Colt's Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs.Colt's Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs.
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-2751
COLT‘S NECK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, APPELLEE, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Colt‘s Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2751.]
Appeals—
(Nos. 2025-0693 and 2025-0980—Submitted March 25, 2026—Decided July 22, 2026.)
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court оf Appeals for Franklin County, No. 24AP-273, 2025-Ohio-1236.
KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER, DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY, C.J.
{¶ 1} This is a discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and a certified-conflict case in which we have recognized that a conflict exists between the Tenth District‘s judgment and a judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The appellate-court cases arise from a petition to improve a ditch that flows from Licking County—in Ohio‘s Fifth Appellate
{¶ 2} Neither
{¶ 3} Appellee, the Colt‘s Neck Homeowners Association (“Colt‘s Neck“), appealed the joint board‘s order to the Licking County Court of Common Pleas about two hours before it filed a second appeal of the order in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Both appeals were dismissed. Colt‘s Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Licking C.P. No. 23 CV 1462, 1 (Apr. 25, 2024); Franklin C.P. No. 23CVF-12-9463, 3 (Mar. 28, 2024).
{¶ 4} Colt‘s Neck appealed both judgments of dismissal. The Fifth District dismissed Colt‘s Neck‘s appeal, concluding that the Licking County Court of Common Pleas was not required to convene a panel of common-pleas-court judges from Licking and Franklin Counties to hear the appeal from the joint board‘s order, that there was no right to appeal the joint board‘s order that was issued after its first hearing, and that the matter was not ripe for appeal. Colt‘s Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2025-Ohio-113, ¶ 11, 13-18, 20-21 (5th Dist.).
{¶ 5} In contrast, the Tenth District reversed the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, holding that the trial court had erred under
{¶ 6} Appellants, the Licking County Board of Commissioners, the Franklin County Board of Commissioners, and the Franklin County Engineer, appealed the Tenth District‘s judgment, and the Tenth District certified that a conflict exists between its judgment and that of the Fifth District. We agreed that a conflict exists. 2025-Ohio-3107. No party appealed the Fifth District‘s judgment.
{¶ 7} We sua sponte asked the parties to brief the question whether the jurisdictional-priority rule precluded the Tenth District from hearing the appeal by Colt‘s Neck from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment of dismissal since Colt‘s Neck had first filed an appeal from the joint board‘s order in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas and service of process was first perfected in that appeal. See 2026-Ohio-1023. On this issue, we conclude that the jurisdictional-priority rule doеs not control the outcome of this case. Any error by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas or the Tenth District in not applying the jurisdictional-priority rule merely rendered the resulting judgments voidable, not void, and any claim that the courts violated the jurisdictional-priority rule has been forfeited by the parties’ failure to object to the proceedings moving forward in those courts. The case therefore could properly proceed in Franklin County.
{¶ 8} This case presents three straightforward questions asserted in the propositions of law and the order certifying a conflict: (1) Was the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas required to convene a two-judge panel to hear the appeal by Colt‘s Neck from the joint board‘s order? (2) Is there a right to appeal a joint board of county commissioners’ order to proceed on a petition to improve a ditch
{¶ 9} The answer to each question is yes.
{¶ 10} Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the Tenth District and remand the matter to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas to convene a two-judge panel of common-pleas-court judges from Licking and Franklin Counties.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 11} Cole Ditch has its headwaters in Licking County and flows through Licking and Franklin Counties before draining into Blacklick Creek. Its watershed spans 1,132 acres, with 238 acres in Licking County and 894 acres in Franklin County. The watershed includes 70 parcels in Licking County and 341 parcels in Franklin County.
