*3 C.J., NIX, FLAHERTY, Bеfore ZAPPALA, and PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, MONTEMURO, CASTILLE and JJ. THE
OPINION OF COURT FLAHERTY, Justice. sole
The issue raised in this police case whether the may automobile, conduct a warrantless search of an exigent absent circumstances, occupants after its have been arrested and are outside the police custody. automobile in For the reasons that follow, we that a hold such search is illegal and that evidence as seized a result must suppressed. be
The facts of record are that in late Pittsburgh police received anonymous calls telephone identifying William White Henry and drug Bennett as dealers. The caller described the two men gave and their and addresses locations where they allegedly drugs. dealt Subsequently, police met awith confi- dential informer who given by confirmed the information the anonymous and description caller added a car Bennett’s and by the method two drug which the made deliveries. purchase arranged a controlled January, police
In late of the two informer. One using cocaine the confidential the informer identi- and purchase officers who witnessed cocaine to the informer. person who sold fied as White co- positively as from White tested purchased The material caine. that informer told February, confidential house; that large supply of cocaine Bennett’s
he had seen a selling him he be cocaine that week- Bennett told would forth end; being moved back and drugs and that were de- He also told Bennett’s and White’s residences. between to make sale cocaine tectives that the dealers intended Saturday, February on Abbott’s Beer Distributor behind 1990. on arranged put
Police to have the area surveillance on working 17. The who had been February two detectives day assisting met with others who would be case the other told them. The essence of what were briefed illegal car expected was that a blue be involved February two detectives who drug Early sale. on drove Bennett’s house and investigation controlled the Bennett, standing another man on the witnessed White front porch. information, on of their the detectives totality
Based residence, vehicle, his search warrants for Bennett’s secured person. They as residence and person and his well White’s vehicle. The did not obtain search warrant White’s *4 to the stakeout area communicat- detectives then returned and they to that secured search warrants. ed other officers had thereafter, into area. drove his blue Ford Shortly White car, got An man into White’s and this was unidentified into area and happening, passed Bennett drove White’s leaving the area. Bennett was car several times before When converged car. gone, upon White’s police during police happened of what Although accounts White’s somewhat, eight police essence is that six or arrest differ the passen- car and took both converged upon officers White’s custody. According and ger White into one officer’s ac- count, officer, another emerged gunpoint; the driver who also that the car prеsent, voluntarily was said driver exited the after the officer identified himself and asked him to come out of the car.
Next, two partially open officers entered the car from both doors. The on passenger officer side of the car first noticed colleague marijuana and communicated his that a cigarette present seats; was on the console between the mo- ments after that on the officer the driver’s side retrieved a seats, paper bag brown between the two front which he took Upon discovering outside the car to open. bag that the cocaine, contained the officer announced the others that he “the dope,” had and the occupants the car were handcuffed.
The court of common pleas, sitting court, as a suppression suppressed the on grounds evidence that White was not arrested until after the warrantless search uncovered mari- juana cigarette and cocaine. The court further observed that there еxigent were no justifying circumstances a warrant- less search of the car and that had time to secure a search warrant for they the vehicle because received informa- tion about the February transaction thirty-six between forty-eight hours before the search. reversed,
Superior holding search warrant White’s required automobile not prob- because had able cause to search the vehicle and the search was properly pursuant conducted to the exception” “automobile to the war- requirement. rant The for this exception rationale is said to be that impracticable to obtain warrants for vehicles in nature, transit because of highly their mobile and that absent it is possible the vehicle will moved be will contraband disappear. Superior Court acknowledged that a warrantless search of permissible a vehicle is only when probable cause arises in but way, unforeseen concluded that probable cause was unforeseen this cаse because it was unknown what vehicle would be used. *5 event, in the search any also held that
Superior was, therefore, arrest,” and to a lawful occurred “incident justified. to address the appeal allowance of order granted
We in order must secure search warrants question of when to conduct vehicle searches. matters, howev addressing these substantive
Before claim that er, necessary the Commonwealth’s it is to address the of his automobile has his claim that search White waived I, Pennsylvania of illegal under Article Section 8 the state constitu he did not set forth his Constitution1 because by Commonwealth v. required in the manner tional claims Edmunds, This claim is 526 Pa. 586 A.2d clearly Pennsylva claim under the raises a meritless. White Constitution, claim, his and relates support nia cites cases Edmunds, That the the claim. is sufficient. cases to briefing the dicta, clearly importance this court stressed in order to aid the courts analyzing and certain factors mandating not reviewing constitutional issues.2 While state its use. importance encourage its and analysis, wе reaffirm words, may that Edmunds expresses the idea be other therein, not listed that these address concerns helpful claim in order for a asserted concerns must be addressed cognizable. Pennsylvania be Constitution 1, § provides: 1. Art. houses, persons, papers people their and The shall be secure in seizures, and no war- possessions from unreasonable searches and things any any place person or to seize or shall issue rant be, describing nearly may probable without
without them as as nor cause, affiant. supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to 2. As stated in Edmunds: analyze general important litigants at rule it is brief following factors: least four 1) Pennsylvania provision; text constitutional case-law; 2) history provision, including Pennsylvania states; 3) related case-law other considerations, 4) unique including state and local policy issues of concern, jurispru- Pennsylvania applicability within modem dence. at 895.
