DOSS, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT.
No. 2012-0162
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted September 26, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.
135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678
{¶ 1} In this case, we determine that Iran Doss is not entitled to summary judgment that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” eligible to sue the state for compensation pursuant to
I. Background
{¶ 2} Appellee, Iran Doss, was convicted by a jury in 2006 of one count of rape and one count of kidnapping. He was classified as a sexually oriented offender, sentenced to four years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution and a fine.
{¶ 4} Upon reconsideration, a split panel vacated both the kidnapping and the rape convictions. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449, 2008 WL 323168 (”Doss II“). The Doss II majority held that the state failed to present sufficient evidence showing that Doss knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim‘s ability to consent was substantially impaired. Id. at ¶ 21-23. The court vacated the convictions and ordered Doss discharged from prison.
{¶ 5} The state appealed the vacation of the rape conviction, but we declined review. State v. Doss, 118 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2008-Ohio-3369, 889 N.E.2d 1025. After his release, Doss filed an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to
{¶ 6} The trial court granted Doss‘s motion for summary judgment for the following reason: “The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff Doss‘s conviction and order his immediate release can only be interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.”
{¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, in yet another two-to-one decision. Doss v. State, 8th Dist. No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429, 2011 WL 6245473 (”Doss III“). The majority reiterated that its review of the record in Doss II had revealed that Doss‘s statement was the only evidence of the alleged victim‘s mental condition and that the state had presented no evidence that Doss knew, or should have known, that the alleged victim‘s ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired because of voluntary intoxication. Id. at ¶ 15. The court of appeals found no genuine issue of fact and no error in the trial court‘s entry of summary judgment.
{¶ 8} The dissenting judge stated,
Our holding in [Doss II] does not mean that Doss is innocent—merely that, based upon the evidence the state presented, Doss‘s guilt could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The same cannot automatically be said of whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know or reasonably should not have known of the victim‘s incapacity.
Id. at ¶ 21 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address the state‘s propositions of law: (1) “A trial court adjudicating a contested claim of innocence may not grant summary judgment in favor of a former inmate based solely on an appeals court finding that a criminal conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence” and (2) “Under
II. Analysis
{¶ 10} The General Assembly has developed a two-step process to compensate those who have been wrongfully imprisoned. The first step is an action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary factual determination of wrongful imprisonment; the second step is an action in the Court of Claims to recover money damages. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, paragraph two of the syllabus. The wrongful-imprisonment statute,
{¶ 11}
(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the Revised Code, a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an individual who satisfies each of the following:
(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony.
(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser included offense by the court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony.
(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty.
(4) The individual‘s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the charged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any person.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 12} Thus, a plaintiff in a civil case for wrongful imprisonment must first prove that he or she is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual.” In this case, proof of the factors in
{¶ 14} In construing a former version of
{¶ 15} When a court vacates or reverses a criminal conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence, the court is saying that the state has not proven the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; it is not saying that innocence has been proven. Thus, reversal on insufficiency of the evidence does not automatically mean that the defendant was wrongfully imprisoned. Chandler v. State, 95 Ohio App.3d 142, 641 N.E.2d 1382 (8th Dist.1994). If the legislature had intended to compensate all persons whose convictions are reversed based on insufficient evidence, it could have explicitly stated this in
{¶ 16} In this case, Doss argues that the vacation of his convictions and discharge from prison are proof of his actual innocence. In contrast, the state
{¶ 17} The differing burdens of proof explain why a vacation of Doss‘s conviction does not prove his innocence. The appellate court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the state failed to prove Doss‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But that ruling does not answer the question whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know, or could not reasonably have known, of the alleged victim‘s incapacity. See Ratcliff v. State at 182 (evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily prove innocence by a preponderance of the evidence). Preponderance of the evidence is a distinct legal standard from beyond a reasonable doubt. By not requiring more of Doss, the lower courts contravened the mandate of
Proof Offered to Support Summary Judgment
{¶ 18} To analyze whether Doss affirmatively established his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, we must examine the evidence that he submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment. To prevail on the motion, he must have demonstrated that there was no genuine issue of material fact, that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that reasonable minds, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, can come to only one conclusion, which is adverse to the nonmoving party. Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 29. Appellate review is de novo. Id.
The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff Doss‘s conviction and order his immediate release can only be interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 20} This conclusion was incorrect. The trial court relied solely on the court of appeals’ reversal and vacation of the conviction to hold that Doss was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It did not require a hearing or additional evidence. It simply cited the court of appeals’ holding that the state had not offered sufficient evidence to prove Doss‘s convictions. And in affirming the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment, the Eighth District correctly acknowledged Walden‘s rule that an acquittal does not necessarily establish actual innocence, but then applied the rule incorrectly. Despite the jury‘s verdict of guilty and without any evidence from Doss, the majority held that the record showed insufficient evidence of the alleged victim‘s substantial impairment. Thus, the judgment of the trial court that found Doss to be eligible for compensation and the appellate court‘s judgment affirming that finding were not based upon an affirmative showing of actual innocence. They were based on a dearth of evidence of guilt. Both courts relieved Doss of his statutory obligation to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit the charged offense, including all lesser included offenses, an obligation that must be fulfilled before he is allowed to claim the status of one who was “wrongfully imprisoned.”
{¶ 21} To show actual innocence under the wrongful-imprisonment statute, Doss must prove that “the charged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by [him] or was not committed by any person.”
III. Conclusion
{¶ 22} Not every person who is released from prison because of a successful appeal is entitled to compensation. The legislature set forth a procedure for
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.
Mancino, Mancino & Mancino and Paul Mancino Jr., for appellee.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and Matthew P. Hampton, Deputy Solicitor; and William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John F. Manley and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.