TERRY TONEY, et al. v. CITY OF DAYTON, et al.
Appellate Case No. 27245
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
June 30, 2017
[Cite as Toney v. Dayton, 2017-Ohio-5618.]
Trial Court Case Nos. 2014-CV-1713, 2014-CV-3292 & 2014-CV-3294 (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
ΟΡΙΝΙΟΝ
Rendered on the 30th day of June, 2017.
JOSHUA A. ENGEL, Atty. Reg. No. 0075769, 5181 Natorp Boulevard, Suite 210, Mason, Ohio 45040
MICHAEL K. ALLEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0025214, 810 Sycamore Street, 5th Floor, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
PAUL M. DEMARCO, Atty. Reg. No. 0041153, 119 East Court Street, Suite 530, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
THOMAS J. MANNING, Atty. Reg. No. 0059759, P.O. Box 751484, Dayton, Ohio 45475 Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
JOHN C. MUSTO, Atty. Reg. No. 0071512, 101 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402
DAWN M. FRICK, Atty. Reg. No. 0069068, DAVID M. SHAVER, Atty. Reg. No. 0085101, JEFFREY C. TURNER, Atty. Reg. No. 0063154, EDWARD J. DOWD, Atty. Reg. No. 0018681, CHRISTOPHER T. HERMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0076894, 8163 Old Yankee Street, Suite C, Centerville, Ohio 45458
LORI E. DENLINGER, Atty. Reg. No. 0053384, 7501 Paragon Road, Dayton, Ohio 45459
QUINTON F. LINDSMITH, Atty. Reg. No. 0018327, JAMES P. SCHUCK, Atty. Reg. No. 0072356, 100 South Third Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215
STEPHEN C. MCHUGH, Atty. Reg. No. 0018788, 33 West First Street, Suite 600, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorneys
TUCKER, J.
{1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Ghassan Deek, Eusebio H. Faura, Teresa K. Griffith, Thomas A. Griffith, Scott Howard, Darlene Lucas, Dean Lucas, Joe Meyer, Stacy Toney, Terry Toney, Austin Troxell and Charles Grant Vandervort, appeal from the decision of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas in their civil actions contesting notices of civil liability issued under Dayton, Trotwood and West Carrollton municipal ordinances implementing
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} The ordinances at issue (collectively, the “Ordinances“)—Revised Code of General Ordinances of the City of Dayton, Ohio [hereinafter R.C.G.O.] 70.121; City of Trotwood Code of Ordinances [hereinafter TCO] 313.11 and 333.09; and Codified Ordinances of West Carrollton, Ohio [hereinafter WCCO] 72.130—implement automated traffic enforcement systems. Under the Ordinances, automatic camera stations are installed at selected locations to detect red-light and speed-limit violations. When a vehicle is photographed in the midst of a violation, a notice of civil liability is mailed to the owner of the vehicle. The owner may then pay the monetary penalty or request an administrative hearing to contest the notice.
{3} Appellants Ghassan Deek, Teresa Griffith, Thomas Griffith, Stacy Toney, Terry Toney and Charles Vandervort commenced Case No. 2014 CV 01713 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on March 25, 2014.1 With the exception of Thomas Griffith and Stacy Toney, all of them received at least one notice of civil liability from the City of Dayton. None of the recipients requested an administrative hearing.
{4} Appellants Scott Howard, Joe Meyer and Austin Troxell commenced Case No. 2014 CV 03292 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on June 4, 2014. All of them received at least one notice of civil liability from the City of West Carrollton. Mr. Howard received two notices and did not request an administrative hearing in response to either of them. Mr. Meyer received three notices and requested a hearing in response to one. Mr. Troxell received two notices and requested a hearing in each instance.
{5} Appellants Scott Howard, Darlene Lucas and Dean Lucas commenced Case No. 2014 CV 03494 on June 4, 2014, though they subsequently filed an amended complaint to join Appellant Eusebio Faura as an additional plaintiff.2 Messrs. Faura and Howard each received a notice of civil liability from the City of Trotwood, and
{6} In a series of orders entered on July 29 and July 30, 2014, the trial court consolidated the three cases. The complaint in each case consists of essentially the same four causes of action. Count I is a cause of action for declaratory judgment concerning the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunals established by the Ordinances. Count II, also a cause of action for declaratory judgment, concerns the constitutional validity of the Ordinances pursuant to the due process clause of the Ohio Constitution. Count III is a request for injunctive relief, and Count IV is a claim of unjust enrichment. At Appellants’ request, and without opposition, the trial court dismissed Count I in all three cases on March 1, 2016.3
{7} On August 8, 2016, the trial court entered a final decision in the consolidated cases, resolving a number of dispositive motions. In Case No. 2014 CV 01713, the court:
- overruled the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment;
- overruled the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification;
- sustained the motion of Defendants, the City of Dayton and Chief Richard Biehl, for summary judgment; and
- sustained the motion of Defendant, RedFlex Traffic Systems, Inc., for summary judgment.
In Case No. 2014 CV 03292, the court:
- overruled the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings;
- overruled the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification;
- sustained the motion of Defendants, the City of West Carrollton and Chief Doug Woodard, for summary judgment; and
- sustained the motion of Defendant, RedFlex Traffic Systems, Inc., for summary judgment.
And in Case No. 2014 CV 03294, the court:
- overruled the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings;
- overruled the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification;
- sustained the motion of Defendants, the City of Trotwood and Quincy Pope, Sr. for judgment on the pleadings; and
- sustained the motion of Defendant, RedFlex Traffic Systems, Inc., for summary judgment.
II. Appellants’ First Assignment of Error
{8} For the first of their two assignments of error, Appellants contend that:
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE AUTOMATIC TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE COURSE OF LAW PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{9} Appellants raise a facial challenge to the Ordinances, arguing that they violate the Ohio Constitution because
{10} All “legislation, including municipal ordinances, [is] entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.” (Citation omitted.) Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94327, 2010-Ohio-4685, ¶ 7. As a result, courts should “liberally construe [a challenged ordinance] in order to save it from constitutional infirmities.” Id., citing City of Lebanon v. McClure, 44 Ohio App.3d 114, 116, 541 N.E.2d 1073 (12th Dist.1988). If, by “‘any fair course of reasoning, the [ordinance] and the constitution can be reconciled, [then] the [ordinance] must stand.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Carswell, 114 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 9.
{11}
{12} Unlike ” ‘some legal rules, [due process] is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.‘” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). Instead, due process is a ” ‘flexible [concept] and calls for such procedural protection as [a given] situation demands.’ ” Id., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Identification of the precise requirements of procedural due process for a specific set of circumstances generally requires consideration of the following three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by *** official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [that private] interest through the [official] procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [third], the [g]overnment‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement[s] would entail.
(Citation omitted.) Id. at 335; see also Shirokey v. Marth, 63 Ohio St.3d 113, 120, 585 N.E.2d 407 (1992), citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Simply put, “[t]he less that is at stake, other things being equal, the less process is due.” Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1353 (7th Cir.1997). When the ” ‘interest is purely economic, the [Ohio] constitution demands only *** a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’ ” See Shirokey, 63 Ohio St.3d at 120, quoting 1946 St. Clair Corp. v. City of Cleveland, 49 Ohio St.3d 33, 36, 550 N.E.2d 456 (1990).
A. The Ordinances
{13} Appellants direct their challenges at the Ordinances’ provisions on administrative hearings, arguing that they suffer from four putative constitutional shortcomings: use of hearsay testimony in the absence of discovery and subpoena power; limitations on affirmative defenses; abrogation of spousal privilege; and the bond requirements. Elaborating on their first argument, Appellants acknowledge that the “Ohio Supreme Court has held that administrative agencies are not bound by the rules of evidence applied in court.” City of Cleveland v. Posner, 193 Ohio App.3d 211, 2011-Ohio-1370, 951 N.E.2d 476, ¶ 27, citing Simon v. Lake Geauga Printing Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 41, 44, 430 N.E.2d 468 (1982). Discovery “is typically not available,” and an administrative tribunal may admit any reliable, probative and substantial evidence, including hearsay.4 Kuczak v. City of Trotwood Police Dep‘t, S.D.Ohio No. 3:13-cv-101, 2016 WL 4987170, *6 (Sept. 15, 2016); Posner, 2011-Ohio-1370, ¶ 27. Moreover,
because “there is no constitutional right to confront witnesses in civil proceedings,” the availability of subpoenas in administrative actions is not constitutionally mandated. See Kuczak, 2016 WL 4987170, *13, citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960), fn. 16. Recognizing these principles, Appellants contend nevertheless that where an administrative
{14} Regarding affirmative defenses, Appellants argue that limitations imposed on the supporting evidence that may be introduced are unreasonably restrictive. They also argue that the burden of proof required of some defendants may result in the abrogation of spousal privilege inasmuch as R.C.G.O. 70.121(C)(2), TCO 313.11(c)(3)(A) and 333.09(c)(3)(A), and WCCO 72.130(C)(4)(a) allow the owner of a vehicle to avoid civil liability for a violation committed by another person by providing the name and address of the person driving the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation. Regarding the bond requirement, Appellants argue that the Ordinances effectively deny indigent defendants the remedy of an administrative hearing.
1. R.C.G.O. 70.121
{15} The first of the Mathews factors is “the private interest that will be affected by the official action.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) Under the City of Dayton‘s ordinance, the civil penalty assessed “may not exceed $250.00 per violation,” but violators who fail to remit timely payment of the penalty must also pay a late fee of $25.00.5 R.C.G.O. 70.121(F)(2) and (4). The private interest under the Dayton ordinance, then, is a maximum of $275.00. Although this amount would doubtless be a significant expense for the average motorist, it is comparatively insubstantial with respect to the overall cost of owning and operating a vehicle.
{16} The second factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the] private interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Dayton‘s ordinance establishes that an alleged violator must receive a notice of liability, has the right to an administrative hearing, and at the hearing, may introduce at least some evidence in support of a defense. R.C.G.O. 70.121(C)(3)-(4), (D), (E)(1)(c) and (E)(2). Under R.C.G.O. 70.121(E)(2), which sets forth a list of “affirmative defense[s],” the owner—or driver—of a vehicle can avoid liability by showing that commission of the violation was necessary “in order to yield the right-of-way to an emergency vehicle *** or to a funeral procession“; that the vehicle “or [its] registration plates were stolen before the violation occurred“; that “at the time and place of the alleged violation, the traffic control signal or speed sensor,” as applicable, “were not operating properly“; or that the driver of the vehicle at the time was not the person named in the notice. To “demonstrate that the *** vehicle or [its] registration plates were stolen before the violation occurred,” the owner of the vehicle “must submit proof that a [corresponding] police report *** was filed prior to the violation or within 48 hours after the violation occurred.” R.C.G.O. 70.121(E)(2)(b). Similarly, when an owner receives a notice of liability and wishes to defend on the grounds that another person was driving the vehicle, the owner must indicate, “at a minimum, the [actual] operator‘s name and
{17} Notwithstanding that these procedures fall short of the due process accorded a defendant in a civil trial, they suffice to minimize the risk of penalizing the wrong party. Procedural “due process rules are meant to protect persons not from [any] deprivation, but [only] from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” (Emphasis added.) Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Dayton‘s ordinance accounts for the most likely scenarios in which a person identified in a notice of liability is not responsible for the violation alleged—authorized or permissive use of the vehicle by another person, theft of the vehicle or its license plates, or malfunctioning of the automatic enforcement equipment. Furthermore, despite the limitations imposed on the evidence that a defendant may introduce at an administrative hearing, the defendant still has a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that another person was responsible for the violation; regarding defenses of this kind, we conclude that additional or substitute procedural safeguards would likely have little value.
{18} By contrast, a defendant mounting a defense based upon a fault in the automatic enforcement equipment encounters significant obstacles, the inability to submit discovery requests or issue subpoenas to the person or persons responsible for monitoring and maintaining the equipment.6 Even so, these obstacles do not of themselves rise to the level of constitutional infirmities because a defendant has no constitutional right to confront witnesses in civil proceedings. Kuczak v. City of Trotwood Police Dep‘t, S.D.Ohio No. 3:13-cv-101, 2016 WL 4987170, *13 (Sept. 15, 2016). The ordinance, for that matter, does not on its face prohibit defendants from engaging their own expert witnesses to testify regarding the equipment‘s accuracy. And because administrative hearings held pursuant to R.C.G.O. 70.121 qualify as quasi-judicial proceedings, a defendant can overcome these obstacles through an administrative appeal under
matter when this opportunity occurs in order to preserve [the defendant]‘s due process rights“), citing City of Cleveland v. Posner, 193 Ohio App.3d 211, 2011-Ohio-1370, 951 N.E.2d 476, ¶ 30-40.
{19} The third Mathews factor is the government‘s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Nominally, at least, the ordinance is an exercise of the city‘s police powers intended to promote traffic safety. Compared to the administrative hearing process as presently constituted in the ordinance, additional procedural safeguards, such as vesting the tribunal with subpoena power and granting defendants the right to engage in discovery, would certainly result in a dramatic increase in the city‘s costs and administrative burdens. For example, as the Southern District of Ohio found in a similar case, the “fiscal and administrative burdens of requiring police officers, or others who could testify about the accuracy of the equipment used, to attend each administrative hearing would eliminate any efficiencies that the civil enforcement proceedings were designed to achieve.” Kuczak, 2016 WL 4987170, *13; see also Balaban v. City of Cleveland, N.D. Ohio No. 1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283, *7 (Feb. 5, 2010). We find likewise that the increased fiscal and administrative burdens would outweigh the potential benefit of enhanced procedural due process protections.
{20} Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments concerning use of hearsay evidence and lack of discovery and subpoena power are unavailing. The ordinance affords the recipient of a notice of liability with a reasonable opportunity to present a defense based on the most likely grounds, even if a recipient seeking to prove an equipment malfunction would, as a practical matter, have little choice other than to bring an administrative appeal under
{21} The balance of the purported constitutional infirmities with which Appellants charge the ordinance are unavailing, as well. Appellants argue that the ordinance unfairly restricts the evidence that an owner of a vehicle may present in support of an affirmative defense. Their complaint in this respect is that “a person who receives a notice of violation and who claims not to have been driving the car [at the time of the violation] is not permitted *** merely [to] convince the hearing officer that [another person] was *** the driver.” Appellants’ Br. 23. Yet, the ordinance effectively gives a defendant in this position a choice: accept liability for the third party‘s use of the car, or identify the responsible third party. This would not seem to violate due process or upset traditional notions of fair play. See, e.g., Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir.2009) (affirming the constitutionality of this approach under a similar Chicago ordinance).
{22} Further, Appellants contend that married defendants who receive notices of liability for violations committed by their spouses must either pay penalties for violations they did not commit, or implicate their spouses. See R.C.G.O. 70.121(C)(2). Appellants describe this Scylla and Charybdis as an abrogation of
{23} The difficult choice thus foisted upon married defendants does not render the ordinance unconstitutional on its face. Assuming, without finding, that the ordinance might abrogate spousal privilege in some cases, it would necessarily do so only in those cases in which one spouse is driving with the other in the car. Irrespective of whether the ordinance might offend spousal privilege in certain circumstances, Appellants have lodged a facial challenge to the ordinance, and to prevail, they must show that the ordinance cannot be applied constitutionally in any circumstances. (Citation omitted.) Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898, ¶ 21. The ordinance would not, on its face, necessarily do so in every instance.
{24} Appellants’ remaining argument against the ordinance is that the bond requirement in R.C.G.O. 70.121(E)(1)(c) denies due process to indigent defendants. Certainly, this requirement creates additional hurdles for defendants with limited financial means, and by extension, it could discourage such defendants from requesting administrative hearings to contest notices of liability. Nevertheless, the rectification of economic disparities of this kind is not the purpose of procedural due process protections. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has held that “the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent [person] who is subject to a child support order, even if that [person] faces incarceration” for up to one year. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011). Here, far less important interests are at stake, supporting the conclusion that procedural due process does not require that the ordinance permit an indigent defendant to obtain a waiver of the bond requirement. Furthermore, assuming without finding that the bond requirement is unconstitutional with respect to indigent defendants, the ordinance could still be applied constitutionally with respect to non-indigent defendants. Appellants’ facial challenge therefore cannot succeed on this basis.
{25} Evaluated pursuant to the Mathews factors, the ordinance provides a situationally appropriate level of procedural due process protection. Consequently, Appellants have not shown that the administrative procedures established in the ordinance are constitutionally insufficient. Evaluated pursuant to the rational-basis test, the result is the same.
