City of Waconia, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, vs. Jayson Dock, et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents.
A19-1099
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
June 16, 2021
Anderson, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: June 16, 2021 Office of Appellate Courts
Jared D. Shepherd, George C. Hoff, Hoff Barry, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant.
Mark W. Vyvyan, Pari I. McGarraugh, Frederickson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellants/cross-respondents.
Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.
S Y L L A B U
- An order that grants a permanent injunction may be reviewed on appeal when timely taken from either the final judgment, under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a) , or from the order that grants the injunction, underMinn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b) . - The City’s ordinance regulating docks is functionally a zoning regulation because it governs the subjects identified in
Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1 (2020) , and serves a zoning purpose. The City therefore was required to follow the procedural requirements ofMinn. Stat. § 462.357 (2020) when adopting that ordinance, even if the City purports to rely solely on its authority to regulate docks underMinn. Stat. § 412.221, subd. 12 (2020) .
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
We are asked to decide two questions in this appeal. The first is whether the appeal filed by appellants Jayson and Cristine Dock (the owners) was timely. The second is whether an ordinance that purports to regulate docks via a statutory city’s authority under
The district court granted respondent City of Waconia’s request for a permanent injunction against the owners. Instead of appealing from that order, the owners appealed from the final judgment, which was entered in the district court less than 30 days after the filing of the order. The City contends that the owners’ appeal was untimely because the time to appeal from an injunction order, see
On the merits, the owners argue that the City’s ordinance, which prohibits them from building a permanent dock on their lakeshore property, is void because the City did not follow the procedures required for adopting a zoning or surface-use regulation. See
We conclude that the appeal was timely and that the City’s ordinance is subject to the procedural requirements of
FACTS
The owners have lakeshore property on Lake Waconia in the city of Waconia. In June 2017, the owners began building a year-round dock extending from their property into the lake. One month later, the City adopted Ordinance 705, an interim ordinance that prohibited the construction of any permanent dock for one year.
To stop dock construction by the owners, the City served a cease-and-desist order on the owners and also began litigation to enforce the ordinance. The district court denied the City’s request for a temporary injunction against the owners but warned the owners that proceeding with construction would be at their own financial peril should they ultimately lose on the merits of the litigation.
In early October 2017, the City repealed Ordinance 705 and enacted Ordinance 707. This ordinance amended the Waconia city code to prohibit permanent docks in public waters from riparian (lakeshore) lots within the city. It also required all seasonal docks to be removed from public waters for at least 90 days between November 1 and April 1 of each year. The purpose of Ordinance 707 was to “control and regulate Docks for riparian properties that have shoreline within the city to [e]nsure safety for person and property.” For authority, the City cited its power to regulate docks under
By November 2017, construction of the owners’ dock was nearly complete. The City filed an amended complaint that sought a permanent injunction under the new ordinance to halt further construction of the dock and to require its removal. The owners counterclaimed, seeking an injunction to prevent the City from ordering
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the City asserted that the owners were in violation of the ordinance, and the owners claimed that the ordinance was procedurally defective for two reasons. First, the City did not give notice and hold a public hearing, as required for a zoning ordinance under
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court concluded that Ordinance 707 was not a zoning ordinance because the City chose to rely on its powers under
The order for summary judgment was filed on May 2, 2019. On May 3, the City served notice on the owners of the filing of the order. The May 2 order was entered as the judgment of the court on May 28.
On July 16, 2019, the owners filed a notice of appeal. The City moved to partially dismiss the appeal, asserting that the appeal period for the injunction began on May 3, when the City served the owners with notice of the filing of the district court’s May 2 order. See
On review of the merits, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, City of Waconia v. Dock, No. A19-1099, 2020 WL 1909700, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 2020), but on different grounds. The court held that Ordinance 707 is not a zoning ordinance because it applies “generally” and does not “regulate activities within specific zones.” Id. at *6. It also held that the surface-use statute did not apply because Lake Waconia was not solely within the City’s jurisdiction and because the City had no joint powers agreement with neighboring municipalities. Id. at *5.
The owners sought review on the merits and the City sought review on the timeliness of the owners’ appeal. We granted review to address two questions: one, was the owners’ appeal timely? and two, is Ordinance 707 subject to the procedural requirements for adopting a zoning ordinance under
I.
We first consider whether the appeal by the owners was timely under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. “Construction and application of a rule of procedure is a legal issue, which we review de novo.” Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 153 (Minn. 2001). We will apply the plain language of the rule unless we determine that the language is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations and therefore is ambiguous. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014).
We begin by explaining the nature of the dispute. Rules 103 and 104 of our Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure identify categories of appealable decisions from the district courts and the timing for appeals from those decisions. As relevant here, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment,
Ordinarily, an order granting summary judgment requires an entry of judgment to be appealable. See Johnson & Peterson, Inc. v. Toohey, 184 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Minn. 1971) (“An order granting summary judgment is an intermediate order which requires a subsequent judgment to give it effect and is not appealable.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But when an order that decides a motion for summary judgment resolves a request for injunctive relief, we have considered appeals taken from that order as appealable under Rule 103.03(b). See State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 899 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Minn. 2017) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction was proper under
Here, the district court issued an order that granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and request for a permanent injunction. That order was entered as the final judgment less than 30 days later, and this appeal was taken from the judgment. It is undisputed that the owners could have taken their appeal from the court’s summary judgment order. See Favorite v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 91 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Minn. 1958) (“That part of the order which grants an injunction permanently enjoining plaintiff . . . is appealable.“). But if taken from the order, the appeal would be untimely because it was not filed within 60 days after the City served the owners with written notice of the filing of that order. See
The City argues that an appeal of the injunction could be taken from only the injunction order and that, consequently, the appeal is untimely and we have no jurisdiction to hear it. The owners counter that their appeal was timely because Rule 103.03 permits an appeal from either an
A.
We agree with the owners that the timeliness of this appeal can be determined under the plain language of Rule 103.03. As noted above, Rule 103.03 identifies categories of decisions and events before the district court from which an appeal may be taken. Nothing in the rule suggests that an appeal may be taken in only one category and not another when the particular outcome before the district court involves a potentially appealable order and a potentially appealable judgment. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 103.03—permitting appeals from final judgments and injunction orders—have no qualifying or restricting language, unlike other paragraphs in the rule. For example, paragraph (d) allows an appeal from an order for a new trial “if the trial court” makes certain express findings.
Here, the court’s summary judgment order falls into two of the categories identified in Rule 103.03. The summary judgment order was an appealable order to the extent it granted a permanent injunction.
The City argues that we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the “sole act” that commences the running time for an appeal from an appealable order is the service of the notice of the filing of the order, by which measure the owners’ appeal is not timely. See 5A Diane B. Bratvold & Paula Duggan Vraa, Minnesota Practice—Methods of Practice § 1.23 (4th ed. 2007). Although the City is correct that the appeal would be untimely if taken from the order, this time limit is irrelevant because we conclude that the owners permissibly and timely appealed from the judgment.
Our conclusion that the owners could appeal from either the injunction order or the final judgment is supported by several longstanding policies that undergird our interpretation of the rules of civil appellate procedure. Specifically, we seek to “preserv[e] the right to appeal” and avoid setting a “trap for the unwary.” Huntsman v. Huntsman, 633 N.W.2d 852, 855–56 (Minn. 2001). We also encourage unified appeals. Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc., 418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 1988) (“[T]he thrust of the rules governing the appellate process is that appeals should not be brought or considered piecemeal.“).
In Engvall v. Soo Line Railroad. Co., 605 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. 2000), we considered these policies when faced with a question that was almost identical to the one at hand. There, we considered whether an appellant’s failure to take a timely appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment that is immediately appealable, even without an express determination under
determination” that interlocutory appeals are mandatory would be “inconsistent” with our practice of allowing procedural flexibility for appellants. Id. As an example, we cited Shorewood v. Metropolitan Waste Control Commission, 533 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. 1995). Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 742–43. In Shorewood, the district court issued an order dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but the order directed the entry of judgment. 533 N.W.2d at 403. The judgment was then appealed. Id. Because the district court had directed the entry of judgment, we held that the appellant was “justified in regarding the order as a nonappealable order for judgment and in taking an appeal from the judgment—even though an appeal from the order would be proper.” Id. at 404.7 In Engvall, we noted that our conclusion in Shorewood “evinces a policy of some procedural flexibility for the benefit of the appellant.” 605 N.W.2d at 743. That preference for allowing procedural
We also stated in Engvall that a rigid determination of the rules would be inconsistent with our policies against piecemeal litigation and against setting traps ” ‘by a rule designed to alleviate untoward risks, not to create them.’ ” Id. at 745 (citation omitted). Although our statements in Engvall were made in the context of appealable interlocutory orders and judgments, these policy considerations are even more relevant here, where the appealable order effectively resolved the case by deciding all of the parties’ remaining claims. Requiring the owners to appeal the injunction from the order would necessitate a piecemeal appeal because at least one of the owners’ noninjunction claims—abuse of the legal process—could be appealed only from the judgment. Requiring separate appeals on these facts would also set a “trap for the unwary” party, Huntsman, 633 N.W.2d at 854, who may assume that a judgment is forthcoming and that a unified appeal would benefit all parties and the judicial system. Therefore, a restrictive interpretation of Rule 103.03 does no service here.
The City counters that, even if piecemeal appeals result, that result is dictated by the rules, which specifically contemplate multiple appeals. See
The City also contends that permitting an appeal on these facts denies the City, and parties to other litigation involving injunctions, a “speedy, final determination” of the validity of an injunction order. We disagree. Judgment was entered by the district court less than 30 days after the injunction order was filed. At that point, the City knew the last possible date for an appeal, and this appeal was taken within the 60 days required by
Accordingly, we hold that an order that grants a permanent injunction may be reviewed on appeal if timely taken from either the final judgment, under
II.
Next, we consider whether the district court erred by issuing an injunction requiring the owners to remove their nearly completed dock because it was in violation of Ordinance 707. The owners argue that
This question requires us to review the district court’s grant of summary judgment and to determine the relationship between the two statutes on which the parties rely,
A.
We must first determine whether Ordinance 707 is a zoning regulation within the meaning of
The goal of all statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate” the Legislature’s intent.
1.
Because we have not previously adopted a test for determining whether an ordinance is a zoning regulation, we must do so now. As a statutory city, Waconia has no inherent powers; it has only those powers “expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers.” Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Minn. 1997) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The city’s zoning power is conferred by the state zoning enabling act,
Although the zoning enabling act does not define “zoning,”
For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, a municipality may by ordinance regulate on the earth’s surface, in the air space above the surface, and in subsurface areas, the location, height, width, bulk, type of foundation, number of stories, size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of yards and other open spaces, the density and distribution of population, the uses of buildings and structures for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activities, or other purposes, and the uses of land for trade, industry, residence, recreation, agriculture, forestry, soil conservation, water supply conservation, conservation of shorelands . . . or other purposes, and may establish standards and procedures regulating such uses. . . . The regulations may divide the surface, above surface, and subsurface areas of the municipality into districts or zones of suitable numbers, shape, and area. The regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings, structures, or land and for each class or kind of use throughout such district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts. The ordinance embodying these regulations shall be known as the zoning ordinance and shall consist of text and maps.
From this language we conclude that a functional analysis is appropriate for determining whether an ordinance is a zoning regulation governed by Accordingly, the first step in determining whether an ordinance is a zoning regulation is to determine whether it governs the subjects identified by The second step is to determine whether an ordinance serves a zoning purpose. In assessing whether an ordinance serves a zoning purpose, a variety of nonexclusive factors may be relevant, including the stated purpose of an ordinance and [Z]oning ordinances typically divide a geographic area into multiple zones or districts. Within the districts or zones certain uses are typically allowed as of right and certain uses are prohibited by virtue of not being included in the list of permissive uses for a district. In general, zoning ordinances provide landowners with permitted uses, which allow a landowner to use his or her land, in said manner, as of right; zoning ordinances are traditionally aimed at directly controlling where a use takes place, as opposed to how it takes place, classify uses in general terms, and attempt to comprehensively address all possible uses in the geographic area. Zoning ordinances make a fixed, forward-looking determination about what uses will be permitted, as opposed to case-by-case, ad hoc determinations of what individual landowners will be allowed to do and allow certain landowners whose land use was legal prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance to maintain their land use despite its failure to conform to the zoning ordinance. 8 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25:59 (3d ed. 2020). The presence of these characteristics indicates a zoning purpose. A functional test that considers the content and purpose of the ordinance accords with our prior statements and holdings. We have previously stated that a “zoning statute or ordinance is one which, by definition, regulates the building development and uses of property.” In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Advert. Device Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2003). We have also observed that the purpose of zoning laws is ” ‘to control land use[] and development in order to promote public health, safety, welfare, morals, and aesthetics.’ ” In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 329 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 676 N.W.2d 401, 407 (Wis. 2004)). More narrowly, “zoning ordinances are regarded as being aimed primarily at conserving property values and encouraging the most appropriate use of land.” Hutchinson v. Cotton, 53 N.W.2d 27, 28 (Minn. 1952). Moreover, we have adopted a functional test in at least one parallel context. See City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2008). In Sax Investments, we determined whether a city ordinance was preempted by the state building code and concluded that the phrase “building code provision” means “at least those subjects specifically regulated by the State Building Code,” which required us to examine the specific provisions of the ordinance at issue. Id. at 8. A functional analysis also accords with persuasive authority from legal experts and courts more generally, although the tests vary. One test looks to the nature and purpose of the ordinance. See 8 McQuillin, supra, § 25:59 (“Whether or not a particular ordinance is a zoning ordinance may be determined by a consideration of the substance of its provisions and terms, and its relation to the general plan of zoning in the city.” (footnote omitted)); Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 809 N.W.2d 362, 366 (Wis. 2012) (using a functional analysis that considers the characteristics and purposes of an ordinance); Square Lake Hills Condo. Ass’n v. Bloomfield Twp., 471 N.W.2d 321, 326–27 (Mich. 1991) (quoting McQuillin and applying a functional analysis); Piper v. Meredith, 266 A.2d 103, 107 (N.H. 1970) (same). Another test asks whether the ordinance would have a substantial effect on land use. See 1 Arden districts or zones. See Powell v. City of Houston, 664 S.W.3d 167, 176 n.8, 177 (Tex. 2021) (holding that a regulation is zoning when it “shares the common features of zoning,” which include “district-based regulation of the uses to which land can be put and of the height, bulk, and placement of buildings on land“); City of Walnut Grove v. Questco, Ltd., 564 S.E.2d 445, 447 (Ga. 2002) (“[W]e reiterate our holding . . . that a land use regulation be evaluated as a whole to determine whether or not it involves dividing a governmental unit into zones or districts and applying different standards to such zones or districts in regard to property therein.“); Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs v. City of Las Vegas, 622 P.2d 695, 697 (N.M. 1980) (” ‘[Z]oning is defined as governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones.’ ” (quoting Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 554 P.2d 665, 667 (N.M. 1976))). But other courts have relied on formal distinctions. See, e.g., Landmark Land Co. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Colo. 1986) (upholding a building-height regulation under the city‘s police power because the city was “free to choose the method of implementing” its permissible goal). In sum, we conclude that whether an ordinance is a zoning regulation requires a two-step inquiry in which we consider whether the ordinance governs the subjects identified in section 462.357, subdivision 1, and whether the ordinance serves a zoning purpose.8 Applying our test, we conclude that Ordinance 707 is a zoning regulation. Under We begin with location. The statute permits cities to regulate the location of structures, including through the use of districts or zones. We disagree with the City‘s assessment that Ordinance 707 is simply a citywide ban on permanent docks. Although the ordinance applies to “all Docks in Public Waters that have shoreline within the City,” it expressly exempts “Commercial Docks, Marinas or Public Docks,” which the ordinance defines in relation to formal zones. For the purpose of the ordinance, a commercial dock means “a Dock used in conjunction with a commercial or other revenue producing business enterprise . . . provided that the Dock is attached to and serves a parcel zoned for commercial use.” (Emphasis added.) A marina means “a commercial Dock for the mooring of seven or more watercraft or seaplanes . . . and where . . . the parcel to which the Marina is adjacent is zoned for commercial purposes, specifically those for which the Marina is used.” (Emphasis added.) And a public dock means “any Dock or Dock structure that is owned and operated by the City, the County or the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources.” Accordingly, by its own terms, Ordinance 707 regulates the location of docks because it permits them on commercially zoned shoreline lots but prohibits them from private, noncommercial lots.10 That a city could rely on its zoning power to also regulate the location of a dock within a property is inconsequential. Next, we determine whether the ordinance regulates the type of foundation of a structure. The ordinance differentiates between a “permanent” dock and a “seasonal” dock based on the methods and materials used to anchor the dock in the lakebed. The ordinance prohibits any permanent dock, which it defines as one that “is not a Seasonal Dock and is supported by pilings, retaining wall or other materials and associated with a permanent foundation that is either resting or embedded in the lake bottom and is designed to make relocation impracticable.” But the ordinance permits “seasonal” docks, which it defines as docks that “may be removed from the Public Waters on a seasonal basis.” Because the ordinance effectively prohibits certain types of foundations—those that rest or are embedded in the lake bottom and are designed to make relocation difficult—the ordinance regulates the “type of foundation” of a “structure” as described in Finally, we determine whether Ordinance 707 regulates the “uses” of structures or land “for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activities, or other purposes.” Because Ordinance 707 regulates subjects permitted by The ordinance has the following purpose: “[T]he intent of this Chapter is to control and regulate Docks . . . to [e]nsure safety for person and property and to promote the general health, safety and welfare of the general public and the citizens of the City.” Promoting safety and the general health and welfare of the people is a permissible zoning goal. See We turn next to the manner in which the ordinance operates. Generally, zoning ordinances are “aimed at directly controlling where a use takes place, as opposed to how it takes place,” and these ordinances “typically divide a geographical area into multiple zones or districts.” 8 McQuillin, supra, § 25:59 (emphasis added). Consequently, reliance on formal districts is highly indicative of a zoning purpose. See In re Denial of Eller Media Co.‘s Applications, 664 N.W.2d at 8 (“[T]he creation of districts or zones and the classification of those districts is a vital part of any zoning plan.“). As explained, Ordinance 707 permits nonpublic permanent docks on commercial properties but not on residential properties. Thus, the ordinance operates directly through the districts established by the City‘s zoning code, see In addition, under zoning laws, “certain uses are typically allowed as of right and Some provisions suggest a nonzoning application. Ordinance 707 does not permit preexisting permanent docks (a “nonconforming use” in zoning parlance), see id., or for docks that, like the owners’ dock, were undergoing construction at the time the ordinance was adopted. In addition, the ordinance addresses very narrow uses—that of permanent docks and seasonal docks—and does not “classify uses in general terms” or “attempt to comprehensively address all possible uses” in the city. See id. But these features are entitled to little weight under our analysis because any noncomprehensive amendment to a zoning code contains similar provisions. On the whole, Ordinance 707 embodies a clear judgment about the appropriate use and development of land within the city. It regulates dock usage and where permanent docks may be built, which fundamentally are zoning judgments. See 1 Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning § 1:18 (5th ed. 2020) (“Zoning is ‘a legislative act representing a legislative judgment as to how the land within the City should be utilized . . . .’ ” (citation omitted)); Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 417 (Minn. 1981) (explaining that zoning ordinances involve a wide range of value judgments and are inherently legislative rather than judicial in character). Accordingly, because Ordinance 707 regulates subjects authorized by Having determined that Ordinance 707 is functionally a zoning regulation, we next decide whether the City was required to follow the procedural requirements for adopting or amending a zoning ordinance. This question requires us to determine the relationship between two statutes: Minnesota Statutes chapter 412 governs the powers of statutory cities. See generally The council shall have power to establish harbor and dock limits and by ordinance regulate the location, construction and use of piers, docks, wharves, and boat houses on navigable waters and fix rates of wharfage. The council may construct and maintain public docks and warehouses and by ordinance regulate their use. By contrast, when adopting or amending a zoning ordinance, a city is required to provide notice and hold a public hearing. See Although chapters 412 and 462 each provide the City with sufficient authority to regulate docks, the Legislature has made it clear that, when exercising zoning power, a city must follow the procedural steps that are set out in chapter 462. “It is the purpose of sections 462.351 to 462.364 to provide municipalities, in a single body of law, with the necessary powers and a uniform procedure for adequately conducting and implementing municipal planning.” The City argues that if the Legislature had intended for the zoning procedural requirements to apply when a city exercises its power under Due process considerations bolster our determination. Zoning laws interfere with the property rights of owners, and because of this concern, a variety of protective doctrines apply, including the nonconforming-use doctrine, vested-rights doctrine, and discretionary variances. See White v. City of Elk River, 840 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 2013) (“A nonconforming use is a use of land that is prohibited under a current zoning ordinance but nonetheless is permitted to continue because the use lawfully existed before the ordinance took effect.“); Ridgewood Dev. Co. v. State, 294 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Minn. 1980) (“[In a] vested rights analysis the court asks whether a Allowing cities to implement zoning regulations without following statutory zoning procedures bypasses these protections, which raises serious questions about constitutional and statutory due process. “We have long upheld a municipality‘s authority to enact zoning ordinances . . . . But we also have recognized limitations—both constitutional and statutory—on that authority.” White, 840 N.W.2d at 49; see also 1 Salkin, supra, § 8:3 (“Procedural requirements are considered by the courts to be safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of power. Failure to comply with such procedural requirements has been regarded not only as an ultra vires act on the part of municipal legislators, but also as a denial of due process of law.“); Glen Paul Ct. Neighborhood Ass‘n v. Paster, 437 N.W.2d 52, 56–57 (Minn. 1989) (stating that “[a]dministrative convenience does not outweigh the right of property owners to statutorily mandated due process” and invalidating a zoning amendment because the city failed to make a bona fide effort to comply with the notice requirement). Many courts and commentators share our concern with bypassing zoning law requirements by relying on another source of authority. See, e.g., 8 McQuillin, supra, § 25:59 (“[W]here an ordinance is in nature and purpose a zoning ordinance, it must comply with the zoning statute.“); 1 Rathkopf et al., supra, § 1:10 (“While the zoning power is justified because it is a facet of the general police power, a locality cannot evade the protection provided for the citizen‘s use of his property by the legislative limitations imposed on the zoning power, by labeling what is actually a zoning ordinance a ‘police power’ ordinance.“); Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1966) (disapproving of attempts by municipalities to “evade the protections” of legislative limits on zoning power by “labeling a zoning act a mere exercise of police power“); Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Tenn. 2004) (adopting a functional definition of a zoning ordinance in part to eliminate “the risk that a municipality may avoid statutory zoning requirements by attempting to label what is in reality a zoning ordinance as a building regulation“); Thrash Ltd. P‘ship v. Cnty. of Buncombe, 673 S.E.2d 689, 693–94 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that a multifamily dwelling ordinance passed under a city‘s general police powers was invalid for not complying with zoning notice requirements). Ultimately, a municipality is a political subdivision of the state, and thus, municipal powers of statutory cities exist at the sufferance of the Legislature. See Country Joe, Inc., 560 N.W.2d at 683. Requiring a city to follow the procedural steps contained in We hold that Ordinance 707 is functionally a zoning regulation, and therefore, the City is required to follow the procedures outlined in For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
2.
B.
CONCLUSION