Commonwealth v. Felder, M., Aplt.Commonwealth v. Felder, M., Aplt.
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY1
Over the past two decades, in a series of Eighth Amendment cases applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,2 the United States Supreme Court consistently has held that sentencing an offender who was under eighteen years old at the time of the crime raises special constitutional considerations. Of particular consequence in this line of cases were Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited mandatory life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), which held Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral appeal. In the wake of these decisions, hundreds of defendants who committed murder as a juvenile and werе
For our part, in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (”Batts II“), we exercised “our constitutional power of judicial administration to devise a procedure for the implementation of the Miller and Montgomery decisions in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 451 (internal quotations omitted). Among other things, we adopted a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for juveniles and imposed on the Commonwealth the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a juvenile offender is incapable of rehabilitation. See id. at 459. We determined these procedures were necessary to effectuate what we believed then was the central mandate of Miller and Montgomery: that “for a life-without-parole sentence to be constitutionally valid, the sentencing court must find that the juvenile offender is permanеntly incorrigible and that rehabilitation would be impossible.” Id. Still, even after establishing this comprehensive set of legal criteria to guide juvenile sentencings, other questions remained. We granted review in this case to consider one such issue: whether a discretionary term-of-years sentence may be so long as to amount to a de facto life sentence, thereby triggering the substantive and procedural protections afforded by Miller and its progeny.
Before we could resolve that issue, however, the High Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021), which severely narrowed the holdings of Miller and Montgomery as previously understood by many courts, including this one. Upon careful review of this new guidance, we are constrained to conclude our decision in Batts II has largely been abrogated. We further conclude Jones is dispositive of the issue presented here. As we will explain below, pursuant to the reasoning in Jones, even if a term-of-years sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, Miller provides no viable avenue for relief. Accordingly, we affirm appellant‘s judgment of sentence.
Before discussing the facts, we start with a review of the relevant precedent. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court began to place various constitutional limits on sentencing juveniles who had been convicted of serious criminal offenses.3 First, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), it concluded the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for murderers who were under eighteen at the time of their crimes. Next, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), the Court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide. Then in Miller in 2012, the Court barred mandatory sentencing schemes for juveniles convicted of homicide, concluding such sentences violate the principle of proportionality inherent to the Eighth Amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.4 Four years later, in Montgomery, the Court held Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212.
Our opinion in Batts II came on the heels of these decisions and the General Assembly‘s enactment of a new sentencing statute for juveniles convicted of first- and second-degree murder after June 24, 2012 — the day before Miller was decided. See
We reiterated this understanding when we proceeded to consider the legality of Batts‘s sentence de novo, and held it was illegal. Initially, we recognized there was “no question that the sentencing court thoroughly and completely reviewed the record and thoughtfully considered the testimony presented at the resentencing hearing” before
Our task in Batts II did not end there. We also recognized that “[d]espite the sentencing court‘s best efforts . . ., the lack of procedural safeguards resulted in it failing to properly apply the law to Batts‘[s] resentencing.” Id. at 451. Moreover, we observed that, at that time, there remained several hundred individuals in Pennsylvania prisons serving what we then believed were illegal life-without-parole sentences awaiting resentencing. See id. at 450. For those reasons, and because “[t]he General Assembly has not taken any appreciable steps to create a separate sentencing statute or to revise existing law so that it applies to juveniles convicted of first-[ or second-]degree murder prior to Miller[,]” we determined an “exercise of our constitutional authority [wa]s required to set forth the manner in which resentencing will proceed in the courts of this Commonwealth.” Id. at 450-51. And since we sought to devise only a procedural framework for implementing Miller and Montgomery‘s substantive mandate, we reasoned that such power “falls squarely within our constitutional authority.” Id. at 449; see
Pursuant to that power we approved a medley of protective procedural measures advanced by Batts and his amici. First, we determined “a faithful application of the holding in Miller, as clarified in Montgomery, requires the creation of a presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 452. Second, based on “the definitive language used by” the High Court‘s precedents, we concluded “that to overcome the presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender, the Commonwealth must prove that the juvenile is
Even after Batts II, certain issues remained unresolved. We confronted one of those issues in Commonwealth v. Machicote, 206 A.3d 1110 (Pa. 2019). There, we held “that when a juvenile is exposed to a potential sentence of life without the possibility of parole the [sentencing] court must consider the Miller factors, on the record, prior to imposing a sentence.” Id. at 1120. Failure to do so, we explained, renders the resulting sentence illegal — even in cases like Machicote‘s, where the defendant was not actually sentenced to life without parole. See id.
