THE STATE EX REL. PURDY ET AL. v. CLERMONT COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL.
No. 96-2067
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted and decided October 8, 1996—Opinion announced January 22, 1997
77 Ohio St.3d 338 | 1997-Ohio-278
Mandamus action challenging boards of elections’ interpretation of R.C. 3513.04—Writ denied, when.
IN MANDAMUS.
{¶ 1} Relators in this election matter are Virginia M. Purdy and Anita M. Tighe. Respondents are the Clermont and Cuyahoga County Boards of Elections.
{¶ 2} Relators became candidates in their districts for nomination for the offices of state representative, Ohio House of Representatives. Purdy attempted to secure the Republican Party nomination for election to the Eighty-Eighth House District, and Tighe the Democratic Party nomination for election to the Seventieth House District. However, both relators were defeated in their March 1996 primary elections.
{¶ 3} Purdy and Tighe subsequently filed nominating petitions and statements of candidacy for election to the State Board of Education (“State Board”) for the Tenth District and Fifth District, respectively. Relators timely filed their petitions with their boards of elections, seeking to have their petitions certified and their names placed on the ballots for the November 1996 election. See
{¶ 4} Respondent Clermont County Board of Elections received two written protests challenging Purdy’s candidacy, and respondent Cuyahoga County Board of Elections received one written protest challenging Tighe’s candidacy.
{¶ 5} On September 9, 1996, relators filed an original action in mandamus in this court, challenging respondents’ interpretation of
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, James F. DeLeone, C. David Paragas, N. Victor Goodman and J. Gregg Haught, for relators.
Talikka, Ischie, Talikka, Wilson & Black and Neil R. Wilson, for relator Anita M. Tighe.
Donald W. White, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas L. Blust, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Clermont County Board of Elections.
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Patrick J. Murphy and Michael P. Butler, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.
DOUGLAS, J.
{¶ 6} The issue in this case is whether respondents properly concluded that
{¶ 7} Relators assert that
{¶ 8} The paramount consideration in construing a statute is legislative intent. State ex rel. Zonders v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 5, 8, 630 N.E.2d 313, 315. “ ‘In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.’ ” Id., quoting State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323. “If the meaning of a statute is unambiguous and definite, then it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is appropriate.” State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 651 N.E.2d 995, 997.
{¶ 9} Relators contend that the term “any office,” as set forth in
{¶ 10} Clearly,
{¶ 11} The language of
{¶ 12} Relators also argue, alternatively, that
{¶ 13} Initially, it is important to observe that although relators seek a writ of mandamus, the effect of the requested relief would be to enjoin respondents from enforcing the clear mandates of
{¶ 14} Nevertheless, we have also concluded that the constitutionality of a statute may, in certain instances, be challenged by mandamus. State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1209; see, also,
{¶ 15} In the case at bar, relators would have a clear legal right to have their petitions certified if we determined that
{¶ 16} The constitutional rights of candidates and voters “do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.” Bullock v. Carter (1972), 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92, 99. Election laws that govern the selection and eligibility of candidates inevitably affect an individual’s right to vote and to associate with others for political purposes. Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983), 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 557. Notwithstanding, states are free to adopt comprehensive laws that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process. Id.
{¶ 17} Relators claim that any election law that limits ballot access for prospective candidates must be analyzed under the most rigorous standard of review. In this regard, relators assert that to pass constitutional scrutiny,
{¶ 18} In Burdick v. Takushi (1992), 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245, the court, in upholding Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting, observed:
“Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters. Each provision of a code, ‘whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.’ Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 [103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 557] (1983). Consequently, to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. * * * Accordingly, the mere fact that a State’s system ‘creates barriers * * * tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose * * * does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’ Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 [92 S.Ct. 849, 856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92, 100] (1972); Anderson, supra, at 788 [103 S.Ct., at 1569-1570, 75 L.Ed.2d, at 557]; McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 [89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739] (1969).
“Instead, as the full Court agreed in Anderson, 460 U.S., at 788-789 [103 S.Ct., at 1569-1570, 75 L.Ed.2d, at 557-558]; id., at 808, 817 [103 S.Ct., at 1580, 1584-1585, 75 L.Ed.2d, at 570, 575-576] (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), a more flexible standard applies. A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’ Id., at 789 [103 S.Ct., at 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d, at 558]; Tashjian [v. Republican Party of Connecticut], supra [479 U.S. 208], at 213-214 [107 S.Ct. 544, at 547-549, 93 L.Ed.2d 514, at 522-523 (1986)].
“Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 [112 S.Ct. 698, 705-706, 116 L.Ed.2d 711, 723] (1992). But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions. Anderson, 460 U.S., at 788 [103 S.Ct., at 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d, at 557]; see also id., at 788-789, n. 9 [103 S.Ct., at 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d, at 557-558].” 504 U.S. at 433-434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063-2064, 119 L.Ed.2d at 253-254.
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} The effect of
{¶ 21} Some of the important state interests that have been recognized to uphold the constitutionality of various elections provisions are (1) having orderly, fair, and honest elections instead of chaos, (2) maintaining the integrity of the political process by preventing interparty raids and intraparty feuds, (3) maintaining the integrity of various routes to the ballot, (4) avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or frivolous candidacies, (5) ensuring that elections are operated equitably and efficiently, (6) preventing candidacies that are prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel, and (7) preventing parties from fielding an independent candidate to capture and bleed off votes in a general election that might otherwise go to another party. See, generally, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995), 514 U.S. 779, 832-835, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1870, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 919; see, also, Storer v. Brown (1974), 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714; and Foster v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1977), 53 Ohio App.2d 213, 7 O.O.3d 282, 373 N.E.2d 1274.
{¶ 22} Ohio has carefully set forth which public offices are subject to partisan primaries and those that call for nonpartisan elections.
{¶ 23} In Foster, supra, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County held that
“A defeated party primary candidate running in a general election by write-in even for a different office with a different electorate can conceivably have the effect of diminishing the general election as a major struggle. There is a strong suggestion that a loser in a party primary is not an independent in terms of political philosophy; party allegiance was demonstrated by candidacy in the primary election. The independent candidacy in the general election of a defeated party primary candidate is suggestive of intraparty feuding. The candidacy of an individual whose political philosophy and voter support is independent of the major parties is not limited by R.C. 3513.04 since this individual would not ordinarily be a candidate in a party primary.” (Footnote omitted.) 53 Ohio App.2d at 232, 7 O.O.3d at 292-293, 373 N.E.2d at 1286.
{¶ 24} It is evident that relators’ first and foremost desire was to become state representatives. However, relators lost their primaries and then filed nominating petitions seeking reelection to the State Board. Clearly,
{¶ 25} With respect to the situation here, we believe that relators have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} Based on the foregoing, we find that respondents did not act in clear disregard of
Writ denied.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and STRATTON, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent.
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 28} I respectfully dissent because
{¶ 29} Our citizens, as voters, expect free and fair elections. Open electoral contests are a long tradition in this country. These are basic premises from which our examination of any law regulating elections must proceed. The state may legitimately restrict access to the ballot, but its authority is constrained. See
{¶ 30} The constitutional deprivation here is simple. Purdy and Tighe sought their parties’ nominations for state representative in their legislative districts by filing a petition for candidacy in the primary election. Both lost the primary election. Purdy and Tighe then filed timely petitions to become candidates for reelection as Members of the State Board of Education of Ohio. State Board of Education members are nonpartisan officials. They are not part of the primary election process. Following protests challenging each candidate, the boards of elections in Purdy’s and Tighe’s counties refused to certify Purdy and Tighe as State Board of Education candidates. The boards concluded that
{¶ 31} Clearly, application of the statute burdened Purdy’s and Tighe’s constitutional rights by prohibiting their candidacies. Yet the state does not cite a single legitimate interest to support its contention that the statute should be applied to candidates seeking election to different, nonpartisan offices. While sore loser statutes are generally constitutional because they further the state’s interest in preventing intraparty feuds from spilling over to the general election ballot, Storer v. Brown (1974), 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, the state has no such interest here. This is a nonpartisan election—for a different office.
{¶ 32} Denying Purdy and Tighe their rights is the unfortunate result of a conclusory application of the law. Respondents did not address the application of
{¶ 33} Surely the majority does not sanction a view that represents such a stark misinterpretation of constitutional law. To be sure, there are many important state interests that have been recognized to uphold the constitutionality of various election provisions, including ensuring orderly, fair, and honest elections instead of chaos; maintaining the integrity of various routes to the ballot; avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or frivolous candidacies; and ensuring that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. See, generally, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995), 514 U.S. 779, 832-835, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1870, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 919.
{¶ 34} None of these interests is sufficient to constitutionally permit the application of
{¶ 35} Equally absent is the possibility of voter confusion. The electorate is substantially different for the State Board of Education offices than for the state representative positions that Purdy and Tighe sought in the primary. To be sure, a different electorate alone may not resolve the issue of a defeated party primary candidate seeking a different office in the general election. See Foster v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1977), 53 Ohio App.2d 213, 232, 7 O.O.3d 282, 292, 373 N.E.2d 1274, 1286. Yet when the dispute involves a nonpartisan office, which is not part of a primary election scheme, voters are not misled by the presence of a candidate who previously ran in a party primary for a different office.
{¶ 36} Nor, obviously, is there any ballot overcrowding here. The boards’ decisions to remove Purdy and Tighe left the voters with no true choice, no actual
{¶ 37} It further defies prudent constitutional analysis to assert that any intraparty feuding occurred here. This is not a situation where a party primary loser subsequently sought a different partisan office via an independent candidacy. See Foster, 53 Ohio App.2d at 232, 7 O.O.3d at 292, 373 N.E.2d at 1286. Foster held
{¶ 38} The majority cannot escape those facts, nor can it ignore the policy behind the statute. In enacting sore loser statutes, the state’s aim is to ensure that contending forces within the party bring an end to their differences through the primary election. Storer, 415 U.S. at 735, 94 S.Ct. at 1281, 39 L.Ed.2d at 727. Since the primary election serves to winnow the field, the sole purpose of sore loser statues is to preserve the general election ballot for the winners of the primary election and for those independents who have qualified separately. The statute most assuredly does not exist to limit avenues to public service by preventing citizens from seeking a nonpartisan office solely because they aspired to a partisan office in an earlier primary election. Yet that is the effect of the majority’s decision. At its worst, the majority’s result would prevent a first-time participant in our election system who might lose a party primary due to low name recognition or low campaign funds from serving the public on a local level by running for county school board later in the year.
{¶ 40}
PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
COOK, J., dissenting.
{¶ 41} I respectfully dissent. Reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon voting rights are generally upheld where the state’s important regulatory interests justify the restrictions. Burdick v. Takushi (1992), 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063-2064, 119 L.Ed.2d 245, 254. Relators presented a prima facie case that