THE STATE EX REL. SNEAD, APPELLANT, v. FERENC, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
No. 2013-1084
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted October 8, 2013—Decided January 14, 2014
138 Ohio St.3d 136, 2014-Ohio-43
Id. at 29.
{¶ 24} Thus, we made a strong statement in Williams, and we explained to attorneys and the public at large what requires the “strictest discipline.” This is not a case in which to back away from that pronouncement. For over four years, Anthony embezzled more than $100,000 from the church at which he was employed. I do not believe that the mitigating faсtors warrant a departure from the sanction of disbarment.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Karen H. Osmond, Assistant Disciplinаry Counsel, for relator.
James T. Ambrose, for respondent.
(No. 2013-1084—Submitted October 8, 2013—Decided January 14, 2014.)
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Robert A. Snead, appeals from the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel appellee, Clermont County Court of Common Pleas Judge Richard P. Ferenc, to correct a
{¶ 2} Sneаd pled guilty in 2002 in Clermont County Common Pleas Court to a number of felonies, including kidnapping with a sexual-motivation specification, fеlonious assault on a police officer, and aggravated burglary. On February 27, 2002, the common pleas court issued a judgment entry in State v. Snead, Clermont C.P. No. 2001-CR-00010, reflecting Snead‘s guilty plea and ordering a presentence investigation.
{¶ 3} On March 11, 2002, the court еntered a judgment entry of sentence. That entry set out the charges upon which Snead was found guilty and the 21-year sentence оf imprisonment imposed. The common pleas court judge signed the entry, and it was file-stamped by the clerk of courts.
{¶ 4} Eleven yеars later, on April 10, 2013, Snead filed a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition in the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. Snead argued that the March 11, 2002 judgment entry was defective—and hence not a final, appealable order—because it did not contаin all the elements required under
{¶ 5} On April 18, 2013, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment entry of sentence. The nunc pro tunc entry stated the fact of conviction, listed the offenses of which Snead was convicted, repeаted the sentence, and this time indicated the manner of conviction—Snead‘s guilty plea.
{¶ 6} Snead then was granted leave tо file an amended petition and argued in the court of appeals that the nunc pro tunc entry did not cure the defective March 11, 2002 judgment entry for two principal reasons. First, Snead asserted that a court cannot use a nunc pro tunc entry tо correct a judgment that is void under
{¶ 7} On June 7, 2013, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the grounds that the nunc pro tunc entry rendered the mandamus сlaim moot and that relief in prohibition was unavailable because Snead had an
{¶ 8} We find that Snead‘s challenge to the validity of the March 11, 2002 judgment entry has no merit. A final, appealable order in a criminal case under
{¶ 9} Lester held that the manner of conviction is a requirement of
{¶ 10} This court has consistently regarded
{¶ 11} Based on Lester, the court of appeals was correct to dismiss the mandamus claim as moot. State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, 943 N.E.2d 1010, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 123 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-5259, 915 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 1 (“‘mandamus will not compel the performance of an act that has alreаdy been performed‘“); State ex rel. Walker v. Donnelly, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96307, 2011-Ohio-1106, 2011 WL 826359, ¶ 3-4. And because Snead had an adequate remedy, the court of appeals correctly dismissed his prohibition claim.
{¶ 12} Alternatively, Snead argues that the March 11, 2002 judgment entry was not a final, appealable order because it did not reflect the disposition of the three felony charges in case No. 2001-CR-00091. Snead cites a number of decisions in which a criminal defendant was tried on multiple charges, the trial court entered final judgment as to one but not all оf the counts, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable оrder. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 59 Ohio App.3d 1, 569 N.E.2d 1068 (8th Dist.1989).
{¶ 13} Those cases are distinguishable. The Clermont County Common Pleas Court‘s docket for case No. 2001-CR-00091 shows that the stаte voluntarily dismissed all charges filed under that case number on February 27, 2002, before the final sentencing entry in case No. 2001-CR-00010 was issued. Thе March 11, 2002 entry disposed of all charges remaining in Snead‘s case, which is all that was
{¶ 14} Bаsed on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O‘NEILL, JJ., concur.
Robert A. Snead, pro se.
D. Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Brant, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.