Having cognizable concluded White has raised claims *6 Pennsylvania Constitution, the it remains to address justified whether the search was because it was conducted pursuant to the exception”; “automobile whether the search justified probable was the on cause which it was based because manner; in arose an unforeseen whether the search was permissible arrest; it was incident because to an and whether search the is be excused an inventory because search would have disclosed the same evidence. respect
With to the claim that of the search the vehicle was permissible under exception,” the “automobile the Common- Superior wealth and are error. The “auto- so-called mobile to the exception” requirement for a search is warrant perhaps best articulated Maroney: Chambers v.
In enforcing the Fourth prohibition Amendment’s against seizures, unreasonable searches and the Court has insisted probable upon cause as a requirement minimum for a permitted reasonable search by the Constitution. As a rule, general also required judgment magis- has the of a trate on the рrobable-cause of issue and the issuance a warrant a Only before search is made. exigent circum- stances judgment will the the to probable cause of Carroll, serve as a authorization a search. sufficient for supra, holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to search stopped an automobile on the movable, highway; alerted, the car occupants is the are the car’s may contents never be if again found a warrant must be obtained. Hence an search is immediate constitu- tionally permissible. 42, 51, (1970)
399 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 26 L.Ed.2d added). (Emphasis sum, general the rule is that a search warrant
required police may before conduct search. As any excep rule, tion to this police may a search vehicle without a warrant (1) where: there is probable cause to that an believe automo (2) bile contains activity; evidence criminal unless the car is searched or impounded, the occupants are automobile likely to away drive and contents never may the automobile (3) have obtained this by police; be located
again
way
could not have secured
they
in such a
information
exigent
there
circumstances.
are
search,
i.e.,
warrant
for
in Com-
exception”
the “automobile
This court addressed
Ionata,
518 Pa. at in Support at Affirmance). case, present
The with respect to the “automobile is exception,” analytically identical Ionata. both cases had ample concerning advance information the fact that a search would likely automobile be involved true, is apprehending suspect. When that a warrant required may before automobile be searched. As the United States Supreme Court stated Chambers v. Maroney: Carroll,
Neither
supra, nor other
cases
this
require
suggest
every
or
conceivable circumstance
search
an auto even
probable
may
with
cause
be
made without extra
for
protection
privacy that a warrant
affords. But the
probable
circumstances
cause
furnish
a particular
particular
auto
articles are most
for
unforeseeable____
often
1980-81,
U.S. at
S.Ct.
(Emphasis words, In other although the Fourth generally Amendment requires probable cause to deter- be mined and warrant be issued a magistrate before a conducted, search may be unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an coupled presence automobile with cause, probable may excuse the requirement a search case, warrant. In Ionata and in this no *8 there were unforeseen circumstances. Police knew in advance what automobiles might be involved requested and could have for warrants the automobiles, just search of the they persons as for did error, dwellings.3 Superior Court was in deter- therefore mining that the permissible search was under the “automobile exception” exigent and that circumstances existed to justify the search. case,
3. In this the mere fact that did not know which car would drug be used qualify to conduct the is transaction not to sufficient an unforeseen request circumstance. Police have could drafted their for a particular warrant in terms "as reasonably possible,” that were as is Grossman, 290, 296, Commonwealth v. 521 Pa. 555 A.2d 899 (1989), in to order the secure warrant.
54 event, the
Next, any that Court determined Superior it incident to an occurred permissible search was because not under contends that he was Although arrest. White he conducted and that was the time the search was arrest at car the search his only arrest after warrantless put under Commonwealth claim is meritless. this completed, was an whether Rodriquez, determining we the test reiterated has occurred: arrest that indicates an any an arrest as act have defined
“We subjects him custody the into person intention to take making the person will of the actual control and arrest____” Common quoting Pa. (1987). Duncan, 1177, 1179
wealth v. arrest, say fair of the is officer’s account Under either subject that to the free to leave and he was that White was not him Had he who removed from car. control of the officers leave, have attempted likеly it seems he would been was, therefore, He guns. of several looking down the barrels under arrest. under arrest at the time of the search does
That was White not, however, of the of the legality of the matter dispose that a warrantless Superior search. Court’s view warrantless if it is incident arrest permissible of an automobile is search Court’s Supreme with the United States view accord Belton, New York v. 69 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. Belton, car for a stopped a officer a marijuana. He saw on the traffic and smelled also violation marked term envelope “Supergold,” floor of the vehicle marijuana. removed the driver associated with The officer he from the car and them under passengers placed and three and then occupants searched each of the car arrest. He car, jacket leather in the where he found black searched pockets He one of the and discovered unzipped seat. back The Court held cocaine. United States though jacket lawful еven of the vehicle was car, any of the of the who could occupants not accessible to not, therefore, or de- any weapons jacket retrieve *9 stroy any might contraband which be contained therein. The holding Belton is as follows: policeman
[W]e hold that when a has made a lawful custodi- al arrest of the occupant automobile, of an he may, as a contemporaneous arrest, incident of that search the passen- ger compartment of that automobile.
