COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. DAVID PACHECO, Appellant
No. 42 MAP 2020
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
DECIDED: November 17, 2021
BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
ARGUED: March 9, 2021
OPINION
We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether trial court orders that authorized the disclosure of Appellant David Pacheco‘s real-time cell site location information (“CSLI“) were the functional equivalent of search warrants and satisfied the requisites of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that the challenged orders were the functional equivalent of search warrants and complied with the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, which affirmed Appellant‘s judgment of sentence.
I. Background Summary
The record establishes that in 2015, the Narcotics Enforcement Team of the Montgomery County District Attorney‘s Office (“Commonwealth“), working with the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA“), learned that a large Mexican drug-trafficking organization was smuggling heroin into the United States for distribution, and that Appellant, a resident of Norristown, Pennsylvania, played a significant role in the operation by retrieving the heroin in Atlanta, Georgia, and transporting it to wholesale buyers in New York City.
Relevant here,
Notably,
The statute further directs that an order issued under that section shall specify:
(i) That there is probable cause to believe that information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation will be obtained from the targeted telephone.
(ii) The identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the targeted telephone, or, in the case of the use of a telecommunication identification interception device, the identity, if known, of the person or persons using the targeted telephone.
(iii) The identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation.
(iv) In the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices only, the physical location of the targeted telephone.
(v) A statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen register, trap and trace device or the telecommunication identification interception device relates.
Additionally,
Consistent with these statutory provisions, on or about August 28, 2015,3 the Commonwealth filed in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court“) an application and affidavit along with a proposed order pursuant to
The application further stated that Montgomery County Detective Michael J. Reynolds had prepared an attached affidavit setting forth specific and articulable facts that established probable cause to believe that information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation would be obtained from the enumerated cell phone or on any replacement telephone number billed to the same subscriber for the upcoming 60-day period.
Attached to the application was a 29-page affidavit of probablе cause completed by Detective Reynolds.5 Identifying Appellant as the target of the criminal investigation, the affidavit set forth Detective Reynold‘s experience and education in investigating drug trafficking and his beliefs regarding the use of cell phones in drug trafficking and the distribution of drugs from source countries, including Mexico. Affidavit of Probable Cause
of Montgomery County Detective Michael J. Reynolds, dated August 28, 2015, at 1-6. Significantly, the affidavit states that the facts alleged establish probable cause to believe that Appellant, and others known and as of yet unknown, are committing and will continue to commit offenses including, but not limited to, manufacture, delivery, and/or possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance,
The affidavit bases its assertion of probable cause on various sources, including information provided by other investigators and law enforcement agencies, as well as three separate confidential informants who had participated in previous drug-trafficking investigations that led to the arrest of two individuals.
The trial court issued orders on August 28, 2015, authorizing the requested forms of electronic surveillance pursuant to
number billed to the same subscriber, believed to be Appellant. Trial Court Order, DA-165-1015, 8/28/2015, at ¶ 1.7
The orders identified Appellant by name as the subject of the investigation and the source of the heroin, and stated that the information likely to be obtained by the electronic surveillance would relate to the particular criminal offenses enumerated in the application.
On October 15, 2015, the trial court issued a nearly identical order permitting usage of the various electronic surveillance and tracking methods of the same telephone number believed to be utilized by Appellant for an additional 60 days, for a total tracking period of 120 days to investigate the same enumerated violations of the Crimes Code set forth in the Commonwealth‘s application and affidavit of probable cause.
While not challenged in this appeal, on December 11, 2015, and January 6, 2016, the Commonwealth sought and obtained orders from the Superior Court pursuant to Subchapter B of the Wiretap Act (“Wire, Electronic, or Oral Communication“), authorizing the interception of oral, electronic, and wire communications for the cell phone registered to Appellant, as well as three other cell phones believed to be used by him. Upon examination of the information received as a result of the various orders entered, the Commonwealth was able to identify nine occasions
By surveilling intercepted phone conversations, detectives learned that Appellant planned to return to Norristown from Georgia on January 10, 2016, driving with the retrofitted car battery containing the drugs. Police apprehended Appellant at that time and seized from the car battery three kilograms of heroin, which was the equivalent of approximately 100,000 singe-dose bags. Appellant was arrested and charged with nine counts each of possession with intent to deliver and criminal use of a communications facility, two counts of dealing in unlawful proceeds, and one count each of conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver and corrupt organizations.