{¶ 12} In April 2023, the Jefferson Township Board of Trustees and landowner Julie Dockter petitioned the Franklin County Board of Commissioners tо improve the water drainage of Cole Ditch to alleviate stormwater flooding of
{¶ 13} The Franklin County Engineer‘s Office held two informational meetings and prepared a report that included a preliminary cost estimate, a statement of feasibility, and a cost-benefit analysis for the proposed ditch improvement. It served notice of the proposed ditch improvement on landowners whоse parcels were within the Cole Ditch watershed, since the landowners within the watershed would be assessed the costs of the improvement. Relevant here, the engineer gave notice to Colt‘s Neck and to 89 of the 104 members of Colt‘s Neck.
{¶ 14} Because the proposed ditch improvement could benefit or damage property in Licking and Franklin Counties, a joint board consisting of members of each county‘s board of county commissioners was convened to consider the ditch-improvement petition. See
{¶ 15} At the first hearing on the petition, the joint board denied Colt‘s Neck‘s motion to dismiss the petition. Abigail Obert of the Franklin County Engineer‘s Office testified that the proposed ditch improvement would clear obstructions and dredge sediments from the ditch, shape the ditch and ground surfaces, and install piping and culverts. She estimated that the improvement would cost $3,228,000, with the costs assessed to each landowner within the Cole Ditch watershed, which includes governmental entities that own properties within the
{¶ 16} The joint board admitted into evidence letters from residents of the Cole Ditch watershed and heard testimony from some of the affected landowners; the overwhelming majority of commenters opposed the proposed ditch improvement. The joint board then adopted a resolution finding that the improvement was necessary and conducive to the public welfare and that its benefits outweighed its costs. It therefore ordered the Franklin County Engineer to proceed with preparing reports, plans, and schedules needed for the improvement.
{¶ 17} Colt‘s Neck appealed the joint board‘s order to the courts of common pleas in Licking and Franklin Counties.
{¶ 18} In the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Colt‘s Neck asserted that the joint board had failed to give proper notice to 17 landowners that would be affеcted by the proposed ditch improvement, that the first hearing was neither fair nor unbiased, that the petitioners had failed to sustain their burden of proof, that the joint board had lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the first hearing and make a decision on the ditch-improvement petition, and that the joint board‘s order was otherwise unconstitutional and erroneous. In addition to seeking reversal of the joint board‘s order, Colt‘s Neck requested damages in an amount exceeding $25,000.
{¶ 19} About two hours after it filed its notice of appeal from the joint board‘s order in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Colt‘s Neck filed substantively the same notice of appeal in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 21} The Fifth District subsequently dismissed Colt‘s Neck‘s appeаl from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment of dismissal, concluding that the trial court was not required to convene a joint panel of common-pleas-court judges from Licking and Franklin Counties to rule on the appeal from the joint board‘s order, because Colt‘s Neck had requested damages in its notice of appeal. Colt‘s Neck, 2025-Ohio-113, at ¶ 11 (5th Dist.). The Fifth District further decided that Colt‘s Neck had no right to appeal the joint board‘s order that was issued after the first hearing, for three reasons: (1)
{¶ 22} The Tenth District took a different tack, ultimately reversing the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment of dismissal and remanding the matter to that court for further proceedings. See 2025-Ohio-1236 at ¶ 30 (10th Dist.). The Tenth District determined that the trial court had erred under
{¶ 23} We accepted the discretionary appeal filed by the Licking County and Frаnklin County boards of commissioners and the Franklin County Engineer to review the following propositions of law:
PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 1: The [Tenth District] erred in determining that a panel of judges from two or more counties must be convened under
R.C. 6133.10 , when the appellant claims damages following a first hearing.PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 2: The Tenth District erred in determining that
Ohio Revised Code Chapters 2506 ,6131 and6133 provide a statutory right to the appeal of a decision made following a first hearing in a joint county ditch petition matter.PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 3: The Tenth District erred in determining that
R.C. 6131.25 , gives any “affected owner” standing to appeal.
See 2025-Ohio-3107.
