*1 we conclude defendant owner’s Finally, property subject provisions concerning zoning are not rights Mu- newly citizen contained enacted housing senior Land Law. We therefore reverse nicipal judgment Use Division. Appellate Hughes, Mountain, Justices For reversal—Chief Justice and Judge and Schreiber Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford Conford—Y.
For affirmance—-None. PETITIONER-APPELLANT, PANZINO, v. CONTI- LOUIS COMPANY, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. NENTAL CAN September 29, Argued 23, 1976 1976. March Decided *3 Finn cause for appellant Mr. M. Jerry argued Firm, Goldberger, Siegel attorneys). (Messrs.
Mr. John cause for Taylor respondent. W. argued delivered of court was opinion occupational a claim for J. Petitioner filed Mountain, from his employment six hearing years retiring loss Compensa- with As the Workmen’s respondent corporation. written, per- exceeded span tion Act was then this time to be a claim was required within such period missible heard, however, was before claim filed. months his Two is- time limitation. The abrogated amendment amendment and thus before whether the applies sue us is claim. petitioner’s saves Panzino, Louis retired was that petitioner,
It stipulated 31, 1966; during March that respondent’s employ loud had been to his he employment exposed until loss. and had suffered binaural It was noise 54% em after the years summer of more than six late terminated, Panzino ployment that discovered that his hear loss filed ing was work-related. He his claim September statute, 1972. At that time the relevant limitations A. 34:15-34, that claims for provided compensable occu must be filed within two pational disability years employee’s last exposure the course of during employment, or within year one whichever discovery, was longer; that furthermore a claim would be “forever barred” unless within five presented years from date last exposure. statute,1 3, 1974, An amendment to this effective July eliminated all requirements except “that where a claimant knew the nature of the disability its relation to the must employment,” petition be filed “within after the date on which the first claimant had such . . .” This claimant’s was filed konwledge his within a month his that discovery hearing impairment work-related. was 12, 1974,
On ruled September Judge was entitled that Panzino that he came prevail, holding the favor the statutory within amendment. An award $4,320. entered in the sum of On appeal Appellate reversed. 135 N. Super. J. Division It held (1975). the amendment given only should be prospective ap- give it retrospective effect would be plication respondent’s impair vested bar impose the earlier time limitation. This Court granted certifica- 68 tion.
We first consider whether or not the enact- amendatory *4 have ment was intended to The retrospective operation. the Statement attached bill as introduced in Sponsor’s the read follows: Assembly as Occupational they often diseases are of an insidious such nature that years exposure do not evident become until to the cause thereof. by abrogating
This bill memorializes this fact the burdensome
1 L. c. 65. presently a claim arbitrary within which effect time restrictions easily lapse may filed, and which in fact must be prescribed, symptoms As disease are evident. here of before even years permitted after the within claimant be would a claim disability knowledge and its relation to of the nature actual employment. reveal in- that may legislative materials various theOf by is a statement instructive of the most tent, one act. of the sponsor legis- normally sponsor expressions reveal a of the bill of the [T]he by significant of a more revealed those than that lative intent more legisla- significant context, legislative In this casual adherent. [Dickerson, former.
tive intent well be the actual intent (1975)] Application Interpretation Statutes The spon- legislators bill, look to its on a In the course of deliberations having charge representatives of committee sor as well as to the it, expected particularly informed about well one to be as who meaning, recognition purpose, of this effect. In and intended its give reality practice, legislative statements courts consideration to sup- sponsor grounds by relied on those a bill’s similar to made charge port committeeman of statements made the use Statutory Sutherland, Construction [2A bill. Statutes 1973)] 48.15, (4th 221-22 ed. § here rather clearly identifies statement sponsor’s restrictions Existing corrected. time mischief sought “burdensome” have been found to be claims initiating upon their very revealed that by Experience “arbitrary.” often do not become manifest diseases nature occupational Kane decision in This Court’s after exposure. until years N. J. 552 identified (1962), Corp., v. Durotest There the limit. petitioner’s rigors she from which beryllium poisoning had contracted decedent aware of not, however, died. She did become ultimately until seven and disease one-half the existence Because this exceeded employ. respondent’s after leaving which such a claim was within required term five-year then, was barred. result seemed filed, to be her suit said, have now, unjust. been There we and seems
303 five-year prosecution If limitation of ac- operates occasionally harshly lengthening tion of is desirable, appeal change Legis- considered for such must tobe 556] J. at ture. relief afforded by new amendment can be seen as such an legislative response to appeal, intent signifying that claims for shall occupational disease if honored filed within two discovery.
