Commonwealth v. Jeffries

a potential obtain from thereafter an identification We should is danger suggestion present. witness, strength entertain fine concerning questions in each rather case; identification witness’ potential to eliminate rule precisely we established broad have a witness is The fact that such need inquiries. called identification is up- of the pretrial sure very he. on to the knowing perpetm- even point to mate, not render in- (or nickname) Whiting does tor’s name I join majority opinion cannot Thus, applicable. I in the result. even concur though Appellant. Commonwealth v. Jeffries, Argued September Before 25,1973. O’Brien, Eagen, Nix JJ. Roberts, Pomeroy, Manderino, Norman Paul Wolhen, with him Wolhen é Landy, for appellant. R.

Louis Assistant Paulich, District Attorney, with L. him Robert Eberhardt, Assistant District Attorney, W. and Robert Duggan, District for Com- Attorney, monwealth, appellee. by

Opinion Eagen, November 26, 1973: Mr. Justice from appeal This is an order of the Superior affirming judgment Court,1 sentence imposed Superior Spauld [Judge 303 A. 1 226 Pa. 2d 833 ing dissenting opinion Judge joined.] filed a which Hoffman Ms convic following Howard Jeffries, upon appellant, a before trial drugs narcotic after possession tion of We reverse because jury. a without judge sitting obtained certain evidence at trial of admission Fourth Amendment.2 violation facts. following pertinent The record discloses four 6, 1970, of November the afternoon On automobile observed in an unmarked officers in Pittsburgh. a street along public walking Jeffries officers, when saw testified One officer him do the offi- seeing Upon so, his pace”. “quickened and started to pursue Jeffries, vehicle cer left the police While the officer giving chase, to run. began who then cigarette package throw observed Jeffries the street. along Shortly thereafter, parked automobile him Jeffries and directed to stand overtook the officer that moment the other ar- At officers wall. against and told they were the on the scene officer, rived him to “hold one Jeffries, minute”. apprehended who the cigarette recovered package then from The officer it and was vehicle, the found to con- parked underneath of a foil-wrapped packages substance several later tain be heroin. to determined the had no argues lawful right to and the him, and arrest fruits of the Mm

chase unlawful have been suppressed. should activity The Com- the counterargues police had probable monwealth cause or arrest Jeffries, his con- alternatively, to pursue an cause to conduct them investigatory gave duct stop, properly admitted evidence since the it was thus illegal activity. Moreover, fruit Com- the evidence was argues obtained indepen- monwealth search; hence, or legality arrest dent Given no consideration. tMs merits arrest premise, the suppress 2 pretrial to motion evidence was A denied after hearing. ad- contends the narcotics should be Commonwealth or mitted under the doctrine of abandoned property, doctrine. under the view plain found the action of the offi The lower court The an arrest with cause.3 probable cers constituted in arrest is constitutionally law is clear warrantless based which is defined probable cause,4 valid unless on arresting facts and circumstances within the offi as, cer’s and of which he had trust knowledge reasonably sufficient themselves to war worthy information, rant a man of reasonable caution to believe offense the person has been or is to be being committed, has committed the offense.5 arrested In the instant Commonwealth contends case, supplied that Jeffries’ factual flight necessary foundation for cause. This Court, however, has the contention that consistently rejected flight, cause to arrest. In and of constitutes itself, Pa. A. 2d 695 Pegram, “Although flight this Court stated: indi- may (1973), to some ‘consciousness of Common- cate, degree, guilt’, A. 2d Collins, 368, 371, wealth v. alone ... is not sufficient flight standing (1970), Bosurgi, A. In Commonwealth v. 2d 304 following in the tins defined arrest manner: Court “Officers are any required to make formal declaration of or arrest use the apply physi- . . . nor to manual force or exercise word ‘arrest’ ‘such eye’ person. to the cal restraint as to be visible order to arrest a accomplished by ‘any . . . An arrest act that indicates an person] custody subjects [a to take into intention him to ” person making the actual control and will of the the arrest.’ Id. 68, A. 2d at 311. 190 4 McCray Illinois, 300, v. (1967) See ; 386 87 S. Ct. 1056 Bailey, 224, (1972); v. 448 Pa. A. 292 2d 345 Comm Murray, 326, (1970); v. onwealth 437 Pa. A. 263 2d 886 Common Marino, 245, v. (1969); wealth A. 255 2d 911 Common Brayboy, 365, (1968). v. 431 A. wealth 246 2d Pa. 675 5 Ohio, (1964). See Beck 379 U.S. 85 S. Ct 223 324

establish cause for an arrest. As the probable Superior Court noted Commonwealth v. Santiago, A. Superior (1971) 2d : 111, 114-15, if urges ‘The Commonwealth that even this does con stitute cause the created probable subsequent flight valid for the arrest. The Court United grounds States v. 259 F. Pa. Supp. (E.D. 1966), Margeson, the question considered of whether could consti flight tute cause and stated: with probable “Flight, coupled other such as knowledge of the defendant’s factors, criminal record or the of contraband or prior sight screams for or reliable information that defendant help had or had attempted commit committed crime, be indication that there is may strong something wish to hide from the fleeing those constitute cause for arrest. . . . probable However, in and of is not sufficient flight, itself, to constitute probable cause otherwise who does not de anyone, sire to talk to the who either walks or runs always subject would to a arrest. away legal Such cannot be countenanced procedure Fourth Amendments as presently interpreted Fourteenth ” ’ Id. at A. Court.” 2d at Supreme 593-94, Commonwealth v. Roscioli, 697. See also Pa. 59, A. 2d 396 Commonwealth v. (1973); Bailey, 448 Pa. 292 A. 2d 345 Since there (1972). were none mentioned factors to couple of the above with the ele ment of cause did not exist flight, probable to arrest Jeffries.6 probable The court found that even if lower cause did not recovery prior arrest, to the exist narcotics from under parked provided adequate vehicle

neath foundation for disagree reasoning. cause. with this We It is well settled arrest, that evidence discovered after an cannot be considered when determining whether cause existed for the arrest Cf. Henry States, v. United 80 S. Ct. 168 this the Commonwealth Notwithstanding finding, as a or attempts stop to the officer’s action justify v. Ct. 1868 seizure under 392 U.S. Terry Ohio, v. New 88 S. Ct. York, and Sibron (1968), posi with this agree We cannot, however, tion. in Com- and Sibron interpreted Terry

This Court monwealth v. 253 A. 2d 276 (1969), Hicks, if arrest is ab- stated: cause to “[E]ven seize a sent, police officer still legitimately in such as Hicks was seized this and con- person, case, a limited search of the individual’s outer clothing duct in an attempt presence to discover of weapons which might be used to endanger safety police officer and unusual others, police observes if officer conduct on the suspicious part the individual seized him which leads to conclude that reasonably criminal be activity may and that the with person afoot whom he is be armed and dealing may dangerous.” Id. [Emphasis supplied.] at 253 A. 2d 279. 158-59, To come the Terry rule, within therefore, must be able to to articulated facts point which give belief rise to the reasonable criminal activity is afoot. See also Commonwealth Swanger, A. 2d 875 and Commonwealth v. Pegram, supra. there is one fact which Instantly, would give rise to the reasonable belief Jeffries was in involved criminal activity. simply was walking along a public Pittsburgh street broad daylight and when he saw he a officer knew, “quickened his pace” and him. started to run when officer began to chase enough This is justify seizure under Terry, as this interpreted Court, absent some other factor suspicion which would rise to give of criminal conduct. the police it is clear had Thus, no right to “arrest” and the or “seize” Jeffries action of the chas- him and him was a violation subsequently arresting ing of Ms Amendment right.7 Fourth

The asserted that notwith- Commonwealth, however, the evidence standing finding primary illegality, there no should admissible because search v. Pol- the In Commonwealth was abandoned. property 299 A. 2d 233 Court was lard, (1973), tMs 138, stated: confronted with tMs exact and question abandoned be ob- “Although property may normally tained and used for the evidentiary purposes by police, such property may not utilized where the abandon- ment is coerced unlawful action. by police

“As the Fifth in Circuit noted Fletcher v. Wain wright: ‘Several courts have considered this situation the uniformly have held that iMtial taint illegality ed the seizure of the evidence since the throwing the direct of the In consequence illegal entry. such a situation it cannot be said that there was a “voluntary abandonment” of the evidence. The courts that only have allowed the seizure of evidence that was thrown out the emphasized window have that “no improper or act was committed unlawful the any officers prior being to the evidence tossed out the window.’ 339 F. (citation 2d 64 62, (5th 1968) See omitted). Cir. 7 Terry, In Mr. Chief Justice WabEen stated: “We have recent ly protects people, held ‘the places,’ Fourth Amendment not States, 347, 351, 507, 511, Katz v. United 389 88 S. Ct. 19 L. Ed. 2d wherever an individual harbor a reason ‘expectation privacy’, id., 361, able (Mr. Ct. at 507 concurring), Hablen, Justice he is entitled to be free from unreason government course, specific able intrusions. Of the content right shaped by of this incidents must be the context in which it is asserted. For ‘what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.’ Elkins v. United States, 206, 222, 1437, 364 U.S. 1446, 80 S. Ct. 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 Unquestionably petitioner (1960). protection was entitled to the the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland.” supplied.] [Emphasis 9, 392 U.S. at 88 S. Ct. at 1873. also (8th Hobson United F. 2d States, 1955).” Cir.

“Here the officer’s record establishes that the unlawful the causative factor and coercive action was 143- which motivated abandonment.” Id. at appellant’s 299 A. in aban- 2d at 236. The causative factor the donment presently consideration was unlaw- ful and coercive action of chasing order seize him. This is situation where party sight abandons the spontaneously property upon are or where involved police, an unlawful act towards Cf. Common- accused. wealth v. 2dA. Shaffer, We instantly have unlawful act which motivated abandonment.

Lastly, argues the evidence should be admitted plain under the view doctrine. In Harris v. States, United 88 S. Ct. 992 the United States Court Supreme stated that objects in the “of an falling plain view officer who has to be in the right position to have that view” are ad In missible evidence. the instant case it cannot be ques tioned the officer had a right and to be duty on the but the he street, only reason had a “plain view” of the object seized because of is his unlawful of act attempting to seize Jeffries. the officer had Thus, no lawful right to be in position the to the have view. inherent Moreover, in plain the view doctrine is the principle the seized must object not have been in put plain view as a result of unlawful conduct. Thus, the doctrine does not in the case apply instant to validate the evidence. the

Consequently, evidence should have been sup as of pressed fruit the primary illegality. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).

Judgment reversed. Chief Justice Jones

Mr. took no part in consid- or of this case. eration decision Pomeroy: Dissenting Opinion Mr. Justice Offi I that majority with agree wholeheartedly an make cer did have cause to probable Rhodes Jeffries. of pursuit arrest set defendant when out other argue I to Nor do understand the Commonwealth the ab is granted wise. The here question whether, there suffi were nonetheless probable sence of cause, stop Terry justify investigatory cient facts to Ed. 2d v. Ct. L. Ohio, 1, 1868, 92 S. Williams, and Adams U.S. (1968) In of these deci light 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). I that the officer’s conduct am sions, persuaded Amendment. the constraints of Fourth violated Court Supreme recog In States Terry, United circum may nized that “a officer appropriate a per in an manner approach stances and appropriate criminal be investigating possibly purposes son for there is no cause to make though even havior 20 L. Ed. Expand 2d at 906. an arrest.” remarked in Supreme Court theme, on this ing “the Fourth Amendment does not require Adams that of information precise who lacks the level policeman to to cause arrest simply necessary shrug crime to occur a criminal and allow a or to Ms shoulders Terry it contrary, recognizes On escape. may work to adopt essence inter good be the A brief stop ... of a response. suspicious in mediate his in order to determine or to main identity dividual, momentarily while quo obtaining the status more tain be most reasonable light information, at the the officer time.” 407 U.S. at known facts 616, 617.1 L. Ed. 2d at Terry Adams involved “frisks” of Both defendants on during canse, weapons the course of which than less were police. by rights on These intrusions individual seized were far anything up greater occurred in which the instant than case until cigarette pack was examined when moment was In the case at initial encounter between bar, day Officer and Jeffries took broad place Rhodes were light thoroughfare. on well-traveled The parties that well Jeffries testified acquainted with each other. “more had Rhodes “all his and was known life”, than offic occupation aware” of Rhodes’ as narcotics er.2 begin He did to flee until he had recognized itself Rhodes. Even if the constitute flight did certainly cause it Officer arrest, gave for Rhodes for some grounds reasonable that suspecting criminal I was afoot. the facts activity believe shown constituted circumstance” for “appropriate further that an investigation, “appropriate manner” of a fleeing suspect is to approaching give chase. The induced conduct which Jeffries to discard was not it cigarette pack unconstitutional; good police work. formally arrested. The extent is of the Intrusion a critical factor testing Terry, reasonableness of conduct “for ready determining there ‘no is test reasonableness other than by balancing against [or need search seize] the invasion

which the search Municipal [or seizure] Court, entails.’ Camara v. 523, 534-535, 536-537, 938-940, 18 L. Ed. 2d (1967).” 302 U.S. at 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905. Testimony, Notes 30a. Rhodes had visited Jeffries’ home earlier two weeks and had told Jeffries that he knew some of his drugs. friends were involved Appellant. v. Clark,

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Jeffries

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Nov 26, 1973

Citation: 311 A.2d 914

Docket Number: Appeal, 18

Court Abbreviation: Pa.