KEVIN BROWN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, OFFICE OF DEVON ANDERSON, HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF‘S OFFICE, HARRIS COUNTY OFFICE OF COURT MANAGEMENT, AND HARRIS COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR-COLLECTOR OFFICE OF MIKE SULLIVAN
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-1756
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION
August 29, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk
ENTERED
Pending before the Court in the above referenced cause, seeking damages and punitive damages for violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution and
Sheriff‘s Office, Harris County Office of Court Management, and
Standard of Review
Summary judgment under
Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant must offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant‘s
If the movant meets its burden and points out an absence of evidence to prove an essential element of the nonmovant‘s case on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant must then present competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim and to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. National Ass‘n of Gov‘t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party‘s case renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The nonmovant may not rely merely on allegations, denials in a pleading or unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning every element of its cause(s) of action.
Conclusory allegations unsupported by evidence will not preclude summary judgment. National Ass‘n of Gov‘t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d at 713; Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). “‘[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . .‘” State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “Nor is the ‘mere scintilla of evidence’ sufficient; ‘there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.‘” Id., quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. The Fifth Circuit requires the nonmovant to submit “‘significant probative evidence.‘” Id., quoting In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1978), and citing Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Cajun Electric Power Co-Op., 799 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, and Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Allegations in a plaintiff‘s complaint are not evidence. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996)(“[P]leadings are not summary judgment evidence.“); Johnston v. City of Houston, Tex., 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995) (for the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, “only evidence--not argument, not facts in the complaint--will satisfy’ the burden.“), citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westown Assoc., 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
The court must consider all evidence and draw all inferences from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Ass‘n of Gov‘t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d at 712-13. The Court may not make credibility determinations. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009), citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
The Court has no obligation to “sift through the record in search of evidence” to support the nonmovant‘s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994). Rather the nonmovant must identify evidence in the record and demonstrate how it supports his claim. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
For a no-evidence motion for summary judgment,
Key Allegations of Brown‘s Complaint (#1)
Brown, who rents a post office box that he claims gives him “effective consent to be on the [post office] property,” alleges that since June 28, 2012 he was illegally arrested two times at a post office in Harris County, that his vehicle was seized and sold, and that a number of wrongful actions were taken against him for several months. Specifically he alleges that around 5 p.m. on June 28, 2012, when he was wearing gospel singer Ann Nesby‘s “Put It On Paper” t-shirt as he went to retrieve his mail from his post office box, his Ford Mustang GT suffered a flat tire in the post office parking lot because of exposed rebars erected with rusty iron by Supervisor Denise J. Raipe (“Raipe“). After Brown reported the problem to USPS, to avoid signing a tow-wrecker‘s ticket slip Raipe told Postal Police to falsely arrest Brown. Brown‘s Ford Mustang was seized, along with his cell phone. Postal Policeman Ibarra (“Ibarra“), unit # P2163, arrived
Brown claims that while he was in jail, Nolen, Ibarra, Gonzalez, Assistant District Attorney Eric Kugler (“Kugler“), Colleen Patrice Barnett, Clinton F. Greenwood (“Greenwood“), Kate Dolan (“Dolan“), and Lynne W. Parsons (“Parsons“) stole his Texas Driver‘s License and refused to return it.
On July 13, 2012 Brown filed an Internal Affairs Division complaint with Harris County Sheriff‘s Office against Nolen. On
The complaint then states that Sheriff Adrian Garcia (“Garcia“) was the policymaker for the Harris County Sheriff‘s Office with regard to the hiring, firing, training, and discipline of officers. The Harris County Sheriff‘s Office allegedly unlawfully sold Brown‘s car. Although Garcia was fully aware of the facts described above, he did not take any action against Postal Police Ibarra and Gonzalez or Harris County Defendants Kugler, Parsons, Dolan, Todd R. Keagle (“Keagle“), and Greenwood. Nor did Harris County Office of Court Management take action against Eric Stewart Hagstette (“Hagstette“), Blanca Estel Villagomez (“Villagomez“), Jean Spradling Hughes (“Hughes“), and Jo Robin Brown.
