296 A.3d 933
Md.2023Background
- Scotland Beach subdivision (1921) included Lots 17–19; Joan K. Brady deeded portions of those lots to the State in 1945 (the "Brady Deed") referencing Plat 1919 and conveying the land "forever in fee simple" for construction/maintenance of a highway (Scotland Beach to Point Lookout/Bay Front Drive).
- The State recorded plats (Plats 1918/1919) and constructed the northern portion of Bay Front Drive; storm erosion in the 1950s submerged parts of the peninsula and prevented completion of the southern segment.
- In 1988 the State conveyed to St. Mary’s County a "Road Conveyance Deed" transferring "all right, title and interest" in lands shown on Plats 1918/1919 (including the disputed strip) pursuant to the statutory authority to transfer unneeded highway lands to a county for transportation purposes.
- Parcel now at issue is a narrow, partly-unpaved strip south of Station Marker 14 used for pedestrian access and County maintenance of a shoreline revetment; County later posted an "End of County Maintenance" sign at about Station Marker 14.
- Wilkinson (successor trust owner of adjacent lots) sued the County asserting ownership by, inter alia, adverse possession/that the Brady Deed conveyed only an easement or a fee simple determinable; the Aikens intervened asserting rights to use the strip as a public road.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment to the County on title and held no public road existed; the Appellate Court affirmed fee title but held the strip south of Station 14 was a public road by dedication; the Maryland Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Brady Deed conveyed less than fee simple (easement or fee simple determinable) | Wilkinson: deed ambiguous; it conveyed only an easement for a specific highway purpose or, alternatively, a fee simple determinable that reverted when project was abandoned | County: deed language is plain and conveyed fee simple absolute; purpose recital does not limit estate | Held: Brady Deed unambiguous — conveyed fee simple absolute; no reversionary language or easement created |
| Whether a public road was established over the disputed strip (south of Station 14) | Aikens/Wilkinson: State did not complete project and dry land is insufficient for a road; no dedication created such that County lacks a public-road interest | County: even if it received title, the 1988 conveyance was not an acceptance of a dedicated public road; County later closed the road by ordinance | Held: A completed common-law dedication occurred (offer by Brady via deed/plat + acceptance by State via recording and control), and the 1988 Deed transferred Bay Front Drive to County as a county road; County’s 2017 ordinance validly closed the road |
Key Cases Cited
- Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45 (2009) (apply contract/deed interpretation principles; plain deed language controls)
- Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110 (1999) (construe deed as whole; descriptive clauses are less important than granting clause)
- Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Thornton Mellon, LLC, 478 Md. 396 (2022) (granting language ordinarily passes fee simple absent contrary intent)
- Gilchrist v. Chester, 307 Md. 422 (1986) (conveyance for a public purpose does not inherently debase a fee)
- City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 357 Md. 484 (2000) (common-law dedication requires offer + acceptance; acceptance can be record or assumption of control)
- Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n Inc., 424 Md. 253 (2012) (public roads are established by public authority, dedication, or prescriptive easement)
- Maryland-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n v. Town of Washington Grove, 408 Md. 37 (2009) (discusses government dedications and offers of land for public use)
- Stuart v. City of Easton, 170 U.S. 383 (1898) (recital of public purpose does not, by itself, limit or debase a fee)