COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MICHAEL FELDER
No. 18 EAP 2018
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT
February 23, 2022
BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY JJ.
Appeal from the Order of Superior Court entered on 12/20/2017 at No. 660 EDA 2015 affirming the Judgment of Sentence entered on 10/24/2014 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0014896-2009. ARGUED: September 11, 2019
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY1
Over the past two decades, in a series of Eighth Amendment cases applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,2 the United States Supreme Court consistently has held that sentencing an offender who was under eighteen years old at the time of the crime raises special constitutional considerations. Of particular consequence in this line of cases were Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited mandatory life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), which held Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral appeal. In the wake of these decisions, hundreds of defendants who committed murder as a juvenile and were imprisoned under Pennsylvania‘s former mandatory-life-without-parоle sentencing scheme had to be resentenced.
For our part, in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (”Batts II“), we exercised “our constitutional power of judicial administration to devise a procedure for the implementation of the Miller and Montgomery decisions in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 451 (internal quotations omitted). Among other things, we adopted a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for juveniles and imposed on the Commonwealth the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a juvenile offender is incapable of rehabilitation. See id. at 459. We determined these procedures were necessary to effectuate what we believed then was the central mandate of Miller and Montgomery: that “for a life-without-parole sentence to be constitutionally valid, the sentencing court must find that the juvenile offender is permanently incorrigible and that rehabilitation would be impossible.” Id. Still, even after establishing this сomprehensive set of legal criteria to guide juvenile sentencings, other questions remained.
Before we could resolve that issue, however, the High Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021), which severely narrowed the holdings of Miller and Montgomery as previously understood by many courts, including this one. Upon careful review of this new guidance, we are constrained to conclude our decision in Batts II has largely been abrogated. We further conclude Jones is dispositive of the issue presented here. As we will explain below, pursuant to the reasoning in Jones, even if a term-of-years sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, Miller provides no viable avenue for relief. Accordingly, we affirm appellant‘s judgment of sentence.
I. Relevant Precedent
Before discussing the facts, we start with a review of the relevant precedent. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court began to place various constitutional limits on sentencing juveniles who had been convicted of serious criminal offenses.3 First, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), it concluded the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for murderers who were under eighteen at the time of their crimes. Next, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), the Court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide. Then in Miller in 2012, the Court barred mandatory sentencing schemes for juveniles convicted of homicide, concluding such sentences violate the principle of proportionality inherent to the Eighth Amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.4 Four years later, in Montgomery, the Court held Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212.
Our opinion in Batts II came on the heels of these decisions and the General Assembly‘s enactment of a new sentencing statute for juveniles convicted of first- and second-degree murder after June 24, 2012 — the day before Miller was decided. See
We reiterated this understanding when we proceeded to consider the legality of Batts‘s sentence de novo, and held it was illegal. Initially, we recognized there was “no question that the sentencing court thoroughly and completely reviewed the record and thoughtfully considered the testimony presented at the resentencing hearing” before imposing a discretionary life-without-parole sentence. Id. at 437 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 424 (noting sentencing court “took into account the general factors in [S]ection 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, the Miller factors and the factors identified in
constitutional scrutiny. In our judgment, the sentencing court had “overlooked the main premise” of the High Court‘s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and impermissibly overrode its repeated admonitions “that juvenile first-degree murderers are presumptively less culpable than their adult counterparts and, as such, should be sentenced differently.” Id. at 437. Thus, notwithstanding the court‘s finding that Batts‘s crime was not the result of unfortunate yet transient immaturity, because the court also opined that “there remained a possibility that Batts could be rehabilitated[,]” we held a sentence of life in
- The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant.
- The degree of the defendant‘s culpability.
- Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
- Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:
- Age.
- Mental capacity.
- Maturity.
- The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the defendant.
- The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.
- Probation or institutional reports.
- Other relevant factors.
prison without the possibility of parole was illegally “disproportionate under Miller and Montgomery[.]” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 436, 439.
