Jоhn P. MARZITELLI, et. al., Respondents, v. CITY OF LITTLE CANADA, petitioner, Appellant.
No. C9-97-152
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Aug. 20, 1998
582 N.W.2d 904
Deno W. Berndt, Warchol Berndt & Hajek, Minneapolis, for respondents.
OPINION
BLATZ, Chief Justice.
The narrow issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court had jurisdiction to amend its September 12, 1996 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment (order) on December 23, 1996. Resolution of this issue turns on whether the time for appeal, and the district court‘s jurisdiction to amend its findings, terminated 30 days after service of notice of filing of the Septembеr 12th order or whether language in the order directing the entry of judgment rendered it nonappealable, thereby postponing the running of the time for appeal and extending the district court‘s jurisdiction. We hold that the language directing the entry of judgment did not affect the appealability of the order in this special proceeding and, therefore, the district court‘s jurisdiction ended once the timе to appeal from the order expired without appeal having been taken.
Pursuant to
On October 16, 1996, the court administrator entered judgment. The Marzitellis then filed a notice of motion and motion for amended findings or new trial on October 18, 1996. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for October 30, 1996, but was delayed until November 20, 1996 by stipulation of the parties. Following the hearing, the district court issued an amended order entitled Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment filed on December 23, 1996. In the amended order, the court concluded that the assessment constituted an unсonstitutional taking of the Marzitellis’ property without fair compensation and the court vacated the special assessment and remanded the matter to Little Canada for reassessment. This order did not direct that judgment be entered. Appeal was taken from the amended order on January 23, 1997.
In a two-to-one opinion, the court of appeals held that the district court had jurisdiction tо amend the September 12th order.2 The court reasoned that the September 12th order was rendered nonappealable by a sentence providing “LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY” and, therefore, proper appeal should be taken from the judgment.3 Furthermore, the court determined that the time for appeal from the judgment had not begun to run because Little Canada had not served notice of the entry of the judgment on the Marzitellis.4 However, the dissent argued that the language directing the entry of judgment did not affect the appealability of the September 12th order.5 The dissent emphasized that the rules governing special proceedings require that appeals be brought within 30 days, the time limit for orders.6 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the matter became final and neither the district court nor the appellate court could exercise jurisdiction.7
The dates governing this jurisdictional issue are not in dispute. Therefore, it is a purely legal issue that we review de novo.8 We begin by holding that the special
The court of appeals held that the district court‘s September 12th order was rendered nonappealable by the language in the order providing “LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY” and, therefore, the time for appeal did not begin to run when Little Canada served notice of filing of the order on the Marzitellis. In so holding, the court relied in part on Saric v. Stover, in which the court of appeals held that language direсting the entry of judgment rendered a district court order denying a motion for a new trial nonappealable.13 The Saric court reasoned that, “Since an appeal from the order is authorized, confusion is caused by directing that judgment be entered. However, when the trial court has included such direction in an order, the parties must await the entry of judgment and perfect their appeal from that judgment.”14
The court‘s reasoning in Saric is contrary to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Appellate Practice and we now overrule that decision. Rule 103.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Practice governs the appealability of orders and judgments. To allow practice to deviate from the plain language of the rule by treating an order which is appealable under
Therefore, we conclude that the district court‘s September 12th order was appealable pursuant to
We recognize that Gelin v. Hollister, cited by the dissent, holds that a district court may retain jurisdiction over a post-trial motion brought prior to the running of the time for appeal.16 However, this case is not dispositive of thе action before us as it was decided prior to the enactment of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and Civil Appellate Procedure under a rule of law that “[l]imitations upon the time for bringing an appeal, and logically likewise upon the power of the court to modify its judgments and orders during such period, are to be liberally interpreted to avoid a forfeiture” of either right.17 In contrast,
We note that requiring parties to file a timely appeal while a post-trial motion is pending does not deny the parties the opportunity to have the district court decide their motions. Rather, the parties may apply to the appellate court for a stay on the appeal to give the district court time to decide the pending post-trial motion.21 This procedure nоt only preserves the time limitation on appeals, but also helps to ensure that the district court hears and rules on the motion in an expedient manner. This is particularly important when the case involves a special proceeding. In such cases, the time for appeal is abbreviated to ensure “speedy and summary determination of matters passed upon by the court[.]”22 Howevеr, as the Marzitellis did not file a timely appeal in this action, they did not avail themselves of this opportunity and the district court lost jurisdiction before it could decide their motion.
The court of appeals is reversed.
GILBERT, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe the trial court retained jurisdiction to amend its findings when the Marzitellis timely moved for a new trial or for amended findings. See
The rules of civil procedure provide that a trial court may grant a new trial for numerous reasons, including to correct errors of law made at trial.
According to the majority, notwithstanding timely Rule 52.02 and 59 motions, if the time for an appeal from the trial court‘s order or judgment expires without an appeal having been taken, then the order or judgment becomes final and the trial court‘s jurisdiction to amend the order terminates. Under
In Indianhead, we addressed the question of when an order from the North Dakota Railroad and Warehouse Commission became final under North Dakota statutes and laws. Id. at 182-84, 128 N.W.2d at 339-41. While we acknowledged that “[t]he courts have generally observed that an order or judgment becomes final only after the appellate process is terminated or the time for appeal has expired,” we interpreted “final order” as meaning an “ultimate and conclusive order” and held that the commission‘s final order was not issued until after the second remand because all earlier orders had been reversed on appeal by the district court. Id. at 183-84, 128 N.W.2d at 340-41. In the present case, because Rule 52.02 and 59 motions were timely filed, there was no ultimate and conclusivе order until the trial court‘s amended order was filed on December 23, 1996. This conclusion is consistent with our holding in E.C.I. Corp. v. G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 434-36, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976).
In E.C.I., we held that the time limit for taking an appeal was properly computed from the entry of an amended judgment rather than from the original judgment. Id. at 435, 237 N.W.2d at 629. The original judgment in E.C.I. was “clearly incorrect” and a new judgment was entered approximately 1 month later. We reasoned that the original judgment was not the final judgment of the trial court, thus, the time for appeal did not start to run until the modified judgment was entered. Id.
In the present case, the original order was also subsequently found to be incorrect by the trial court. Logic dictates that if the rules provide for a timely motion for a new trial, the trial court must retain jurisdiction to rule on that motion. Rules 52.02 and 59 provide a mechanism for trial courts to cor
We effectively held as much in Gelin v. Hollister, 222 Minn. 339, 342-43, 24 N.W.2d 496, 499 (1946). In Gelin, we concluded that:
Where an application [for setting aside the trial court‘s findings] is made within the time for appeal, the court has the power, for the correction of judicial error, to hear the motion for and to order the modification, vacation, or setting aside of its orders аnd its judgments after the time for such appeals has expired.
Id. Admittedly, there is no rule explicitly authorizing the tolling of the time limit for taking an appeal while a motion for a new trial is pending. Compare, Fed. R. Civ. App. P. 4(a)(4) (providing that, after a timely motion for a new trial is filed, “the time for appeal for all parties runs from the entry of the order disposing of * * * the motion * * *“). However, in Gelin, we recognized the soundness of tolling the time for appeal while a motion for a new trial is pending, thereby extending the trial court‘s jurisdiction to rule on a timely and properly made motion.
We have not previously overruled Gelin, nor do
As the majority points out, a party who makes a motion fоr a new trial or amended findings may ask the court of appeals for a stay of the time limitation for appeal. If the stay is granted, it allows the trial court to retain jurisdiction to rule on the motion and also helps ensure that the trial court rules on the motion in an expedient manner. However, there is no assurance that the stay will be granted. In fact, in the case the majority cites to support the proposition that parties may request a stay on an appeal, the court of appeals denied a request for a stay and held that the trial court lost jurisdiction to amend a judgment after an appeal was filed. Gummow v. Gummow, 356 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 1984). In Gummow, the court granted one request for a stay of appeal but denied a second, even though the trial court had not yet ruled on a pending motion to amеnd findings. Id. The court of appeals then declared the trial court‘s amended order, which was filed after a notice of appeal was filed, to be of no effect. Id.
Even in special proceedings, a more efficient use of judicial resources would be to first allow the trial court to correct its errors before involving the court of appeals in the process. This process might result in some minor delay, but the delay is justified because:
[a] motion for a new trial provides both trial court and counsel with a unique opportunity to eliminate the need for appellate review or to more fully develop critical aspects of the record in the event appellate review is sought. * * * The trial court is given * * * the opportunity to correct its own errors without subjeсting the parties and the appellate courts to the time, expense and inconvenience involved in an appeal.
Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 201-02 (Minn. 1986). Indeed, in Sauter, we held that a party‘s failure to make a motion for a new trial under