Com. v. Jefferson, T.Com. v. Jefferson, T.
Appellant, Taylor Jefferson, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 42-84 months’ incarceration, imposed following his conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license.1 Herein, Appellant challenges the trial court‘s decision to deny his motion to suppress the seized firearm under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, alternatively, under
The trial court, in disposing of Appellant‘s motion to suppress, set forth the following factual history:
On April 25, 2017, around 11:00 p.m., Officers Alexandria Taylor and Nathan Detting with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police were patrolling the Homewood area of Pittsburgh. As part of their routine patrol, the officers ran license plate numbers of various vehicles through their computer system to check for stolen vehicles and any [V]ehicle [C]ode violations. When the officers ran the license plate of a vehicle that was being driven by [Appellant], the officers learned that there was a “full extradition warrant out of Pennsylvania” for an individual named Taylor Jefferson. The officers also learned that Taylor Jefferson was the registered owner of the vehicle. The [National Crime Information Center (“NCIC“)] system that the officers used to run the license plate did not provide the officers with a picture of Mr. Jefferson, and the officers were not otherwise familiar with [him] or his name.
As the officers were attempting to validate the warrant, and before the officers had made any contact with [Appellant‘s] vehicle, [Appellаnt] pulled over to the side of the road and lawfully parked the vehicle. Officers Taylor and Detting pulled over behind [Appellant‘s] vehicle and activated a spotlight. The officers’ vehicle did not block [Appellant] from being able to leave the parking space. The officers pulled over behind [his] vehicle in order to identify the driver and to investigate whether he was the registered owner of the vehicle, and thus the person for whom there was an arrest warrant.
Officer Detting and Officer Taylor simultaneously approached the vehicle, with Officer Detting approaching the driver‘s side and Officer Taylor approaching the passenger side. [Appellant] was about to exit the vehicle, with one foot already on the ground, when the officers approached the car. Officer Detting told [him] to remain in the vehicle and asked for his identification. [Appellant] informed Officer Detting that he had left his ID at homе, but he provided his full name to the officer.
As Officer Detting was speaking to [him], Officer Taylor observed [Appellant] “slowly and deliberately reach into his right sweat pants pocket” with his right hand. She was able to notice this movement because the officers had illuminated the inside of the vehicle with a spotlight. Officer Taylor was about to tell [Appellant] to remove his hand from his pocket when she saw him “start to pull his hand out of his pocket.” As he pulled his hand
out of his pocket, Officer Taylor saw that [Appellant] had a “good grip” on a firearm. Upon seeing the firearm, Officer Taylor drew her weapon and yelled “gun, gun, gun.” Officer Detting drew his weapon, and [Appellant] promptly handed the firearm to Officer Detting. Officer Detting retrieved [Appellant‘s] weapon and asked [him] to exit the vehicle. [Appellant] was handcuffed, and the officers ultimately determined that [he] did not have a license to carry a concealed firearm. [Appellant] was then taken into custody.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“TCO“), 2/8/18, at 1-3 (numbering and formatting omitted).
The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with firearms not to be carried without a license, persons not to possess firearms,2 and possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer‘s number.3 After Appellant‘s preliminary hearing, the trial court dismissed the charge of possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer‘s number, but held the remaining charges for trial.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the firearm. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a non-jury trial. The charge of persons not to possess firearms was nolle prossed, and the trial court convicted Appellant of firearms not to be carried without a license. On June 12, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 42-84 months’ (3½-7 years‘) incarceration. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court denied. He then filed a
A panel of this Court issued a memorandum decision on August 2, 2019, reversing the trial court‘s suppression order and vacating Appellant‘s judgment of sentence. Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed a timely application for reargument before this Court en banc. We granted the Commonwealth‘s application for reargument on October 4, 2019, and withdrew the panel memorandum. Appellant filed a substituted brief on October 15, 2019, and the Commonwealth filed its substituted brief on November 14, 2019.
