CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION еt al., Petitioners, v. KENNETH CORY, as State Controller, Respondent; TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION et al., Real Parties in Interest; GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, as Governor, etc., et al., Interveners. TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION et al., Petitioners, v. KENNETH CORY, as State Controller, Respondent; CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Real Parties in Interest; GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, as Governor, etc., et al., Interveners.
Civ. No. 23229
Third Dist.
May 7, 1984
155 Cal. App. 3d 494
Schwartz, Steinsapir, Dohrmann, Krepack, Sommers & Edelstein, Schwartz, Steinsapir, Dohrmann & Sommers, Laurence D. Steinsapir, Michael R. Feinberg, Raymond L. Hansen, Bullen, McKone, McKinley, Gay, Keitges & Pach, Donald M. Pach, James R. Donahue and Keith Tohru Yamanaka for Petitioners and Real Parties in Interest.
Morrison & Foerster, F. Bruce Dodge and Patrick J. Flinn for Respondent.
John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, N. Eugene Hill, Assistant Attorney General, and Geoffrey L. Graybill, Deputy Attorney General, for Interveners.
OPINION
BLEASE, J.-In this consolidated original mandamus proceeding the petitioners seek to compel the State‘s Controller to transfer funds from the General Fund (
Respondent Kenneth Cory, Controller, demurs to the petitions. He admits that the most recent annual budget bill appropriating $1 is a prohibited impairment. However, he submits three earlier instances of reduced but substantial in lieu appropriations may not have been. The Controller contends, in any event, he cannot effect any transfer unless compelled by order of court.
Interveners George Deukmejian, Governor, and the Department of Finance (
FACTS2
The Legislature has enacted a statewide teachers’ pension plan. The purpose clause recites: “In order to provide a financially sound plan for the retirement, with adequate retirement allowances, of teachers in the public schools of this state, teachers in schools supported by this state, and other persons employed in connection with the schools, the State Teachers’ Retirement System is established.” (
The progenitor of the current State Teachers’ Retirement System was established in 1913. (Stats. 1913, ch. 694, p. 1423.) From its inception the system has had an unfunded liability; the statutory scheme has never included a mechanism for compiling reserves actuarially sufficient to generate investment income proportionate to the amount of future benefit payments for which it becomes obligated. In 1971 the Legislature acknowledged that the assets of the system were insufficient to meet this unfunded liability. (Stats. 1971, ch. 1305, p. 2568.) In light of this situation, the Legislature provided that members and the employing agencies each shall contribute to the system a percentage of salaries earned and that the state shall contribute a sum certain for a given number of years. (Ibid.)
The state contribution was set at $135 million annually for a period of 30 years beginning July 1, 1972. (Id., at p. 2577.) By virtue of an existing statute, former section 14113, these sums did not constitute an appropriation. Rather, the appropriation was made in and was subject to each State Budget Act.3 (Stats. 1969, ch. 896, § 2, p. 1771.) Over time the amount of the aggregate statutory contribution was raised to $144.3 million in order to defray intervening increases in benefits. (See Stats. 1977, ch. 894, §§ 9, 10, pp. 2678-2679; Stats. 1979, ch. 259, item 343, p. 700.)
On June 6, 1978, Proposition 13 (
The first transfers to the Teachers’ Retirement Fund were to be made for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1980. (Ibid.) However, the State Budget Act for that fiscal year contained an appropriation, in lieu of the statutory appropriation, of a reduced amount, $171,616,000. The act said of this amount: “For transfer by State Controller, in lieu of the appropriations
Similarly, in lieu reduced appropriations were enacted in the next two State Budget Acts. (Stats. 1981, ch. 99, p. 510; Stats 1982, ch. 326.) In the succeeding budget bill, for fiscal year 1983-1984, the Legislature appropriated and sent to the Governor an in lieu amount of $211,313,000. (Stats. 1983, ch. 324 [item 6300-101-001].) On this occasion, for the first time, the Governor reduced the in lieu appropriation, to one dollar ($1), saying the money could better be used for other educational purposes notwithstanding there was an unfunded actuarial liability of the Teachers’ Retirement System.5 (Id., p. 45.)
These proceedings ensued shortly thereafter.
DISCUSSION
It is at once apparent that this case is a close relative of our recent decision in Valdes v. Cory (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 773 [189 Cal.Rptr. 212]. In Valdes we reviewed an enactment repealing, for three months, the statutory appropriation of state employer contributions to the Public Employees’ Retirement System provided by Government Code section 20741 et seq. We held the enactment unconstitutional as an impairment of contract.6 (Valdes, supra.) None of the parties argues Valdes was wrongly decided or ill-reasoned and it serves as a substantial predicate for our discussion here.
I
The Governor tenders the broadest defenses to petitioners’ claims. He argues that section 23401 et seq. do not give rise to a contract and,
The parties agree that a state may enter into contracts with citizens creating an obligation which the Legislature cannot impair by subsequent enactment. They agree that legislation which merely declares a state policy and directs a subordinate body to carry it into effect is subject to revision or repeal in the discretion of the Legislature.
The Governor takes the position that a statute does not create contractual obligations unless it explicitly uses words of contract and that a contract therefore cannot be created by implication from a statute. He takes as his text an excerpt which Taylor v. Board of Education (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 734, 742 [89 P.2d 148], obtained from the legal encyclopedia, American Jurisprudence. It says that “[a]n agreement requiring the ... suspension of legislative control will not be raised by mere implication.”8 Whatever the meaning of this generality borrowed from foreign law,9 three
In California law, a legislative intent to grant contractual rights can be implied from a statute if it contains an unambiguous element of exchange of consideration by a private party for consideration offered by the state. The paradigmatic exposition of this theory is in County of San Luis Obispo v. Gage, supra, 139 Cal. 398, 407-408. Gage held that the statutory obligation of the state to fund the support of orphan and abandoned children provided by the counties “was the equivalent of an offer upon condition, and upon the performance of the condition by any county the offer became a promise, and binding as such upon the state.” (Id., at p. 407.)10
That is the case here. The subject of the legislation, pensiоn rights, has long been characterized as within the domain of contract. (See
These principles apply to sections 23401 and 23402. Their language manifests a continuing obligation to fund the Teachers’ Retirement Fund in future years pursuant to statutory formulae. (Cf. Valdes, supra, at p. 787.) In the enactment creating the obligation the provisions of law conditioning the funding upon appropriations in the State Budget Act were repealed. (See, e.g., Stats. 1977, ch. 894, § 85, p. 2737.) By these means a commitment to permanency of funding was made. Given this commitment to permanency of funding and the critical importance which funding bears to the capacity of the state to fulfill the underlying contractual promise to pay the pensions, we imply a promise of funding in exchange for the valuable services rendered by the state‘s teachers. “[T]he interest of the employee ... is in the security and integrity of the funds available to pay future benefits.” (Valdes, supra, at p. 784.) This palpable element of exchange results in a contractual “promise“, i.e., an intent to confer private rights. (See Rest.2d Contracts, § 2; see generally id., § 21.)
The Governor argues the in lieu reductions in funding made in the State Budget Acts following enactment of section 23401 and 23402 evidence a contrary, retrospective intention. This is a circular argument; it uses evidence of a violation of a contract to show there was no contract. Like any such argument it ends, unhelpfully, where it started, which is at the precise point in issue. Moreover, the view of a subsequent Legislature of the meaning of a prior legislative enactment is not controlling. (See, e.g.,
The Attorney General also asserts the 1978 legislation was part of a “stopgap” response to Proposition 13 and is thus imbued with a fatal aura of tentativeness. To the contrary, no such aura emanates from the statute; it is an unambiguous commitment to permanent, long-term financing, freed from the contingencies of annual budgetmaking. In this respect the case is no different than Valdes.
The Governor does seek to distinguish Valdes as uniquely dependent on the state‘s employer relationship with its employees. That issue was not resolved by Valdes. Valdes ostensibly involved pension funding rights of the nonteacher personnel of local school districts. (See Valdes, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 776.) These employees of the local district are also Public Employees Retirement System members. (
It is true, as noted by the Governor, Taylor, supra, remarks that the relation of teacher to the state is not “a contract of employment.” (31 Cal.App.2d at p. 739.) This does not imply, however, that other contractual relations between teachers and the state are ruled out. (Compare 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 402 (1975), relation between State Teachers’ Retirement System and teachers is contractual.) Moreover, the distance between the state and the employment relation is measurably shorter in this context. In Taylor the legislative action modified the backdrop of public law governing one aspect of the contract relation between teachers and their school employers. Here the role of the state is not so aloof. Pension rights are an element of compensation of the teacher as employee. (See Betts v. Board of Administration, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 863.) When the state directly undertakes to provide an elemеnt of compensation of the employment relation the distancing from that relation which obtained in Taylor does not exist.
Under ordinary principles of contract law a bargain may be sealed by performance with knowledge of the offer. (See, e.g., Rest.2d Contracts, § 50.) We are informed, without dispute, that information concerning the enactment of the statutes in issue was widely disseminated to teachers by the State Teachers’ Retirement System. (Also see Rest.2d Contracts, § 23, com. c.)11 It is a matter of indifference whether the consideration
We conclude that sections 23401 et seq. imply an intent to grant private rights of contract. When the promise to permanently fund the retirement system is accepted by teachers by initial or continued employment a contract is established.
II
The Controller conceded this conclusion at the outset. However, in a disanalogous borrowing from Valdes, he implies the contract right is only a right to systematic, substantial, annual state contributions to the Teachers’ Retirement Fund.12 Accordingly, no impairment оf contract occurred when in lieu appropriations of “substantial” amounts were made by the Legislature in the State Budget Acts of 1980; 1981 and 1982. It is only the Governor‘s reduction of the 1983 budget bill appropriation which the Controller says is an impairment. This claim raises an issue of interpretation of the contract, which is also a matter of state law. “All contracts, whether public or private, are to be interpreted by the same rules, except as otherwise provided by this Code.” (
The Controller misreads the statute. It contains a straight-out promise to pay fixed and determinable sums of money. There is no reason to measure the contract right by any yardstick other than the amounts specified by sections 23401 and 23402. The measure of performance of a contractual obligation is the performance promised. “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” (
III
The more sweeping defense having to do with interpretation of the contract is that a legislative power to revoke or modify future installments is implicit in the reserve funding scheme. That view makes the contractual obligation an annual one and invokes the interpretive canon of strictissimi juris (fn. 8, ante). We reject this approach, however, because the importation of such a provision cannot be squared with the manifest intention of the parties. “A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties.” (
As we have shown, a clear manifestation of intent to contract does not require explicit statutory acknowledgement. Similarly, the suspension of legislative control may be inferred frоm less than an explicit disavowal of any rights to modify the promise. “‘Nothing is to be taken as conceded but what is given in unmistakable terms or by an implication equally clear.‘” (Newton, supra, 100 U.S. at p. 561 [25 L.Ed. at p. 712]; italics added.)
Here the unambiguous inference there is no retained power to modify the amounts due in future installments arises from two considerations. The first is that the future installments are provided for in a present appropriation in section 23401 et seq. which is coupled with the simultaneous repeal of the statute subjecting installments to the annual budgetary process.
Second, where the state makes a contractual offer of a reserve funding scheme for a pension plan the consideration being tendered is a measure of fiscal insurance against future adverse economic and political developments.13 The teacher who accepts this inducement at the outset of a career, e.g. to offset prospects of higher present compensation in alternative em-
Accordingly, it is not possible to view the state‘s promise as divisible into pro tanto segments. The promise of a fiscal floor tendered by such a statutory offer is meaningless unless the state intends to suspend all legislative control. Interpretation of the promise as retaining segmented, annual controls would vitiate the contract.
As a matter of state law, to extinguish a contractual obligation it is incumbent upon the obligor to fully perform. (See
IV
The state occupies a unique position in the field of contract law because it is a sovereign power. This gives rise to general principles which may limit whether an impairment has accrued as a matter of constitutional law. First “[a]n attempt, must be made ‘to reconcile the strictures of the Contract Clause, with the “essential attributes of sovereign power,” ...‘” (Allen v. Board of Administration (1983) 34 Cal.3d 114, 119 [192 Cal.Rptr. 762, 665 P.2d 534].) “Not every change in a retirement law constitutes an impairment of the obligations of contracts, however. (See Stork v. State of California (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 465, 468 [133 Cal.Rptr. 207].) Nor does every impairment run afoul of the contract clause.” (Allen v. Board of Administration; supra, at p. 119.) ““The constitutional prohibition against contract impairment does not exact a rigidly literal fulfillment; rather, it demands that contracts be enforced according to their “just and reasonable purport;” not only is the existing law read into contracts in order to fix their obligations, but the reservation of the essential attributes of continuing governmental power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. (City of El Paso v. Simmons (1965) 379 U.S. 497, 508 ...;
Those generalizations find no concrete application here. No issue of fettering the police power is tendered. Nor are we presented with an impairment of a private contract accomplished incidental to a disinterested legislative purpose to modify the backdrop of public law. An issue of prohibited impairment arises when the scope of the legislative impairment is not narrowly tailored to conform with an ostensible, innocent, governmental purpose. Accordingly, case law has given rise to the concept of permitted impairments as “minimal impairments.” (See e.g. Valdes, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 789.) That is to say, the critеrion of innocent purpose is that only the minimal impairment needed to attain the tendered legitimate public end has been visited upon the contracting parties. The concept of “minimal impairments” has no proper application as a vague license for the state to impair its obligation so long as it is only “a little bit.”
We are presented the issue of impairment in a special context; the alteration of the state‘s own obligation of payment. The leading case involving such an impairment is United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey (1977) 431 U.S. 1 [52 L.Ed.2d 92, 97 S.Ct. 1505]. It points out that, although the state may not contract away its police power it may “bind itself in the future exercise of the taxing and spending powers.” (Id., at p. 24 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 110]; fn. omitted.) In considering the standard applicable to such a fiscal obligation the court said: “As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. In applying this standard, however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State‘s self-interest is at stake. A governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not have to be raised. If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.” (Fns. omitted.) (Id., at pp. 25-26 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 111-112]; italics added; see also Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 307-309 [152 Cal.Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1].)
United States Trust places the justification for an impairment of a contractual funding obligation under the light of strict scrutiny. (See Tribe,
This is not to say that the terms of the contract set forth by sections 23401 et seq. are eternally immutable. We imply no view of the permissibility of alternation of the amount of payment in response to a change in the unfunded liability of the system. (See, e.g., Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [76 Cal.Rptr. 869].) However, changed circumstances and an alternation tailored to conform thereto are matters in the nature of reformation or exсuse for nonperformance of the contract. The affirmative burden of pleading and proving such a justification is on the state. (See United States Trust Co., supra; cf. 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, § 913, p. 2501.) No such claim is made here.
No cognizable justifications for the reductions in issue from the amounts provided in sections 23401 et seq. have been shown. We are bound to find them ineffectual to alter the state‘s obligation.
As an afterthought the Governor makes an eleventh hour frontal assault on the validity of sections 23401 et seq.16
A court cannot order the appropriation of money. (
The seminal authority on the “one item” requirement is Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt (1963) 59 Cal.2d 159 [28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 379 P.2d 28]. There the Supreme Court equated the “one item” requirement with “single subject” rule of (former) California Constitution article IV, section 24 (now art. II, § 10) which limits the subjects of a single legislative enactment. (Metropolitan, supra, at pp. 174-175.) The court said the presence of multiple appropriations in an act does not necessarily violate the one item limitation. “Where a statute sets up a number of special funds for a single purpose, or there are a number of allocations of money from different funds for that one purpose, the allocations, considered together, should be treated as being only ‘one item of appropriation.‘” (Id., at p. 174.)17 This rule applies here.
The unifying theme of the enactment which included section 23401 et seq. is set forth in its declaration of urgency. “The adoption of
For thesе reasons we conclude section 23401 et seq. are a valid appropriation. As such they are an adequate predicate for ordering the relief requested by petitioners. (See Valdes, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 792-793.)19
VI
The remaining points raised by the parties require little discussion.20 Petitioners request interest be awarded on the amounts owing under section 23401 et seq. pursuant to Civil Code section 3287. No party argues against entitlement to interest and we accept the implied concession. (See California State Employees’ Assn. v. Cory (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 888, 891 [176 Cal.Rptr. 904]; compare Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 [197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720].) However, no money to pay such interest was appropriated in section 23401 et seq. Moreover, the amounts appropriated by those provisions will be exhausted by the relief we will order. (See Baggett v. Dunn (1886) 69 Cal. 75, 78 [10 P. 125], exhaustion of appropriation by payments extinguishes authority to draw upon it.) While we recognize petitioners’ right to prejudgment interest we are unable to compel
Petitioners also seek attorneys’ fees for prosecution of these proceedings. Their first ground is Government Code section 800. That statute is inapposite; this is not an appeal or review of an administrative proceeding. (Ferris v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 [194 Cal.Rptr. 16].) Their alternate ground is Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. That section provides that a prerequisite of entitlement to recovery of attorneys’ fees is whether “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate ....” Here it is not. The large sums in issue will accrue to the direct benefit of the members of the State Teachers’ Retirement Fund, of whom a significant portion are members of the California Teachers Association. In these unique circumstances we hold the magnitude of the benefit is such that the financial burden placed on petitioner CTA is not out of proportion to the personal stake of its members. (Compare Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 143 [185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874]; and id., at pp. 144-146 (dis. opn. Kaus, J.).)
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent State Controller to comply with his legal and ministerial duties imposed by section 23401 et seq. and to transfer the full amounts required by those provisions without limitation by the provisions of the State Budget Acts of 1980-1981, 1981-1982, 1982-1983 and 1983-1984. The Governor shall bear the costs of these proceedings.
Carr, J., concurred.
REGAN, Acting P. J.-I dissent. I fully agrеe with the Governor that the statutory appropriations in Education Code sections 23401 and 23402 do not create a contract with the members of State Teachers’ Retirement System (STRS). These appropriations to the reserve fund were born of a crisis to meet the financing of local government and school districts, and not of an effort to contract with members, whereby the state would provide capitalization of the unfunded liability of the reserve fund in return for teachers’ continued employment. I find no adequate manifestation in sections 23401 and 23402 of a promise giving rise to a contractual obligation. Nor is there any manifestation of any “permanance of a continuing obligation” to fund the reserve fund solely by the included formulae.
Nor do I see any “unambiguous element of exchange of consideration by a private party for consideration offered by the state.” In fact, I fail to see
Under a “defined benefit plan” such as STRS, members are assured of receiving defined benefits upon retirement based on formulae that take into account years in service, salary level and similar criteria. Contributions to such a plan may have little relationship to the value of benefits earned by a specific employee.1 Contributions and appropriations may be on a “pay-as-you-go” basis, or reserves may be compiled actuarilly sufficient to generate adequate investment income to meet future obligations, and thus, make the plan “fully funded.”2
These appropriations are clearly intended to amortize the unfunded liability so as to enable sufficient investment capital to accrue to meet future obligations. No benefit or element of compensation is provided for in the statutes. The majority relies on County of San Luis Obispo v. Gage (1903) 139 Cal. 398 [73 P. 174], in implying a contract in the appropriations. Unlike Gage, however, the statutory appropriations in the instant case are not for the direct support or maintenance of anyone. Nor is there any “sub-
I concurred in Valdes v. Cory (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 773 [189 Cal.Rptr. 212], in finding a contractual obligation in contributory payments of the state to the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). However, there are important factual differences between Valdes and the instant case.
In Valdes, I was impressed by the Public Employees’ Retirement Law provision that the monthly contributions to the retirement fund were “continuing obligations of the State.” (139 Cal.App.3d, at p. 787.) Furthermore, I saw a deeper and greater obligation in the state to make payments to a plan which originally involved the payment of retirement salaries to state employees, wherein the state, as employer, was making the employer contribution for the direct benefit of the employee. Further yet, the duties of actuarial investigation and reporting as well as the conduct of the state over 50 years manifested an intent “that periodic employer contributions will not be altered ....” (Ibid.) In the instant case, however, the statutory scheme does not contain the kind of express language which we had found in Valdes, and which in that case led to our conclusion that a contractual obligation was implied. There is nothing in this case which makes an in lieu appropriation offensive.3 Unlike “the continuing obligations of the State” in Valdes, the statutory appropriations in the instant case were part of a stop-gap measure necessitated by the property tax initiative known as “Prop. 13” to provide a upward-sliding scale of state funding to the reserve fund.
I have agreed in the past that employee pension beneficiaries have a vested interest in the integrity and security of the source of funding for the payment of benefits (Valdes v. Cory, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 785.) We stretched that interest into a contractual right in Valdes, travelling far from the contractual interest the employee had in his or her direct pension benefits.
However, in the instant case, I do not think we can stretch the interest in the input to this reserve fund so far. As we discussed in Valdes, the con-
As I have stated, I do not find the same contractual interest in the input to the reserve fund as we found in Valdes. Secondly and consequently, I see no impairment of any vested rights to members of STRS. In the instant case, the annual in lieu appropriations do not suspend any employer contributions, nor do they change the source of contributions as was done in Valdes. The in lieu appropriations have no effect on the benefits, nor is the plan being changed to any member‘s disadvantage. Thus, the in lieu appropriations offend neither Betts nor Valdes. In any case, as I see no contractual obligation in the law, the questions of impairment, alteration, and segmentation are irrelevant.
I am convinced this is a dangerous thing to do-to read contractual obligations into statutes which may remotely, rather than directly, affect beneficiaries. As we noted in Valdes, it is elementary the Legislature has power, absent constitutional restrictions, expressly to amend or repeal existing statutes. By extending the basis of constitutional infirmity into statutes such as this, we tie the hands of this and future Legislatures.
“It is the general rule that one legislative body cannot limit or restrict its own power or that of subsequent Legislatures and that the act of one Legislature does not bind its successors.” (In re Collie (1952) 38 Cal.2d 396, 398 [240 P.2d 275].) This is, of course, subject to constitutional limitations. (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691 [97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161].) However, “all intendments favor the exercise of the Legislature‘s plenary authority: ‘If there is any doubt as to the Legislature‘s power to act in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the Legislature‘s action. Such restrictions and limitations [imposed by the Constitution] are to be construed strictly, and not to be extended to include matters not covered by the language used.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
In this case, I do not find an adequate manifestation of a promise giving rise to a contractual obligation. As I see no contract in the statutory appro-
I would deny the writ.
The petitions of real parties in interest and interveners for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied August 20, 1984.
Notes
| “(Millions) | |
| “(a) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1981 | $ 10 |
| “(b) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1982 | 20 |
| “(c) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1983 | 40 |
| “(d) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1984 | 60 |
| “(e) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1985 | 80 |
| “(f) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1986 | 100 |
| “(g) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1987 | 120 |
| “(h) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1988 | 140 |
| “(i) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1989 | 160 |
| “(j) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1990 | 180 |
| “(k) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1991 | 200 |
| “(l) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992 | 220 |
| “(m) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1993 | 240 |
| “(n) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1994 | 260 |
| “(o) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1995 | 280 |