Brown claims that these events caused him past and future pain, anxiety, loss of sleep, fear, embarrassment, anger, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, false criminal charges appearing on his background check, loss of bail bond money paid
Brown states that he complained to Harris County Sheriff‘s Office-Internal Affairs Division and Harris County Tax Office about Nolen, Michael Lovell, and Manuel Martinez for use of excessive force in his handcuffing, unlawful detention, wrongful arrest, and violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Brown claims that Raipe violated his First Amendment freedom of the press when she instructed Nolen to delete the pictures of his flat tire from his cell phone. He also charges Harris County‘s Office of Court Administration (specifically Villagomez Hughes, and Jo Robin Brown), Harris County District Attorneys Parsons, Dolan, Greenwood, etc.), and Harris County Sheriff‘s Office (Nolen) with violating his First Amendment rights “by
Brown also contends that Nolen and her co-deputies violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested him without probable cause, searched him, and seized his property (including his Ford Mustang GT, Texas Driver‘s License, and cell phone). Also in violation of the Fourth Amendment they searched his cell phone and deleted the pictures of his flat tire.
The Office of Harris County Tax Collector-Assessor Mike Sullivan purportedly violated Brown‘s Fourteenth Amendment rights by depriving him of his property on October 2, 2012 by transferring his vehicle title without due process. Harris County Office of Court Management‘s Hagstette violated Brown‘s Fourteenth Amendment rights by depriving him of life, liberty, and property on July 18, 2012 when Hagstette “signed the probable cause found capias unlawfully as he fail[ed] to give me as the p.o. box renter equal protection of the law as no p.c.!” Brown accuses Hughes of violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights by issuing a writ signed by Harris County Sheriff‘s Office‘s C. Jersic, remanding Brown to custody in Jo Robin Brown‘s court, depriving him of life, liberty, and property without due process
Brown further claims that Parsons, Kugler, Keagle, Barnett, Dolan, Patricia R. Lykes, and James Leitner of the Harris County District Attorney‘s Office deprived Brown of his life, liberty, and property by failing to file a motion to dismiss the false criminal trespass complaint against him and causing him to spend six months in jail.
Brown additionally alleges that Nolen violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the “OJP Programs statute” by putting “BLACK MALE” in the offense report. Brown complains that he was denied the benefits of service protection and subject to discrimination by Harris County Defendants under programs and activity funded by OJP.
Finally Brown asserts that Defendants “ratified” the actions of the individual Defendants and did not have “the general orders and written policies in place in the areas to prevent misconduct discrimination, wrongful detentions and arrest, search and seizures that would have prevented plaintiff‘s civil Rights violations and OJP statute violations and Constitutional Rights
Relevant Law
Municipalities and other bodies of local government, which include counties, are “persons” within the meaning of
To state a claim for municipal liability under
“The governing body of the municipality or an official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority must have actual or constructive knowledge of such a custom.” Okon, 426 Fed. Appx. at 316, citing Bennett, 735 F.2d at 862. “‘Actual knowledge may be shown by such means as discussions at council meetings or receipt of written information,‘” while “constructive knowledge ‘may be attributed to the governing body on the ground that it would have known of the violations if it had properly exercised its responsibilities, as, for example, where the violations were so persistent and widespread that they were the subject of prolonged public discussion or of a high degree of publicity.‘” Id., citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985).
Ratification can also be a basis for governmental immunity when an authorized policymaker affirms that in performing the challenged conduct, the employee was executing official policy.
Whether a governmental decision maker has final policymaking authority is a question of law. Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). “It has long been recognized that, in Texas, the county sheriff is the county‘s final policy maker in the areas of law enforcement, not by virtue of delegation by the county‘s governing body, but, rather, by virtue of the office to which the sheriff has been elected.” Turner v. Upton County, 915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1990)(citing Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980))(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 586 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817 (1996).
The named defendants in this action are all entities of Harris County. A suit against an individual in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity of which the individual is an agent, an employee, an official or a representative. Wilson v. Dallas County, Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-879-L, 2014 WL 4261951, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014), citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Thus a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state, itself. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)(holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under
A municipality may be liable for the failure of a policymaker to take precautions to prevent harm, provided that the omission is an intentional choice and not merely a negligent oversight. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Negligent training will not support a
A municipality or local governmental entity cannot be liable under
“Deliberate indifference” is a “stringent standard, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action,” for which “[a] showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice“; it requires a plaintiff to show that “‘in the light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.‘” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 547 (5th Cir. 2010)(quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2094 (2011). “Usually
Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense, protects government officials in their personal capacity performing discretionary functions not only from suit, but from “liability
To prevail on a
Regarding a false arrest claim,6 “a police officer must make a determination of probable cause before he causes any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1992). Probable cause exists when the facts within the officer‘s knowledge and the facts of which he has reasonably reliable information would be sufficient to believe that the suspect was committing or had committed an offense. United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 1973); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). See also Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 2004)(“Probable
“Whether an arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it--whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.”
