THE SANTA BARBARA COUNTY WATER AGENCY, Respondent, v. ALL PERSONS AND PARTIES etc., Defendants; MAURICE A. BALAAM et al., Appellants.
L. A. No. 22761
In Bank
Jan. 24, 1957
Respondent‘s petition for a rehearing was denied February 19, 1957.
47 Cal. 2d 699 | 306 P.2d 875
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Herman Phleger, Alvin J. Rockwell and John M. Naff, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
Vern B. Thomas, District Attorney (Santa Barbara), and Lawrence M. Parma, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg and Adolphus Moskovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, J. Lee Rankin, Solicitor General of the United States, Perry W. Morton, Assistant Attorney General, David R. Warner and Roger P. Marquis, Attorneys, Department of Justice, and Price, Postel & Parma as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
SHENK, J.—This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff Santa Bаrbara County Water Agency confirming the validity of a so-called “Master Contract” between the agency and the United States, acting by and through the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior, and five so-called “Member Unit Contracts” between the plaintiff and each of five public bodies, namely, the city of Santa Barbara, and the Carpinteria, Summerland, Montecito and Goleta County Water Districts.
The plaintiff as petitioner commenced this proceeding on February 8, 1950, pursuant to section 11.10 of
The petition alleged six causes of action each seeking the confirmation of one of the contracts involved. The defendants demurred to each count on both general and special grounds. The demurrers were overruled. The defendants’ answer denied the validity of the formation of the plaintiff agency, certain proceedings of the board of directors of the agency leading to and including the signing of the master contract, the master contract itself, the proceedings of the
The defendants also pleaded nine affirmаtive defenses to each of the causes of action. In substance it is alleged: (1) that provisions in the member unit contracts authorized by the Santa Barbara County Water Agency Act, whereby the agency will levy ad valorem taxes on all property in the agency to establish a fund from which contributions will be made to the member units, violate the constitutional provisions against legislative gifts and authorization of the imposition of local taxes by special legislation (
The agency demurred generally to each of the affirmative defenses and the demurrers were sustained.
The causes were tried on November 14, 1951, and a judgment was entered on October 22, 1952. The judgment declared (a) the legality of the organization and existence of the agency, the city of Santa Barbara and the four county water districts, (b) the due execution of the six contracts, (c) the lawfulness of the contracts, and (d) that the defendants had waived and were estopped from asserting the illegality or unconstitutionality of the agency and of the Santa Barbara County Agency Act. The defendants have appealed from all portions of the judgment. The Attorney General of the State of California has appeared as amicus curiae in support of the judgment, and the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation has appeared as amicus curiae asserting the invalidity of the contract.
The county of Santa Barbara is situated in a semiarid portion of Southern California. It has no common source of water supply that can serve the entire county but contains numerous noncontiguous watersheds. The county has grown greatly in population and develоped an economy requiring full utilization and development of all available water supplies. For many years the county made investigations and engineering surveys of its water resources utilizing private, public and United States engineers for that purpose. Pursuant thereto, in June, 1945, a comprehensive water development plan for the county was submitted by the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Santa Barbara County Water Agency was formed by the Legislature in 1945 to carry out the plan. The agency‘s boundaries are coextensive with those of the county and the lands served by all member units lie within its boundaries.
Cоmmencing in 1946 the agency began negotiations for a water supply from the Cachuma Unit of the Santa Barbara County Project, described in House Document Number 587 of the 80th Congress, 2d Session of April 1, 1948. That document reveals that the Cachuma Unit will consist of the Cachuma Dam and Reservoir on the Santa Ynez River, the Tecelote Transmountain Diversion Tunnel and the South Coast
The contracts in question are for the furnishing of domestic water by a purveyor thereof at a stipulated price. They do not involve the construction of distribution systems, as in the Ivanhoe and Madera cases. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824]; Madera Irr. Dist. v. All Persons, ante, p. 681 [306 P.2d 886].) The master contract contemplates a supply of water for irrigation, municipal, domestic, industrial and other uses to be furnished and delivered to each member unit of the agency for a period of 40 years, specifying delivery points, time of delivery and maximum rates for various classes of water. The agency is charged with the payments for all water delivered to member units. Provisions other than those specifically objected to by the defendants in their affirmative defenses provide for the storage of water, availability of excess water, responsibility for water shortage, the recognition by the bureau of existing water rights, transfers of water by member units, defaults in payments, inspection of books and records by the bureau and other provisions not here material.
The member unit contracts, identical in form, are in general repetitions of the master contract except as to the contracting parties and the changes made necessary by the substitution thereof. Payments for water to be delivered are to be made by member units to the agency. Those features of the master contract which are objected to are contained also in each of the member unit contracts.
It is the general rule that a contribution from one public agency to another for a purely local purpose of the donee agency is in violation of the constitutional prohibition, but that such a contribution is legal if it serves the public purpose of the donor agency even though it is beneficial to local purposes of the donee agency. (Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. County of San Diego, 112 Cal. 314 [41 P. 423, 44 P. 571].) Thus in City of Oakland v. Garrison, 194 Cal. 298 [228 P. 433], payment by the county of Alameda to the city of Oakland to improve a street entirely within the city was held to be proper where the county board of supervisors found it would be for the general good of the county. And in County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal.2d 625 [59 P.2d 139, 106 A.L.R. 903], it was held that the state could impose a statewide tax on motor vehicles and then apportion some of the proceeds to the counties for local use because a statewise public purpose was being served. “The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for legis-
That the conservation and beneficial use of the domestic waters of this state serve a public purpose is without question. (
It is next contended by the defendants in both their first and second affirmative defenses that the act creating the agency is in violation of
The limitations of
It is also contended that
It is also contended, although not specifically set out in any of the affirmative defenses, that the special enactment of the Santa Barbara County Water Agency Act is in violation of
It would appear from a reading of the section that the term “municipal purposes” has reference to the purposes
Generally it is true that where the scope of a project transcends the boundaries of a municipality it ceases to be for a municipal purpose. (See Pixley v. Saunders, supra, 168 Cal. 152; County of Los Angeles v. Hunt, supra, 198 Cal. 753; Gadd v. McGuire, 69 Cal.App. 347 [231 P. 754].) In Pasadena v. Chamberlain, supra, 204 Cal. 653, involving the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District Act with respect to
It is noted that the cases have made distinctions between the meaning to be given the terms “municipal corporations” or “municipal purposes,” depending upon the particular section of the Constitution to which the definition relates. (See dissenting opiniоn by Chief Justice Beatty in County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, at page 637 [63 P. 78, 621].) It is concluded that the agency is not performing a purely municipal function within the meaning of
The invalidity of the act is also urged by the defendants in their third and fourth affirmative defenses on the ground, generally, that the only lands receiving benefits thereunder are those within the member units; that considerable portions of land within the boundaries of the agency are not within any member unit and therefore are not benefited by the act, and that the levy of an ad valorem tax on all lands within the agency authorized by the act is a taking of property without due process of law. This contention has often been litigated under similar circumstances. The basis question relates to a proper finding of a benefit conferred on lands not directly served.
In the present case the agency was created by a special act of the Legislature wherein it was determined what lands were to be assessed for the benefit of the public improvement. In such circumstances “the property owners are not entitled to a hearing on the question of benefits to the land included within the district for they are conclusively presumed to have been heard through their representatives in the legislature.” (Orosi Public Utility Dist., In re, 196 Cal. 43, 50 [235 P. 1004].) Such a determinаtion, however, cannot be arbitrary, capricious or without factual basis.
The basis of proper legislative determination of benefits conferred on all lands within a district is dealt with exhaustively in Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, supra, 177 Cal. 119, and that case is determinative of the contentions in the present case. There claims of lack of direct benefit of all lands within the district were the same for all material purposes as those urged by the defendants in their third and fourth affirmative defenses. Beginning at page 123 this court stated: “The warrant and justification for charging the cost of such improvement upon designated lands is to be found, in theory at least, in the benefit to be derived by the lands assessed from the contemplated work.
As to the imposition of an ad valorem tax, the court had this to say, beginning at page 124: “It is thoroughly settled that the legislature may apply the ad valorem method of assessment, without any judicial inquiry into, or determination of, the extent of benefits. Recognizing that absolute equality cannot be attained under any system of taxation or assessment, the courts hold that constitutional requirements are satisfied by that approximation to equality which may fairly be thought to result from an assessment of the cost upon the property benefited in proportion to its
From the foregoing it is apparent that the inclusion of all of the lands within the agency and the imposition of an ad valorem tax on all of these lands on the ground that they would benefit by the operation thereof was a matter properly determined by the Legislature. It is noted that among the purposes for which the agency was created are “controlling and conserving storm, flood and other surface waters for any beneficial use and for the protection of life and property in said district.” (Stats. 1945, p. 2780.) Those indirect benefits referred to in Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, supra, and conferred upon all of the lands within the agency, appear to be well within the legitimate scope of the act.
In their fifth affirmative defense the defendants raise issues which have been discussed and disposed of in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], and in Madera Irr. Dist. v. All Persons, ante, p. 681 [306 P.2d 886]. In accordance therewith it is concluded that the excess land provisions of the contracts involved here, which are substantially the same as those in the Ivanhoe and Madera contracts, are inapplicable and if not declared to bе so would deprive the landowners of the member units of their property rights without due process of law and constitute a denial of the equal protection of the laws; that the United States is acting in its proprietary capacity as a purveyor of the domestic waters of the state to the agency and its member units; that it is bound to observe and comply with the laws of the state with reference to the rights of the water users being served, and that the contract is invalid insofar as it, by implication or otherwise, provides that the United States can arbitrarily cause to be discontinued the distribution of water to those for whose benefit the right to the water was acquired in the first instance.
Numerous other grounds for the invalidity of the contracts are asserted. It is stated in the defendants’ sixth affirmative defense that the contracts are lacking in consideration and are impossible of performance, in their seventh and eighth affirmative defenses that provisions in the contracts author-
Questions have been raised as to the sufficiency of certain proceedings leading to the execution of the contracts and the notice of elections for their confirmation. Such questions need not be determined in this case for the reason that upon a submission of any further proposed contracts the alleged defects need not recur.
The attorney general appearing as amicus curiae in behalf of the State of California in support of the judgment, questions the right of the appellants to prosecute this appeal. It appears that the notice of appeal was filed some 35 days after entry of the judgment. Section 11.10 of the Santa Barbara County Water Agency Act provides in part that any “party may appeal at any time within 30 days after the entry of the judgment.” It is contended that the failure to appeal within the time specified requires that the appeal be dismissed by the court of its own motion, even if no objection has been made by any party to the рroceeding. (In re Horowitz, 33 Cal.2d 534, 537 [203 P.2d 513]; Estate of Hanley, 23 Cal.2d 120, 123 [142 P.2d 423, 149 A.L.R. 1250].)
The appellants assert that the 30-day period within which an appeal “may” be taken in pursuance of section 11.10 of the act is permissive and not mandatory. Section 2(i) of the act provides that “may” is permissive and “shall” is mandatory. Section 11.10 of the act, after setting forth the special provision for the time in which to appeal, states further that the “rules of pleading and practice not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, are applicable to all actions or proceedings provided for by this section.”
The appellants contend that as the special provision is
The intent of the so-called “permissive” appeal provisions of section 11.10 at best is doubtful and in accordance with the foregoing no good reason appears why the appeal should not be entertained.
It is concluded that the judgment insofar as it declares the validity of the Santa Barbara Water Agency Act and the existence of the agency and its member units must be and hereby is аffirmed. Insofar as the judgment confirms and declares valid the master contract and the five member unit contracts it is reversed, the appellants to recover costs on appeal.
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
GIBSON, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the views expressed in the portion of the majority opinion which relates to the validity of the Santa Barbara Water Agency Act and the existence of the Agency and its member units. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], I disagree with the majority opinion insofar as it reverses the judgment of the trial court.
Traynor, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Dissenting.—This is a companion case to Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], and for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in that case, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court here.