveyed as a fee simple determinable. In support of his contention, Wilkinson maintains that the conveyance was specifically for the purpose of constructing Bay Front Drive. Since this “event” did not occur, Wilkinson insists that the interest reverted to him. We disagree. The Brady Deed did not convey the Property in fee simple determinable. A clause in a deed that states “that [a] property is conveyed for public purposes does not qualify or limit the estate conveyed[.]” Gilchrist, 307 Md. at 426, 514 A.2d at 485 (citation omitted); Stuart v. City of Easton, 170 U.S. 383, 394, 18 S. Ct. 650, 654 (1898) (“[T]he mere expression of a purpose will not of and by itself debase a fee.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As we explained in Sands v. Church of Ascension & Prince of Peace:
[W]hen the language of an instrument does not clearly indicate the grantor‘s intention that the property is to revert to [them] in the event it is diverted from the declared use, the instrument does not operate as a restraint upon alienation of the property, but merely expresses the grantor‘s confidence that the grantee will use the property so far as may be reasonable and practicable to effect the purpose of the grant.
181 Md. 536, 542, 30 A.2d 771, 775 (1943) (citation omitted).
While we acknowledge that the Brady Deed contained recitals reflecting that the land was being conveyed to the State “in order to . . . construct[] . . . and or improve . . . a highway and/or bridge, . . . as a part of the Maryland State Roads System, and, thereafter use, maintain and/or further improve said highway and/or bridge[] . . . for public
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the Appellate Court that the circuit court “did not err in granting the County‘s motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment
B. The Appellate Court Correctly Held that a Public Road Was Established on the Property South of Station Marker 14 by Dedication.
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Appellate Court that a public road was established over the Property by dedication. In Maryland, public roads are established by: (1) public authority, (2) dedication, or (3) prescriptive easement.10 Clickner v. Magothy River Ass‘n Inc., 424 Md. 253, 269, 35 A.3d 464, 474 (2012) (quoting Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 352 (1885)). We do not address the third method, prescriptive easement, because it was not raised before this Court. See
State governments or municipalities may create a public road through condemnation proceedings11 pursuant to their public authority, i.e., eminent domain. Thomas, 63 Md. at 355 (“The existence of an ordinary highway over the land of an owner, whether it had its origin by condemnation, . . . does not divest [them] of the property in the soil.“); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36, 47, 21 A. 690, 693 (1891) (“And so the condemnation of private property for a highway subjects the land so taken merely to an easement in favor of the public, and does not divest the owner of the fee.” (citation omitted)); Anderson v. Great Bay Solar I, LLC, 243 Md. App. 557, 593, 221 A.3d 1050, 1072 (2019) (“[W]here land is appropriated to the public use under the right of eminent domain, the public authority generally is limited to their precise needs.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “Since . . . the general public [is] entitled to use [] public highway[s], street[s], or road[s], this Court has, without exception, held that condemnation for such purposes is constitutionally authorized.” Green v. High Ridge Ass‘n, Inc., 346 Md. 65, 75, 695 A.2d 125, 130 (1997).
2. Dedication
In City of Annapolis v. Waterman, we described common-law dedications as follows:
Generally, common-law dedications are voluntary offers to dedicate land to public use, and the subsequent acceptance, in an appropriate fashion, by a public entity. Common-law dedications are not mandated by statute. The offers are generally, although not exclusively, made by showing roads, parks or similar facilities on plats without any limitations on dedication, and the recording of those plats. Generally, acceptance is made by an express recorded document or by the appropriate entity assuming control and maintenance of the property offered. With acceptance, common-law dedication is complete.
357 Md. 484, 503-04, 745 A.2d 1000, 1010 (2000). Thus, dedication requires: (1) an offer to dedicate and (2) an acceptance of that offer. Id. at 504, 745 A.2d at 1010; Town of Glenarden v. Lewis, 261 Md. 1, 2, 273 A.2d 140, 141 (1971) (citations omitted).