On May 27, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to suppress raising several issues, including a challenge to the real-time CSLI collected by investigators. Relevant here, in a supplement to the motion to suppress filed on November 18, 2016, Appellant contended that the Commonwealth failed to “seek a search warrant from the [c]ourt to legally utilize ‘Mobile Tracking Technology’ . . . or similar technology . . . as . . . is required and necessary under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Supplement to Motion to Suppress, 11/18/2016, at ¶ 5. Appellant maintained that the use of mobile tracking technology constitutes a “search” for constitutional purposes that is unreasonable, as general searches are constitutionally prohibited absent a warrant based upon probable cause.
Following a hearing on April 10, 2017, the trial court denied Appellant‘s motion to suppress. In its opinion in support thereof, the trial court held, inter alia, that under a totality of the circumstances test and based on the four corners of the affidavit of probable cause, the court orders for mobile communication tracking information are supported by probable cause. Trial Court Suppression Opinion, 5/4/2017, at ¶ 12. The court explained that probable cause existed from the combined information of the three confidential informants, the cellular analysis of electronic devices that corroborated at least one of the confidential informant‘s information, and the call detail records revealing that Appellant was in contact with known drug dealers in Mexico and other persons previously apprehended in a narcotics case.
The trial court further rejected Appellant‘s claim that the challenged orders were unlawful general warrants because they failed to include limitations on the time and manner of real-time location tracking. The trial court reasoned that Subchapter E of the Wiretap Act does not require limitations on the time or manner of phone location tracking.
During the jury trial, the parties stipulated that between September 13, 2015 and December 5, 2015, Appellant made seven trips from Norristown, Pennsylvania, to Atlanta, Georgia, to acquire from Marcelo Enciso approximately three kilograms of heroin concealed in a car battery. The parties further stipulated that Appellant would then deliver the car battery concealing the drugs to the Hernandez family in Bronx, New York, and return later to collect the proceeds from the drug sale. The Commonwealth presented evidence consistent with the stipulation, including multiple phone calls between Appellant and the other participants discussing coordination of the trips and the price of the drugs. The Commonwealth further presented photos taken in Atlanta depicting Enciso and Appellant exchanging car batteries outside of a gas station. Appellant testified on his own behalf, admitting that he engaged in the alleged drug transactions, but contending that he did so under duress, claiming that the Mexican drug cartels coerced him to act as a drug courier by threatening to kill members of his family if he did not cooperate.
The jury convicted Appellant of all charges, with the exception of corrupt organizations. On November 29, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of 40 to 80 years, followed by 10 years of probation. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, raising several issues. Germane to this appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court‘s denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, he framed his issue as follows:
Whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress all evidence derived from the warrantless real-time tracking of [his] cell phone where such evidence was obtained in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
Concise Statement, 1/31/2018, at 1.
II. Trial Court Opinion
In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court held that Appellant waived his challenge to the denial of suppression of CSLI information by setting forth a vague statement of matters complained of on appeal that did not disclose what evidence was obtained without a court order or warrant. Trial Court Opinion, 3/8/2018, at 7. Examining the grounds upon which Appellant sought to suppress thе CSLI evidence at the suppression hearing, the court found that none of those claims encompassed the issue of whether the Commonwealth obtained and used information without obtaining a warrant.
III. The Carpenter Decision
Approximately three months after the trial court issued its opinion and before the Superior Court adjudicated Appellant‘s direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018), which addressed “whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user‘s past movements.”9 Id. at 2211.
Based on suspicions that Carpenter was involved in a string of robberies, federal prosecutors sought and obtained two court orders pursuant to the Federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA“). That statute permits the government to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunications records upon a demonstration of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
The two orders, issued by federal magistrate judges pursuant to
Prior to trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the historical CSLI records provided by his wireless carriers, contending that the government‘s seizure of the records violated the Fourth Amendment because they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause. The district court denied the suppression motion, and Carpenter subsequently was convicted of six counts of robbery, and five firearm offenses. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Carpenter‘s judgment of sentence, finding that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had voluntarily shared that information with his wireless carriers.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Recognizing the ever-evolving nature of digital technology, the High Court observed that historical CSLI records maintained by wireless network providers did not fit neatly under existing jurisprudence. Id. at 2214. The Court reasoned that requests to obtain cell phone location records implicate two lines of cases involving privacy interests. Relating to the first line of cases, which pertain to an individual‘s expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements, the Court contrasted its decision in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), which held that law enforcement‘s use of a beeper to aid in tracking Knotts’ car was not a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because a person travelling in an automobile on public streets has no expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another, with United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), which found that the federal agents’ installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones’ car to monitor continually the vehicle‘s movement for 28 days constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2215. Examining the privacy interests involved, the Court concluded that collection of historical CSLI records present greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle in Jones because a cell phone “tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner.” Id. at 2218.
The second line of cases implicated by the collection of historical CSLI, the Court found, involved the long-standing principle that a person does not have a reasonable privacy interest in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, i.e., the third-party doctrine.10 Id. at 2216. Observing that CSLI conveys a “detailed and comprehensive record of the person‘s movements,” the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to historical CSLI, concluding that a third party‘s possession of CSLI does not overcome the phone user‘s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 2217. The Court based its conclusion on the fact that historical CSLI, while commercially generated, is not voluntarily “shared” as one understands the term, considering that cell phones are “indispensable to participation in modern society,” and that “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering it up.” Id. at 2220.
Accordingly, the High Court held that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI,” and that the “location information obtained by law enforcement from Carpenter‘s wireless carriers was the product of a search.” Id. at 2217. The Court emphasized that historical CSLI‘s “time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person‘s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.‘” Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., Concurring)). The Court characterized the location records as holding the “privacies of life,” observing that individuals compulsively carry their cell phones at all the times beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences and potentially revealing venues. Id. at 2217-18 (citation omitted). The Court observed that the “retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable.” Id. at 2218. Thus, the Court concluded, when the government obtained Carpenter‘s CSLI from the wireless carriers, it invaded his reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements. Id. at 2219.
Based on the foregoing, the Court held that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring historical CSLI records.11 Id. at 2221. Addressing the D orders issuеd to obtain Carpenter‘s historical CSLI, the Court determined that those orders did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment because the federal statute only required the government to show “reasonable grounds” for believing that the “records were relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” Id. (citing
Finally, while the High Court determined that Carpenter was entitled to relief, the Court emphasized that its decision should be construed as a narrow one, stating explicitly that the decision did not extend to matters not before it, including the collection of real-time CSLI, which is at issue here. Id. at 2220.
IV. Appeal in Superior Court
On appeal to the Superior Court, Appellant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by holding that he waived his challenge to the denial of suppression of real-time CSLI evidence by failing to set forth the claim clearly in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal. Appellant further contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress CSLI evidence where the Commonwealth illegally tracked his cell phone in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Fourth Amendment, and the High Court‘s then-recent decision in Carpenter.
The Superior Court affirmed Appellant‘s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 227 A.3d 358 (Pa. Super. 2020). Initially, the court agreed with Appellant that he preserved his challenge to the warrantless collection of CSLI evidence by presenting the issue in his motion to suppress and setting forth the issue with sufficient clarity in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal. Pacheco, 227 A.3d at 365-66.
Regarding the merits of Appellant‘s suppression claim, the Superior Court observed Carpenter‘s holding that the acquisition of historical CSLI evidence constituted a search for constitutional purposes, and that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.
Finding “no meaningful distinction between the privacy issues related to historical and real-time CSLI,” the Superior Court extended Carpenter‘s rationale to real-time CSLI tracking, and held that Appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the real-time record of his physical movements.
The Superior Court next examined whether the orders authorizing disclosure of the CSLI satisfied the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.12 The court relied upon Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), for the proposition that orders issued under the federal Wiretap Act constituted warrants under the Fourth Amendment if three requisites were satisfied: (1) the orders must be issued by neutral, disinterested
The Superior Court concluded that the orders issued here pursuant to Subchapter E of Pennsylvania‘s Wiretap Act satisfied the requisites set forth by the High Court in Dalia because: (1) the orders were issued by a neutral, disinterested common pleas court judge who was authorized to issue the orders under
The Superior Court emphasized that the orders were obtained pursuant to lengthy affidavits of probable cause, extensively detailing the criminal investigation into Appellant‘s role in the Mexican cartel‘s illegal activities at issue, which were attested to by the personal observation of the affiant, information provided by other law enforcement agencies, several confidential informants, and information from other electronic and physical surveillance.
The Superior Court reasoned that the orders were substantially different from the “D orders” issued in Carpenter, which were based merely on “reasonable grounds” to believe that the records sought were relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
V. Allowance of Appeal in this Court
This Court subsequently granted Appellant‘s petition for allowance of appeal to address the following issues:
(1) Whether the Superior Court Panel erred in finding that an Order by a Court of Common Pleas permitting the Commonwealth to search 108 days of real time cell site location information was the equivalent of a search warrant, as required by United States v. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018)? Furthermore, did the Order of the Court of Common Pleas permit the Commonwealth to track Petitioner‘s cell phone(s) in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Fourth Amendment, the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act and the recent decision in Carpenter?
(2) Whether the Superior Court properly held that the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018), extends to the collection of real time cell site location information.
Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 237 A.3d 396 (Pa. 2020).13
As these issues ultimately challenge the decision of the suppression court, our standard of review is whether the suppression record supports the trial court‘s factual findings; we maintain de novo review over the suppression court‘s legal cоnclusions, as they are questions of law. Commonwealth v. Mason, 247 A.3d 1070, 1080 (Pa. 2021). Our scope of review is limited to considering only the evidence of the prevailing party at the suppression hearing and so much of the evidence of the non-prevailing party as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the suppression record. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013).
VI. Issue I
A. Parties’ Arguments
The parties first address the threshold issue of whether the High Court‘s ruling in Carpenter (that the government‘s acquisition of historical CSLI constituted a search that requires a warrant supported by probable cause) applies with equal force to the collection of the real-time CSLI evidence at issue here.
Appellant asserts that the Superior Court properly held that the acquisition of 108 days of his real-time CSLI implicates, at a minimum, the same privacy concerns that arose from the government‘s collection of extensive historical CSLI in Carpenter, and therefore constitutes a search for purposes of a constitutional analysis under the state and federal constitutions. He argues that like historical CSLI, acquisition of real-time CSLI allowed law enforcement to achieve near perfect surveillance of his location, beyond public thoroughfares to private residences in which he sought refuge. Further, he posits, both types of CSLI collection allow the government “to conduct continuous surveillance of a citizen‘s every move for an extended period of time in a way which was not previously possible due to the practical limitations associated with traditional surveillance methods.” Brief for Appellant at 21.
Indeed, in Appellant‘s view, collection of his real-time CSLI results in a greater privacy intrusion than thаt involved with historical CSLI, as real-time tracking raises distinct privacy concerns relating to the manner by which it is acquired. He emphasizes that historical CSLI is automatically generated as the cell phone periodically communicates with cell-phone towers in its normal course of operation, while real-time CSLI tracking requires the wireless service providers to signal or “ping” the cell phone at the request of law enforcement and then provide the location information to investigators.
Thus, Appellant asserts, unlike historical CSLI, there can be no argument that he voluntarily abandoned his expectation of
Accordingly, Appellant asks this Court to hold that Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for the acquisition of historical CSLI also applies to the collection of real-time CSLI in this case.14 Notably, the Commonwealth offers no argument on the issue, as it does not dispute that Carpenter’s warrant requirement extends to the Commonwealth’s collection of Appellant’s real-time CSLI. Brief for Appellee at 7 n.1.15
B. Analysis
Upon independent review of the inquiry, we agree with the parties and the Superior Court that Carpenter’s warrant requirement for the collection of historical CSLI, which provides “a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements,” applies with equal force to the collection of real-time CSLI in the instant case. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2211. Mirroring the analysis in Carpenter, we reach this conclusion based on our findings that: (1) Appellant has an expectation of privacy in his location and physical movements as revealed by the Commonwealth’s collection of real-time CSLI over a period of months, which society is prepared to accept as reasonable; and (2) Appellant did not voluntarily disclose his CSLI to a third party and abandon that expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine.
As Appellant cogently notes, the acquisition of 108 days of his real-time CSLI implicates the same privacy concerns that arose from the government’s acquisition of continual historical CSLI in Carpenter. The Carpenter Court found that “[m]apping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.” Id. at 2217. The Court explained that similar to the GPS monitoring of a vehicle for 28 days in Jones, which constituted a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, “the time-stamped data [retrieved through historical CSLI] provides an intimate window into a person’s life.” Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217.
The same is true here, where the continual real-time CSLI provided an intimate window into Appellant’s personal endeavors, revealing a wealth of information
We further agree with Appellant that he did not waive his legitimate expectation of privacy in his real-time CSLI under the third-party doctrine, as he never voluntarily disclosed his daily physical movements and locations to his wireless carrier. As the Carpenter Court clarified, “[a]part from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data;” thus, the government’s acquisition of the information from a third party “does not overcome [an individual’s] claim to Fourth Amendment protection.” Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2220. In this regard, the collection of location information in real time may be more invasive than historical CSLI due to the process by which it is obtained, i.e., with law enforcement requesting the real-time surveillance exclusively for criminal investigative purposes, as opposed to wireless service providers collecting the CSLI for general operational purposes, as occurs with historical CSLI.
Accordingly, we hold that Appellant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his continuous real-time CSLI; thus, the Carpenter rationale requiring a warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment for the collection of historical CSLI equally applies here.16 Under these circumstances, the Commonwealth’s acquisition of real-time CSLI must comply with longstanding Fourth Amendment constitutional protections applicable to search warrants.17
VII. Issue II
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s warrantless retrieval of 108 days of his real-time CSLI did not comply with the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional protections elucidated in Carpenter because the Section 5773 orders authorizing the acquisition of, inter alia, real-time CSLI data are not the functional equivalent
Specifically, Appellant characterizes the primary concern in Carpenter as emanating from the statutory standard authorizing federal authorities to acquire CSLI based upon “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds” to believe that the information sought was “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
Likewise, Appellant maintains, Section 5573 of the Wiretap Act lacks the requisite individualized suspicion for a warrant as it requires only “probable cause to believe that information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation will be obtained from the targeted phone.”
Appellant explains that a requisite element of probable cause is particularity or specificity, which is lacking in both the federal statute in Carpenter and Section 5773 of Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act, as they both require a relevancy standard relating to the existence of a criminal investigation, and not a nexus to particularizеd criminal activity. This failure, he asserts, allows for the search to be defined exclusively by the executing officers’ subjective determination of what might be relevant to a criminal investigation, affording law enforcement carte blanche access to monitor the location of the cell phone without any limitation as to time of day or geographic location, including private residences.
Challenging the Superior Court’s conclusion that the requisites for probable cause set forth by the High Court in Dalia were satisfied here, Appellant argues that there was no judicial determination of probable cause that the targeted cell phone was being used in connection with any specific offenses or would lead to evidence of a particular crime or contraband. He further asserts that there was no finding of probable cause as to the identity of the cell phone’s user and whether that individual would be engaged in criminal activity in
Finally, and contrary to the conclusion of the intermediate appellate court, Appellant opines that the totality of the circumstances does not establish probable cause to believe that the information obtained would lead to evidence of specific violations of the Crimes Code. In Appellant’s view, the trial court order merely found “probable cause” that information “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation” would bе obtained from the CSLI evidence, as that was the only determination that Section 5773 required the trial court to render. Appellant concludes that the Section 5773 orders “fail to effectuate the primary purpose of the warrant: to abolish general searches and seizures.” Brief for Appellant at 37.18
In response, the Commonwealth asserts that this Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the trial court’s orders authorizing the search of Appellant’s real-time CSLI comported with the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the High Court’s decision in Carpenter. Nevertheless, it submits, Appellant’s arguments focus not on the trial court’s orders authorizing the search of his real-time CSLI, but on the statute pursuant to which the orders were issued, i.e., Section 5773 of the Wiretap Act. The Commonwealth contends that Appellant did not present to the trial court a facial challenge to Section 5773 of the Wiretap Act, and maintains that he may not do so in his appeal to this Court because the claim is waived. Brief for Appellee at 9 (citing
Assuming for purposes of argument that the claim is preserved, the Commonwealth contends that Section 5773 comports with the Fourth Amendment and is clearly distinguishable from the federal statute deemed insufficient in Carpenter. First, it emphasizes the disparate standards of individualized suspicion required by the two statutes: “reasonable grounds” in
Second, the Commonwealth finds “puzzling” Appellant’s contention that the Wiretap Act does not require any quantum of suspicion relating to the commission of a particular crime. Brief for Appellee at 14. The Commonwealth argues that the “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation” language contained in the probable cause standard set forth in
Third, the Commonwealth refutes Appellant’s contention that Section 5773 does
Turning to the trial court orders issued pursuant to Section 5773, the Commonwealth likewise finds them to be consonant with Fourth Amendment guarantees. It asserts that Appellant does not challenge this Court’s jurisprudence establishing that an order issued under the Wiretap Act may serve as the functional equivalent of a warrant for constitutional purposes. Brief for Appellee at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Alexander, 708 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Pa. 1998) (plurality) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that an order issued by a neutral judicial authority, which found probable cause for the interception of an oral communication under the Wiretap Act, could not satisfy the warrant requirement); Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the probable cause/warrant requirement to obtain an oral communication under the Wiretap Act could be satisfied by a prior determination of probable cause rendered by a neutral, judicial authority); and Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254, 1258-59 (Pa. 1989) (holding that “a judicial order authorizing the installation of pen registers [under the Wiretap Act] is the equivalent of a search warrant in its operative effect . . . [and] the affidavit and order must comply with the requirements of probable cause“)).
Given that orders may constitute search warrants when the requisites of probable cause have been established, the Commonwealth argues that there is no reasonable dispute that probable cause was established here, as found expressly by the trial court in the Section 5773 ordеrs, which were based upon the extensive and detailed affidavit of probable cause accompanying the Commonwealth’s application. See
Accordingly, the Commonwealth concludes, the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act is wholly distinguishable from the federal statute at issue in Carpenter because it requires the requisite probable cause to search an individual’s CSLI. Because the trial court found probable cause for the issuance of the orders at issue, and that conclusion is not disputed herein, the Commonwealth requests that we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, which
In his reply brief, Appellant responds to the Commonwealth’s claim that he did not preserve in the trial court a facial challenge to Section 5773. He clarifies that he is not requesting a declaration that Section 5773 is unconstitutional but, rather, seeks the same relief sought in Carpenter, i.e., a declaration that the orders authorizing the collection of CSLI evidence, which were issued pursuant to a particular wiretap statute, fail to satisfy the warrant requirement. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 18 (stating “Appellant does not and has not challenged the constitutionality of Section 5773.“). Thus, he argues, the presumption of constitutionality applicable to duly-enacted legislation is not germane tо his suppression issue.
Somewhat inconsistently, Appellant reiterates his position that Section 5773’s requirement of probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment, as the statutory text requires only probable cause that the search will uncover evidence “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation,” and not evidence of particularized criminal activity. He further discounts the Commonwealth’s reliance on this Court’s decisions in Alexander, Brion, and Melilli, which acknowledged that orders issued by a neutral judicial authority could potentially satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requisites for a warrant. Appellant contends that those cases did not examine the particular issue of whether Section 5773 provides constitutional safeguards equivalent to that of a warrant.
Finally, while Appellant does not concede expressly that the orders establish probable cause required for a warrant, he acknowledges that the affidavit of probable cause demonstrated the Commonwealth’s belief that he “may have been a transporter of drugs, a drug mule if you will;” that telephone numbers registered to his name had been in contact with individuals involved in drug transactions within several days of those transactions; and that he was or had been involved with transporting drugs from Atlanta, Georgia, to Norristown, Pennsylvania. Id. at 4.
B. Analysis
In examining whether the orders authorizing the collection of Appellant’s real-time CSLI comply with the Fourth Amendment, we begin our analysis with a review of the protections guaranteed by that provision. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional mandate makes clear that search warrants may only issue upon probable cause. “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.” Commonwealth v. Leed, 186 A.3d 405, 413 (Pa. 2018). In considering an affidavit of probable cause, the issuing authority “must apply the totality of the circumstances
In summarizing the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has explained that there are three prerequisites for a valid warrant: (1) the warrant must be issued by a neutral, disinterested magistrate; (2) the entity seeking the warrant must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense; and (3) thе warrant must describe particularly the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255.
A court reviewing the issuing authority’s determination of probable cause examines only whether a substantial basis exists for the issuing authority’s finding of probable cause. Johnson, 42 A.3d at 1031. An “after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, as an issuing authority’s probable cause determination is entitled to deference.
Relevant here, the United States Supreme Court has not required that the issuing authority label its determination of probable cause a “warrant.” In fact, in Dalia, the Court upheld a court order authorizing the interception of an oral communication on grounds that it substantively complied with the 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement. 441 U.S. at 256 (stating that the “[t]he April 5 court order authorizing the interception of oral communications occurring within petitioner’s office was a warrant issued in full compliance with these traditional Fourth Amendment requirements“).
Likewise, as the Commonwealth cogently observes, this Court has held that orders issued pursuant to the Wiretap Act may serve as the functional equivalent of a warrant for constitutional purposes where the protections of the Fourth Amendment were afforded. See Brion, 652 A.2d at 289 (holding that the probable cause/warrant requirement to obtain an oral communication under the Wiretap Act could be satisfied by a prior determination of probable cause rendered by a neutral, judicial authority); and Melilli, 555 A.2d at 1258-59 (holding that “a judicial order authorizing the installation of pen registers [under the Wiretap Act] is the equivalent of a search warrant in its operative effect . . . [and] the affidavit and order must comply with the requirements of probable cause“)). Thus, it is clear that the substance, not the label, determines whether a particular court order constitutes a valid warrant.20
Initially, the affidavit sets forth Detective Reynold’s extensive experience and education in investigating drug trafficking. It also includes Detective Reynold’s affirmations that: (1) he is aware that drug traffickers use cellular phones, often times multiple phones, to arrange and discuss the distribution of drugs; (2) drug traffickers have shipments of controlled substances sent to them from source countries, including Mexico; and (3) after drug traffickers smuggle drugs into the United States, they transport them by a variety of means, including by automobile. Affidavit of Probable Cause of Montgomery County Detective Michael J. Reynolds, dated August 28, 2015, at 1-4.
Significantly, the affidavit included the following affirmation by Detective Reynolds:
I am aware of the circumstances of this case and am personally involved in the investigation of the facts contained in this affidavit. I allege the facts outlined in the following paragraphs to show there is probable cause to believe David Pacheco, and others known аnd yet unknown have committed, are committing, and will continue to commit offenses including but not limited to their involvement in the Manufacture, Delivery, and/or Possession With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (35 Pa. P.S., Section 780-113); Criminal Conspiracy (18 Pa. C.S.A., Section 903); Dealing in Proceeds of Unlawful Activities (18 Pa. C.S.A., Section 5111); and Criminal Use of Communication Facility (18 Pa. C.S.A., Section 7512).
Notably, the affidavit identified Appellant as the target of the investigation, identified the phone number of the targeted phone, and indicated that the phone is possessed and used by Appellant. Id. at 5-6. The affidavit based its assertion of probable cause on various sources, including Detective Reynold’s personal participation in the investigation, and information provided by other investigators and law enforcement agencies, such as the Montgomery County Detective Bureau, the Narcotics Enforcement Team, and the DEA. The affidavit further based its assertion of probable cause on information provided by three separate confidential informants who had proven to be reliable in connection with past narcotics investigations that led to the successful arrest and prosecution of several known drug dealers. Id. at 6-22. These confidential informants had personal knowledge that Appellant’s family members and associates were involved
As noted, on August 28, 2015, the trial court issued the Section 5773 orders which authorized, inter alia, Appellant’s wireless service providers to send signals or “pings” to the targeted cell phone numbers listed in the district attorney’s application, at times as directed by law enforcement, to generate real-time CSLI, and then disclose that CSLI to investigators, revealing Appellant’s whereabouts. Id. at ¶ 9. The orders stated that based upon the application, filed in conjunction with the aforementioned affidavit of Detective Reynolds, there was probable cause to believe that information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation would be recovered by authorizing investigators to obtain data relating to the physical location of the targeted cell phones. Trial Court Order, DA-165-1015, 8/28/2015, at ¶ Id. at ¶ 1. Significantly, the orders identified Appellant by name as the subject of the investigation and the source of the heroin, id. at ¶ 3, and found that the information likely to be obtained by the electronic surveillance would relate to violations of the Crimes Code, including the manufacture, delivery, and/or possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, criminal conspiracy, and criminal use of a communication facility. Id. at ¶ 4.
On October 15, 2015, the trial court issued a nearly identical order permitting usage of the various electronic surveillance and tracking methods of the same telephone numbers believed to be utilized by Appellant for an additional 60 days, for a total tracking period of 120 days to investigate the same enumerated violations of the Crimes Code.
Upon careful review, we hold that the district attorney’s application and affidavit of probable cause provided a substantial basis for the trial court to conclude that evidence of the enumerated crimes allegedly committed by Appellant would be found in the requested real-time CSLI. As did the Superior Court below, we find that the three requisites for a valid warrant under the Fourth Amendment have been established.
First, the orders were issued by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which is a neutral, detached, issuing authority. Second, the district attorney demonstrated in its application and affidavit the requisite probable cause to believe that the evidence sought would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense. To be precise, the application and affidavit demonstrated probable cause to believe that the CSLI evidence sought from the targeted cell phones, identified by the phone number attached to them, would aid in the apprehension of Appellant for the specific offenses of manufacture, delivery, and/or possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, criminal conspiracy, and criminal use of a communication facility. Thus, the Commonwealth established individualized suspicion and a nexus between the real-time CSLI evidence sought and the identified crimes alleged to have been committed by Appellant. The Commonwealth additionally demonstrated in the affidavit that Appellant utilized his cell phone in conducting the drug-trafficking activities.
Moreover, Appellant has failed to prove any clеarly erroneous fact-finding of the
Third, the applications and affidavits of probable cause provided particular descriptions of the place to be searched and the items to be seized. While Appellant’s instant challenge to the Section 5773 orders focuses exclusively upon the probable cause requirement for a valid warrant, he asserts additionally, without elaboration, that the Section 5773 orders “permitted surveillance which far exceeded that for which there was any attempt to establish probable cause and authorized law enforcement to continuously monitor [his] location 24 hours a day, seven days a week for an aggregate of 108 days, without any limitations, geographic or otherwise to account for [his] lawful activities.” Brief for Appellant at 16-17. He further suggests that law enforcement obtained his whereabouts “anywhere that he traveled, including behind doors and walls of the private dwellings in which he sought refuge.” Id. at 18. Respectfully, to the extent that Appellant has preserved a particularity challenge, we are not persuaded by his contentions.23
The Fourth Amendment “specifies only two matters that must be ‘particularly describ[ed]’ in the warrant: ‘the place to be searched’ and ‘the person or things to be seized.‘” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006). The challenged Section 5773 orders authorized a search of information generated by the enumerated telecommunication service providers that related to Appellant’s cell phone, which was identified particularly on each Section 5773 order by a separate telephone number. The evidence seized was limited to the CSLI disclosing Appellant’s whereabouts. While the aggregate duration of the surveillance authorized by the multiple orders was lengthy, it was supported by the extensive affidavits of probable cause accompanying each Section 5772 application. As referenced throughout, these affidavits set forth specific and articulable facts to believe that Appellant played an integral role in an international heroin distribution organization being investigated by the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania State
(deeming waived Appellant’s claim that the Section 5773 orders were overly broad because he failed to include that issue in his concise statement of matters complained of on appeal), and Appellant did not seek allowance of appеal for this Court to review that ruling. It is well-settled that where a claim has been presented to the trial court, but abandoned on appeal, this Court should not pass upon it because “[f]ailure to pursue an issue on appeal is just as effective a forfeiture as is the failure to initially raise the issue.” Commonwealth v. Piper, 328 A.2d 845, 847 n.5 (Pa. 1974). We address the particularity of the Section 5773 orders only to complete our review of whether they satisfy the three requisites of a valid warrant under the Fourth Amendment, as elucidated in Dalia, supra.