Most relevant here, the Superior Court also has been at the forefront of addressing a wave of so-called de facto life sentence claims.8 In 2018, a three-judge panel held as a matter of first impression that “a trial court may not impose a term-of-years sentence on a juvenile convicted of homicide if that term-of-years sentence equates to a de facto [life-without-parole] sentence unless it finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation.” Foust, 180 A.3d 433. Although the panel “decline[d] to draw a bright line . . . delineating what constitutes a de facto [life-without-parole] sentence and
II. Facts & Procedural History
Having set forth the legal context in which the present appeal arose, we now return to the facts and procedural history. One summer day in 2009, when he was seventeen-and-a-half years old, appellant was playing in a pick-up basketball game with Andrew Williams at an outdoor court in Philadelphia. The pair were matched against brothers Jarrett and Malcolm Green. Shortly into the game, appellant‘s style of play became aggressive. Eventually, an argument ensued after Williams refused to hand the ball over to the Greens. Appеllant walked to the sideline and removed a .380 semiautomatic handgun from his gym bag. He then shot Malcolm in the head before shooting Jarrett in the stomach and leg. Only Malcolm survived.
In 2012, a jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder and aggravated assault for his role in shooting the Greens. Pursuant to the then-applicable mandatory sentence for first-degree murder, which also applied to juveniles, appellant was sentenced to life
The Superior Court vacated appellant‘s judgment of sentence two years later. By that time, both Miller and Batts I had been decided. And since appellant‘s judgment of sentence was not yet final, the Superior Court determined he was entitled to the benefit of those rulings and to consideration of the Miller factors before being resentenced, and remanded the case for such proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Felder, 2148 EDA 2012, 2014 WL 10919377 (Pa. Super. June 27, 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
On October 24, 2014, the trial court held a second sentencing hearing. Appellant asserted the murder was an impulsive act that was the product of his undeveloped juvenile brain. He maintained that, because his brain was still developing at the time, he presented a greater opportunity for rehabilitation than would an adult who committed the same crime. Appellant offered evidence to demonstrate he already had used prison as an opportunity to rehabilitate and to better himself. For example, while incarcerated, appellant obtained his high school diploma and participated in therapeutic sessions with a violence prevention counselor. He also submitted testimony from his mother and a letter from his cousin.
The court considered the record — including, inter alia, presentence memoranda, psychological reports, victim impact statements, and school records — as well as the parties’ arguments and evidentiary presentations, and the court‘s own “very lengthy contemporaneous notes taken during both the trial of this case and during the initial sentencing proceeding.” Notes of Testimony (“N.T.“), 10/24/2014, at 51. The court also contemplated, “on the record, every one of the twelve factors for a [c]ourt to consider before sentencing a juvenile for first-degree murder as enumerated in Miller and Batts [I.]” Sentencing Court Op., 2/18/2016, at 5; accord N.T. 10/24/2014 at 51-52. Based on that
On appeal to the Superior Court, appellant challenged the legality of his sentence, arguing “a 50-year minimum sentence is a de facto life sentence.” Commonwealth v. Felder, 660 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 6505643 at *2 (Pa. Super. Dec. 20, 2017) (unpublished memorandum).9 The panel found appellant‘s support for that position to be lacking. First, although appellant portrayed a 2012 United States Sentencing Commission Preliminary Quarterly Data Report as demonstrating that 470 months is considered a life sentence for purposes of federal law, the panel reviewed the same report and concluded the figure was nothing more than a nonbinding “statistic out of context.” Id. at *3.10 Similarly, after looking to cases from other states that have addressed this issue, the panel lamented
In the absence of clear binding authority, the panel returned to the core holding of Miller, which prohibited only those sentencing schemes that prescribe mandatory life sentences without parole. The panel explained that, on its face, Miller “does not directly apply” to appellant‘s claim, i.e., a challenge to a lengthy, but discretionary, term-of-years sentence. Id. at *4; see also id. (”Miller did not address a situation . . . wherein a juvenile defendant was given a significant sentence upon the discretion of the trial court“); id. (”Miller takes no stand on claims of de facto life sentences“). It therefore concluded “that when a juvenile convicted of homicide has been subjected to a discretionary sentence that may approach, but does not clearly exceed life expectancy, that sentence does not run afoul of Miller.” Id. Applying that rule to appellant‘s case, the panel detected no Eighth Amendment problem with his sentence. Although the 50-year minimum term may appear “significant” since it precludes appellant from seeking parole until he is 68 years old, the panel nevertheless found it constitutional because it “was the result of an individualized and discretionary sentencing hearing[.]” Id.
Appellant sought allowance of appeal in this Court, and we granted discretionary review limited to a single question:
Does not a sentence of 50 years to life imposed upon a juvenile constitute a de facto life sentence requiring the sentencing court, as mandated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (”Batts II“), [to] first find permanent incorrigibility, irreparable corruption or irretrievable depravity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Felder, 187 A.3d 909 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam). This issue presents a question of law over which we exercise a de novo standard and plenary scope of review. Batts II, 163 A.3d at 435.
After the parties briefed and argued the issue upon which we granted review, the Supreme Court decided Jones. Because our review of that decision leads us to conclude it is dispositive here, we dispense with our usual practice of recounting the parties’ arguments and proceed directly to our analysis.11
For the last few years, there has been widespread “disagreement in state and federal courts about how to interpret Miller and Montgomery[.]” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313; Batts II, 163 A.3d at 458 n.26 (discussing different approaches). To create clarity and resolve the split, the Court granted certiorari in Jones to consider whether a sentencer who imposes a life-without-parole sentence must make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility, or at least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313. Upon its review, the Jones Court concluded that ”Miller and Montgomery squarely rejected such a requirement.” Id. at 1314.
Taking Miller first, the Jones Court clarified that it “mandated ‘only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics — before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 1314, quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483. According to the Court, such a discretionary “procedure ensures that the sentencer affords individual consideration to, among other things, the defendant‘s chronological age and its hallmark features.” Id. at 1316 (internal quotations and citation
As for Montgomery, the Jones Court bluntly declared that it “did not purport to add to Miller‘s requirements.” Id. To bolster this position, the Court noted it granted certiorari in Montgomery “not to consider whether the rule announced in Miller should be expanded, but rather simply to decide whether Miller‘s holding is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.” Id. at 1317 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the Court found unpersuasive Jones‘s reliance “on language in Montgomery that described Miller as permitting life-without parole sentences only for those whose crimes reflect permanent inсorrigibility, rather than transient immaturity.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the Court emphasized that Montgomery “flatly stated that ’Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement’
We distill the following holdings from Jones. First, “a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a murderer under 18.” Id. at 1318-19. Second, “an on-the-record sentencing explanation . . . is not required by or consistent with Miller.” Id. at 1320. Although “States may require sentencers to make extra factual findings before sentencing an offender under 18 to life without parole” or “direct sentencers to formally explain on the record why a life-without-parole sentence is appropriate notwithstanding the defendant‘s youth[,]” the federal constitution “does not demand those particular policy approaches.” Id. at 1323. In short, “[i]n a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State‘s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).12
To reiterate, under the current state of Eighth Amendment law as expressed by Jones, “a State‘s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313. A life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile murderer is thus constitutional, and hence no viable Miller claim exists, “so long as the sentence is not mandatory — that is, [ ] so long as the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and impose a lesser punishment.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Batts II, we interpreted Montgomery as “clarif[ying] that Miller requires far more than mere consideration of an offender‘s age prior
Moreover, we are constrained to conclude that without a substantive constitutional mooring, the procedural protections we adopted in Batts II cannot stand in their current, judicially-created form. As we have observed, “the Pennsylvania Constitution clearly and unambiguously bestows upon this Court ‘the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduсt of all courts[,]’ ” but only if “such rules ‘neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant[.]’ ” Id. at 449, quoting
We are thus forced to conclude the sentencing procedures we adopted in Batts II “do not carry the protections of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, ___ A.3d ___, 2021 WL 4889071 at *3 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc). And absent some constitutional impetus, those procedures are no longer the product of a proper exercise of this Court‘s authority over judicial administration, because they enlarge the substantive rights of juvenile homicide offenders beyond what Miller, as cabined by Jones, requires. Cf.
We turn, finally, to the purported de facto life sentence before us, and we again find that Jones controls. To put it simply, even if a 50-years-to-life sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, “there is no Miller problem here.” United States v. Grant, 9 F.4th 186, 197 (3rd Cir. 2021) (en banc). This is because Miller‘s bar on mandatory life-without-parole sentencing regimes “is a prophylactic that entitles a juvenile homicide offender to a certain sentencing proсess, but not a particular sentencing outcome[.]” Id. at 193. Indeed, permanent incorrigibility is “not an eligibility criterion akin to sanity or a lack of intellectual disability[,]” rather it is “a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating circumstance.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1315. For that reason, Miller “mandated only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics — before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 1311 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Grant, 9 F.4th at 200 (“What matters for Miller purposes is whether the sentencer considered a juvenile homicide offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics before sentencing him or her to [life without parole].“).
It logically and necessarily follows that if a discretionary sentencing scheme is constitutionally sufficient to permit the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender, so too can a court impose a sentence that is something less than life without parole. This includes a term-of-years sentence that may amount to a de
Here, the record makes clear that appellant received the constitutionally required procedure guaranteed by Miller and the Eighth Amendment. In resentencing appellant, the court had before it the parties’ presentence memoranda, psychological reports, school records, and victim impact statements. It heard testimony from appellant and his mother and read a letter from his cousin. It considered the parties’ arguments and evidentiary presentations made at the resentencing hearing. It reviewed “lengthy contemporaneous notes taken during both the trial of this case and during the initial sentencing proceeding.” N.T. 10/24/2014 at 51. And it contemplated, “on the record, every one of the twelve factors . . . enumerated in Miller and Batts [I.]” Sentencing Court Op., 2/18/2016, at 5. This process was more than enough to meet the constitutional standard. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“The resentencing in Jones‘s cases complied with [Miller] because the sentence was not mandatory and the trial judge had discretion to impose a lesser punishment in light of Jones‘s youth.“).
IV. Conclusion
Though we might prefer the more expansive view of Miller as seen through the lens of Montgomery, we cannot ignore that Jones‘s interpretation is controlling as a matter of Eighth Amendment law. And because that decision abrogates our foundational understanding in Batts II that a juvenile homicide offender cannot constitutionally receive a sentence of life without parole unless he or she is proven to be permanently incorrigible, the procedural protections we adopted in that case to ensure that result are no longer tenable as an exercise of this Court‘s power of judicial administration. Therefore, when sentencing juvenile homicide offenders from this point forward, sentencing courts are
Chief Justice Baer and Justices Todd and Mundy join the opinion.
Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion in which Justice Todd joins.
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion.
Former Justice Saylor did not participate in the decision of this mattеr.
Notes
the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect under section 2155[.]
Batts I, 66 A.3d at 297 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Lastly, Section 1102.1(d) mandates thata juvenile‘s age at the time of the offense, his diminished culpability and capacity for change, the circumstances of the crime, the extent оf his participation in the crime, his family, home and neighborhood environment, his emotional maturity and development, the extent that familial and/or peer pressure may have affected him, his past exposure to violence, his drug and alcohol history, his ability to deal with the police, his capacity to assist his attorney, his mental health history, and his potential for rehabilitation.
[i]n determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole under subsection (a), the court shall consider and make findings on the record regarding the following:
(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and written victim impact statements made or submitted by family members of the victim detailing the physical, psychological and economic effects of the crime on the victim and the victim‘s family. A victim impact statement may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.
(2) The impact of the offense on the community.
(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the defendant.
(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant.
(5) The degree of the defendant‘s culpability.
(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Mental capacity.
(iii) Maturity.
(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the defendant.
(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.
(vi) Probation or institutional reports.
(vii) Other relevant factors.
Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion which principally took aim at the Court‘s treatment of Montgomery. He argued that “[r]ather than accept what was plainly the case — that Miller was procedural, not watershed, and thus not retroactive — Montgomery proceeded to ‘rewrite’ it into a substantive rule.” Id. at 1325 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This supposed error, in Justice Thomas‘s view, forced the Jones majority to “labor[ ] mightily to avoid confronting the tension between Miller and Montgomery[.]” Id. at 1328. In this regard, the Jones majority held that, to the extent Montgomery “is in tension with the Court‘s retroactivity precedents that both pre-date and post-date Montgomery, those retroactivity precedents — and not Montgomery — must guide the determination of whether rules other than Miller are substantive.” Id. at 1317 n.4. Justice Thomas took this statement to mean the Court was effectively overruling Montgomery “in substance but not in name.” Id. at 1327; see id. (contending Montgomery “gave a good-for-one-ride ticket to a class of juvenile offenders, and its errors will never be repeated“).
In the alternative, the dissent says we should discontinue this case on the basis that “the analysis is not substantially prompted, or supported, by the parties’ arguments.” Dissenting Opinion at 6. Although the dissent acknowledges we afforded the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing Jones, it implies this was insufficient “because our mandate to the parties for additional briefing did not mention Batts II[.]” Id. at 7. Again, this argument lacks any purchase since it is based on the dissent‘s truncated reading of the issue before us. Appellant baked consideration of Batts II directly into the question presented, and our supplemental briefing order instructed the parties to brief Jones‘s “impact on the issue presented[.]” Order, 6/22/2021. Thus, the implication we are somehow acting unilaterally or without input from the parties, is not well taken.
At bottom, the issue we must decide, as framed by appellant, is whether he is entitled to relief under Batts II. Answering that question necessarily requires us to re-evaluate Batts II under Jones, which, the dissent concedes, “changed everything.” Dissenting Opinion at 5. That the parties have refused to provide us with a fair appraisal of the High Court‘s intervening, binding decision is not a proper reason to dismiss the appeal. Cf. generally Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 149 (Pa. 2018) (“[I]f the ‘power’ of a court amounts to nothing more than the power to do exactly what the parties tell it to do, simply because they said so and without any actual merits review, it is not judicial power at all. It is a restriction on power.“) (internal quotations and citation оmitted; emphasis in original). Nor does the dissent‘s assertion of mootness warrant dismissal. Even if we agreed with that characterization (we do not), this case would almost surely qualify for an exception. See, e.g., Pap‘s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 600-01 (Pa. 2002) (alluding to the great-public-importance exception to the mootness doctrine, particularly in the face of a material lack of clarity in governing law). We crafted Batts II, so the responsibility naturally falls to us to clarify its viability following new governing federal law — and to do so with haste. Contrary to the dissent‘s protestations, we respectfully believe the present case is a proper vehicle for providing that clarification.
We also note that Jones did not resolve whether a juvenile homicide offender may raise a viable as-applied Eighth Amendment claim challenging the disproportionality of a given sentence. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“this case does not properly present — and thus we do not consider — any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones‘s sentence.“), citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As well, we stress that Jones “does not preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder.” Id. at 1323. Our General Assembly remains free at any time to legislatively reimpose the Batts II procedures, or to enact any other appropriate measures. We merely conclude that we lack the power to impose such requirements because they are not constitutionally required.