To create a public road by dedication, “no particular form or ceremony is necessary[.]” Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 419, 24 A.2d 795, 800 (1942). Rather, the
a. Offer
We hold that the Brady Deed and Plat 1919, which was incorporated into the Brady Deed, reflect evidence of an offer. The Brady Deed is sufficient to establish Ms. Brady‘s intent because it expressly states that her property would be used “for public convenience,” as well as “for a public highway and/or bridge[.]” (Emphasis added). The Brady Deed did not contain any limiting language and stated that the conveyance was “forever in fee simple, . . . free and clear of liens and encumbrances[.]” Additionally, the recordings of Plat 1919 on June 19, 1952, and again on March 26, 1986, generate a presumption that Ms. Brady “intend[ed] to dedicate” her property to “public use[.]” Gunby, 402 Md. at 330, 936 A.2d at 372; Mauck, 247 Md. at 443, 231 A.2d at 690 (citations omitted). Assuming, arguendo, that the Brady Deed‘s language or Plat 1919 were individually insufficient, the Brady Deed also references a “highway and/or bridge and their appurtenances,” “as shown and/or indicated on the aforesaid plat,” specifically Plat 1919, which depicts Bay Front Drive, a highway. Thus, we agree with the Appellate Court that both the Brady Deed and Plat 1919 establish Ms. Brady‘s unequivocal intent to offer the Property to public use. Wilkinson, 255 Md. App. at 250, 279 A.3d at 1075. This, however, does not end the inquiry, because this Court must evaluate the evidence of the State‘s acceptance.
b. Acceptance
We further hold that the State accepted Ms. Brady‘s offer to dedicate the Property to public use. We have held that “[g]enerally, acceptance is made by an express recorded document or by the appropriate entity assuming control and maintenance of the property offered.” Waterman, 357 Md. at 504, 745 A.2d at 1010. Here, the State accepted the offer to dedicate set forth in the Brady Deed by accepting the conveyance and recording the instrument. Lewis, 261 Md. at 4, 273 A.2d at 142 (“[A]cceptance may ordinarily be evidence[] . . . by deed or other record[.]” (citations omitted)). We agree with the Appellate Court‘s conclusion that the dedication was complete when the State accepted the Property by the Brady Deed.13 Wilkinson, 255 Md. App. at 254, 279 A.3d at 1077.
First, the 1988 Deed, entitled “Road Conveyance Deed,” provided that the State owned the Property and maintained it for public use. The 1988 Deed characterizes the Property as State-owned when it mentions: (1) “certain State Highway(s) and/or Bridge(s) designated as . . . Bay Front Drive[;]” (2) “Right of Way Plat(s) designated as State
Under the 1988 Deed, the County remained “subject to” the completed dedication. The 1988 Deed specifically indicates that this conveyance was subject to “all rights and reservations that may have been granted or reserved by former owners of this property or their predecessors in title[.]” The 1988 Deed further notes that the County, upon accepting, would be subject “to each and every reservation, restriction, condition, covenant and control set forth in” the deed. We reject the County‘s contentions because the basis of Ms. Brady‘s offer and the State‘s acceptance was that the Property would be used for a public purpose, specifically as a highway or bridge. The 1988 Deed‘s “subject to” language unambiguously indicates that the parties had intended to incorporate that public purpose into the deed.
The General Assembly has given the State and county governments the authority to open, alter, and close public roads for over 200 years. See e.g., Barrickman v. Commissioners of Harford County, 11 Gill & J. 50, 56 (1839) (explaining that the powers of the county commissioners to open and close public roads are regulated by statute, and the jurisdiction, as conferred, being special and limited, “must be administered in the
(a) The purpose of this section is to return unneeded land to the tax rolls of the counties and to make this land available for use by a county or municipality for any transportation purpose.
(b)(1) [I]f land acquired under this subtitle is not needed for present or future State, county, or municipal transportation purpose or other public purposes, the Administration shall dispose of the land as soon as practicable after the completion or abandonment of the project for which the land was acquired.
(2)(i) If the land is from a project that was abandoned, and the Secretary determines that the property is no longer needed for any State transportation purpose, a county or municipality may acquire the land for a transportation purpose, with the approval of the Secretary[.]