Purther, been axiomatic that the Work long Act is to be construed. Torres liberally men’s 458, Trenton Times 64 N. Newspaper, 461 (1974); Co., Inc., Petrozzino v. Monroe Machine Calculating Bros., Close v. Kordulak 577, (1966); 44 N. J. mind, this in aware Bearing being the mischief to be remedied and sought always conscious purposes important the beneficent this social legisla tion, no we reason would perceive why Legislature place any have wished to greater upon the reach sensibly of the statute than can be drawn from language. its we conclude that the Accordingly enactment should be read to cover claimant files any who within two he years of date which learns the nature his dis his ability relation to employment. its course, Of to read the statute in way this sanctions peti- claim, unless, read, tioner’s as so uncon- enactment stitutional. The claim was filed within a month of Pan- — zino’s affliction which discovery his he had long — been conscious was Respondent work-related. argues our giving amendment this interpretation results an unconstitutional deprivation of its "vested right” take of the advantage statutory time limits in when effect the claim filed. to this According argument, respondent finds in this support Court’s decision State v. Standard Oil J.N. sub (1950), aff’d nom. Oil Standard Co. v. State New Jersey, 341 U. 71 S. Ct. L. Ed. 1078 (1951), respondent could not constitutionally be deprived to assert *6 forth in the in limitations set statute effect of the time
bar in fact took filed claim. filing his when petitioner 1972, which date the 14, by applicable on September place un- differently, somewhat already expired. had Stated defense be characterized rationale respondent’s this der a vested which could not lost right assertion of as the im- or intervention without judicial by either legislative Therefore, con- respondent guarantees. due process pairing was tends, fact that the statute amended after filed, could have hearing, was but before no effect claim statute; of right plead its vested to passage upon of right extinguished remedy petitioner’s time with it. action died on the to state challenge legislation
A constitutional
a
or
vested
destroys
right generally
it impairs
that
ground
clause
Eourteenth Amendment.
of the
due process
implicates
Rothman, 65 N.
219,
225 (1974).
v.
thman
Ro
of the United States considered such
Court
The Supreme
Donaldson,
Corporation
Chase
v.
in
Securities
challenge
a
1137,
constitutes vested which is ment. [5 N. J. 293] We do not choose accord this statement the compre- *7 hensive amplitude suggested by Rather we respondent. think it should be confined to the particular issue before the Court in ease, e., that i. the effect of lapse time a claim in upon sounding The contract. plaintiff’s claim in the case us contract; before does not from spring it ais born of right See N. statute. J. S. A. 34:15-30. We are satisfied that the Legislature, by virtue of the 1974 amendment, has simply the enlarged of this stat- availability utory to occupational by disease the five-year removing limitation period.
Because Panzino’s claim is so evidently grounded statute, the it cannot be characterized as deriving the contract of employment. The notion that such rights as this are contractual has hitherto been and considered emphatically rejected. ring The hollowness of of “contract” becomes obvious when we tap against binding it fact that Act became
upon employers employees employment and whose contracts ante- * ** adoption act, and, injury, dated until least parties by changes are bound even radical and substantive the act entry employment made after into contract. analogy handy analysis to contract is often a aid of a specific problem, just paper as tube sometimes be an aid hearing, accurately rights “contract” no but more describes the employer employee Compensa- duties of an under the Workmen’s paper tion Act than a tube corrects [McAllister deafness. v. Board
306 1963), aff’d, Super. (App. 249, Kearny, 260 Div. N. J. 79 Ed. of (1964)] J.N. recalling by take is strengthened we today position time requirements have treated our' courts in which
manner have They Act. the Workmen’s Compensation forth in set limitation, but ordinary as statutes considered been not In action. agency prerequisites jurisdictional rather as Com of the Workmen’s jurisdiction invoke the order Division, necessary as show been pensation as to span filed within the the petition em arose out of and in the course of injury show Dock Federal Shipbuilding Dry Schwarz v. ployment. Co., 16 N. J. 248 (1954). year jurisdictional fact, filing is a claim within a [T]ke limitations, plead complainant calls statute of not what enjoined might equity.
ing might or in a of which court of Co., Supply Eq. 444, (Ch. Electric [Miller Beller 1927)] State, N. J. Super. Davis v. 441-42 See also (App. Co., v. American Cyanamid Div. Riccioni 26 N. J. 1957); 1, 5 Super. Div.), certif. den. 13 N. J. 289 (App. (1953); Valentine v. Walter & Kidde L. 1947). Ct. (Sup. then, defense, was not bar avail made
Respondent’s limitations, but a statute rather the Compensa able *8 jurisdiction. Thus it can logically Court’s lack be tion amendment the 1974 does not revive expired said that claim; it merely enlarges jurisdiction. instead agency’s be claimed successfully could not at the the suit What time at the permissible was filed become time the was case of jurisdiction defense lack no ex heard longer sought a bar to the relief as petitioner. isted is, our conclusion It that the amend- accordingly, ment under consideration must be interpreted retroactively above, and as described that as so construed must be sustained. The of the judgment Appellate Division is re- Com- of the Division of Workmen’s and the judgment versed is reinstated. pensation Louis Panzino Petitioner was
Schreiber, J. (dissenting). on noise hazard March respondent’s last exposed was “forever for workmen’s compensation 1966. His claim A. N. J. S. five on March years later 1971. barred” on a bar, he filed claim' Despite petition 34 :15-34.1 on come Concededly 1972. if the matter had September for would have dis time, at that been hearing petition missed. A. statute, 34:15-34, amended, effective 3,-1974, eliminate the five limitation
July year period.2 July 3, 1974, part 1 Prior N. J. S. A. read in as fol 34:15-34 : lows * * * * * * * any Notwithstanding provision of this set section hereinabove forth, compensation compensable occupational all claims for for petition disease hereunder shall be forever barred unless duplicate secretary compensation filed in with the of the workmen’s Trenton, years bureau in within five after the date on which the employee exposed employment ceased to in the course of with be employer occupational disease; provided, however, to such employee paid compensa- in the of death event of an who has been compensable occupational disease, tion on account of a dependents, 34:15-13g on behalf of as defined in section Statutes, timely years if Revised shall be filed within two payment employee notwithstanding the date of last to the such years any part beyond or two thereof extends the five- year period hereinabove set forth. July 3, 1974, 2On and after the amended act read: Notwithstanding filing time limitation for of claims for compensation 34:15-51, set as forth in sections 34:15-41 and or any Title, as set forth in other section of this there shall no upon filing compensation claims for compensable occupational disease, defined; provided, as hereinabove however, that disability where claimant knew the nature of the employment, its relation to all claims for compensable occupational peti- disease shall be barred unless a duplicate secretary tion is filed with the of the division in Trenton within 2 after the date which the claimant first provided knowledge; further, had such agreement in case an *9 awarded and was compen his case Then moved petitioner for the essentially Division reversed The sation. Appellate becanse right a vested possessed the respondent reason that at claim extinguished petitioner’s year five bar N. J. Super. March 1971. 135 end of I agree. aff’d (1950), 5 N. J. 381 Oil Standard
In State 341 U. S. Jersey, v. New Oil Co. sub nom. Standard Court Supreme onr (1951), L. Ed. 1078 Ct. : enunciated
without an 295], defense moral being put son, property difference between the died or spare right impairment. ** [*] We contracts. The Mr. Justice Jackson remedy merely right, generally * principle. supra, the destruction of of action has become the courts obligation conceive the disappeared, constitutes under [*] to his defense after memories for a independent principle such accepted The statute of a sufficient statute statutes abrogation hj* and does not New a and evidence has been lost.” While it is vested at litigation vesting without rule that a statute of this class consideration. embedded in Chase Securities Jersey 293]. of this only “are barred under [*] remedy right limitations is one a in the rule to be practical class and its rights extinguish remedy in our stale remedy reduces the Our rule ^ law to real and claims, jurisprudence have is mere is existing grounded is proof against Corporation sustain operation equally faded, perceives pragmatic [*] right, and the citizen “right” law, tangible personal shadow, repose. in sound reason witnesses a a that where new as no violation would operates [*] to mere v. Donald- devices legislative a has been essential As promise a defense [id. from seem have said a [*] to confine the in the majority seeks Standard principle Oil case to contract that the petitioner’s claims asserts compensable occupational compensation for has been disease employer claimant, employee’s such made between such then an compensation shall be barred claim unless com- duly pensation secretary years filed with such within after employer payment pursuant the failure of the to make terms part agreement; or such in case paid by employer, such been then within 2 last compensation. payment of
