ALLEN D. BOYD v. STATE OF OHIO, et al.
Appellate Case No. 27553
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
January 12, 2018
2018-Ohio-108
FROELICH, J.
Triаl Court Case No. 16-CV-6512; (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Rendered on the 12th day of January, 2018.
ALLEN D. BOYD, 56 E. Alkaline Springs Road, Vandalia, Ohio 45377 Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se
ZOE SAADEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0089181, 150 East Gay Street, 16th Floor, Criminal Justice Section, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
{1} Allen D. Boyd, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed, pursuant to
I. Background and Procedural History
{2} Our opinion in Boyd‘s direct appeal in his 2011 criminal case, State v. Boyd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25182, 2013-Ohio-1067, provides the following underlying facts.
{3} At approximately 4:00 p.m. on August 1, 2011, Vandalia police officers responded to a two-story, four-unit apartment building on a report of domestic violence. The caller had reported that her boyfriend, Boyd, had put a gun to her head. After arriving, Officer Brazel called the girlfriend and instructed her to exit the building. After exiting, the girlfriend approached Brazel and provided additional details about what Boyd had done. She also indicated that her adult nephew was inside the apartment. The officer contacted the nephew by phone, who then also exited the building. The officer made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact Boyd. Boyd eventually exited the apartment; he was ordered to the ground and handcuffed. After Boyd was arrested, Officer Brazel and Sergeant Stanley “cleared” the apartment to make sure there were no other suspects or victims. During the sweep, the officers located a firearm on the bed in the master bedroom of the girlfriend‘s apartment. Brazel testified at a suppression hearing that the apartment complex was “for single mothers and their children only,” but
{4} Boyd was charged with having weapons while under disability, in violation of
{5} On appeal, Boyd challenged the trial court‘s denial of his motion to suppress, claiming that the “trial court erred in overruling [his] motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional search of his residence.” On March 22, 2013, we concluded that the trial court had erred in denying the motion to suppress. Boyd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25182, 2013-Ohio-1067. We stated that “[s]ince the officers herein arrested Boyd outsidе of the apartment, and no one posed a danger to them, the trial court erred when it determined that the protective sweep was justified by the circumstances.” Id. at 27. We further concluded that there were no exigent or emergency circumstances justifying the officers’ entry into the apartment, id. at 30, and that the State had waived any argument that Boyd lacked standing to object to the search, id. at 31-32. We reversed Boyd‘s conviction and remanded for further proceedings.
{6} Upon remand, a jury trial was scheduled for August 13, 2013. Boyd alleges in his amended complaint in this action that the State made several plea offers, but he rejected each of the offers. On August 9, 2013, the trial court dismissed the action, without prejudice, at the request of the State; the entry indicated that a necessary witness
{7} After the dismissal of the criminal action, Boyd and others filed several motions with the trial court related to the return of property. Of relevance, one motion was brought by Boyd‘s neighbor, Lori Staley, seeking the return of the seized firearm, which allegedly belonged to her. The court ultimately ordered the firearm to be destroyed.
{8} On December 29, 2016, Boyd, pro se, filed this civil action in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a determination that he was a “wrongfully imprisoned individual,” pursuant to
{9} In his amended complaint, Boyd detailed the trial court proceedings that occurred in his prior drug case and his 2011 case for having weapons while under disability. Boyd alleged that his initial 1995 drug offense conviction was void, and thus hе had no disability to form the basis of his subsequent conviction for having weapons while under disability. Boyd also alleged that he never possessed the gun seized on August 1, 2011, which belonged to Staley.
{10} Addressing the requirements to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned person, within the meaning of
{11} On February 20, 2017, the State filed a motion to dismiss the action, pursuant to
{12} Boyd opposed the State‘s motion, asserting that he could satisfy each element of
{13} Boyd appeals from the trial court‘s judgment.
II. Applicable Standards
{14} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief сan be granted, pursuant to
{15} The Ohio legislature has developed a two-step process to compensate individuals who have been wrongfully imprisoned. Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678, 985 N.E.2d 1229, 10. “The first step is an action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary factual determination of wrongful imprisonment; the second steр is an action in the Court of Claims to recover money damages.” Id. Through this process, the legislature “intended that the court of common pleas actively separate those who were wrongfully imprisoned from those who have merely avoided criminal liability.” Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 52, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989); Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, 9.
{16} Boyd sought a declaration that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual, pursuant to
- The individual was сharged with a violation of a section of the Revised
Code by an indictment or information, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony. - The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-included offense by the court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony.
- The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term оf imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty.
- The individual‘s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
- Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the charged offense, including аll lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any person.
Here, the factual findings underlying criminal charge giving rise to Plaintiff‘s wrongful imprisonment claim were never in dispute on appeal. State v. Boyd, 2013 WL 1189012, (C. A. No. 25182, March 22, 2013). The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in overruling Plaintiff[‘]s motion to suppress. Id. The apartment where the firearm was found, was deemed to be the residence of the Plaintiff. Id. The firearm was found in the master bedroom of the apartment of the Plaintiff‘s residence. Id. The Plaintiff did not prove in his pleadings that he was innocent of having a gun while under disability. In fact, Plaintiff mentions in the Complaint that a firearm was taken from a closet of his residence. Complaint at 13-14. This firearm was found in Plaintiff‘s residence while he was under disability for a prior drug conviction. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not satisfy the statute and was not a wrongfully imprisoned individual, because the error in procedure (warrantless search violation) that resulted in the Plaintiff‘s release did not occur subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment. Plaintiff must prove all five sections of
R.C. 2743.48(A) . Even when the Court takes all the factual allegations contained in the pleading as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff does not meet his burden underR.C. 2743.48(A) . Pursuant toCiv.R. 12(B)(6) , the Plaintiff can prove no set facts in support of his claim.