Id. 460, 101
S.Ct. at
One this court had occasion Timko, to address in Commonwealth v. question the same Timko, Pa. A.2d 620 police arrested a driver who had been operating his who, vehicle erratically and after stopping, would not open the doors or windows of the vehicle. As attempted gain van, to entrance to the Timko reached for a zipped bag and attempted then to drive away. point, At that police broke into the van and dragged Timko from the vehicle. After Timko was searched аnd handcuffed, police searched the bag into which he had at- reach, tempted to finding two packages marijuana and a loaded revolver. We held that the fruits of the search must be suppressed. In response to the Commonwealth’s claim that there is an exception” “automobile on based the inherent mobility automobiles, practical problems in obtaining war- rants and the diminished expectation privacy, we stated:
In the case of no luggage, such operate considerations diminish the expectation citizen’s of privacy. A piece of luggage is not mobile once is taken into police custo- Thus, dy---- valise, a zippered analogous personal luggage, may not be searched without a simply warrant because it has been seized an automobile. 38-39,
4. The Timko court writes: *10 Pennsylvania may
It is that of Supreme axiomatic the Court Pennsylvania the under provide protection more citizens than courts provide the Constitution the federal Pennsylvania Constitution, our it is view that under the United States and of Timko is as valid today ago fifteen years the as it was rule thrust of Timko is even fact, when Timko was decided. the more than it was in 1980 because this court compelling today the interests inherent increasingly emphasized privacy has I, Pennsylvania 8 See Article Section of the Constitution. (1991). Edmunds, v. 374, A.2d Commonwealth 586 887 contrast, has Supreme deempha- Court By United States Fourth sized the interests inherent Amendment. privacy stated in Belton: As the search is not that the arrestee has justification for the
[T]he container, no in the but the lawful privacy interest justifies infringement any privacy arrest custodial have. may the arrestee interest 768, 775
453 101 S.Ct. 69 L.Ed.2d U.S. Mason, v. (1981). in Commonwealth Pa. As we 535 stated court, 3,n. n. 3 this when consider- against securing as ing imрortance privacy relative convictions, a than has criminal has struck different balance Court, Pennsylvania and under the United States balance, given are privacy greater individual’s interests an law. deference than federal therefore, with Court’s determi disagree, Superior
We permissibly nation that vehicle was searched because White’s may person a an A officer conduct search of arrestee's within an immediate control as a matter of course area arrestee’s ever-present an of the risk in arrest situation that an arrestee because destroy may weapon a or to or evidence.... seek to use conceal However, United States weapon the arrestee to their exclusive personal danger that the arrestee Pa. at ‘‘[o]nce incident of the arrest.” law enforcement officers have reduced or property destroy Chadwick, not evidence, 622-23. immediately supra, might gain control, search of U.S. access to the associated and there [1] at property with the property luggage no S.Ct. is no longer person to seize [2476] or longer other any at a Merely arresting was under arrest. White someone does not any property give police carte blanche to search belonging Certainly, may the arrestee. officer search the arres- person person tee’s the area which the is detained in order to prevent obtaining weapons the arrestee or evidence, destroying otherwise, exigency,5 but absent an privacy arrestee’s interests intact against remain a war- short, justifiable rantless search. no there is search inci- dent to arrest under the Pennsylvania Constitution save for person the search of the and the immediate area which the person occupies his during custody, as stated above.6
Finally, it remains to consider the Commonwealth’s *11 claim that the warrantless search should be excused because an inventory search would have disclosed the same evidence. In Timko we summarily argument dismissеd a similar by Brandt, reference to Commonwealth v. 244 Pa.Super. (1976),
A.2d 1238 which held that an inventory search is permissible when lawfully the vehicle is custody police police and when are able to show that search was fact a search for purposes conducted of protection of the property owner’s while it in police remains custody; protection of the police against claims of lost or property; stolen protection of police against If danger. the search was part conducted as of a criminal investigation, it is not an propose 5. We do not to invalidate warrantless searches vehicles police where the danger must search order to avoid to themselves or others, might police as occur in the case where had reason to believe explosives this, present Emergencies were in the vehicle. such as however, part sire not of this case. car, 6. The record indicates that after White was removed from the he patted weapons down for and then moved a short distance from his vehicle, car guard. under close He was not free to return to his as a officer testified: Q: you any Did have concern perhaps at that time that Mr. White would run back to his vehicle? A: When he was with me? Q: you away by your When he was with ten feet car. A: No. I standing path believe I was in his back to his vehicle. Thus, whatever was contained in the vehicle was not accessible to White, nothing and there is any of record to indicate that there were reasons, exigent danger police, such as justify which would warrantless search of the car. is no doubt the warrantless
inventory search. There criminal in this conducted as of a part case was not, therefore, permissible as an inven- investigation, it is tory search. Superior order of Court is reversed.
The PAPADAKOS, J., of this participate did not the decision case.
MONTEMURO, J., concurring opinion. files a CASTILLE, J., dissenting opinion. files a MONTEMURO, J., by as a senior participates designation 701(f). provided Rule of Judicial Administratiоn judge by MONTEMURO, Justice, concurring. Majority. concur in the result reached respectfully Edmunds, Commonwealth years ago, in
Four right A.2d 887 this Court asserted Pennsyl- our protections broader citizens under provide by the States Consti- provided vania Constitution than United in Edmunds provides analytical a clear tution. Our decision protections framework discussion of when additional framework our own state constitution are warranted. This *12 analyze the of our Commonwealth to the requires courts following four factors:
1) Pennsylvania provision the text of the constitutional 2) case- history provision, including Pennsylvania the the law
3) states; from other related case-law 4) considerations, including of state and policy unique issues concern, Pennsylvania applicability local and within modem jurisprudence.
Id. at
390,
We analysis Pennsyl independent “undertake under the courts 391, 567 Id. at also vania Constitution.” A.2d at 895. We litigants analyze for to recognized “important” that was prongs analysis implicating four of this when brief the Id. provision Pеnnsylvania Constitution.
A.2d at 895. case, has to Majority employ the instant failed Edmunds I, analysis deciding in that Article Section 8 of the than the Pennsylvania provides protections Constitution more Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as Belton, New York v. interpreted 453 U.S. 101 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d held that Majority The has also litigants asserting rights Pennsylvania additional the Edmunds do to argue analysis Constitution not have Combined, meaningful way. before this Court in I any believe that weakening these two actions have the effect of our Edmunds. The Majority decision has sent a to message the Edmunds analysis litigants the lower courts and to that not argued by parties does have to be nor used our deciding courts additional rights when are extended under Instead, I I Pennsylvania disagree. Constitution. would reaffirm the Edmunds vital analysis deciding as when rights required Pennsylvania additional are under the Consti- tution by requiring litigants argue by requiring to it and courts, Court, including this to it in employ their decisions. framework, I
Within
believe that it is essential for this
to the Edmunds
engraft
to
a standard on
analysis.
the Edmunds
This case
analysis
demonstrates
is a rather
whiсh,
loose analytical
currently
tool
fails
interpreted,
to
provide
guidance
sufficient
or to the
litigants
lower courts.
Thus,
of Edmunds
in addition
making
prongs
the four
mandatory,
believe that
we need
a clear constitu
provide
tional standard for evaluating
prongs.
my opinion,
these
DeJohn,
by Commonwealth
implicitly
the standard
created
denied,
cert.
A.2d 1283
U.S.
(1980)
and Edmunds encourages
100 S.Ct.
there was Circuit, Philadelphia, Inc. City Theater 585 Pa. Artist of (1993) clause does not (Pennsylvania takings A.2d 612 clause) with takings than federal provide protections more Pharmaceuticals, v. Merrell Dow Blum (1993) that Penn- holding federal case-law and (rejecting jury parties 12 member to who sylvania requires Constitution them). short, implicit this explicit In I would make request to guidance to a maximum amount prоvide standard so as litigants. courts and to our lower the Ed- summation, I that we must re-affirm believe (1) I
munds strengthen and it. would do this analysis prongs to the four mandatory litigants it for brief making Edmunds; (2) mandatory for the courts of our making (3) the Edmunds analysis; engage to Commonwealth for and substantial reason” standard adopting “important Supreme of the United States Court. departing from decisions reforms, believe, litigants I will and the lower Only with these pro- to our guidance have clear when Constitution courts protections. vides additional Edmunds, four
Analyzed prongs under the believe from the departing reasons presents important this case in Belton provid- holding -Court’s United States our The first protections under Constitution. ing additional under Edmunds is the text required analyze we are prong Edmunds, Pennsylvania provision. Constitutional I, Pennsylvania of the Consti- we noted that Article Section 8 Fourth Amendment of language” tution is “similar Edmunds, Pa. at the United States Constitution. However, not we concluded that we “are bound
A.2d at 887. they images, as if were mirror interpret provisions the two Id. or the text is similar identical.” even where Therefore, text of similarity at 895-96. between the I, and the Pennsylvania 8 of the Constitution Article Section Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu- text of the Belton as the rule in this adopt us to require tion does not Commonwealth.
61 Edmunds Next, history us to of the requires examine Edmunds, In the relevant case-law. we provision along with I, embody that 8 “is meant a concluded Article Section carefully safeguarded notion of this Com- strong privacy, Id. at 394, two centuries.” 586 A.2d at past monwealth However, accept Majority’s I cannot blanket asser- 897. than Pennsylvania tion that “has struck a different balance Court, balance, that Supreme has the United States and under privacy given greater an individual’s interests are deference Majority Opinion Major- than at 56. The under federal law.” ity apparently privacy protections would extend additional Instead, I, under Article Section 8 to all who assert them. believe Edmunds commands that we must carefully scrutinize privacy pro- the asserted interest determine whether is I, Pennsylvania tected under Article Section 8 of the Constitu- tion. case, Appellant asserting privacy the instant is interest course, long recognized his automobile. Of our cases have on privacy
diminished interest an automobile based federal See, 2, 7, e.g., Milyak, Commonwealth v. case-law. 508 Pa. Timko, Commonwealth v. 1346, (1985); 493 A.2d 1349 491 Pa. Mangini, Commonwealth v. 32, 38, 620, (1980); 417 A.2d 623 Commonwealth v. 147, 156, 482, (1978); 478 Pa. 386 A.2d 487 (1973). 107, 110, 875, Swanger, 453 Pa. 307 A.2d 877 Howev er, privacy substantially that federal curtailed interest Belton. My the United research States recognized pro that we also a constitutionally indicates have expectation privacy tected reasonable in an automobile I, Pennsylvania under Article Section 8 of the Constitution. Holzer, See Commonwealth v. 93, 4, 480 Pa. 101 & n. 389 A.2d Baker, 105-6 & n. 4 Commonwealth v. 101, (1978); 518 Pa. overruled on other 1381, (1988), 541 A.2d Rosario, grounds by Commonwealth Pa. 648 A.2d Morris, Commonwealth v. 422 & n. (1994); — denied, U.S.-, cert. n. 724 & 3 In Holzer we 610, 130 115 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 519 held protections person’s “constitutional are to a car” applicable I, under Article 8 of Pennsylvania Section Constitution. Baker, Holzer, A.2d at 106. we held 480 Pa. at se per are not that automobiles well established “[i]t I, ... Article requirements by the warrant unprotected Baker, 518 Pa. at Pennsylvania of the Constitution.” Section 8 1383. I, Thus, Article Section 8 and case-law history according expecta- a limited history it reveal a interpreting independently in an automobile privacy tion of Therefore, us question before Pennsylvania Constitution. privacy additional not we wish extend today is whether to follow the to the but whether we wish protections Appellant *15 sharply privacy curtail a Supreme States Court United this recognized by my opinion, this Court. long interest Instead, automatically adopting Belton. prong weighs against severely consider the merits of carefully we must believe right independently recognized diminishing privacy our constitution. own of the Edmunds analysis requires we prong
The third
from our
states. A review of
related case-law
sister
examine
majority
the vast
of states have
this case-law reveals
of the United States
adopted
reasoning
See,
State,
539,
Belton.
Baxter v.
Ark.
626
e.g.,
274
S.W.2d
denied,
1118, 102
2930,
937 cert.
935,
S.Ct.
73 L.Ed.2d
457 U.S.
(Colo.1981);
Henry,
v.
1122, 1128
People
(1982);
631 P.2d
1331
Waller,
(1992);
283,
1189,
State v.
223
612 A.2d
1193
Conn.
State,
v.
v.
State
1170,
(Del.1983);
Traylor
1173
458
311,
(1983);
People
526, 530,
Calegar,
104 Idaho
661 P.2d
315
Hoskins,
209,
941,
v.
461 N.E.2d
101 Ill.2d
78 Ill.Dec.
denied,
840,
142,
cert.
945,
469
105 S.Ct.
63 (Miss.1982); 87, Harvey, (Mo.1983); State v. 648 88 S.W.2d Roth, 900, 819, State v. 213 (1983); Neb. 331 821 N.W.2d State 701, 102, Cooper, (1982); 304 N.C. 286 S.E.2d 104 State v. Rice, 128, (S.D.1982); 327 N.W.2d 131 State v. 649 Cabage, 589, (Tenn.1983); K.K.C., S.W.2d 591-92 State ex rel. 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); 210, v. Phillips, State 140 Vt.
746, (1981); Smith, 749 675, State v. 119 Wash.2d 835 P.2d (1992); Boswell, 433, 441-42, 1025 State v. 170 W.Va. 294 287, (1982); S.E.2d 295 153, State v. Fry, 131 Wis.2d denied, N.W.2d 571-72 cert. 479 U.S. (1986); State,
S.Ct.
For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted Belton after rejecting the assertion that its own state constitution provided more protections than the United States *16 Constitution:
Any suggеstion that it was intended that section 6 of the bill
of rights in our own constitution was to be interpreted
differently from
Supreme
interpretations
Court’s
of the
search provisions of the fourth amendment cannot
sup-
be
ported. The constitutional debates do not
any
indicate
wish
or
provide
intent
protections
against unreasonable
searches and seizures broader
than
existing
those
under
interpretations
decisional
of the United States Constitution.
Hoskins,
111,
In Supreme Court of Iowa to the deferred by balance struck Supreme the United States Court and refused to adopt a stricter standard under its state constitu- tion than the one set forth in Belton:
64 objections to the search and seizure are
“Defendant’s based protections. on both federal and state constitutional We can, choose, in applying if we stricter standards our impose than constitutional the United States Su- provisions own However, in Belton. we believe that preme Court did rights fair reasonably Belton strikes balance between society. of it now adopt of the individual and those We аs rule.” our
Sanders, 312 at 539. N.W.2d concerns Fry, Supreme Court Wisconsin voiced in not uniformity
national of Fourth Amendment law extend- its protections additional own state constitution: ing rule, officers “By adopting Belton Wisconsin can worrying follow the fourth amendment’s mandates without imposed might about whether some different restrictions be Uniformity on them under the Constitution. Wisconsin interpretation, long protections as consistent with the 1, Constitution, 11 art. sec. reduces the Wisconsin minimum the under which uncertainty confusion Moreover, operate. conforming must Wisconsin’s search developed Supreme and seizure law to that not under the fourth amendment consistent with the only text of search and seizure its constitu- provision, Wisconsin’s history, history judicial tional and its but is also accord public with sound policy.”
Fry, 388 N.W.2d 575. contrast, several of our sister states have refused to See, Hernandez, 1381, Belton. v. 410 e.g., follow State So.2d (La.1982); 159, Toole, Commonwealth v. Mass. 1385 389 448 1264, Greenwald, 808, (1983); 1266 v. 109 Nev. N.E.2d State 36, (1993); Pierce, 184, Jersey 37 v. N.J. 642 858 P.2d New 136 (1994); Belton, People 55 N.Y.2d Brown, (1982); N.Y.S.2d N.E.2d State v. denied, 113, 115 (1992), N.E.2d cert. 63 Ohio St.3d 862, 113 182, 121 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 127 U.S. Piеrce, example, Jersey
For Court of New *17 after apply involving refused to Belton to a case an arrest a routine traffic The court on stop. exclusively relied state I, grounds holding constitutional that “under article paragraph 7 of Jersey the New Constitution the rule of Belton shall not apply to warrantless arrests for motor vehicle offenses.” Pierce, 642 Supreme A.2d at 959. The Court of New Jersey noted that motorists for traffic usually arrested offenses are Thus, removed from the vehicle and secured. the court reasoned: arrestee, defendant],
When an as was the case with has [the car, been handcuffed and placed patrol and the passengers frisked, are removed from the vehicle and justification officer’s for searching pas- the vehicle and the Thus, senger’s clothing is minimal. the context arrests violations, for motor-vehicle bright-line Belton holding Chimel[, extends the [United States 395 U.S. v.] (1969)] S.Ct. beyond L.Ed.2d 685 rule the logical limits of its principle.
Id. at 960.
The court concluded: acknowledge We simple, the virtue of straightforward rules guide police officers applying Fourth Amendment Nevertheless, doctrine. we are convinced that automatic application of bright-line the Belton rule to authorize vehicu- lar searches incident to all traffic poses great arrests too rights guaranteed threat Jersey’s to New citizens constitution, their state and that threat to fundamental rights outweighs any incidental benefit that might accrue to law enforcement simplicity because of the predictability of the Belton Rule.
Id. at 963.
Similarly, Court of Ohio in Brown refused to apply the Belton line bright opined: rule. The court “We do not believe that certainty generated by bright-line test justifies a rule that automatically allows officers to every nook cranny just of an automobile because Brown, the driver is arrested for a traffic violation.” N.E.2d at 115. Accordingly, the court held that the warrant-
66 Ohio search the defendant’s automobile violated the less of Id. Constitution. sister that
My review of these decisions of our states reveals Pennsylvаnia on the of they question are inconclusive whether any rule. of these adopt present should the Belton New cases to analysis deciding detailed of state constitutional concerns only case reject engages follow or the Belton rule. The which is any analysis its state constitution meaningful Pierce which I find well reasoned its criticism of the Belton bright-line rule. to analysis
The fourth
of the Edmunds
us
prong
requires
public
Belton
a case es
policy
examine
considerations.
Belton,
sentially
policy grounds.
decided on
the United
that
Supreme
straightfor
States
lamented the fact
“no
Court
emerged
litigated
ward rule
from the
cases
respecting
has
here —the
of the
of a
question
question
proper scope
involved
of
of an
a lawful
the interior
automobile incident
Belton,
459, 101
its
453
at
occupants.”
custodial arrest of
U.S.
at
proposition
S.Ct.
2863. The Court stated the
that “[w]hen
how a
person
apply
princi
a
cannot know
court will
a settled
situation,
to a
cannot
ple
persоn
scope
recurrent
that
know the
protection,
policeman
of his constitutional
nor can a
know the
459-60,
of
Id.
The
scope
authority.”
his
at
S.Ct. at 2864.
Court
then concluded that courts had found no workable
definition of the “area within the immediate control of the
California,
arrestee”
formulated
v.
395 U.S.
test
Chimel
2034,
Thus,
89 S.Ct.
the United
L.Ed.2d 685
“bright-line”
holding
States
rule
Court established
“that when
has
a lawful
arrest of
policeman
made
custodial
automobile,
occupant
may,
as a contemporaneous
of an
he
arrest,
passenger compartment
incident
that
search the
Belton,
automobile.”
The Activism, and Searches Hancock, State e.g., Catherine (Belton (1982) Arrest, 1130-31 68 Va.L.Rev. Incident Fourth Amendment the level of dramatically reduces rule Rudstеin, The motorists); S. David afforded to protection Analysis an Arrest: An Incident an Automobile Search of (1984) (urging Belton, Marq.L.Rev. New York rule) Lines Silk, Bright David M. When return to Chimel Belton, 136 U.Pa.L.Rev. New York v. Limiting Break Doum: One (1987) narrowly). applied that Belton be (urging “does a the Belton rule has stated that such commentator *19 Fourth Amendment of sound development to the disservice an Lefavre, Amendment in The Fourth Wayne R. doctrine.” and “Good “Bright Lines” Drawing Imperfect World: On (1982). specifi- Faith”, Another has 43 U.Pitt.L.Rev. occupant once the allowing Belton for searches cally criticized and arrested: from the vehicle has been removed the necessary to resolve If line rule had been any bright of the rule Belton, opposite the in it would have been issue announced____ invari- [0]ccupants almost the court searched; an automobile ably are removed before removed, longer is no much have there they once been or from the automobile they weapons can chance that secure destroy evidence therе. Alschuler, and the Fourth Line Fever Bright
Albert W. Amendment, 227, 274 45 U.Pitt.L.Rev. and has no seriously
I rule is flawed agree that the Belton long It has been the Pennsylvania jurisprudence. in place the police may in the search rule this Commonwealth only to a car incident to an arrest compartment of passenger destroy- from occupants or to the protect safety prevent their In Timko, 37, 417 at 622. 491 Pa. at ing contraband. the contrast, allows the to search the Belton rule therein any containers contained compartment passenger instant case demon- no such exists. The exigency even where from Here, was removed the the defendant point. strates this safety of the officers point, At this the car and arrested. and the defendant was unable jeopardy,
no in longer in destroy any passenger compartment. evidence contained the evidentiary Had the officers wanted to conduct an search of car, they could the have secured vehicle and obtained In proper my opinion, warrant. Belton carves too wide exception justi- to the requirement warrant where none is today fied. are asked to follow dispense We Belton and with interest in an privacy long recognized automobile our state constitution for sake of a I bright line rule. am not previous convinced that our rule found Timko and based upon practical Chimel created such law problems enforcement in this Commonwealth as to mandate that we dramatically privacy rights curtail the of motorists for the of a bright- sake short, line rule. I not reasoning do believe that the of the opinion United States Court’s in Belton carries the Belton, day. my opinion, widely reasoning criticized long-recognized privacy in an interest automobile under Constitution, Pennsylvania any and the lack of evidence of law problems enforcing insurmountable enforcement current rule in this Commonwealth convince me that there are important and substantial reasons for departing federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence this cаse. Like several states, of our sister I bright would not follow the Belton line rule; instead would maintain the rule set forth in Chimel.
CASTILLE, Justice, dissenting. majority The holds that even though police this probable matter had illegal drugs cause believe that were car, appellant’s located in though they and even saw a mari- juana cigarette sitting appellant’s on the console of automobile at the they stopped lawfully time his vehicle and removed him pursuant the car to a valid warrant for appellant’s person, though police and even found an eighth of ounce of cocaine on appellant’s person they when removed him from him, the car and lawfully searched the cocaine found in his vehicle nevertheless must suppressed police be because could have obtained a warrant for the entering automobile before to an holding I this leads believe searching it. Because result, respectfully I dissent. must absurd this have Court and Court Supreme Both the United States seized of evidеnce remedy suppression that the recognized Leon, States v. requirement. United is not a constitutional 3405, 3411-12, L.Ed.2d 677 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 468 U.S. Common- Larsen by Mr. Justice As remarked (1985) Corley, wealth v. 507 Pa. (Larsen J., “Both the United States concurring): exclusionary that the this have made it clear Court and application where its would not be extended areas rule will unlawful deterring primary purpose not tend to achieve its that: misconduct.” This Court has stated objec- where the properly employed A of exclusion is rule ... or reliability challenged of the evidence goes tion conduct which is wide- government reflects intolerable controlled. spread and cannot otherwise be Musi, Commonwealth omitted).
(1979) (citations case, there was no present suppression. misconduct that would warrant police inadvertently failed to secure a disputed police It is not they at the time secured the appellant’s warrant vehicle normally required to person. warrant for his While are so, time allows them to do obtain warrants for searches where suppression circumstances the believe that under these inadvertent illegal unnecessarily penalized contraband nothing perceived to deter a by conduct does short, form over police. prioritizes misconduct technicality high to a art. substances and raises vehicle, Here, police saw removing appellant from the upon car and found person. drugs appellant’s on drugs illegal pro contraband These observations and discoveries suspect for the officers to probable cause independent vided *21 in car and which would contraband was that additional car. See Common lawfully appellant’s search police allow 70 Rosenfelt,
wealth v. 616, 627-28, 1131, 443 Pa.Super. 662 A.2d (1995) (probable cause search entire interior trunk and parole vehicle where officer stopped parolee parole for drug view); violation and observed in paraphernalia plain Evans, Commonwealth v. 351, 367, 443 Pa.Super. (1995)
881, 889
(probable cause to search where officer ob
marijuana
served brick of
in plain view
valid traffic
during
Grimes,
Commonwealth v.
543,
stop);
535,
436 Pa.Super.
alloc,
denied,
(1994),
A.2d
Pa.
(1992) (where police
executing
officers
search warrant
residence
drug paraphernalia
plain
observed
in
view auto
mobile, probable cause existed to search the car and evidence
trial).
seized was
Accordingly,
admissible
believe that the
eight ounces of cocaine found in the car should be allowed in a
against
trial
on
charges. See
appellant
drug
drug-related
and
Ionata,
Commonwealth v.
(1988)
518 Pa.
71 officials to administer” more flexible rules based on the totali- Johnson, ty of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. 516 Pa. v. 407, 415, 796, (1987), citing Commonwealth 532 800 Jenkins, (1982) 144, 149-50, 454 A.2d 1006-07 (both setting bright concerning forth line rules station house confessions). Court, in adopting The United States arrest, a bright permitting line rule searches incident to reasoned that a officer’s as to how and “police determination where to search the of a whom he has arrested person suspect is a hoc Fourth necessarily quick judgment ad which the Amendment does not to down in each require be broken of the search.” United instance into analysis step of each Robinson, v. States 467, 477, U.S. 94 S.Ct. (1973). L.Ed.2d
This equally applicable present rationale is to the situation. To a require police independent probable officer who has cause to search a to vehicle first consider whether there was probable upon sufficient cause on other based factors which he prior stopping could have obtained a warrant to the car uncertainty police creates and confusion for both the and the who may subject citizen be to the search. In order to deter what may some consider misconduct and to afford is, understanding citizens a clear of urge what the law would adoption the of a bright line rule that would allow warrantless of searches all automobiles for which have independent probable cause to “that felony believe: a has been committed vehicle, of occupants the or that it has been used furtherance of the felony, commission of a or the officer must believing have a basis for evidence a crime is concealed vehicle, within the or that weapons there are therein which are Lewis, Commonwealth to occupants.” accessible Pa. at 52 a bright Such line rule to prevent police having make a Solomon’s would try choice whether to either risk obtain warrant and flight of the and its occupants, automobile or to not obtain a suppression warrant and risk the contraband the automo bile. majority’s declining statement
I must further note
Belton,
York v.
line rule New
453 U.S.
adopt
bright
unnecessary
is
Dec. 1995. *24 ORDER PER CURIAM. NOW, December, day
AND this 29th the order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby affirmed.
Mr. Justice MONTEMURO participates by designation as a judge senior provided by Rule of Judicial Administration 701(f).