*1 Richmond Virginia Company Electric Power Supervisors Board of Prince William Attorney County, General, Office Counsel, Division of Consumer Corporation State
December 1983. Record No. 830721. Present: Carrico, C.J., Cochran, Poff, Russell, JJ., Compton, Stephenson, Gordon, Retired Justice. *3 Tarletz; Williams, B. & T. III Hunton on Guy Tripp, (Darla for briefs), appellant. Owens; Foote, L. County Attorney
Donald G.
John H.
(Gerald
Baliles,
General;
Gambardella, Assistant At-
Attorney
Anthony
General;
Minter,
Lewis S.
torney
briefs),
on
appellees.
POFF, J., delivered the
of the Court.
opinion
This
of the State
challenges
jurisdiction
Corporation
appeal
review of a
environmental-impact
pro-
Commission to conduct an
transmission line in a corri-
(kv)
to construct a 230 kilovolt
posal
line and a 500 kv line.
dor which
carries a 115 kv
presently
to con-
Electric and Power
Virginia
Company (Vepco) proposes
connecting
struct
the new line in an
corridor
its Loudoun
were
and Gainesville substations. All rights-of-way
acquired prior
$350,000.
On
1969 at a cost of more than
September
under the
Fa-
Utility
the Commission granted Vepco’s application
seq.,
et
Act,
for an amendment
to its
cilities
Code §§
decisions
Following
of convenience and
our
necessity.
certificate
866, 284
222 Va.
in VEPCO
v.
three months later
VEPCO, 222 Va.
County
(1981),
S.E.2d 613
Fairfax
show
“to
Commission directed Vepco
No electrical transmission line of two hundred kilovolts more shall be constructed the State Com- Corporation unless . As a condition to such mission shall . . such line. approve the Commission shall determine that the corridor approval route the line is will minimize adverse to follow reasonably area on the scenic and environmental assets of the concerned. . . . This section shall to such transmission have not been com- for' which rights-of-way acquisitions as of hundred pleted eight, seventy-two. nineteen above, The call a “grand- last sentence which parties quoted clause”, father is the on amendments By focus of the issue appeal. 1, 1983, grandfa- effective the General deleted the July Assembly “transmis- ther and substituted a provision exempts sion lines constructed for which the prior January has and necessity.” issued a certificate of convenience *4 Acts c. 438. that “as a result of Vepco agrees XI, provides: Article 1§ — end 1. Natural resources and of the Commonwealth. To the historical sites § water, air, pure enjoyment people and for recreation that the have clean and the use resources, lands, waters, policy adequate public it shall be the of and other natural resources, conserve, pub- develop, its of the Commonwealth to and utilize its natural Further, lands, buildings. it shall be the Common- lic and its historical sites and lands, pollution, impair- policy protect atmosphere, and waters from wealth’s its ment, destruction, benefit, general people enjoyment, welfare of the for the the Commonwealth. amendments all new kilovolts, transmission lines of more than 200 regardless of time of acquisition will be rights-of-way, subject to Commission review under out, 56-46.1”. As Vepco points § however, the amendments further provided that “any electrical transmission line that is the subject of litigation under 56-46.1 on the effective date of this Act shall be governed by 56-46.1 as in effect on 1983.” Id. January
Invoking clause, the grandfather that, Vepco argues inasmuch as all rights-of-way for the required Loudoun-Gainesville line were acquired prior to the line is from environmen- exempt review; tal-impact that the Commission had no jurisdiction to re- review; hence, quire that we should reverse its order and dissolve the injunction. that,
The record shows following enactment of Commission issued 10 certificates of convenience and necessity transmission lines of more than 200 kv without benefit of the re- view required new by statute. In each the rights-of-way had been acquired before Vepco concludes that “the Commission itself must have subscribed” to view of the legislative intent underlying grandfather clause.
This seems a and, reasonable conclusion the Com- always, mission’s interpretation legislative intent is entitled to great weight. But it is for this Court to determine the of statu- import in tory language light what appears be the central legislative goal.
It appears Commission modified its of the grandfather clause and issued the show cause order against Vepco as a result of our in Citizens While opinions Fairfax. grandfather clause was not in issue in Citizens and was factually Fairfax, arguments advanced in both cases re- inapplicable us to quired consider whether the Commission had jurisdiction or “power” under 56-46.1 to review a an ex- proposal isting corridor the construction new of a line more transmitting than 200 kv. we said:
The interpretation urged on us
would
by Vepco
preclude
Commission review of construction of transmission facilities
whenever the
decides to
company
use
corridor.
This would be the case
changes
of the
the com-
irrespective
*5
pany proposes in the area that
irrespective
changes
have
may
occurred since the corridor was first established.