{19} On appeal, the parties focus on
III. Error in Procedure
{20} First, Boyd argues that he can satisfy the “error in procedure” prong. “When a defendant seeks a declaration that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual and seeks to satisfy
{21} On appeal, Boyd claims that two other procedural errors occurred after his successful appeal that satisfy
{22} We need not decide whether the State‘s misdemeanor plea offer constituted an “error in procedure,” because even if it were, it did not result in Boyd‘s release. Accord James, 148 Ohio St.3d 446, 2016-Ohio-8012, 71 N.E.3d 271. The State‘s plea offer was rejected by Boyd, which necessitated that the matter be set for trial; no other consequence resulted.
{23} Boyd also claims that the State committed a Brady violation after the reversal of his conviction when the prosecutor “never told [the trial judge] that on August 25, 2011 the Grand Jury used the ‘void’ termination entry of Case No. 1995-CR-4033 filed on July 5, 2000 @ 3:22 pm to indict Allen D. Boyd for having a weapon while under a disability in Case No. 2011-CR-2608.” (Use of all capitalization omitted.) Again, we need not address whether this conduct constituted an “error in procedure,” because even if it did, it did not result in Boyd‘s release.
IV. Actual Innocence
{25} Boyd also contends that he is actually innocent of having weapons while under disability. This argument is primarily premised on his belief that the judgment entry in his underlying 1995 drug case is void. He also claims that he did not possess a firearm on August 1, 2011.
A. Disability from 1995 Drug Abuse Case
{26} At the time of Boyd‘s 1995 drug offense,
A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the sentence. If the defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, the court shall render judgment accordingly. The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the сlerk.
As part of the 1998 amendments to
{27} In 2008, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under
{29} The initial judgment entry in Boyd‘s 1995 drug case, which was attached to Boyd‘s amended complaint, was filed on July 5, 2000. The judgment entry stated, in part: “The defendant herein having been convicted of the offense(s) of DRUG ABUSE (Pre-SB 2) (F4) was on June 28, 2000, brought before the Court[.]” (Emphasis in original.) The entry indicated a sentence of 6 months in prison, was signed by the judge, and was time stamped by the clerk‘s office. The judgment entry did not include the manner of Boyd‘s conviction.
{30} Boyd was indicted in Case No. 2011-CR-2608 (having weapons whilе under disability) on August 25, 2011 – after Baker was decided, but before Lester. On October 4, 2011, approximately six weeks after Boyd was indicted in Case No. 2011-CR-2608, the State filed a motion in Case No. 1995-CR-4033 (drug abuse), requesting a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the absence of the manner of conviction from the July 5, 2000
{31} Boyd claims that he was nоt under disability on August 1, 2011, when the relevant events in Case No. 2011-CR-2608 occurred, because the July 5, 2000 judgment entry was void when he was indicted for having weapons while under disability. Although Lester was decided after his indictment, Lester made clear that the absence of the manner of conviction (his guilty plea) from his original judgment entry in Case No. 1995-CR-4033 did not render that judgment void. Rather, in accordance with Lester, the trial court was permitted to rectify the omission by means of the nunc pro tunc, which the trial cоurt did. In other words, as a matter of law, the July 5, 2000 judgment entry was not void, and Boyd was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of that conviction.
{32} We note that
{33} Boyd also asserts that the judgment in 1995-CR-4033 was void, citing case
{34} Upon review of Boyd‘s complaint, Boyd cannot, as a matter of law, establish a claim of actual innocence based on an argument that the judgment in his 1995 drug abuse case was void and thus he was not under disability.
B. Lack of Possession of Firearm
{35} Finally, Boyd claims that he did not have a weapon on August 1, 2011.
{36} A claim of actual innocence requires affirmative proof of innocence. The standard “is nоt satisfied by an acquittal or a finding of legal insufficiency of the evidence. The General Assembly requires a showing of innocence to be made affirmatively and adjudicated de novo before a claimant can be found to be eligible for compensation in a
{37} Boyd alleged in his amended complaint that he “never had possession of Lori Staley‘s Legally Owned firearm on August 1, 2011. Which is why the Plaintiff, Allen Boyd‘s fingerprints and D.N.A. were not on Lori Staley‘s firearm.” The State asserts on appeal that the trial court correctly dismissed Boyd‘s claim, because he “has not made an affirmative showing of actual innocence and cannot meet his burden under
{38} Unlike Boyd‘s arguments regarding his underlying disability, which could be resolved as a matter of law based on a review of the judgment entry in Case No. 1995-CR-4066 (attached to his amended complaint), we cannot determinе that this claim must fail, as a matter of law. Accepting as true Boyd‘s statement that he did not possess the gun, as we must when reviewing a
{39} The State notes that Boyd has attached to his amended complaint a motion by Staley for the return of her firearm in which Staley indicates that her firearm was located in Boyd‘s residence. The State argues that this statement precludes Boyd from claiming that he was actually innocent of having weapons while under disability. Staley went on to state, however, that Boyd never had possession of her firearm and had no knowledge that the firearm was left in the closet of the bedroom. Construing all of the allegations in Boyd‘s complaint in the light most favorable to him, we cannot conclude that Boyd cannot statе a claim of actual innocence based on lack of possession of the firearm.
{41} Boyd‘s assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in part.
V. Conclusion
{42} The trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
HALL, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Allen D. Boyd
Zoe Saadey
Hon. Dennis J. Adkins