While this matter was still pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.Ct. 1183 (2020). In response, Appellant promptly filed an application to file a supplemental brief on April 13, 2020. On May 4, 2020, we grantеd that application. Appellant filed a supplemental brief on May 18, 2020 (“Appellant‘s First Supplemental Brief“), and the Commonwealth filed its response on May 26, 2020 (“Commonwealth‘s First Supplemental Brief“). Appellant requested oral argument, which we granted by order dated August 6, 2020.
Subsequently, on December 22, 2020, our Supreme Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020) (overruling Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014)). Appellant
Appellant has consistently presented the following question for our review: “Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant]‘s motion to suppress evidence because, although the trial court correctly concluded that the police officers subjected [Appellant] to an investigative detention, the police officers did not possess reasonable suspicion to justify that seizure?” Appellant‘s Substituted Brief at 4; Appellant‘s First Supplemental Brief at 5; Appellant‘s Second Supplemental Brief at 5.
Our standard of review is well-settled:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court‘s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court‘s factuаl findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court‘s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court‘s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it
is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (cleaned up).
The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ... (1968); and (3) a custodial detention. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005).
“A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond,” Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted), and therefore need not be justified by any level of police suspicion. Commonwealth v. Polo, ... 759 A.2d 372, 375 ([Pa.] 2000).
“In contrast, an ‘investigative detention’ ... carries an official compulsion to stop and respond.... Since this interaction has elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.” DeHart, 745 A.2d at 636.
***
Finally, “a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.” [Id.] This level of interaction requires that the police have probable cause to believe that the person so detained has committed or is committing a crime.
Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Here, the trial court determined that Appellant was subjected to an investigative detention, requiring that the police have rеasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant would be driving the vehicle registered to him when the police ran its license plate and discovered that Appellant had a warrant out for
Fourth Amendment
We first examine whether Appellant is entitled to relief under Fourth Amendment standards. In determining whether police had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative detention, “the fundamental inquiry is an objective one, namеly, whether the facts available to police at the moment of the intrusion warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. Super. 2001). Reasonable suspicion is dependent on both the quantity and quality of the information police possess prior to detaining an individual. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); see also Commonwealth v. Wiley, 858 A.2d 1191, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding that reasonable suspicion is measured by what the police knew prior to conducting a search or seizure). In order to assess the facts available to police, we must consider
Appellant first argues that,
[a]ccording to Officer Taylor, the Commonwealth‘s only witness at the suppression hearing, although the driver of the vehicle did not commit any violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, she leаrned through NCIC that the registered owner of the vehicle was [Appellant], and that [he] may have had an arrest warrant. However, Officer Taylor admitted that, at the precise moment of seizure, she still had not confirmed the validity of the arrest warrant or the identity of the driver. Moreover, Officer Taylor admitted that both she and her partner, Officer Detting, were not familiar in the least with [Appellant], they had no idea what he even looked like, and, indeed, the purpose of the stop was to verify the validity of the warrant and the identity the driver. In other words, the police officers merely assumed, or were acting on an unparticularized hunch, that the driver of the vehicle was [Appellant].
Appellant‘s Substituted Brief at 16-17.
The Commonwealth contends that this matter has been effectively resolved by the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Glover.5 See Commonwealth‘s First Supplemental Brief at 9-13. In that case, police ran the license plate of a pickup truck they observed on routine patrol, and discovered that Glover, the registered owner of the vehicle, had a revoked
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Court‘s decision, holding that “when the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.” Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1186. Writing for the Majority, Justice Thomas reasoned that,
[b]efore initiating the stop, [the police officer] observed an individual operating a ... pickup truck with [a] Kansas plate.... He also knew that the registered owner of the truck had a revoked license and that the model of the truck matched the observed vehicle. From these three facts, [the officer] drew the commonsense inference that Glover was likely the driver of the vehicle, which provided more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.
The fact that the registered owner of a vehicle is not always the driver of the vehicle does not negate the reasonableness of [the officer]‘s inference. Such is the case with all reasonable infеrences. The reasonable suspicion inquiry “falls considerably short” of 51% accuracy, see United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 ... (2002), for, as we have explained, “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect,” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 ... (2014).
Appellant now contends that the Fourth Amendment standard articulated in Glover does not apply to the circumstances of this case. In this regard, he first argues that:
A careful review readily reveals that Glover is factually distinguishable from [Appellant]‘s case. In Glover, the basis of the stop was a revoked driver‘s license, [i]d. at 1187, and Kansas law itself “reinforces that it is reasonable to infer that an individual with a revoked license may continue driving.” Id. at 1188. In sharp contrast, Pennsylvania law does not presume the identity of a vehicle‘s driver under any circumstances, including revoked-license situations. As this Honorable Court held in Commonwealth v. Andersen, 753 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Super. 2000), “the knowledge a vehicle is owned by an individual whose driving privileges are suspended coupled with the mere assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle, does not give rise to articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that a violation of the Vehicle Code is occurring every time this vehicle is operating during the owner‘s suspension.” [Id.] at 1294 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the stop in [Appellant]‘s case was not even premised on a revoked driver‘s license, which was critical to the Glover Court‘s analysis, but, instead, on a potential arrest warrant.
Appellant‘s First Supplemental Brief at 21.
We disagree with Appellant‘s attempt to distinguish Glover on this basis. As noted by the Commonwealth, the Glover Court‘s discussion of the presumption under Kansas law is not applicable to the facts in this case. See Commonwealth‘s First Supplemental Brief at 12. In Glover, the Court
Here, by contrast, the police had no reason to believe Appellant was unlicensed and, therefore, that factor is essentially irrelevant to the reasonableness of their belief that Appellant was driving the vehicle registered to him. Glover clearly dictates that the inference that the owner is the driver of a vehicle by itself provides reasonable suspicion to permit a Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment, assuming, of course, that the police have reason to believe that the registered owner is involved in criminal conduct. See id. at 1186. Consequently, we disagree with Appellant‘s attempt to distinguish Glover.
Moreover, we observe that the suspicion of criminal activity in this case stemmed from a warrant, and was not contingent upon the discovery of Appellant‘s driving the vehicle. In Glover, the police only knew that the registered owner was not legally permitted to drive. Here, the only necessary inference was that Appellant would be found in the vehicle registered in his
Appellant also attempts to distinguish Glover by suggesting that the scope of that decision did not extend to the instant case, ostensibly because,
the police officer in Glover confirmed, prior to conducting the stop, that [Glover]‘s driver‘s license had, in fact, been revoked. In [Appellant]‘s case, on the other hand, Officer Taylor admitted that, at the precise moment in which [Appellant] was seized, she still had not confirmed the validity of the arrest warrant (or the identity of the driver). In fact, Officer Taylor admitted that the entire purpose of the stop was to verify the validity of the warrant (and the identity the driver).
Appellant‘s First Supplemental Brief at 22 (citations omitted).
We disagree, and instead adopt the Commonwealth‘s assessment that “the deputy in Glover did not confirm the registered owner‘s revoked license to any greater degree than Officer Taylor confirmed the arrest warrant [in this case], as both officers merely ran computer checks. See [Glover,] 140 S.Ct. at 1186.” Commonwealth‘s First Supplemental Brief at 13 n.9. There is no indication in the Glover decision that the issue of reasonable suspicion turned on whether the computer check had been ‘verified’ through some other source. Moreover, certainty about individual factors has never been a prerequisite for reasonable suspicion. “It is well[-]settled that to justify their
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant‘s argument concerning the Glover Court‘s emphasis on “the narrow scope” of its holding. Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1191. In that regard, the Supreme Court remarked that “the presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion. For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, there were no additional circumstances known to police tending to dispel the reasonableness of the inference that the owner of a vehicle was likely to be the driver. Consequently, we conclude that Glover controls and, therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief under the Fourth Amendment.7
Section 8
Appellant alternatively contends that, to the extent “that Glover is applicable in [his] case, because Glover is manifestly inconsistent with the
The Commonwealth maintains that Appellant waived this issue by presenting it for the first time on appeal. See Commonwealth‘s Supplemental Brief at 14-17; see also
It is true that “issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court[,]” and that a “new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 486 (Pa. Super. 2003) (cleaned up). However, given the unique circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth‘s suggested waiver standard is too harsh.
Furthermore, we find the cases cited by the Commonwealth unpersuasive, given the somewhat unique procedural posture of this case. In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659 (Pa. Super. 2009),
Santiago argued on direct appeal that the trial court had erred in failing to suppress the fruits of his statement to police made without the required Miranda8 warnings. [Id.] at 664. This Court, relying in part on the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 ... (2004) (plurality opinion), ruled that the physical evidence obtained subsequent to Santiago‘s statement was not the fruit of the poisonous tree and that, therefore, the trial court did not err in permitting its admission. [Santiago,] 980 A.2d at 665-66. In his appellate brief, Santiago, in an attempt to avoid the dictates of Patane, had
tried to claim that the law set forth therein was inapplicable in Pennsylvania because Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords greater protection than do the provisions in the federal constitution relied upon by the Supreme Court in Patane. Id. at 666-67 n.6. This Court deemed the claim to be waived, noting that even issues of constitutional dimension can be waived if not raised in the trial court; that new and different theories of relief cannot be advanced for the first time on appeal; and that Santiago had failed to specifically raise his Article I, Section 9 claim prior to the time of direct appeal. Id.
Commonwealth‘s First Supplemental Brief at 17.
However, unlike here, there is no indication in the Santiago decision that the appellant had ever invoked Article I, Section 9 in the lower court. Moreover, Patane was decided in 2004, whereas Santiago was convicted in 2007 (for conduct that occurred in 2006). Thus, Santiago could have presented the argument that the Pennsylvania Constitution provided greater protection than Patane in the trial court, but failed to do so. Here, Appellant could not have made an analogous claim with respect to Section 8 until Glover was decided while Appellant was awaiting review in this Court.
The Commonwealth also cites Commonwealth v. Laney, 729 A.2d 598 (Pa. Super. 1999), for the proposition that Appellant has waived this claim by only nominally invoking Section 8 in the lower court. However, in Laney, the appellant offered “neither caselaw nor reason to hоld that [Article 9] offers protection different from the federal constitution[,]” as Laney had only “nominally” invoked such a claim in his appellate brief. Laney, 729 A.2d at 601 n.1. Here, in Appellant‘s Supplemental Brief, he has provided substantial analysis and supporting caselaw contending that Section 8 should
Turning to the merits of Appellant‘s claim, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania “has long emphasized that, in interpreting a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret similar (yet distinct) federal constitutional provisions.” Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991). The “federal constitution establishes certain minimum levels which are equally applicable to the analogous state constitutional provision.” Id. (cleаned up). “However, each state has the power to provide broader standards, and go beyond the minimum floor which is established by the federal Constitution.” Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
stated with increasing frequency that it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated. Although we may accord weight to federal decisions where they are found to be logically persuasive and well reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, we are free to reject the conclusions of the United States Supreme Court so long as we remain faithful to the minimum guarantees established by the United States Constitution.
Id. at 894–95 (cleaned up).
Text of Section 8
Appellant correctly acknowledges that the texts of Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment are quite similar. Appellant‘s Supplemental Brief at 26; see also Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895 (recognizing “the wording of the Pennsylvania Constitution is similar in language to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution“).9 Thus, there is nothing in the text of Section
Pertinent History of Article 8
Nevertheless, the Edmunds Court recognized that the similarity between Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment does not mean we are required “to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images,” and that we must instead “examine the history of ... Section 8, in order to draw meaning from that provision and consider the appropriateness” of departing from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895–96. In this regard, Appellant maintains that our Supreme Court has consistently held that Section 8 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. As this Court has stated:
Both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution help shield citizens from improper behavior by the government. The main thrust of protection under the U.S. Constitution is to prevent police misconduct. The Pennsylvania Constitution affords that protection and a heightened protection of an individual‘s privacy.
Commonwealth v. Dunnavant, 63 A.3d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Appellant urges that he is entitled to relief under Section
Appellant cites three, pre-Glover decisions by this Court in support of his assertion that we should find that Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment are not coextensive in the circumstances of this case. He argues:
With respect to vehicle stops, this Honorable Court made clear in Commonwealth v. Andersen, [753 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Super. 2000)], that knowing the identity of the driver is “patent” to a finding of reasonable suspicion:
Holding otherwise would subject drivers who lawfully operate vehicles owned or previously operated by a person with a suspended license to unnecessary traffic stops. The example of the family car demonstrates this point. Although a family car may be registered in the name of one individual, numerous additional drivers may be licensed and insured to operate the same vehicle. If we allow the police to stop any vehicle for the mere fact that it is owned or once operated by an individual whose operating privileges are suspended, then each additionally insured driver of the family car could be subject to traffic stops while lawfully operating the family car simply because the liсense or another operator of the vehicle is suspended. The lack of articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the Vehicle Code when such a stop occurs without knowing the identity of the driver is patent.
[Id.] at 1294. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bailey, 947 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. 2008), this Honorable Court held that “Officer Wall‘s hunch that the TransAm‘s driver may have been operating the vehicle with a suspended license was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that would have justified stopping the vehicle.” [Id.] at 812. And in Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2008), this Honorable Court found the police officer‘s suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was the owner to be “a reasonable one because the driver matched the description of the owner as a middle aged man[,]” distinguishing Andersen
While we agree with Appellant‘s interpretation of these cases insofar as they stand at odds with the inference at issue in Glover, they do not support his argument that Section 8 is incompatible with the reasonableness of that inference. Appellant fails to cite any pertinent language or analysis from Andersen, Bailey, or Hilliar demonstrating this Court‘s reliance on Section 8‘s heightened privacy protections.
In Andersen, after responding to a disturbance at a tavern, the police encountered Anderson while he was sitting in a black Camaro in the parking lot. See Andersen, 753 A.2d at 1291. The police learned that the Camaro was registered to Andersen, but that his license was suspended. Andersen was allowed to walk home after the police advised him that he was not permitted to drive. Id. at 1292. The following night, the same officers observed the same black Camaro, and initiated a stop. As the Andersen Court observed, “the only relevant information possessed by [the officers] prior to the traffic stops was that [Anderson]‘s driving privileges were suspended and that the Camаro registered to [him] was being operated. Thus, [the] traffic stop[] w[as] based on the mere assumption that [Anderson] was driving the black Camaro.” Id. at 1293. Thus, Andersen is analogous to the instant case, with the caveat that the inference here is at least nominally stronger. See note 6, supra.
Hilliar involved a similar fact pattern with one notable difference. In that case:
The pоlice officer ran [Hilliar]‘s license plate, and determined that the owner of the vehicle‘s license was under suspension. The officer also discovered the owner‘s age and that he was a male. From his observation of the driver[,] the officer believed that [Hilliar] was male, and was about the same age as the owner.
Hilliar, 943 A.2d at 987–88. The Hilliar Court determined that “the officer formed a reasonable suspicion to conclude that [Hilliar] was driving under suspension….” Id. at 992. In doing so, it distinguished Hilliar‘s reliance on Andersen, because police had the opportunity to observe the driver and match his description to the vehicle‘s owner. Id. at 990 n.1. However, there is no discussion in Hilliar expressing any distinction between Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment.
While we agree with Appellant that Andersen conflicts with Glover, we disagree that the conflict reflects a distinction between Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment, because the Andersen rule was neither explicitly nor implicitly premised upon the additional privacy protections provided by Section 8. Rather, we conclude that Andersen‘s interpretation of the at-issue Fourth Amendment standard has necessarily been overruled by Glover.
Related Caselaw from Sister Jurisdictions
Appellant states that he “is unaware of any caselaw from other states interpreting their own constitutions in light of Glover.” Appellant‘s First Supplemental Brief at 35. We reach the same conclusion. Although there are now numerous jurisdictions wherein Glover has been applied, we cannot find any instance in which a court considered a challenge to Glover on state constitutional grounds. Because Glover was decided so recently, this may change. At this moment, however, there is no persuasive authority from our
Policy Considerations
Appellant presents a seriеs of arguments in support of his contention that Glover “is inconsistent with important policy considerations relevant to Pennsylvania criminal procedure and … Section 8[,]” which we consider seriatim. Id. at 40. First, he offers Justice Sotomayor‘s dissent in Glover, in which she generally criticizes the majority decision for its ostensible deviation from Fourth Amendment principles related to the burden of proof at suppression, including the requirement of individualized suspicion. Id. at 37-38 (quoting Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1195 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). However, Justice Sotomayor‘s dissent does not purport to speak to policy considerations specific to Pennsylvania and/or Section 8, or even to the potential for greater protection under state constitutions generally. Thus, we do not find it to be persuasive authority with regard to the question before us.
Second, Appellant contends that while both the Fourth Amendment and Section 8 recognize a diminished expectation of privacy in motor vehicles with respect to searches, “there is nо diminished expectation of privacy in the stop of motor vehicles.” Id. at 38 (emphasis in original). However, there is no dispute here that Appellant was subjected to an investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion. Glover has not altered that standard. Instead, Glover delves deeper into the weeds regarding a common inference in police-citizen interactions involving motor vehicles—that there is a
Third, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996), wherein our Supreme Court stated:
[T]here exists clear precedent in Pennsylvania defining the appropriate standards to be used when considering whether an individual has been seized. The long-standing definition of what constitutes a seizure applied by the Courts of this Commonwealth cannot be ignored, particularly when viewed in tandem with this Court‘s recognition of the privacy rights embodied in
Article I, Section 8 .
In Matos, the Supreme Court considered the United States Supreme Court‘s ruling in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), where the defendant failed to comply with an order by policе to stop, and then
However, we disagree that Matos suggests a similar analysis here. In that case, the Court considered whether a seizure occurred, not whether a particular inference from a common set of facts was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. As noted above, there is no dispute in this case as to whether a seizure occurred. It is also uncontested that a showing of reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard to justify that seizure. The only question here is whether the reasonable suspicion standard was satisfied by a particular set of facts known to police at the time they initiated the temporary detention. Under the Fourth Amendment, the Glover Court said those facts are enough.
In conducting its analysis pursuant to Edmunds, the Matos Court recognized that Pennsylvania jurisprudence had a “long-standing definition of what constitutes a seizure” under Section 8, a definition at odds with the Hodari D. decision. Matos, 672 A.2d at 774. We ascertain no similar history in Pennsylvania with respect to the Glover rule. While Andersen and its progeny came to a different conclusion under their analysis of the Fourth
Through our decisions in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 253 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1969), Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 311 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1973), Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977), and Commonwealth v. Barnett, 398 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 1979), this Court, both in coordination with and independent of the federal courts, has set forth the standards to be applied in determining whether an individual is seized….
Matos, 672 A.2d at 773 (citations reformatted). There is no similar history of Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions closely on point in this case.
Furthermore, in Matos, the Court recognized a significant split in other jurisdictions with regard to whether state constitutions providеd greater protections than the Fourth Amendment standard articulated in Hodari D. See id. at 775. As noted above, Appellant concedes he cannot offer, and we cannot otherwise find, any decisions by our sister jurisdictions that have addressed the matter either way.
Finally, in his second supplemental brief, Appellant posits that our Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Alexander, overruling Gary, supports his contention that Section 8 provides greater protection Glover. We disagree.