Id. at
869,
In of the Commission existing corridor was raised County. course of our analysis upholding argument that Vepco’s grandfather clause was factually we reaffirmed our inapplicable, legislative intent in Citizens. finding The language in issue was [the clause] designed to protect those utilities which had acquired rights- of-way, construction, but had not started before the act was passed. The County’s would trans- exempt any mission control, line from statewide as long as the utility used an existing corridor. There is in the nothing language, history, spirit the section to such support an interpreta- tion, and we reject it.
Id. at 284 S.E.2d at 617. bar,
In the case at is Vepco’s position that the Commission’s environmental-impact jurisdiction over “existing” corridors is lim- ited to cases in which rights-of-way were or in acquired, wholly after part, 1972. If sound, Vepco’s construction is then so as long utility date, a corridor before that it was free (until the enactment of the 1983 amendments) to install in that corridor lines, as transmission many as carrying much volt- chose, age, as it regardless of the effect its decision might have upon environment.2 We cannot agree that the General Assem- bly intended the result construction of clause would entail.
We are mindful of the
rule
general
invoked by Vepco
that courts should not construe
statutory language
is
facially unambiguous.
however,
Whenever possible,
it is our duty
“
2 Obviously, Vepco
acknowledged
instances,
placing
in an earlier
‘in some
new
parallel
lines would be more detrimental
to the environment than the use
VEPCO,
Rappahannock
of new
League
corridors’
222 S.E.2d
har-
the several
of a statute as a consistent and
interpret
parts
effectuate the
statute
legislative goal.
monious whole so as to
“[A]
Citi-
is not to be construed
out a
by singling
particular phrase.”
Provisos,
zens at
“The for which a statute is purpose pri in its or construction.” mary importance Norfolk Lassiter, So. Co. v. 68 S.E.2d 643 Ry. In the of the manifest language legislative pur was to “minimize adverse on the scenic and environ pose mental assets” from construction of trans resulting high voltage mission lines. is But it is Typically, legislative history scanty. that, under reasonable to assume at the time the statute was con sideration, some utilities had corridors for the already acquired in kv. Even purpose constructing though excess such lines have been certificated under the Utilities Facilities may Act, such danger losing they utilities faced the the investment if fail to win made should acquiring rights-of-way they ap have under the new statute. Since the utilities could not proval standards, the enactment of new the General Assem anticipated invest decided to them an to their bly grant exemption protect however, ments. We are of that the the drafts language opinion, man chose to more than the broadly achieve that purpose swept intended. legislature clause, read in from the isolation
Admittedly, statute, the rest of the to not to cases where a only seems apply corridor was for pre-1972 constructing the purpose line, 200 kv but also to cases such as this where a utility proposes to install a 200 kv in a line corridor pre-1972 originally acquired Yet, to construe and the so exemption to other lines.3 carry apply the is to nature of the mischief broadly ignore evolutionary shifts, land grows to legislature sought regulate. Population of-way, posed, There is no evidence in the record before us that at the and we do not notice it planned counsel’s Loudoun-Gainesville suggestion to such effect. corridor time Vepco acquired in the manner now rights- pro uses change, need to control the environmen- potential tal Assembly, abuse We believe that the General expands apace. of future as contingencies aware well circum- contemporary stances, had no intention of extending grandfather exemption 200 kv transmission other one any line than for which rights-of- had been way acquired before enactment of the new statute. Having in the legislative goal, mind rooted as it is in the consti- mandate, whole, tutional and construing 56-46.1 as a we con- clude that the grandfather clause does not apply propo- corridor, sal to upgrade the Loudoun-Gainesville transmission we will affirm the Commission’s order.
Affirmed. R.J., GORDON, dissenting.
In enacting in- 56-46.1 in the General Assembly cluded a grandfather the statute should providing *7 only to transmission lines for which right-of-way acquisitions 8, not been on The completed 1972. April acquisitions transmission line involved this case were before April completed 8, So 56-46.1, 1972. the clear terms of Code statute does § not apply.
Recently, General concluded that the Assembly grandfather 1983, clause was too broad. it amended the statute to it make to all transmission lines. ex- apply prospectively Because the Act made the pressly amendment to cases in inapplicable litigation, the amendment does not to case. this enacted,
Although restricted Code 56-46.1 as originally § Commission added a that not in the statute. provision did appear The ruled that Code 56-46.1 not only applied 8, transmission lines built on after rights-of-way acquired April 1972, as the statute but required, sup- also transmission lines built on planting rights-of-way, transmission existing before Com- ruling, whether or after that date. In so acquired statute, mission amended the a function it should have left to the General Assembly.
This Court has decided
cases
Code
involving
two
866,
v.
(1981),
VEPCO
222 Va.