A claim for false arrest does not depend upon the validity of each individual charge, but on the validity of the arrest as a whole; if there is probable cause for any of the charges made, the arrest is supported by probable cause and the claim for false arrest fails. Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995).
The Supreme Court looks to “the common law to identify those governmental functions that were historically viewed as so important and vulnerable to interference by means of litigation that some form of absolute immunity from civil liability was needed to ensure they are performed ‘with independence and without fear of consequences.‘” Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012), citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). The functions that it identified as entitled to some form of absolute immunity from civil damages liability are (1) “actions taken by legislators within the legitimate scope of legislative authority“; (2) “actions taken by judges within the legitimate scope of judicial authority“; (3) “actions taken by prosecutors in their role as advocates“; and (4) “the giving of testimony by witnesses at trial.” Id.
In Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55, the Supreme Court that the common-law absolute immunity of judges for “acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction” was preserved under
“[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have . . . . If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.”
Davis, 565 F.3d at 221, quoting Forrester. Judicial immunity can be overcome only where the actions taken were not in the judge‘s judicial capacity or where the actions although judicial in nature, are taken in the absence of all jurisdiction. Id., citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). The “absence of all jurisdiction” exception references situations in which a judge acts purely in a private and non-judicial capacity.” Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Bradley, 13 Wall at 351 (“[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction . . . are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.‘“), quoted in Stump v. Steward, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). Whether an act is judicial in nature is determined by “whether it is a function normally performed by a judge” and
A county judge acting in his or her judicial capacity to
Under Texas law, “when acting in the prosecutorial capacity to enforce state penal law, a district attorney is an agent of the state, not of the county in which the criminal case happens to be prosecuted.” Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 828 (1997). Like the common-law immunity of judges, that of a prosecutor “include[s] concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor‘s energies from his public duties, and the
A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor‘s office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages. Such suits could be expected with some frequency for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State‘s advocate. Further, if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.
Moreover, “[f]requently acting under serious constraints of time and even information, a prosecutor inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation. Defending these decisions, often years after they were made, could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials.” Id. at 435-26. Imbler holds that a prosecutor‘s conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State‘s case” enjoys absolute immunity. Id. at 431. See also Kreuger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77(A district attorney “is absolutely immune in a civil rights suit in any actions taken pursuant to his role as State advocate in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial.“). Thus a
Witnesses, including police officers, are absolutely immune from liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). Grand jurors are absolutely immune from liability for actions arising out of their service, as are jurors acting within the scope of their duties. Imbler, 424 U.S. 422-23; White v. Hegerhorst, 418 F.2d 894, 895 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 912 (1970); Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1998).
Derived judicial immunity shields individuals who act pursuant to explicit directions or procedures of a judge, such as a court clerk, a bailiff, or a sheriff involved in judicial process. Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001). See also Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981)(“Clerks
In Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth Circuit held that private persons alleged to have conspired with immune state officials could not be held liable under
Harris County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (#33)
Harris County Defendants, all divisions or departments of the Harris County government, which can only be subject to municipal liability for their own actions and cannot be liable under a respondeat superior theory for the wrongful actions of an employee, observe that Brown has broadly asserted four claims against them: (1) violation of the
Harris County Defendants assert six reasons why their motion for summary judgment should be granted: (1) Brown lacks admissible evidence to show that he was injured because of an officially adopted policy or a persistent widespread practice or custom of Harris County, which was known to the relevant policy maker and was the moving force that caused a violation of Brown‘s constitutional rights; (2) Brown lacks admissible evidence to defeat judicial immunity and/or derived judicial immunity related to actions of the judge and court personnel acting on an order of the judge during Brown‘s criminal prosecution; (3) Brown does not have admissible evidence to defeat prosecutorial immunity related to the actions of the Harris County District Attorney‘s Office during Brown‘s criminal prosecution; (4) Brown lacks admissible evidence to prove that any Harris County Defendant conspired to violate Brown‘s constitutional rights or to discriminate against him; and (5) Brown lacks admissible evidence to prove that any Harris County Defendant discriminated against Brown based on his race, color, or national origin.