In Gary, our Supreme Court adopted the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, “which allows police officers to search a motor vehicle when there is probable cause to do so and does not require any
Appellant argues that Alexander has reaffirmed the principle that, while the Fourth Amendment‘s focus is on effective law enforcement and deterring police misconduct, Section 8 prioritizes privacy over the needs of law enforcement. Appellant‘s Second Supplemental Brief at 14-15, 19. He further argues that Alexander reaffirms Edmunds in that there is no good faith exception in Pennsylvania, which flows from the first argument—that the good faith exception is consistent with the Fourth Amendment‘s goal of deterring police misconduct—but it is inconsistent with Section 8‘s focus on the violation of the privacy rights of the individual. Id. at 19. Moreover, Appellant avers that Alexander stands strongly for the proposition that Section 8 is designed to curtail, not to assist, the investigative power of police, id. at 19-20, and that privacy rights do nоt, therefore, evaporate in a motor vehicle, id. at 20. Appellant then argues, relying in part on Andersen, that:
Glover, a Fourth Amendment case, is manifestly inconsistent with
the strong notion of safeguarding individual privacy embodied by Article 1, Section 8. If that fact was not obvious prior to Alexander, it certainly must be obvious now in light of Alexander. The Pennsylvania Constitution must provide an independent basis for relief by requiring the police, in order to establish reasonable suspicion, to investigate the identity of the driver before conducting a vehicle stop.
While we do not disagree with Appellant‘s understanding that Section 8‘s prioritization of privacy rights over the needs of law enforcement was strongly expressed in Alexander, following the brief diversion from that principle in Gary, it does not follow that the Glover decision is incompatible with Section 8. Indeed, we conclude that Alexander neither demands, nor even suggests, that a departure from the Glover rule is required under Section 8.
First, Alexander is not on point. Alexander and, relatedly, Gary, involved searches requiring probable cause, and whether the inherent mobility of automobiles satisfied the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. The instant case does not involve a search or a seizure that would require probable cause, as Appellant has consistently conceded. Instead, the question before us concerns the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, and the quantum of evidence sufficient to justify further investigation through a temporary detention pursuant to Terry. Alexander does not speak to this issue at all.
Second, the Alexander Court‘s Edmunds analysis is also distinguishable from the case at hand, particularly with regarding the history
Thus, in Alexander, there was a significant history of cases, spanning two decades, demonstrating divergence from the federal automobile exception under Section 8 before the Gary decision temporarily reversed that trend. Here, as discussed above, none of the cases at odds with Glover cited by Appellant were grounded in Section 8, and none of those cases were decided by our Supreme Court. Accordingly, we conclude that Alexander does not compel rejection of Glover under Section 8, and there is no significant history of Pennsylvania case law that would suggest that the Glover inference is incompatible with Section 8‘s heightened concern for privacy.
In sum, Appellant has failed to meet his burden under Edmunds. A textual comparison between the Fourth Amendment and Section 8 does not provide any guidance on the question before us. While we acknowledge that there exists a significant history of interpreting Section 8 to provide greater privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, Appellant cannot cite any cases where our Supreme Court distinguished Section 8 from the Fourth Amendment on what constitutes reasonable suspicion generally, much less on the more specific factual inference addressed by Glover. Although Glover contradicts this Court‘s decision in Andersen, the rule in Andersen was never specifically addressed by our Supreme Court and does not appear to have been grounded in Section 8 jurisprudence. Moreover, as of yet, we are unaware of any cases from sister jurisdictions rejecting the Glover rule on state constitutional grounds. Finally, it can certainly be said that Pennsylvania has a strong policy favoring privacy rights over the needs of law enforcement under Section 8, as articulated by our Supreme Court in Edmunds, Matos, and most recently, Alexander. However, we are far from convinced that any new Fourth Amendment decision by the United States Supreme Court that affects privacy rights—аs such decisions inevitably will do—necessitates greater protections under Section 8 merely because privacy rights are implicated. The Fourth Amendment and Section 8 have thus far remained coextensive as to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish reasonable suspicion, and we see no reason to depart from that history today.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judges Lazarus, Dubow, Murray and McCaffery join this opinion.
Judge Bowes files a concurring opinion in which Judges Shogan, Olson and Kunselman join.
Judges Shogan, Olson and Kunselman concur in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/07/2021
Notes
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.