“(1) whether a panel of judges from two or more counties must be convened under
R.C. 6133.10 , when the appellant claims damages following a first hearing, (2) whetherR.C. Chapters 2506 ,6131 , and6133 provide a statutory right to the appeal of a decision made following a first hearing in a joint county ditch petition matter, and (3) what constitutes an ‘affected owner’ underR.C. 6131.25 thereby granting a party standing to appeal.”
Id., quoting No. 24AP-273 (10th Dist. July 16, 2025).
{¶ 25} After oral argument, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the question “whether the Tenth District Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the jurisdictional-priority rule,” 2026-Ohio-1023.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. The Jurisdictional-Priority Rule
{¶ 26} Our concern in ordering supplemental briefing on the jurisdictional-priority rule was whether the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and the Tenth District had the power to hear an appeal arising from the joint board‘s order since a separate appeal from the joint board‘s order was first filed in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas and service of process was first perfected in that appeal. See State ex rel. Balson v. Harnishfeger, 55 Ohio St.2d 38, 39-40 (1978) (“Service of process is . . . made a condition precedent to vesting оf jurisdiction in determining which of two courts has the exclusive right to adjudicate the whole case.“).
{¶ 28} The jurisdictional-priority rule refers to the “‘jurisdiction‘” of “‘the tribunal whose power is first invoked.‘” Id., quoting Phillips at syllabus. “We have recognized that the word ‘jurisdiction,’ set apart by itself, is a vague term, a word of many, too many, meanings.” (Cleaned up.) Ostanek v. Ostanek, 2021-Ohio-2319, ¶ 20. “It encompasses ‘[s]everal distinct concepts, including territorial jurisdiction, monetary jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction.‘” (Bracketed text added in Ostanek.) Id., quoting Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶ 5. But it also has been used to refer to “‘jurisdiction over a particular case.‘” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 18.
{¶ 29} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14. It focuses on “‘the rules that actually allocate judicial authority among different courts.‘” Id., quoting 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4428, at 6 (3d Ed. 2017). A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction “‘is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.‘” Id., quoting Kuchta at ¶ 19.
{¶ 30} “Personal jurisdiction refers to the court‘s power to render a valid judgment against a particular individual.” State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 36; see also Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984). But unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction does not involve the structural power of the court to hear a class or type of case. Rather, the requirement for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction to issue a valid judgment flows from due process. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. 255, 261 (2017); Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). “The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power . . . as a matter of individual liberty.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland at 702. So unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, a personal-jurisdiction defense may be lost by waiver or a voluntary appearance. Id. at 702-703; see also Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Power Eng. Group, Inc., 2007-Ohio-257, ¶ 6; Maryhew at 156.
{¶ 31} Because it relates to the power of a court to render a valid judgment, a judgment entered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void. Ostanek, 2021-Ohio-2319, at ¶ 22.
{¶ 32} “A court‘s jurisdiction over a particular case refers to the court‘s authority to proceed or rule on a case that is within the court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, at ¶ 19, citing Pratts, 2004-Ohio-1980, at ¶ 12. This reference to a court‘s exercise of its jurisdiction over a particular case “involves consideration of the rights of the parties.” Id. An error committed in a court‘s exercise of the jurisdiction conferred renders the judgment voidable, not void. State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 26.
{¶ 34} We have suggested that when the jurisdictional-priority rule applies, the second court to receive the case “patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction,” such that a writ of prohibition is an available remedy. State ex rel. Consortium for Economic & Community Dev. for Hough Ward 7 v. Russo, 2017-Ohio-8133, ¶ 8. But again, “the word ‘jurisdiction,’ set apart by itself, is a vague term, a word of many, too many, meanings.” (Cleaned up.) Ostanek, 2021-Ohio-2319, at ¶ 20.
