24 A.2d 795 | Md. | 1942
The bill of complaint of Joseph F. Shiebeck and wife alleges that they own a farm in Baltimore County; that a road, laid out partly on the land now owned by them and bounding partly on property recently acquired by James Smith and wife, defendants, has been a public road by general, unobstructed and continuous use for more than twenty years; that the defendants, claiming they own the road, have wrongfully erected a fence along its east side, thereby depriving the complainants of its use; and that, since this road is their only convenient means of access from their farm to the nearest county highway, such an obstruction would cause them irreparable *416 damage. The bill prays for an injunction to remove the fence and to enjoin the erection of any other barrier.
The chancellor, upon sustaining a demurrer to the bill, allowed the complainants to amend it in respect to the location of the road by inserting the words "without encroaching upon the land of the said defendants." After the phrase was inserted, the defendants demurred again. The appeal was taken from an order overruling the second demurrer.
One of the objections made by the defendants was that the complainants did not make an affidavit to the bill after the interlineation was made. It is an established rule in Maryland that prima facie evidence of the facts upon which a complainant's right to relief rests must be presented to the court to warrant the issuance of an injunction. This evidence may consist of the affidavit of the complainant or of a third person who knows the facts, or documentary evidence, its purpose being to verify the averments and induce the court to credit the bill for the truth of its statements. Block v. City of Baltimore,
According to the ancient English doctrine, chancery had no jurisdiction to decide questions relating directly to contested titles to real estate. Clayton v. Shoemaker,
One of the grounds upon which the defendants challenged the legal sufficiency of the amended bill was that it fails to allege that the use of the road has been notorious and hostile. It is a familiar principle that to estalish a right of way by prescription it is necessary to prove an adverse, exclusive and uninterrupted use of the way for twenty years. The term "adverse use" means use without license or permission, for an adverse right of an easement cannot grow out of a mere permissive enjoyment. Where, however, a person has used a right of way for twenty years unexplained, it is fair to presume that the use has been under a claim of right, unless it appears to have been by permission. In other words, the use of a way whenever one sees fit over the land of another, without asking leave is an adverse use, and the burden is upon the owner of the land to show that the use of the way was by license or contract inconsistent with a claim of right. Cox v. Forrest,
It is provided by statute that every bill of complaint shall be expressed in terms as brief and concise as it reasonably can be, and shall contain simply a statement of the facts upon which the complainant asks for relief. Code, 1939, Art. 16, Secs. 174, 176. The material facts essential to the complainant's right to obtain relief should be alleged, but a general statement of the facts is sufficient. It is not necessary to state minutely all the circumstances which may conduce to prove the general charge, as these circumstances are properly matters of evidence which need not be recited to enable them to be admitted as proof. Dennis v.Dennis,
The defendants also contended that the amended bill does not contain a sufficient statement of facts to show irreparable damage. It is undoubtedly true that the mere allegation of a complainant that he will suffer irreparable damage is not of itself a sufficient foundation upon which to base injunctive relief, but facts must be stated which will satisfy the court that the complainant's apprehension is well founded. City ofSalisbury v. Camden Sewer Co.,
The complainants allege in this case that they possess "no other convenient means of access" to the county highway except by the road which has been obstructed, and that the value of their property would be "seriously and permanently injured" by such an obstruction. They state specifically that the closing of the road would vastly increase the fire hazard for their property, hamper the delivery of feed and fertilizer to the farm, and practically prevent any physician from visiting the premises. They declare that as a result of the obstruction there would be "practically no proper ingress or egress" between their property and the county highway. Such an inconvenience would be a continuing one, causing pecuniary loss from day to day. The term "irreparable injury," as used in the law of injunction, does not necessarily mean that the injury complained of is beyond the possibility of compensation in damages, or that the injury must be very great. But while the complainants would be entitled to recover damages at law, they could not recover for the entire past and prospective injury in one suit, but only for the damages prior to the suit. These damages would be difficult to estimate, and in some cases might be comparatively trivial. Therefore, in seeking redress at law, they would be driven to a multiplicity *423
of vexatious and unprofitable suits. Townsend, Grace Co. v.Epstein,
As the complainants in this case are entitled to invoke the aid of equity, the order of the chancellor overruling the demurrer will be affirmed.
Order affirmed, and cause remanded, with costs.