* * *
(ii) If the land is not needed for a county or municipal transportation purpose, the person from whom the land was acquired or the successor in interest of that person has the right to reacquire the land[.]
(Emphasis added). Section 8-309 expressly contemplates that a transfer of property no longer needed for a State transportation purpose may be transferred to a local government for a local transportation purpose. The plain and unambiguous terms of the 1988 Deed, or the “Road Conveyance Deed,” reflect that the State conveyed Bay Front Drive to the
The 1988 Deed conveyed the entirety of the bed of Bay Front Drive, which the 1988 Deed expressly describes as a “county road.” The 1988 Deed does not treat the unpaved portion of Bay Front Drive over the Property differently than the paved northern portion of the road; rather, Bay Front Drive is referred to as a whole. By the express terms of the 1988 Deed, the conveyance was fee simple title to a county road, and the conveyance was undertaken by the State pursuant to its statutory authority to convey land that was “no longer needed for any State transportation purpose[]” to “a county . . . for a transportation purpose[.]”
In reaching our conclusion that the 1988 Deed conveyed the entirety of Bay Front Drive as a road, we also observe that, in addition to providing a statutory process for the State to convey property no longer needed for a state highway project, the General
The governing body of a county may open, alter, or close any county road under this subtitle on its own initiative if:
(1) at least 30 days’ notice is given by publication once a week for 3 successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county; and
(2) a hearing is held to consider any objection or counter petition.
Consistent with the express authority granted by State law, Chapter 109 of the Code of St. Mary‘s County provides that the “County Commissioners of St. Mary‘s County are authorized and empowered to control and regulate the public roads and bridges in the county.” St. Mary‘s County Code § 109-1 (2017). As the Appellate Court observes, Chapter 109 further provides that the County may, by petition, “[c]ondemn, lay out, open, extend and make new public roads[]” or “[a]lter, straighten, widen, grade, improve, or close up, in whole or in part, any existing public road[.]”
Wilkinson petitioned the County in December 2007 to close Bay Front Drive. On November 15, 2016, the County held a public hearing to assist in “deciding whether to approve [Wilkinson‘s] petition to . . . close [Bay Front Drive].”
CONCLUSION
We agree with the Appellate Court‘s well-reasoned analysis and affirm its judgment in all respects. We hold that: (1) the County owns fee simple title to the Property; (2) the Brady Deed constituted a completed dedication of Bay Front Drive to the State; (3) under the plain and unambiguous language of the 1988 Deed and statutory procedure for transferring State-owned property to a county government for “a transportation purpose,” the entirety of Bay Front Drive was transferred to the County as a “county road“; and (4) the County‘s adoption of the 2017 Ordinance constituted the legislative enactment required under State law and the County Code for the closure of a public road. Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Court‘s judgment vacating and remanding on the Aikens’ claims against both the County and Wilkinson. On remand, the circuit court should “take into consideration that the portion of Bay Front Drive over the [] [P]roperty” was closed pursuant to the 2017 Ordinance. Wilkinson, 255 Md. App. at 258, 279 A.3d at 1080.
JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Notes
1.) Did [the Appellate Court] misconstrue the 1988 deed as a matter of law by failing to consider the language, intent and surrounding circumstances to hold that a “public road” was established on the disputed property, where the road project was no longer feasible and the deed specifically stated that the property was no longer needed for a public road?
Wilkinson‘s brief includes additional questions regarding the ownership interest of the Property. Ordinarily, “[u]nder our certiorari process, this Court will only consider matters on appeal raised in a petition for writ of certiorari that we have granted.” MAS Assocs., LLC v. Korotki, 475 Md. 325, 365, 257 A.3d 553, 576 (2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]e may either limit the issues or add issues which the parties have not presented in certiorari petitions or cross-petitions.” Id., 257 A.3d at 576 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The determination of the estate interest is material to the parties’ interests; therefore, “we shall exercise our discretion to consider this issue.” Id. at 365-66, 257 A.3d at 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we have rephrased the original question presented for analytical consistency and clarity.