309 contract; "claim in before us the ease does spring is a born of statute.” There are two (at 305). right Eirst, in difficulties this the position. right compensation In Cureton benefits out of the contract. employment arises Co., v. Joma & Plumbing Heating 326 (1962), Proctor Justice for unanimous court stated: writing compensation The workman’s to the benefits which he has employment contract, “earned” comes from his whose include terms provisions Amsterdam Workmen’s Act. New the Casualty Popovich, (1955). Co. v. N. J. 331]. N. J. at Co., In Heldrich v. L. American Incubator N. J. Mfg. the (1928), Court wrote: Supreme * * * compensation upon The whole of scheme workmen’s rests employer employee whereby voluntarily contractual basis and enter relationship carrying rights into a with it certain and certain ob- ligations. rights obligations to, necessarily agreed These and are limine, relationship when the of master and servant first arises. [104 N. J. L. 495]. The statutory for compensation provisions personal injuries are only when applicable employer employee agree accept statutory provisions in the employment agreement. . J. S. A. 34:15-7.3 N In the absence such an agreement, if employer’s based on responsibility, any, is S. A. 34:15-1. negligence. 3 N. J. A. 34:15-7 reads: by express employer employee agreement, When shall either accept implied, provided, provisions or as hereinafter of this injuries personal to, of, article for or for the death employee arising by such employment out of and in accident the course of his employer regard shall be made without
negligence employer, according to the schedule contained except sections 34:15-12 and in all 34:15-13 this title cases injury intentionally self-inflicted, when the or death is or when proximate injury, intoxication is the natural cause of and the proof upon employer. burden of of such fact shall be
310' fixed in the field, the time
Second, in passage the tort cause of action vests of limitations bars the statute Bethlehem, Burns v. non-liability. defendant’s privilege The Workmen’s Compensa Steel J.N. injuries remedy personal one replaced tion Act vesting upon another. general principle To eliminate cause because the fixed expiration statutorily common of in the of action embodied in statute instead is pay law to to form. homage *11 Com in Workmen’s the limitation rationale that The the have does not and therefore jurisdictional Act pensation is ais distinction of limitations a same effect as statute the barred be action is both, cause of In the without difference. time period. determined a legislatively cause of the passage are not concepts and statute of Jurisdictional However, in result vesting. Both may exclusive. mutually absolute for is lack of jurisdiction due to the effect vesting. v. De Asio be waived. not may absence of jurisdiction the den. certif. Div.), (App. 62 N. Bayonne, J. Super. American, Co., Gyanamid Riccioni v. N. J. 386 (1960); N. J. 289 den. 26 N. certif. Div.), J. Super. (App. limitations due to the statute vesting Since would appear charged, be waived to be party leads to in jurisdiction the issue terms of casting more constant effect. vesting of vesting rule Jersey Few which policies support proceed- workmen’s compensation
are to equally applicable Eirst, rule. there support Three reasons ings. primary determinations namely, prevent is the to evidentiary purpose, have when of factual after the event memories issues long ' and documents faded, or disappeared, witnesses have died — lost. to assure a certainty potential is personal Second will after a subject liability defendant he specified not the work- period of time. This particularly pertinent in insurance rates men’s field where the premium A. adjusted are on the basis of 34:15- experience. Third, 89. there is equitable policy discourage claimants from on their sleeping rights.
Other
jurisdictions
have considered the problem
em
retroactivity have
interest of the
recognized
vested
E. Horn &
In Overmiller D.
191 Pa.
ployer.
Super.
562,
In Pendzich v. Industrial 11 Wis. 2d N. W. 2d 781 a claim for occupa filed (1960), employee tional deafness six and six after an injury. months court him held that barred six-year statute of limitations An all compensation. statute, intervening requiring cases of occupational deafness until after delay application they been removed from the noise of employment months, six did not apply to because plaintiff yet statute effect the six-month during following claimant’s last work. day
In the field, Lawson’s Workmen’s leading treatise Law, 78.80 fol- there (1976), appears § lowing comment: *12 Finally, changing be noted that amendments periods applied generally retroactively,
limitations are whether improve change the effect of the would be to or worsen the claimant’s position. 15-209; [Id. omitted]. footnotes if the contention Alternatively, rejected, vesting retro- does not follow. well activity automatically It is settled that a statute will not be retroactive effect given unless terms its clear, are “so and no strong imperative that other meaning them, can be annexed to or unless intent legislature otherwise be Kopczynski cannot satisfied.” v. County of Camden, 2 419, N. (1949). The source of this par Heth, ticular United expression is States v. 7 U. S. (3 L. Ed. Paterson 399, where Justice (1806) Cranch) went on to note that: * * * to, especially ought con when such to be adhered rule This parties, pre-existing affect or will situation struction will alter the remuneration; services, rights, and or interfere with their antecedent uphold obviously improper, nothing ought that
which so unequivocal im interpretation, but inflexible vindicate the port legislature. terms, manifest intention of the 412-413; 483-484], S. at 2 L. Ed. at U. to Assembly Statement Sponsor’s language J. A. as the amendment 1236, Bill which was enacted clear, 34:15-34, strong imperative not contain the does application. would admit of retroactive only that language Rothman, Rothman v. 65 reads: Statement Occupational [sic] an insideous nature diseases are often of such exposure they years do evident until after
that not become abrogating by fact thereof. This bill memorializes this cause presently arbitrary in effect within time restrictions burdensome and filed, and which in fact a claim must be which may easily lapse symptoms of disease are evident. before even the permitted years prescribed, would be within after As here claim knowledge disability nature had actual of the the claimant employment. and its relation to fact claim would be The reference to the per- “[A] mitted within 2 after the claimant years knowledge” and time of discovery relation between time expresses a without either event to the date filing relating passage of the amendment. contain
Further the amendment itself does not language retroactivity. intent clearly expresses legislative In amendment reads: pertinent part the * * * * * * * * * provided no there shall be * * disability *, all where knew the nature of the claims a claimant * * * shall he barred unless a is filed within * knowledge *. on which the claimant had such date first 1; emphasis 34:15-34, A. L. c. [N. § J. S. as amended supplied]. *13 — words “shall be” future connotation express Fern, what must See Cassan happen now on. v.
N. J. Super. 96, Hannan v. Em 1954); Div. (Law Commercial Union ployers Super. 485, Ins. 117 N. J. Terracciona v. 53 N. J. Magee, 488-489 Div. 1971); (Law act be Super. 557, Ct. 1959). Accordingly, (Cty. or after interpreted only to to claims arise on apply with the effective tense re past date. use Although to be spect disability may the claimant’s con knowledge sistent with a retroactive the language interpretation, reasonably amendment be read to compel cannot Moreover, when the retroactivity. understanding Legis lature intended Workmen’s retroactivity Compensa has Act J. amendments, tion said so. N. it See expressly S. A. example may Another be 34:15-95(d). found N. J. amendment S. A. 34:15-95 which provided payments permanent disability whose total employees was due in to a part cause. The non-compensable Legisla ture provided act shall be retroactive as touching any “[t]his accident since a date. c. occurring” previous L. § 3. In the 1947 military amendment former concerning per sonnel who were subsistence receiving governmental pay ments while the act injured job, expressly applied accidents A. 34:15- occurring July 1946. 12.5. bolster the strained of' the attempt interpretation
statute reference to the known axiom well Work- men’s Act is to mis- Compensation liberally construed is That placed. principle not be used to extend the should Workmen’s Division’s limits. Compensation jurisdictional Our courts have heretofore this Justice recognized limitation. Case in Pierson National Corp., Fire L. Proofing Ct. (Sup. wrote: 1937) Finally, argued the Workmen's Aot is a liberally remedial statute and should be construed. courts Our have * * * ; every question held so but that does not mean that of suf- argument ficient doubt to warrant is to be resolved in favor of the *14 jurisdiction, is to invoke the his claimant even when dispute. claimant, say, [117 N. J. L. the nub of his status as a is 603].
at Motor J. 341 Ford Nagy Heher Justice wrote: (1951) juris- Its Bureau creature the statute. is a limited, special is reasonable doubt where there diction is * * * power particular power, is denied.
of the existence of a * * n * jurisdictional established, compensa- facts must compliance 349]. tion afforded full with statute. con- employer creating responsibility Retroactively liability. of its primary stitutes enlargement intent of a clear legislative This effected in absence reasons justify and conflicts with the unrefuted putting such claims to rest. Division. judgment
I would affirm the Appellate Mountain, Hughes, For reversal—Chief Justice Justices Sullivan, Confoed—6. Pashman Cliffoed and Judge
For Scheeibee—1. affirmance—Justice NEWARK, THE CITY A HOUSING AUTHORITY OF OF POLITIC, BODY CORPORATE AND PLAINTIFF-RESPON- DENT, v. NORFOLK REALTY DAVIS COMPANY AND CO., INC., WHITE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. Argued May 24, 1976 Decided October 1976.