Defendants assert that Brown, whose claims center on his arrest and criminal prosecution in Harris County courts, makes conclusory allegations under a heading, Policy, Practices, Procedure, Custom and Ratification” that they “ratified” the actions alleged in the complaint and vaguely alleged, “Defendants
Defendants submit affidavits of experienced and qualified experts who opine on and describe the rules, policies and procedures of the different County Defendants: Affidavit of Brian A. Rose regarding the Harris County District Attorney‘s Office (Ex. 2); Affidavit of Ed Wells regarding the Harris County Office of Court Management (Ex. 3); Affidavit of Peggy Martinez regarding the Harris County Tax Assessor/Collectors Office (Ex. 4); and Affidavit of Jay O. Coons, Ph.D. regarding the Harris County Sheriff‘s Office (Ex. 5). Brown has no evidence of an official policy of any of the County Defendants that caused the violation of Brown‘s rights. Other than conclusory allegations,
The allegations against Judge Jean Spradling Hughes, Judge of Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 15, and Judge Jo Robin Brown, Judge of Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 12, relate to their official actions or inactions connected to Harris County Office of Court Management, for which they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Moreover, under Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W. 2d 689, 707 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, writ dism‘d by agreement), “[I]n Texas, judicial immunity applies to officers of the court who are integral parts of the judicial process, such as a prosecutor performing typical prosecutorial functions, court clerks, bailiffs, constables issuing writs, and court-appointed receivers and trustees.” In accord Hawkins v. Walvoord, 25 S.W. 3d 882, 890 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2000, pet. denied)(holding that the court administrator selecting an attorney for representation of an indigent and the sheriff taking the attorney into custody pursuant to court directive were entitled to judicial immunity.); In re Foust, 310 F.3d 849, 855 (5th Cir. 2003)(because judges are absolutely immune, and because “[e]nforcement of a court order is closely intertwined with the judicial function, court personnel . . . charged with enforcing a valid court order, such as a
Defendants maintain that County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because the events of which Brown complains were state actions or lack of actions that were intimately involved with that judicial process which is protected by judicial immunity.
Furthermore, regarding the alleged violations of Brown‘s constitutional rights by the Harris County District Attorney‘s Office and individual assistant district attorneys, including their failure to file a motion to dismiss the cases against him earlier than they did and to return his property, these prosecutors, who are state actors, are not liable because of the
In addition, the public policy and law clearly establishing absolute prosecutorial immunity for prosecutors participating in functions “intimately associated with the judicial process” have been clearly articulated in Imbler, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 349 (2009). Such prosecutorial immunity protects a prosecutor even when he acts in bad faith or with ulterior motives, as long as he acts within the scope of the District Attorney‘s prosecutorial functions. Clawson v. Wharton County, 941 S.W. 2d 267, 272 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996).
Harris County Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment because those actions of which Brown complains were part of the District Attorney‘s criminal prosecution and were state
Regarding Brown‘s claim under
While Brown does not identify what he refers to by the “OJP Program Statute,” Exhibit E to Defendants’ motion, is a copy of some information attached to Brown‘s Complaint which states that Title VI and the “OJP Program Statute” both prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex and religion by the State and local law enforcement agencies that receive financial assistance from the Department of Justice. It also states, “Individuals also have a private right of action under Title VI and under the OJP Program Statute. . . . However, you must first exhaust your administrative remedies by filing a complaint with DOJ if you wish to file in Federal Court under the OJP Statute.” As noted, Brown presents no admissible evidence of discrimination against him by a County Defendant based on his race, color or national origin, but provides only conclusions and opinions.
In sum, Harris County Defendants claim they are entitled to
Court‘s Decision
The Court agrees with the Harris County Defendants’ recitation of the law and their application of it to the facts as well as the evidence, or lack thereof, here. Based on the Court‘s presentation of the law, Harris County Defendants’ briefing and evidence, and Brown‘s far too conclusory pleadings and his failure to allege supporting facts, no less provide competent evidence to support any of his claims or to controvert Defendants‘, the Court
ORDERS that Harris County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (#33) is GRANTED. Final judgment will issue by separate document.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 29th day of August, 2016.
___________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE