COMMONWEALTH оf Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Bruce Alan CHASE, Appellee.
960 A.2d 108
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Nov. 26, 2008.
Argued Sept. 13, 2006.
However, despite my grave concerns, I decline to go beyond what Atkins and Roper require on the record in this case. Accordingly, as did Justice Lundberg-Stratton, I request that our legislature consider the issue, summon and question scientific experts (which an appellate court may not do), and consider whether the national consensus and our statutory law are in line with the demands of the
Michael F.J. Piecuch, Office of Atty. Gen., for Office of Attorney General, appellant amicus curiae.
Philip B. Friedman, Ambrose, Friedman & Weichler, for Bruce Alan Chase, appellee.
John B. Mancke, Mancke, Wagner & Spreha, Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania Ass‘n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, appellee amicus curiae.
Sarah Sisti McInnes, Bryan Roger Sgrignoli, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP, Philadelphia, for American Civil Liberties Union of PA, appellee amicus curiae.
BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER and BALDWIN, JJ.
OPINION
Justice EAKIN.
At 3:30 a.m. on August 24, 2004, Officer John Stephens was parked off Route 5, a two-lane highway with a broken-yellow center line and no traffic signals. Officer Stephens watched appellee‘s car for 20 to 30 seconds before it passed him; he
Based on this and additional information collected after the stop, appellee was charged with DUI-General impairment,
The trial court granted appellee‘s suppression motion, concluding both constitutions require probable cause to stop a vehicle for an alleged traffic violation, rendering unconstitutional the Vehicle Code provision authorizing stops based on reasonable suspicion. The Commonwealth appealed pursuant to
The former version of
Gleason thus held the statutory standard for stоps based on potential Vehicle Code violations was probable cause, even if an investigative stop would be constitutionally permitted in a non-vehicle situation based on reasonable articulable suspicion.2 Gleason did so based on interpretation of the former
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle‘s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver‘s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
The issue before us is whether the legislature could determine the quantum of cause an officer needs to stop a vehicle for an alleged violation of the Vehicle Code. This being a question of law, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. Craley v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 586 Pa. 484, 895 A.2d 530, 539 n. 14 (2006). A statute will only be found unconstitutional if it “clearly, palpably and plainly” violates the Constitution. Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 561 Pa. 571, 752 A.2d 384, 388 (2000). There is a strong presumption legislative enactments are constitutional. Id.; see also
The
A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the
Appellee goes on to argue some federal circuits “have held that probable cause is required to conduct a traffic stop.” Appellee‘s Brief, at 25 (citations omitted). However, a review of those cases reveals they too merely confirm that a vehicle stop based on probable cause was lawful—they do not state probable cause was required for every stop, merely because a vehicle was involved. See United States v. Puckett, 422 F.3d 340, 342 (6th Cir.2005) (“Puckett contends that the district court erred in not granting his motion to suppress because [the officer] lacked probable cause to stop him and therefore the fruits of the illegal search are inadmissible. Probable cause is determined by the tоtality of the circumstances....“); United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 423 (5th Cir.2002) (“The decision to stop an automobile is constitutional ‘where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.’ “) (quoting Whren, at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769); United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir.2001) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.“) (quoting Whren, at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769); United States v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir.2000) (“It is true that ‘so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful.’ “) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.1993)).4
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits also have indicated reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a vehicle stop. See Booker, at 721-22 (reasonable suspicion existed to investigate placement of temporary tag on vehicle); United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir.2005) (noting officer must have reasonable suspicion that some illegal activity, such as traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur); United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2001) (stating vehicle stop “must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity“); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.1993) (noting “if an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, there is no intrusion upon the
These federal cases acknowledge the constitutionality of a vehicular Terry stop to investigate suspected criminal activity. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). A “brief investigatory stop” of a person or a vehicle would be a Terry stop, requiring only reasonable suspicion. Arvizu therefore supports the conclusion that reаsonable suspicion is sufficient to make a vehicle stop to investigate suspected criminal activity. See United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir.2006).
The Third Circuit summarized this area of law:
Terry and Whren stand for the proposition that a traffic stop will be deemed a reasonable “seizure” when an objective review of the facts shows that an officer possessed specific, articulable facts that an individual was violating a traffic law at the time of the stop. In other words, an officer need not be factually accurate in her belief that a traffic law had been violated but, instead, need only produce facts establishing that she reasonably believed that a violation had taken place.
Appellee‘s argument conflates two portions of the Terry exception; Terry requires reasonable suspicion, and its purpose is to allow immediate investigation through temporarily maintaining the status quo. If reasonable suspicion exists, but a stop cannot further the purpose behind allowing the stop, the “investigative” goal as it were, it cannot be a valid stop. Put another way, if the officer hаs a legitimate expectation of investigatory results, the existence of reasonable suspicion will allow the stop—if the officer has no such expectations of learning additional relevant information concerning the suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally permitted on the basis of mere suspicion.
In Whitmyer, we reviewed a vehicle stop and stated:
We note that this is not a case where further investigation would lead to a discovery of a violation of the Vehicle Code. If the trooper was unable to clock Appellee for three-tenths of a mile or observe the conditions that would warrant a citation for driving at an unsafe speed, there is no further evidence that could be obtained from a subsequent stop and investigation.
Whitmyer, at 1118. The Superior Court recently followed similar logic:
[I]t is hard to imagine that an officer following a vehicle whose driver is suspected of driving at an unsafe speed would discover anything further from a stop and investigation. Similarly, if an officer who observes a driver run a red light or drive the wrong way on a one-way street, the officer either does or does not have probable cause to believe there has been a violation of the Vehicle Code. A subsequent stop of the vehicle is not likely to yield any more evidence to aid in the officer‘s determination.
Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 270 (Pa.Super.2005). This logic is correct. If Terry allows an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion, there must be something to investigate.
Sands distinguished a vehicle stop for suspected DUI, noting that such a stop was “a scenario where further investigation almost invariably leads to the most incriminating type of evidence, i.e., strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and blood shot eyes. This type of evidence can only be obtained by a stop and investigation.” Id. This is correct—when the existence of reasonable suspicion combines with the expectation that the stop will allow light to be shed on the relevant matters, the stop is not unconstitutional.
The statute cannot reduce the protections a citizen has under our Constitution—if it did so, it would indeed be unconstitutional. A statutory standard minimally equivalent to the constitutional standards applied in other situations is appropriate; it is not inconsistent with our jurisprudence.5
The amendment of
Indeed, the language of
The trial court‘s order is reversed to the extent it found
This does not end our analysis, as
The Commonwealth argues
Turning to history and case law, both parties refer to the general proposition that “unlike the
Appellee relies on our decisions in Whitmyer, Gleason, Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875, 878 (1973), Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975), and McKinley v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 576 Pa. 85, 838 A.2d 700, 705 (2003). Swanger held a random vehicle stop, based upon
[B]efore a police officer may stop a single vehicle to determine whether or not the vehicle is being operated in compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code, he must have probable cause based on specific facts which indicate to him either the vehicle or the driver are in violation of the code.
Id., at 879. Importantly, Swanger did not mention
Murray interpreted § 1221 to mean probable cause was required to conduct a vehicle stop for an alleged violation of the Vehicle Code. Murray, at 416-17. However, Murray also stated, “[A]n investigative stop of a moving vehicle to be valid must be based upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is presently invоlved in criminal activity.” Id., at 418. Again, like Swanger, Murray did not mention
Thus, Whitmyer, Gleason, Murray, and Swanger did not address, let alone hold,
McKinley stated:
[T]he decision in Whitmyer to retain an elevated standard to support automobile stops for Vehicle Code violations derived from interpretation of an undefined term and reconciliation of the statute with prior rulings of the Court that the probable cause standard for these kinds of stops was constitutionally and/or judicially mandated, see Whitmyer, ... at 1115-16 (citing Murray [and] Swanger), and not from the plain meaning of a statutorily defined term.
McKinley, at 705 n. 2. While this footnote may seem persuasive for appellee, McKinley dealt with “the validity of an administrative driver‘s license suspension under the Implied Consent Law, which was predicated on an extraterritorial encounter between Appellant and a Harrisburg International Airport Police corporal.” Id., at 701. Therefore, McKinley also did not address, let alone hold,
Ultimately, this history and case law reveals two main points. First, since the
A review of other states’ case law reveals many states have upheld vehicle stops based on reasonable suspicion. See generally Commonwealth‘s Brief, Appendix 1-2, at 38-41 (collecting numerous cases). Appellee cites seven cases from other states for the proposition that probable cause is required to conduct a vehicle stop. See Appellee‘s Brief, at 13. However, none of those cases have held a state constitution requires police have probable cause to make a vehicle stop. See Commonwealth v. Fox, 48 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Ky.2001) (relying on Whren‘s holding “that the temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the
People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 252, 771 N.Y.S.2d 64, 803 N.E.2d 385, 388 (2003) (discussing inventory searches of vehicle and adopting Whren‘s holding “that where a police officer has probable cause to detain a person temporarily for a traffic violation, that seizurе does not violate the
The Commonwealth argues a reasonable suspicion standard adequately addresses law enforcement‘s need to enforce the Vehicle Code and the citizenry‘s privacy interests. Appellee, along with other interested parties who filed amicus briefs, argues reasonable suspicion would not adequately protect Pennsylvanians’ privacy and essentially would provide police with unfettered discretion, which could lead to police making vehicle stops based on a pretextual motive.
As noted above, Pennsylvanians have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and this Court found
Pennsylvanians also have a significant interest in having the Vehicle Code enforced. In the context of DUI roadblocks, we
[T]he mass carnage that results from unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles occupying the road, outweighs the privacy interests of the individual.... [T]he state has a vital interest in maintaining highway safety by ensuring that only qualified drivers are permitted to operate motor vehicles, and that their vehicles operate safely, thus assuring that dangerous drivers as well as dangerous automobiles are kept off the road.
Commonwealth v. Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 611 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1992). In 2006, there were 128,342 reported vehicle crashes in Pennsylvania. See 2006 Pennsylvania Crash Facts and Statistics, published by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, at 8, electronic version available at: http://www.dot.state.pa.us/Internet/Bureaus/pdBHSTE.nsf/InfoFb06?OpenForm. The reported crashes in 2006 resulted in 96,597 injuries, and 1,525 deaths. Id. Obviously, some of the people involved in the crashes were not responsible for the accident, but were nonetheless seriously injured. For example, the reported crashes in 2006 resulted in 4,569 pedestrian injuries and 170 pedestrian deaths. Id. Vehicle crashes also cost Pennsylvanians a fantastic amount of money each year. The economic loss due to reported vehicle crashes in Pennsylvania in 2006 was a staggering $11,135,889,322, id., which is about $895 per person. Id.
Reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop a motorist must be viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). “In a Terry stop, ‘the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer‘s suspicions. ‘” Commonwealth v. Mistler, 590 Pa. 390, 912 A.2d 1265, 1277 (2006) (Eakin, J., dissenting) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). “A finding of reasonable suspicion does not demand ‘a meticulously accurate appraisal’ of the facts.” Booker, at 721 (quoting United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir.2006)). Indeed, even stops based on factual mistakes generally are constitutional if the mistake is objectively reasonable. Id., at 721-22 (citing Coplin, at 101) (although defendant‘s drivers’ license valid, traffic stop objectively reasonable because police cruiser computer indicated license suspended); United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir.2004) (although vehicle properly registered, traffic stop objectively reasonable because police cruiser computer indicated registration expired).
While it is argued the lesser standard will allow a vehicle stop to be made based on pretextual motives, the United States Supreme Court made clear that case law “foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren, at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. In other words, if police can articulate a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, a constitutional inquiry into the officer‘s motive for stopping the vehicle is unnecessary.
Ultimately, the legislature constitutionally determined the reasonable suspicion standard adequately balances citizens’ privacy in a vehicle and law enforcement‘s ability to briefly investigate an alleged violation of the Vehicle Code. It is not our role to disturb this democratic function when the current version of
The order of the trial court finding
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Former Chief Justice CAPPY, and former Justices NEWMAN and BALDWIN did not participate in the decision of this case.
Chief Justice CASTILLE and Justice BAER join the opinion.
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion.
Justice SAYLOR, concurring.
While I agree with the majority that the rationale justifying allowance of a Terry stop founded upon reasonable suspicion (as opposed to probable cause) implicitly assumes that further investigation is possible, I do not see any need in the present matter to make such investigative potential a specific element of the constitutional test, particulаrly as this case does not implicate the issue. See Majority Opinion at 92-95, 960 A.2d at 114-16 (affirming that additional evidence can be obtained in an investigative stop for suspicion of DUI). See generally United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (developing that a Terry stop of a vehicle is justified so long as the officer harbored an objectively reasonable suspicion that the driver violated the law, in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop). The majority proceeds under the supposition that certain vehicle violations cannot be investigated further by stopping the vehicle; however, notwithstanding the majority‘s recitation of various circumstances as set forth in Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 270 (Pa.Super.2005) (referencing driving at an unsafe speed, running a red light, and driving the wrong way on a one-way street), there are many instances in the case law where the driver makes an inculpatory statement to the officer following the stop. Such statements—assuming they