{26} The ordinance bears a real and substantial relation to public safety and implements a streamlined, low-cost system of traffic enforcement. Although it considerably restricts the defenses and evidence available to recipients of notices of liability, administrative costs in the absence of these restrictions would defeat the purpose of the system. The design of the ordinance, then, is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, and for all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the ordinance is not constitutionally invalid on its face. Wymsylo, 2012-Ohio-2187, ¶ 21; Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 274, 503 N.E.2d 717 (1986), quoting Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), paragraph five of the syllabus.
2. TCO 313.11 and 333.09, and WCCO 72.130
{27} With respect to the Dayton ordinance, the Trotwood and West Carrollton
{28} The Dayton ordinance also differs from the West Carrollton ordinance inasmuch as it states that a “certified copy of [a] notice of liability *** shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein and shall be admissible in a proceeding alleging a violation,” whereas the analogous provision of the West Carrollton ordinance states that “[the fact that a vehicle is registered in the name of the person to whom a notice of violation is issued will be deemed] prima facie evidence that [that person] was operating the vehicle at the time of the offense.” R.C.G.O. 70.121(C)(4); WCCO 72.130(C)(3).
{29} The Trotwood and West Carrollton ordinances do not otherwise differ substantively from the Dayton ordinance. Therefore, we hold that the Trotwood and West Carrollton ordinances are not facially unconstitutional pursuant to
3. Procedural Questions
{30} In Case Nos. 2014 CV 01713 and 2014 CV 03292, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellees under
{31} In order to meet this initial burden, the movant must identify those portions of the record properly before the court pursuant to
{32} The key to summary judgment is that no genuine issue as to any material fact is presented for trial. Whether a fact is “material” depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 617 N.E.2d 1123 (1993). An issue of material fact exists when the relevant
{33} In Case No. 2014 CV 03294, the court sustained the motion of Appellees, the City of Trotwood and Quincy Pope, Sr., for judgment on the pleadings.
{34} A motion for judgment on the pleadings can be “characterized as a belated
{35} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to
{36} For a “trial court to dismiss a complaint under
{37} The “material facts are uncontroverted” in these cases. Appellants’ Br. 9. Because we agree with the trial court‘s conclusions of law regarding the constitutionality of the Ordinances, we find that the court did not err by sustaining Appellees’ motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.
B. Standing and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
{38} As a practical matter, our ruling on the constitutional validity of the Ordinances all but obviates the need to address the argument that some of the appellants lack standing to appeal from the trial court‘s decision. We agree, however, with the trial court‘s determination that those who received a notice of liability have standing to appeal, regardless of whether they paid or did not pay their civil penalties before commencing suit in the trial court. See, e.g., San Allen, Inc. v. Buehrer, 2014-Ohio-2071, 11 N.E.3d 739, ¶ 57-58 (8th Dist.).
III. Appellants’ Second Assignment of Error
{39} For their second assignment of error, Appellants contend that:
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES ON APPELLANTS’ UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS.
{40} Appellants base their claim of unjust enrichment on the argument that the Ordinances are facially unconstitutional. Appellants’ Br. 43. Because we have held that the Ordinances are not facially unconstitutional, we find that Appellants’ second assignment of error is moot.
IV. Conclusion
{41} The Ordinances bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental function, and they are neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. They provide an appropriate level of procedural due process guarantees in light of their purpose, the private interests at stake and the administrative and fiscal burdens that additional due process protections would impose on cities. Therefore, we overrule Appellants’ assignments of error and affirm the trial court‘s decision of August 8, 2016.
WELBAUM, J., concurs.
FROELICH, J., concurring:
{42} I would find that there are significant legal concerns involving some of the process provided, or not provided, to certain individuals who wish to contest a “notice of civil liability.” However, on this record, I concur that the trial court did not err in granting the motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings
Copies mailed to:
Joshua A. Engel
Michael K. Allen
Paul M. DeMarco
Thomas J. Manning
John C. Musto
Dawn M. Frick
David M. Shaver
Jeffrey C. Turner
Edward J. Dowd
Joshua R. Schierloh
Lori E. Denlinger
Quintin F. Lindsmith
James P. Schuck
Sommer L. Sheely
Stephen M. McHugh
Amelia N. Blankenship
Christopher R. Conard
Neil F. Freund
Kelly M. Schroeder
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz