CHARLES D. CHAFFINS, ET AL. v. ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE, LLC
Record No. 160582
Supreme Court of Virginia
July 13, 2017
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCKINGHAM COUNTY, Donald C. Blessing, Judge
PRESENT: Goodwyn, Mims, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ., and Millette, S.J.
July 13, 2017
In this appeal, we consider whether a natural gas company‘s notices of intent to enter private property complied with
I. Background and Procedural History
The Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (“ACP“) is a public service comрany “engaged in the underground storage and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.” As such, it is a “natural gas company,” as defined by federal law, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC“).
Appellants, Charles and Linda Chaffins, Michael Huntley, and Beverly McQuary (“Landowners“), own real property in Buckingham County along a proposed route. On March 6, 2015, ACP sent Landowners letters seeking permission to enter their properties to conduct preliminary surveys and studiеs. The letters explained that “[c]onducting these surveys and environmental studies is required as part of the permitting process for” the pipeline.
When Landowners withheld their permission, ACP provided notices of intent to enter their properties “on or after April 27, 2015” pursuant to
Landowners separately demurred. They argued, in part, that by only stating that the entry would occur “on or after April 27, 2015,” the notices failed to “set forth the date of the intended entry” as required by
The case proceeded to a hearing on the merits оf ACP‘s petition, wherein the circuit court again heard argument on the sufficiency of the notices. In concluding that ACP‘s notices provided a right to enter Landowners’ properties, the court reasoned that the word “intended” in
II. Analysis
Landowners maintain on appeal that by only stating the entry would occur “on or after April 27, 2015,” ACP‘s notices of intent to enter failed to “set forth the date of the intended entry” as required by
When construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, which “is initially found in the words of thе statute itself.” Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Hill, 254 Va. 88, 91, 488 S.E.2d 345, 346 (1997). “[I]f those words are clear and unambiguous, we do not rely on rules of statutory construction.” Id. However, “consideration of the entire statute . . . to place its terms in context to ascertain their plain meaning does not offend [this] rule because ‘it is our duty to interрret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.‘” Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cnty. Emples. Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 283 Va. 190, 194-95, 721 S.E.2d 524, 526 (2012) (quoting Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Board of County Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983)).
A. Code § 56-49.01
A. Any firm, corporation, company, or partnership, organized for the bona fide purpose of operating as a natural gas сompany as defined in
15 U.S.C. § 717a , as amended, may make such examinations, tests, hand auger borings, appraisals, and surveys for its proposed line or location of its works as are necessary (i) to satisfy any regulatory requirements and (ii) for the selection of the most advantagеous location or route, . . . [and] may enter upon any property without the written permission of its owner if (a) the natural gas company has requested the owner‘s permission to inspect the property as provided in subsection B, (b) the owner‘s written permission is not recеived prior to the date entry is proposed, and (c) the natural gas company has given the owner notice of intent to enter as provided in subsection C . . . .B. A request for permission to inspect shall (i) be sent to the owner by certified mail, (ii) set forth the date such inspection is proposed to be made, and (iii) be made not less than 15 days prior to the date of the proposed inspection.
C. Notice of intent to enter shall (i) be sent to the owner by certified mail, (ii) set forth the date of the intended entry, and (iii) be made not less than 15 days prior to the date of mailing of the notice of intent to enter.
This statute provides a mechanism by which natural gas companies may enter private property without permission. First, the company must request the owner‘s permission to inspect the property on a “proрosed” date.
Importantly, at each step, the natural gas company must provide advance notice. These notice requirements allow thе landowner to be present during the tests if desired, arrange for livestock to be confined prior to the entry, and ensure that any property damage is documented. See
When read in this context, the requirement that a notice of intent to enter must “set forth the datе of the intended entry” has an unmistakable meaning. The notice must provide the landowner with dates certain upon which the natural gas company intends to enter the property. ACP‘s “on or after” notices did not do this. At best, they
Nevertheless, ACP contends that the above interpretation leads to an absurd result. See Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 230, 682 S.E.2d 906 (2009) (“[A] court must avoid any literal interpretation of a statute that would lead to absurd results.“). It argues that “practicаlly speaking,” “[a]ny number of issues can affect the commencement of surveys on the ‘intended’ date, including weather, equipment problems, and delays resulting from surveys on other properties.” In such a scenario, ACP asserts that it would be “absurd” if it were required to “reissue notices, wait another 15 days, and then hope that external circumstances do not again prevent surveying activities on the specified date.”
The phrase “absurd result” has a specific meaning in our jurisprudence. It “describe[s] situations in which the law would be internally inconsistent or othеrwise incapable of operation.” Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227 n.9, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 n.9 (2006) (quoting Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004)). While in some cases the above interpretation of
In short,
B. Mootness
Nevertheless, ACP argues that intervening events have rendered this appeal moot. On June 17, 2016, after the circuit court issued its order, ACP sent Landowners additional notices of intent to enter their properties. These additional notices referenced the cirсuit court‘s order, which “confirm[ed]” ACP‘s right to enter Landowners’ properties under the original notices. They then stated, “[a]ccordingly, [ACP] intends to enter upon [Landowners’ properties] in order to perform studies and surveys” between July 6, 2016 and July 11, 2016.1 ACP argues that this appeal is moot becаuse the additional notices, which omit the disputed “on or after” language and include dates certain for the intended entry, are the “operative documents” and clearly satisfy the requirements of
Generally, “a case is moot and must be dismissed when the controversy that existed between litigants has ceased to exist:
Whenever it appears or is made to appear that there is no actual controversy between
the litigants, оr that, if it once existed, it has ceased to do so, it is the duty of every judicial tribunal not to proceed to the formal determination of the apparent controversy, but to dismiss the case. It is not the office of courts to give opinions on abstract propositions of law, or to decide questions upon which no rights depend, and where no relief can be afforded. Only real controversies and existing rights are entitled to invoke the exercise of their powers.”
E.C. v. Dep‘t of Juvenile Justice, 283 Va. 522, 530, 722 S.E.2d 827, 831 (2012); see also Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 447, 452, 739 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2013). This case is not moot because the controversy between the litigants still remains.
Despite arguing that the additional notices are now the “operative documents,” ACP has continually maintained before this Court and throughout this litigation that its original “on or after” notices are valid and comply with
Thus, ACP‘s contention that there is no longer a controversy is incorrect. The circuit court‘s order held that ACP is entitled to enter Landowners’ properties under the original notices. The additional notices in no way repudiate the original notices,2 and ACP has refused to concede that the original notices are flawed. Accordingly, this case is not moot because there is an actual, ongoing controversy regarding ACP‘s right under the original notices to enter Landowners’ properties for the purposes set forth in
III. Conclusion
In sum, the case is not moot, and ACP‘s “on or after” notices did not “set forth the date of the intended entry” as required by
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
Here, the additional notices explainеd that completion of the necessary tests would require that five distinct crews enter Landowners’ properties. They further provided the limited dates on which each crew would be present. Landowners concede that the timeframes set forth in the additional notices for each crew were “reasonable” as applied to their properties and thereby satisfied the requirements of