{¶ 35} Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, the jurisdictional-priority rule does not exist because the Ohio Constitution or a statute created it. Rather, it is a common-law rule, Allen v. Pulaski Cty. Circuit Court, Ninth Div., 2009 Ark. 167, 11 (2009), that “exists to promote judicial economy and avoid inconsistent results,” Russo at ¶ 10, and it prevents a defendant from being “harassed and oppressed by two actions for the same cause where [the] plaintiff has a complete remedy by one of them,” State ex rel. Maxwell v. Schneider, 103 Ohio St. 492, 496 (1921). It is a rule that rests on policy, not a constitutional or statutory provision.
{¶ 37} Here, the Licking and Franklin County Courts of Common Pleas each had subject-matter jurisdiction over appeals from the joint board‘s order regarding the ditch-improvement petition:
{¶ 38} It is ultimately up to the General Assembly to clarify the appellate process that applies when an affected landowner wishes to appeal from an order to
{¶ 39} None of the parties asserted in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that the jurisdictional-priority rule precluded the case from proceeding in that court. Also, no one raised any issue with the appeal of that court‘s judgment going forward in the Tenth District. Consequently, any error regarding the jurisdictional-priority rule has beеn forfeited.
{¶ 40} We conclude that the jurisdictional-priority rule did not deprive the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas or the Tenth District of the power to hear this case. Accordingly, this matter is properly before this court to decide the propositions of law and the certified-conflict questions. Therefore, we turn to the issues presented by the discretionary appeal from the judgment of the Tenth District and the certified-conflict questions.
B. Standard of Review
{¶ 41} An appellate court reviews de novo an order granting a
{¶ 42} Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we also rеview de novo. Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., 2024-Ohio-1625, ¶ 13. We ask “not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus.
C. Multicounty Ditch Improvements
{¶ 43}
{¶ 44} Upon the filing of a petition proposing a joint-county ditch improvement, the board of county commissioners from each county must organize a joint board of county commissioners.
{¶ 45} Upon receiving notice of the petition, the county engineer for the “lead county“—“the county in which the majority of the initial length of a joint county drainage improvement would be located,”
1. The First Hearing
{¶ 46} At the first hearing, the joint board must hear the engineer‘s preliminаry report and any evidence offered by affected landowners for or against granting the proposed ditch improvement.
{¶ 47} The joint board may approve the proposed ditch improvement if it finds that the improvement (1) is necessary for certain statutorily specified reasons related to handling water flowing into and through the ditch, (2) is conducive to the public welfare, and (3) has benefits that will outweigh the costs.
{¶ 48} If the joint board finds at the conclusion of the first hearing that the proposed ditch improvement is necessary, is conducive to the public welfare, and has benefits that will outweigh the costs, it “may decide to proceed with the project survey and design for a proposed improvement.”
2. Appellate Rights
{¶ 49} When a case involves a joint-county ditch improvement under
{¶ 50} The statutory scheme expressly provides that a landowner affected by the dismissal of a ditch-improvement petition after the first hearing may appeal the dismissal to a court of common pleas.
{¶ 51} However,
Any affected owner may appeal to the court of common pleas within thirty days of the date that any order was issued by the board of county commissioners under this chapter, and may appeal any one or more of the following questions:
(1) Is the improvement necessary?
(2) Will the improvement be conducive to the public welfare?
(3) Is the cost of the improvement greater than the benefits conferred?
(4) Is the route, termini, or mode of construction the best to accomplish the purpose of the improvement?
(5) Are the assessments levied according to benefits?
(6) Is the award for compensation or damages just?
{¶ 52} With this understanding of the statutory scheme in mind, we turn to the specific issues presented in this case.
D. The Requirement for a Panel of Common-Pleas-Court Judges
{¶ 53} The first proposition of law and the first certified question concern whether a panel of common-pleas-court judges, one each from Licking and Franklin Counties, must be convened to hear the appeal from the jоint board‘s order filed by Colt‘s Neck.
{¶ 54} Again,
{¶ 55} Nonetheless, the Fifth and Tenth Districts disagreed whether the appeal by Colt‘s Neck involved a claim for compensation or damages, because in its notice of appeal, Colt‘s Neck demanded “damages in excess of $25,000.” But Colt‘s Neck never presented a claim for compensation or damages to the joint board.
{¶ 56} But here, Colt‘s Neck appealed from the joint board‘s order that was issued after the first hearing, in which the joint board did not rule on any claims for compensation or damages but instead directed the Franklin County Engineer to proceed with preparing reports, plans, and schedules needed for the proposed ditch improvement. See
E. Appeal to the Court of Common Pleas
{¶ 57} The second proposition of law and the second certified question concern whether there is a right to appeal from an order that is issued after a joint board‘s first hearing that directs a county engineer to proceed with preparing reports, plans, and schedules needed for a proposed joint-county ditch improvement.
{¶ 58} As noted above, the statutory scheme provides an affected landowner an express right to appeal the dismissal of the petition after the first hearing.
{¶ 59} This court has recognized that “‘“Any” means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.“‘” Weiss v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2000-Ohio-5, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 1997-Ohio-278, ¶ 9, quoting Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (1971). The word “any” is inclusive, The Way Internatl. v. Limbach, 50 Ohio St.3d 76, 80 (1990), and “is often used as meaning ‘all,‘” Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 240 (1948), or “every” (emphasis deleted), State v. Wells, 146 Ohio St. 131, 137 (1945).
{¶ 60}
{¶ 61} The county commissioners and the Franklin County Engineer point to Atley v. Clinton Cty. Commrs., 77 Ohio St. 285, 294 (1907), for the proposition that an appeal will not lie in a ditch-improvement proceeding “yet in its initial stage” but instead must await a final order. When Atley was decided, R.S. 4463—a predecessor to
{¶ 62} And before 1981, former
F. Standing to Appeal
{¶ 64} The third proposition of law and the third certified question ask whether Colt‘s Neck is an affected landowner with a right to appeal under
{¶ 65} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides: “The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 66} In this case,
{¶ 67} In determining whether a party has standing, we have recognized “that the legislature may confer standing by statute.” Voss v. Quicken Loans, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-531, ¶ 13. In particular, “the legislature may by statute authorize
{¶ 68} Exercising its legislative authority, the General Assembly enacted
{¶ 69} “Owner” is defined in
{¶ 70} The word “affected” is not defined in
{¶ 72} This meaning of “affected” also aligns with the standard dictionary definition of the word. “Affect” means “to produce an effect . . . upon” and “to have a detrimental influence on,” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (2002); it denotes an impact on something. An “affected owner” then is a landowner whose land is impacted by the proposed changes to the ditch.
{¶ 73} Under the statutory scheme, affected owners like Colt‘s Neck have rights conferred by
{¶ 74} In its notice of appeal to the courts of common pleas, Colt‘s Neck asserted that its rights had been violated at the first hearing. It contended that the hearing had been unfair and biased and that the petitioners had failed to sustain their burden of proof. In short, Colt‘s Neck has alleged a particularized legal injury—the violation of its rights as an “affected owner” under
{¶ 75} Consequently, Colt‘s Neck has standing to appeal the joint board‘s order under
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 76}
{¶ 77} Because Colt‘s Neck was an affected landowner, it had standing and statutory authority to appeal the joint board‘s order that was issued after the first hearing on the proposed ditch improvement for the Cole Ditch watershed. That appeal should have been heard by a joint panel of common-pleas-court judges from Licking and Franklin Counties.
{¶ 78} Therefore, we answer the certified questions in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Richard D. Rogovin; and Loveland Law, L.L.C., and Bryan S. Hunt, for appellee.
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Joseph R. Durham, and Elizabeth A. Johnson, for appellants Franklin County, Ohio Board of Commissioners and Franklin County Engineer.
Jenny Wells, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Darcy T. Cook, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant Licking County, Ohio Board of Commissioners.