COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MOISES GARCIA
No. 648 WDA 2023
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
February 27, 2024
2024 PA Super 33
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.
J-A29026-23;
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: February 27, 2024
Moises Garcia appeals from his judgment of sentence after he was convicted of drug trafficking crimes.1 He challenges the partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the denial of his motion for bond pending appeal. We affirm.
On May 2, 2022, Corporal Reed Grenci of the Pennsylvania State Police stopped Garcia on Interstate 80 in Mercer County, Pennsylvania. A search of the car Garcia was driving revealed suspected drugs; Corporal Grenci charged Garcia with the above offenses. The charges were held for court.
On August 11, 2022, Garcia filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, in which he moved to suppress all evidence against him. The suppression court heard the matter on December 6, 2022. The court recounted the facts adduced at the hearing:
On May 2, 2022, [Garcia] was stopped by Corporal Reed Grenci (“Grenci”) for violation
of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314 [, which prohibits the use of headphones or earphones while driving]. Grenci witnessed [Garcia] driving slowly compared to other traffic and began to pursue [Garcia], noticed [Garcia] was operating a vehicle while wearing an earbud, ran his license plate, discovered the car being driven by [Garcia] was a rental, and conducted a traffic stop. After stopping [Garcia] and obtaining his license and rental agreement, Grenci inquired about the rental being in another name, [Garcia] not being listed as an authorized driver, and [Garciaʼs] destination; thereby learning [Garcia] was heading from Connecticut to Youngstown, Ohio for approximately five days and [Garciaʼs] brother had allegedly rented the vehicle. During this discussion Grenci discovered [Garcia] possessed no luggage, Grenci returned to his cruiser to enter [Garcia] into his computer at which time he discovered a prior case with a $750,000.00 bond. Grenci then returned to [Garciaʼs] car, ordered [Garcia] to exit the vehicle, and began a line of questioning without issuing a citation or returning [Garciaʼs] documents. When asked on cross examination whether [Garcia] was free to leave at this point, Grenci stated [Garcia] was not and he did not return the documents because he had not fulfilled the purpose of the traffic stop. Grenci asked [Garcia] if he may search the car, [Garcia] denied, and Grenci informed [Garcia] if he refused Grenci would call in the K-9 unit to sniff the car and search the car thereafter if the dog signaled. [Garcia] again denied and the K-9 unit was called, leading to a signal from the dog. Grenci again asked for permission to search to avoid lengthening the process; [Garcia] denied and was taken into custody. Upon the subsequent search of the vehicle, Grenci located a backpack in the back seat which contained allegedly packages of fluorofentanyl (a fentanyl derivative) and heroin.
Suppression Court Opinion, 1/31/23, at 1–2.
On January 31, 2023, the suppression court partially denied Garciaʼs motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the court suppressed certain statements made by Garcia but denied suppression as to all other evidence. Garcia proceeded to a non-jury trial based on stipulated facts. The trial court found Garcia guilty. After conviction and before sentencing, the court denied the Commonwealthʼs motion to revoke Garciaʼs bond.
On May 24, 2023, the trial court sentenced Garcia to consecutive terms of 72 to 144 months of incarceration, 24 months of probation, and 12 months of re-entry supervision. Defense counsel requested that Garcia remain on bond pending appeal, which the trial court denied.
Garcia timely appealed. Garcia and the trial court complied with
On September 27, 2023, Garcia filed an application for relief with this Court, seeking bond pending appeal. This Court directed the trial court to issue a statement of reasons for its bond order. The trial court complied on October 6, 2023. The Commonwealth filed an answer on October 11, 2023, opposing Garciaʼs motion. On October 20, 2023, this Court denied Garciaʼs application for relief by per curiam order.
Now, on appeal, Garcia presents the following issues for this Courtʼs review:
- Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion when it denied in part, [Garciaʼs] Motion to Suppress on January 30, 2023[?]
- Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion
when it concluded that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop[?] - Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion when it concluded that the police officer had “reasonable suspicion to extend the detention” of [Garcia] and extend the investigation of the vehicle [Garcia] was driving[?]
- Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion when it upheld the search warrant used to search the vehicle [Garcia] was driving[?]
- Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion
- Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion by denying [Garciaʼs] Motion for Bond Pending Appeal in its order dated May 24, 2023[?]
See Garciaʼs Brief, at 5–6.
Garciaʼs first issues concern the denial of his suppression motion. As such, we review whether the suppression courtʼs findings of fact are supported by the record and whether the courtʼs conclusions of law are correct. Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 346–47 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). If the record supports the factual findings, those facts bind us, and we will not reverse unless the suppression court erred in applying the law. Id. at 347. The scope of our review is the evidentiary record from the suppression hearing. Id.
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314
Garcia argues, foremost, that Corporal Grenci lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop because the officer could not conclude that Garcia was violating
(a) General rule.--No driver shall operate a vehicle while wearing or using one or more headphones or earphones.
(b) Exception.--This section does not prohibit the use of hearing aids or other devices for improving the hearing of the driver, nor does it prohibit the use of a headset in conjunction with a cellular telephone that only provides sound through one ear and allows surrounding sounds to be heard with the other ear, nor does it prohibit the use of communication equipment by the driver of an emergency vehicle or by motorcycle operators complying with [
75 Pa.C.S.A. §] 3525 (relating to protective equipment for motorcycle riders).
Garcia contends that Corporal Grenci only observed a single earbud and ignored the statutory exception that, according to Grenci, “allows for an earbud in one ear.” Grenciʼs Brief at 17-19.
The Commonwealth responds that Corporal Grenci had reasonable suspicion to stop Garcia to determine whether Garcia had an earbud in his other ear. The Commonwealth notes that the statutory exception uses the word “headset,” which would not include an earbud. And the Commonwealth argues that Corporal Grenci was not required to rule out the possibility that Garciaʼs apparent violation of the law could have an innocent explanation.
Under Pennsylvania law, the level of cause required for a police officer to stop a vehicle for an apparent violation of the Vehicle Code varies based on the officerʼs observations and the provision at issue. Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290–91 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)). An officer may always stop a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle
Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances:
The officer must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot. In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In making this determination, we must give due weight to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. Super. 2007)) (brackets and ellipses omitted). Notably, a determination of reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)). Indeed, allowing a reasonable-suspicion stop only after all possibility of innocence is eliminated would be incongruous with the notion that such a stop “must serve a stated investigatory purpose.” Salter, 121 A.3d at 992. Without any possibility of innocence, there would be nothing for the officer to investigate. Nonetheless, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity requires something more than an observation that an individual is engaging in behavior that many people can do legally. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 945–46 (Pa. 2019).
As applied to
Reasonable Suspicion to Prolong the Stop
Garcia argues that Corporal Grenci lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop by directing Garcia out of the vehicle, questioning him, and securing a canine sniff. Garcia disputes that the information available to the officer allowed him to go past the primary mission of the stop. He stresses that none of what Corporal Grenci saw and learned about him was illegal.
The permissible duration of a traffic stop, “is determined by the seizureʼs ʻmissionʼ—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 792 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). This “ʻincludes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stopʼ such as ʻchecking the driverʼs license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobileʼs registration and proof of insurance.ʼ” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). While the officer is completing the mission of the stop, he may direct the driver to exit the vehicle and ask “a moderate number of questions” about the driverʼs identity and the officerʼs suspicions. Id. at 793 (citations omitted).
An officer may prolong a traffic stop if, before completing the purpose of the stop, the officer develops additional suspicion. Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115 n.5 (Pa. 2008). Further reasonable suspicion can support continued investigation, including a canine sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. Harris, 176 A.3d at 1021 (citing Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. 2004)).
Here, the suppression court reasoned that Corporal Grenci had reasonable suspicion to continue his investigation and dispel his suspicions that Garcia was carrying illegal drugs:
During the moment at which Grenci ordered [Garcia] to exit the vehicle, Grenci was aware of [Garciaʼs] origin and destination, the alleged duration of his
stay (approximately five days), the fact that he was driving a long-term rental car as an unauthorized driver, he takes said trip quarterly, he was traveling without luggage, and he had a sizable bail amount for a prior crime. Based on his knowledge and experience, Grenci articulated the reason the totality of these circumstances piqued his suspicions was due to his knowledge regarding drug traffickers routinely moving between source cities to transport drugs, using long-term rental cars which are not in their names, performing short turnaround trips (thereby negating the need for luggage), and maintaining higher rates of recidivism. Grenciʼs knowledge and experience would lead a reasonable officer with his experience and knowledge under the totality of the circumstances to believe criminal wrongdoing was afoot and further investigation was warranted. Grenci was required to establish choate particularity of his suspicions to manifest the reasonable suspicion which is requisite for an investigative detention. Grenciʼs experience led him to believe the facts known warranted suspicion. Thus, Grenci did establish reasonable suspicion to justify detention.
Suppression Court Opinion, 1/31/23, at 8.
We reach the same conclusion as the suppression court—Corporal Grenciʼs observations while he was checking Garciaʼs documents led him to reasonably suspect that Garcia might be transporting drugs. Although each factor alone might not support a continued detention, the totality of what Corporal Grenci saw added up to allow for further investigation. Harris, 176 A.3d at 1021 (“[E]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.”). This included conducting a canine sniff of the exterior of the rental vehicle. Id. Because reasonable suspicion supported Corporal Grenciʼs prolonged investigation into Garciaʼs possible drug activity, this issue fails.4
Probable Cause to Obtain a Search Warrant
Garcia argues that after his arrest, Corporal Grenci failed to establish probable cause for a warrant to search the vehicle. Although the affidavit stated that a drug detection dog alerted twice to the exterior of the vehicle, Garcia emphasizes that the affidavit did not describe the search in detail, such as what parts of the vehicle the dog sniffed, the duration of the stop, the dogʼs qualifications,5 or whether the officer saw items in the vehicle that could contain drugs.
The Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania require search warrants to be issued only “upon probable cause,” i.e., “where the facts and circumstances within the affiantʼs knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.” Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 263 A.3d 626, 645 (Pa. 2021). On review, we determine “only whether a substantial basis exists for the issuing authorityʼs
Notably, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has instructed that when the police already have reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains drugs, a canine alerting to the outside of the vehicle provides probable cause. Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1192. A dogʼs “indication alone” is sufficient to escalate to this heightened quantum of cause. Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 187 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Here, the affidavit attached to the search warrant describes Corporal Grenciʼs experience and knowledge about drug traffickers. It recounts the stop and observations that led Corporal Grenci to suspect that Garcia was carrying drugs. The affidavit continues to describe the canine sniff:
Based upon my observations, taken within the totality of my training and experience and the circumstances of this stop, I believed that criminal activity was afoot. I asked GARCIA for consent to search the vehicle, which he denied. I contacted Tpr. Jonathan CASEY, PSP K9 Unit, and requested his response to the stop.
Tpr. CASEY arrived on scene at approximately 1315 Hrs. He deployed drug detection canine Senna on a search of the exterior of the vehicle. While searching, Canine Senna displayed alert/ indication behavior to the driverʼs side door seam and alert behavior to the open passenger side front window.
Suppression, Commonwealth Exhibit 3, at 36.
We conclude that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the issuing authority to find probable cause. After establishing facts that gave rise to Corporal Grenciʼs reasonable suspicion, the warrant notes that a “drug detection canine” alerted twice to the exterior of the vehicle that Garcia was driving. To require anything more than the same sequence of events from Rogers and Green would be a hyper-technical reading of the warrant, which is inappropriate on review. Pacheco, 263 A.3d at 645. This issue fails.
Bond Pending Appeal
In Garciaʼs final issue, he challenges the trial courtʼs denial of his motion for bond while this appeal remains pending. Garcia notes that the purpose of proceeding to a stipulated non-jury trial was to allow for this appeal of the courtʼs suppression ruling. He emphasizes his consistent appearance at all scheduled court proceedings as well as his strong community ties and family support in Connecticut.
When a criminal defendant has been convicted and sentenced to two years or more of imprisonment (but not life imprisonment or death), “the defendant shall not have the same right to bail as before verdict, but bail may be allowed in the discretion of the judge.”
A judge who refuses or revokes bail under Rule 521 “shall state on the record the reasons for this decision.”
Here, the trial court explained on the record its reasons for denying Garciaʼs oral request to remain on bond pending his appeal:
THE COURT: And while certainly the nature of the charges as well as the quantity of controlled substances weighs very heavily in my denial of bond, more significant is my realization recently that this offense occurred while [Garcia] was on bond for two other offenses out of a separate jurisdiction, and a different state entirely, which is not insignificant to the Court.
As such, Iʼll be denying bond at this time, and the Defendant shall be committed to begin serving his sentence.
N.T., Sentencing, 5/24/23, at 31.
The trial court further detailed its considerations in a statement of reasons for denying bond. Trial Court Statement of Reasons, 10/6/23, at 4–7 (including Garciaʼs prior record, the nature of Garciaʼs crimes, danger to society, and a lack of mitigating factors such as efforts toward rehabilitation).
We discern no abuse of discretion. The trial court recognized that Garcia, who had just been sentenced to more than a decade of imprisonment in Pennsylvania, had committed serious drug offenses while other cases were pending in Connecticut. This suggested that bail would no longer be effective. See Keller, 248 A.2d at 857 & n.4 (considering the public interest in preventing crimes by denying bail pending appeal). We cannot say that the trial courtʼs decision was manifestly unreasonable, was the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or overrode or misapplied the law. Therefore, this issue fails, and we affirm Garciaʼs judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
2/27/2024