Moreover, the lack of geographical limitation in the challenged Section 5773 orders does not violate the particularity requirement, as the actual locations tracked by the CSLI evidence were neither searched nor seized. Thus, the Commonwealth was not required to describe with particularity in each Section 5772 application every location where Appellant could be tracked. As the Office of the Attorney General observes in its amicus brief, the Section 5773 orders did not grant law enforcement unfettered authority to access conversations and events that transpired inside private residences; rather, they provided law enforcement “only location information and nothing more.” Amicus Brief of the Office of the Attorney General at 21. We therefore conclude that the particularity requirement for a valid warrant was satisfied. Accordingly, the search of Appellant’s real-time CSLI was lawful, as it complied with the traditional requisites of the Fourth Amendment, and Appellant’s suppression motion was properly denied.
We are left with Appellant’s contention that the orders authorizing the collection of his real-timе CSLI violate the Fourth Amendment because they were issued pursuant to Section 5773, which, in his view, fails to set forth a constitutional standard of probable cause. Respectfully, Appellant wants his proverbial cake and to eat it too, as he declares definitively that he is not challenging the constitutionality of Section 5773, see Reply Brief for Appellant at 18 (stating that he “does not and has not challenged the constitutionality of Section 5773“), yet seeks to invalidate the orders authorizing the search of his real-time CSLI based exclusively upon the purportedly unconstitutional statutory language in Section 5773.
Regardless of Appellant’s characterization of his argument to this Court, both parties observe correctly that Appellant did not preserve in the trial court a facial constitutional challenge to Section 5773. As noted, relevant here, Appellant’s suppression motion challenged the Commonwealth’s acquisition of CSLI on the grounds that the Commonwealth failed to obtain a search warrant. See Supplement to Motion to Suppress Evidence, 11/18/2016, at ¶ 5. He further contended that the Commonwealth’s collection of CSLI constituted a constitutionally-prohibited general search. Id. at 6. Appellant did not, however, contend that Section 5773 was unconstitutional or tether his suppression arguments to the text of Section 5773 by alleging that suppression was warranted because Section 5773 utilized a standard less than traditional probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. In short, while Appellant challenged the trial court’s orders sanctioning the real-time tracking of his cell site location in his suppression motion, he did not contend that the statute pursuant to which the searches were authorized was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, Appellant waived any facial challenge to Section 5773. See
Accordingly, to the extent Appellant presents a facial constitutional challenge to Section 5773 in his appeal to this Court, we decline to address the waived issue and hold simply that Section 5773 was applied here in a constitutional manner. See Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 696 (Pa. 2020) (providing that “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two reasonable constructions, one of which would raise constitutional difficulties and the other of which would not, we adopt the latter construction“). We must keep in mind that this Court granted allowance of appeal to address whether the orders authorizing the collection of Appellant’s real-time CSLI complied with the Fourth Amendment. As we have answered this inquiry in the affirmative, this appeal is resolved.
Moreover, we reject Appellant’s contention that his case is not meaningfully distinguishable from Carpenter. There are fundamental distinctions between Section 5773 of the Wiretap Act and the statute at issue in Carpenter,
The federal statute in Carpenter, however, did not require a finding of probable cause or an affidavit attesting to the same.24 Instead, the federal statute permitted authorization for the acquisition of historical CSLI based upon a showing of “reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
VIII. Conclusion
In summary, we hold that because Appellant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his continuous real-time CSLI, the Carpenter rationale requiring a warrant for the collection of historical CSLI applies with equal force here. We further conclude that because the Section 5773 orders authorizing the collection of Appellant’s real-time CSLI evidence satisfied the requisites of the Fourth Amendment, they served as the functional equivalent of a warrant. Thus, the search of Appellant’s real-time CSLI evidence was constitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, which affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Justices Saylor, Todd, Dougherty, and Mundy join the opinion.
Justice Donohue files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
Justice Wecht files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
Notes
(d) Requirements for court order. A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.