Our task in Batts II did not end there. We also recognized that “[d]espite the sentencing court‘s best efforts . . ., the lack of procedural safeguards resulted in it failing to properly apply the law to Batts‘[s] resentencing.” Id. at 451. Moreover, we observed that, at that time, there remained several hundred individuals in Pennsylvania prisons serving what we then believed were illegal life-without-parole sentences awaiting resentencing. See id. at 450. For those reasons, and because “[t]he General Assembly has not taken any appreciable steps to create a separate sentencing statute or to revise existing law so that it applies to juveniles convicted of first-[ or second-]degree murder prior to Miller[,]” we determined an “exercise of our constitutional authority [wa]s required to set forth the manner in which resentencing will proceed in the courts of this Commonwealth.” Id. at 450-51. And since we sought to devise only a procedural framework for implementing Miller and Montgomery‘s substantive mandate, we reasoned that such power “falls squarely within our constitutional authority.” Id. at 449; see
Pursuant to that power we approved a medley of protective procedural measures advanced by Batts and his amici. First, we determined “a faithful application of the holding in Miller, as clarified in Montgomery, requires the creation of a presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 452. Second, based on “the definitive language used by” the High Court‘s precedents, we concluded “that to overcome the presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender, the Commonwealth must provе that the juvenile is
constitutionally eligible for the sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 455. Third, “[c]onsistent with the requirements of due process and [S]ection 1102.1(b),” we held
Even after Batts II, certain issues remained unresolved. We confronted one of those issues in Commonwealth v. Machicote, 206 A.3d 1110 (Pa. 2019). Therе, we held “that when a juvenile is exposed to a potential sentence of life without the possibility of parole the [sentencing] court must consider the Miller factors, on the record, prior to imposing a sentence.” Id. at 1120. Failure to do so, we explained, renders the resulting sentence illegal — even in cases like Machicote‘s, where the defendant was not actually sentenced to life without parole. See id.
Other gaps in the juvenile homicide offender sentencing framework have been filled by the Superior Court. For example, that court has extended aspects of our decision in Batts II to address situations that were not directly at issue in that case See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Olds, 192 A.3d 1188, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (employing reasoning from Batts II, a first-degree murder case, to “hold that the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of [S]ection 1102(b)‘s mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder“); accord Commonwealth v. Sesky, 170 A.3d 1105, 1105-06 (Pa. Super. 2017). In other cases, the intermediate court has partially restricted our holdings in Batts II and Machicote. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 357 (Pa. Super. 2019) (distinguishing Machicote and finding no error in failure to consider Miller factors where the Commonwealth “did not seek, and the sentencing court did not impose, a life-without-parole sentence“); Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977, 983 (Pa. Super. 2018) (Miller factors must be considered “only in cases where the Commonwealth is attempting to meet its burden of overcoming the presumption against juvenile [life-without-parole] sentences“).
Most relevant here, the Superior Court also has been at the forefront of addressing a wave of so-called de facto life sentence claims.8 In 2018, a three-judge panel
what constitutes a constitutional term-of-years sentence[,]” it held the inquiry must be informed by “consider[ing] the sentence for each individual crime separately and not [in] the aggregate[.]” Id. at 438, 441. Not long after, a different panel determined the “key factor in considering the upper limit of what constitutes a constitutional sentence” is “whether there is ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.‘” Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018), quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Using that standard, the Superior Court has approved a range of lengthy term-of-years sentences as constitutional. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Anderson, 224 A.3d 40, 47 (Pa. Super. 2019) (50 years to life); White, 193 A.3d at 986 (35 years to life); Bebout, 186 A.3d at 469-70 (45 years to life); Foust, 180 A.3d at 438 (60 years to life, aggregated from two 30-years-to-life sentences).
II. Facts & Procedural History
Having set forth the legal context in which the present appeal arose, we now return to the facts and procedural history. One summer day in 2009, when hе was seventeen-and-a-half years old, appellant was playing in a pick-up basketball game with Andrew Williams at an outdoor court in Philadelphia. The pair were matched against brothers Jarrett and Malcolm Green. Shortly into the game, appellant‘s style of play became aggressive. Eventually, an argument ensued after Williams refused to hand the ball over to the Greens. Appellant walked to the sideline and removed a .380 semiautomatic handgun from his gym bag. He then shot Malcolm in the head before shooting Jarrett in the stomach and leg. Only Malcolm survived.
In 2012, a jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder and aggravated assault for his role in shooting the Greens. Pursuant to the then-applicable mandatory sentence for first-degree murder, which also applied to juveniles, appellant was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See
The Superior Court vacated appellant‘s judgment of sentence two years later. By that time, both Miller and Batts I had been decided. And since appellant‘s judgment of sentence was not yet final, the Superior Court determined he was entitled to the benefit of those rulings and to consideration of the Miller factors before being resentenced, and remanded the case for such proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Felder, 2148 EDA 2012, 2014 WL 10919377 (Pa. Super. June 27, 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
On October 24, 2014, the trial court held a second sentencing hearing. Appellant asserted the murder was an impulsive act that was the product of his undeveloped juvenile brain. He maintained that, because his brain was still developing at the time, he presented a greater opportunity for rehabilitation than would an adult who committed the same crime. Appellant offered evidence to demonstrate he already had used prison as an opportunity to rehabilitate and to better himself. For example, while incarcerated, appellant obtained his high school diploma and participated in therapeutic sessions with a violence prevention counselor. He also submitted testimony
The court considered the record — including, inter alia, presentence memoranda, psychological reports, victim impact statements, and school records — as well as the parties’ arguments and evidentiary presentations, and the court‘s own “very lengthy contemporaneous notes taken during both the trial of this case and during the initial sentencing proceeding.” Notes of Testimony (“N.T.“), 10/24/2014, at 51. The court also contemplated, “on the record, every one of the twelve factors for a [c]ourt to consider before sentencing a juvenile for first-degree murder as enumerated in Miller and Batts [I.]” Sentencing Court Op., 2/18/2016, at 5; accord N.T. 10/24/2014 at 51-52. Based on that
wide-ranging review, the court found the facts and сircumstances of appellant‘s crime necessitated a lengthy sentence. See N.T. 10/24/2014 at 53-54 (noting there were two victims and additional crimes charged; “to not take those facts into consideration now would be to denigrate the serious nature of the crimes [appellant] committed against both victims“). Accordingly, the court imposed a discretionary 50-years-to-life sentence for appellant‘s first-degree murder conviction.
On appeal to the Superior Court, appellant challenged the legality of his sentence, arguing “a 50-year minimum sentence is a de facto life sentence.” Commonwealth v. Felder, 660 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 6505643 at *2 (Pa. Super. Dec. 20, 2017) (unpublished memorandum).9 The panel found appellant‘s support for that position to be lacking. First, although appellant portrayed a 2012 United States Sentencing Commission Preliminary Quarterly Data Report as demonstrating that 470 months is considered a life sentence for purposes of federal law, the panel reviewed the same report and concluded the figure was nothing more than a nonbinding “statistic out of context.” Id. at *3.10 Similarly, after looking to cases from other states that have addressed this issue, the panel lamented
that it uncovered no “clear resolution,” only “great disparity in approach and interpretation of the dictates of Miller . . . demonstrat[ing] the difficulty of the problem.” Id.
In the absence of clear binding authority, the panel returned to the core holding of Miller, which prohibited only those sentencing schemes that prescribe mandatory life sentences without parole. The panel explained that, on its face, Miller “does not directly apply” to appellant‘s claim, i.e., a challenge to a lengthy, but discretionary, term-of-years sentence. Id. at *4; see also id. (“Miller did not address a situation . . . wherein a juvenile defendant was given a significant sentence upon the discretion of the trial court“); id. (“Miller takes no stand on claims of de facto life sentences“).
Appellant sought allowance of appeal in this Court, and we granted discretionary review limited to a single question:
Does not a sentence of 50 years to life imposed upon a juvenile constitute a de facto life sentence requiring the sentencing court, as mandated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (”Batts II“), [to] first find permanent incorrigibility, irreparable corruption or irretrievable depravity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Felder, 187 A.3d 909 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam). This issue presents a question of law over which we exercise a de novo standard and plenary scope of review. Batts II, 163 A.3d at 435.
III. Analysis
After the parties briefed and argued the issue upon which we granted review, the Supreme Court decided Jones. Because our review of that decision leads us to conclude it is dispositive here, we dispense with our usual practice of recounting the parties’ arguments and proceed directly to our analysis.11
For the last few years, there has been widespread “disagreement in state and federal courts about how to interpret Miller and Montgomery[.]” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313; Batts II, 163 A.3d at 458 n.26 (discussing different approaches). To create clarity and resolve the split, the Court granted certiorari in Jones to consider whether a sentencer who imposes a life-without-parole sentence must make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility, or at least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313. Upon its review, the Jones Court concluded that “Miller and Montgomery squarely rejected such a requirement.” Id. at 1314.
Taking Miller first, the Jones Court clarified that it “mandated ‘only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics — before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 1314, quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483. According to the Court, such a discretionary “procedure ensures that the sentencer affords individual consideration to, among other things, the defendant‘s chronological age and its hallmark features.” Id. at 1316 (internal quotations and citation
omitted); see id. (stating non-mandatory sentencing schemes permit sentencers to “consider the murderer‘s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change“) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In support of this reading of Miller, the Jones Court found it significant that Miller “repeatedly
As for Montgomery, the Jones Court bluntly declared that it “did not purport to add to Miller‘s requirements.” Id. To bolster this position, the Court noted it granted certiorari in Montgomery “not to consider whether the rule announced in Miller should be expanded, but rather simply to decide whether Miller‘s holding is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.” Id. at 1317 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the Court found unpersuasive Jones‘s reliance “on language in Montgomery that described Miller as permitting life-without parole sentences only for those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility, rather than transient immaturity.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the Court emphasized that Montgomery “flatly stated that ‘Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement‘”
and that ‘a finding of fact regarding a child‘s incorrigibility . . . is not required.‘” Id. at 1314-15, quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211.
We distill the following holdings from Jones. First, “a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a murderer under 18.” Id. at 1318-19. Second, “an on-the-record sentencing explanation . . . is not required by or consistent with Miller.” Id. at 1320. Although “States may require sentencers to make extra factual findings before sentencing an offender under 18 to life without parole” or “direct sentencers to formally explain on the record why a life-without-parole sentence is appropriate notwithstanding the defendant‘s youth[,]” the federal constitution “does not demand those particular policy approaches.” Id. at 1323. In short, “[i]n a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State‘s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).12
To reiterate, under the current state of Eighth Amendment law as expressed by Jones, “a State‘s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313. A life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile murderer is thus constitutional, and hence no viable Miller claim exists, “so long as the sentence is not mandatory — that is, [] so long as the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and impose a lesser punishment.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Batts II, we interpreted Montgomery as “clarif[ying] that Miller requires far more than mere consideration of an offender‘s age prior
to imposing a life-without-parole sentence[.]” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 433. This interpretation led us to hold that “for a sentence of life without parole to be proportional as applied to a juvenile murderer, the sentencing court must first find . . . that the offender is entirely unable to change.” Id. at 435; see also id. (expressing belief that “[t]he United States Supreme Court decisions that control in this matter unambiguously permit the imposition of a life-without-parole sеntence upon a juvenile offender only if the crime committed is indicative of the offender‘s permanent incorrigibility“) (emphasis in original). Our understanding in this regard, however, has been abrogated by the High Court‘s decision in Jones.13
Moreover, we are constrained to conclude that without a substantive constitutional mooring, the procedural protections we adopted in Batts II cannot stand in their current, judicially-created form. As
incorrigibility, irreparable corruption and irretrievable depravity.” Id. at 415-16 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see id. at 452 (“a faithful application of the holding in Miller, as clarified in Montgomery, requires the creation of a presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole“); id. at 455 (“Pursuant to . . . the definitive language used by the Supreme Court, we conclude that to overcome the presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender, the Commonwealth must prove that the juvenile is constitutionally eligible for the sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.“). However, Jones now instructs that, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, “a State‘s discretionary sentencing system is... constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313.
We are thus forced to conclude the sentencing procedures we adopted in Batts II “do not carry the protections of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, ___ A.3d ___, 2021 WL 4889071 at *3 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc). And absent some constitutional impetus, those procedures are no longer the product of a proper exercise of this Court‘s authority over judicial administration, because they enlarge the substantive rights of juvenile homicide offenders beyond what Miller, as cabined by Jones, requires. Cf.
sentencing court to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender is circumscribed only to the extent set forth in
mandated by this Court in [Batts II, to] first find permanent incorrigibility, irreparable corruption or irretrievable depravity beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Felder, 187 A.3d 909 (emphasis added). As appellant‘s claim is expressly tethered to our decision in Batts II, the dissent‘s argument we have improperly “inject[ed] consideration of [that] case” into our analysis, is untenable. Dissenting Opinion at 8-9.
In the alternative, the dissent says we should discontinue this case on the basis that “the analysis is not substantially prompted, or supported, by the parties’ arguments.” Dissenting Opinion at 6. Although the dissent acknowledges we afforded the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing Jones, it implies this was insufficient “because our mandate to the parties for additional briefing did not mention Batts II[.]” Id. at 7. Again, this argument lacks any purchase since it is based on the dissent‘s truncated reading of the issue before us. Appellant baked consideration of Batts II directly into the question presented, and our supplemental briefing order instructed the parties to brief Jones‘s “impact on the issue presented[.]” Order, 6/22/2021. Thus, the implication we are somehow acting unilaterally or without input from the parties, is not well taken.
At bottom, the issue we must decide, as framed by appellant, is whether he is entitled to relief under Batts II. Answering that question necessarily requires us to re-evaluate Batts II under Jones, which, the dissent concedes, “changed everything.” Dissenting Opinion at 5. That the parties have refused to provide us with a fair appraisal of the High Court‘s intervening, binding decision is not a proper reason to dismiss the appeal. Cf. generally Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 149 (Pa. 2018) (“[I]f the ‘power’ of a court amounts to nothing more than the power to do exactly what the parties tell it to do, simply because they said so and without any actual merits review, it is not judicial power at all. It is a restriction on power.“) (internal quotations and citation omitted; emphasis in original). Nor does the dissent‘s assertion of mootness warrant dismissal. Even if we agreed with that characterization (we do not), this case would almost surely qualify for an exception. See, e.g., Pap‘s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 600-01 (Pa. 2002) (alluding to the great-public-importance exception to the mootness doctrine, particularly in the face of a material lack of clarity in governing law). We crafted Batts II, so the responsibility naturally falls to us to clarify its viability following new governing federal law — and to do so with haste. Contrary to the dissent‘s protestations, we respectfully believe the present case is a proper vehicle for providing that clarification.
We turn, finally, to the purported de facto life sentence before us, and we again find that Jones controls. To put it simply, even if a 50-years-to-life sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, “there is no Miller problem here.” United States v. Grant, 9 F.4th 186, 197 (3rd Cir. 2021) (en banc). This is because Miller‘s bar on mandatory life-without-parole sentencing regimes “is a prophylactic that entitles a juvenile homicide offender to a certain sentencing process, but not a particular sentencing outcome[.]” Id. at 193. Indeed, permanent incorrigibility is “not an eligibility criterion akin to sanity or a lack of intellectual disability[,]” rather it is “a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating circumstance.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1315. For that reason, Miller “mandated only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics — before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 1311 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Grant, 9 F.4th at 200 (“What matters for Miller purposes is whether the sentencer considered a juvenile hоmicide offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics before sentencing him or her to [life without parole].“).
It logically and necessarily follows that if a discretionary sentencing scheme
facto life sentence. Stated differently, as long as the sentence was the product of a discretionary sentencing system that included consideration of the juvenile‘s youth, the Eighth Amendment is satisfied.
Here, the record makes clear that appellant received the constitutionally required procedure guaranteed by Miller and the Eighth Amendment. In resentencing appellant, the cоurt had before it the parties’ presentence memoranda, psychological reports, school records, and victim impact statements. It heard testimony from appellant and his mother and read a letter from his cousin. It considered the parties’ arguments and evidentiary presentations made at the resentencing hearing. It reviewed “lengthy contemporaneous notes taken during both the trial of this case and during the initial sentencing proceeding.” N.T. 10/24/2014 at 51. And it contemplated, “on the record, every one of the twelve factors . . . enumerated in Miller and Batts [I.]” Sentencing Court Op., 2/18/2016, at 5. This process was more than enough to meet the constitutional standard. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“The resentencing in Jones‘s cases complied with [Miller] because the sentence was not mandatory and the trial judge had discretion to impose a lesser punishment in light of Jones‘s youth.“).
IV. Conclusion
Though we might prefer the more expansive view of Miller as seen through the lens of Montgomery, we cannot ignore that Jones‘s intеrpretation is controlling as a matter of Eighth Amendment law. And because that decision abrogates our foundational understanding in Batts II that a juvenile homicide offender cannot constitutionally receive a sentence of life without parole unless he or she is proven to be permanently incorrigible, the procedural protections we adopted in that case to ensure that result are no longer tenable as an exercise of this Court‘s power of judicial administration. Therefore, when sentencing juvenile homicide offenders from this point forward, sentencing courts are
required to consider only the relevant sentencing statutes, which will guarantee that the sentencer considers the juvenile‘s youth and attendant characteristics as required by Miller. So long as the sentence imposed is discretionary and takes into account the offender‘s youth, even if it amounts to a de facto life sentence, Miller is not violated. Because the sentencing court in the present case followed this procedure, we affirm.16
Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion in which Justice Todd joins.
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion.
Former Justice Saylor did not participate in the decision of this matter.
Notes
the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall also сonsider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect under section 2155[.]
Batts I, 66 A.3d at 297 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Lastly, Section 1102.1(d) mandates thata juvenile‘s age at the time of the offense, his diminished culpability and capacity for change, the circumstances of the crime, the extent of his participation in the crime, his family, home and neighborhood environment, his emotional maturity and development, the extent that familial and/or peer pressure may have affected him, his past exposure to violence, his drug and alcohol history, his ability to deal with the police, his capacity to assist his attorney, his mental health history, and his potential for rehabilitation.
[i]n determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole under subsection (a), the court shall consider and makе findings on the record regarding the following:
- The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and written victim impact statements made or submitted by family members of the victim detailing the physical, psychological and economic effects of the crime on the victim and the victim‘s family. A victim impact statement may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.
- The impact of the offense on the community.
- The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the defendant.
Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion which principally took aim at the Court‘s treatment of Montgomery. He argued that “[r]ather than accept what was plainly the case — that Miller was procedural, not watershed, and thus not retroactive — Montgomery proceeded to ‘rewrite’ it into a substantive rule.” Id. at 1325 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This supposed error, in Justice Thomas‘s view, forced the Jones majority to “labor[ ] mightily to avoid confronting the tension between Miller and Montgomery[.]” Id. at 1328. In this regard, the Jones majority held that, to the extent Montgomery “is in tension with the Court‘s retroactivity precedents that both pre-date and post-date Montgomery, those retroactivity precedеnts — and not Montgomery
We also note that Jones did not resolve whether a juvenile homicide offender may raise a viable as-applied Eighth Amendment claim challenging the disproportionality of a given sentence. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“this case does not properly present — and thus we do not consider — any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones‘s sentence.“), citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As well, we stress that Jones “does not preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder.” Id. at 1323. Our General Assembly remains free at any time to legislatively reimpose the Batts II procedures, or to enact any other appropriate measures. We merely conclude that we lack the power to impose such requirements because they are not constitutionally required.