Robert Troy WARRINER, Jr., by his guardian ad litems R. Troy Warriner, Sr. and Teresa Warriner; R. Troy Warriner, Sr.; Teresa Warriner, individually, Appellants v. Robert P. STANTON, M.D.; Alfred I. DuPont Hospital for Children of the De Nemours Foundation a/k/a Alfred I. DuPont Hospital for Children; Alfred I. DuPont Institute of the Nemours Foundation; The Nemours Foundation, Inc.
No. 05-3435.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Sept. 11, 2006. Filed Jan. 18, 2007.
497
Andrew R. Rogoff, (Argued), Pepper Hamilton, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court for the District of New Jersey granting the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment in a diversity action. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the District Court erred in its choice of law analysis. Applying New Jersey‘s “governmental interest” test, which requires a court to consider the nature and magnitude of each state‘s interest in having its law govern a particular issue, the District Court concluded Delaware had a stronger interest than New Jersey in seeing its tort statute of limitations applied to the medical malpractice claim in this case. Consequently, it dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as time-barred under the Delaware statute. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Robert Troy Warriner, Jr., a New Jersey resident, was born in 1989 with a physical deformity called talipes equinovarus, more commonly known as “club foot.” This condition was first diagnosed twelve days after Warriner‘s birth by physician Robert Stanton, a specialist in pediatric orthopedic surgery at the Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children (“DuPont Children‘s Hospital“) in Wilmington, Delaware. DuPont Children‘s Hospital is owned by The Nemours Foundation, Inc. (“Nemours“).1 Over the next several years, between 1989 and 1996, Warriner underwent multiple corrective surgeries performed by Dr. Stanton at DuPont Children‘s Hospital. Warriner‘s suit centers on a final surgery performed in December of 1996. That surgery involved a procedure called “bilateral tibia and fibula anterior closing wedge osteotomies,” which Warriner‘s parents believed would allow Warriner to walk independently. The Warriners allege the surgery was “inappropriately designed” and resulted in an overcorrection that further hampered their son‘s ability to walk. In the aftermath, Warriner has undergone additional surgeries and physical therapy.
In January of 2003, Warriner, by guardians ad litem, filed a complaint for medical malpractice in New Jersey state court against Dr. Stanton and his employer, Nemours. Dr. Stanton was dismissed from the case by agreement of the parties. Nemours removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the case was barred by Delaware‘s tort statute of limitations. The parties entered into a stipulation of undisputed facts to aid the District Court in determining whether New Jersey‘s or Delaware‘s statute of limitations should apply. That stipulation established the following additional facts. In 1995, Dr. Stanton became licensed in New Jersey at the instruction of his employer Nemours in order to facilitate payments from the State of New Jersey for treatment rendered to New Jersey residents. Dr. Stanton continues to be licensed in New Jersey and, in order to maintain his license, he takes continuing education classes each year. Nemours continues to pay Dr. Stanton‘s annual renewal fees and he last renewed his license in 2003.
* The Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Analyzing the choice of law issue under New Jersey‘s governmental interest test, the District Court determined that Delaware law was applicable and that, as a result, Warriner‘s claims were time-barred under Delaware‘s tort statute of limitations. The District Court reasoned that New Jersey‘s primary interest in the case arose out of Warriner‘s New Jersey residence, and that that interest was greatly attenuated because New Jersey had no connection to the events and conduct giving rise to the lawsuit. By contrast, the District Court observed that all of the events and conduct giving rise to the litigation occurred in Delaware, and Delaware had a strong, clearly stated policy interest in protecting its health care providers through its statute of limitations. In addition, it rejected Warriner‘s argument that New Jersey‘s statute of limitations and its minor tolling provision should apply because Dr. Stanton retained a New Jersey medical license and was affiliated with a pediatric practice in New Jersey. It observed that Dr. Stanton was not licensed in New Jersey at the time the Warriners began seeing him in Delaware, and he did not see any patients in New Jersey until nearly two years after the alleged negligent surgery in this case. The District Court concluded that Delaware‘s strong governmental interest in seeing its law applied to torts alleged to have occurred within its borders, committed by physicians practicing within those borders, predominated and granted defendant‘s motion for summary judgment.
Warriner filed a timely appeal.
II. Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Plaintiffs initially filed an action in New Jersey state court. Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard the district court was required to use initially. Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir.1990). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
III. Discussion
A. New Jersey‘s Governmental Interest Test
It is well established that in a diversity action, a district court must apply
Factors drawn from § 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law (1971) guide New Jersey courts in applying the governmental interest test in tort cases. See Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 733 A.2d 1133, 1140-41 (1999). Those factors are grouped as follows: “(1) the interests of interstate comity; (2) the interests of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the field of tort law; (4) the interests of judicial administration; and (5) the competing interests of the states.” Id. The most important of those factors in the context of a tort claim is the competing interests of the states. Id. at 1141. As discussed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Fu, the initial focus “should be on what policies the legislature or court intended to protect by having that law apply to wholly domestic concerns, and then, whether these concerns will be furthered by applying that law to the multi-state situation.” Id.
Fu also provides guidance in approaching the other four factors. First and foremost, in evaluating the competing interests of the states and interstate comity, “the most significant factor[s] in the tort field,” id. at 1142, a court must consider “whether application of a competing state‘s law would frustrate the policies of other interested states.” Id. at 1141. Second, in considering the goals of tort law, a court should measure “the degree to which deterrence and compensation, the fundamental goals of tort law, would be furthered by the application of a state‘s local law....” Id. However, “because every tort rule, to some extent, is designed both to deter and to compensate, it is necessary to evaluate on a case-by-case basis the relative weight of those underlying purposes with respect to a specific rule.” Id. The remaining two factors—the interests of the parties and judicial administration—are much less significant in the analysis. Erny, 792 A.2d at 1217. “The protection of the parties’ justified expectations, a factor of extreme im-
The governmental interest inquiry proceeds in two steps. The first step involves determining whether an actual conflict of law exists between the states involved, Veazey, 510 A.2d at 1189, because “where the application of either state‘s law would yield the same result, no conflict exists to be resolved.” High v. Balun, 943 F.2d 323, 325 (3d Cir.1991). In this case, the parties do not dispute that an actual conflict of law exists. The District Court was faced with the election of a statute of limitations from two possible options—Delaware‘s statute of limitations, under which plaintiff‘s claim was time-barred, or New Jersey‘s statute of limitations, under which the claim was not time-barred because of a tolling provision that preserves a minor plaintiff‘s claim until the minor reaches the age of eighteen. Since there is no question in this case that an actual conflict exists, we devote our analysis to the second element of the governmental interest inquiry which requires that we “identify the governmental policies underlying the law of each state and how those policies are affected by each state‘s contacts to the litigation and to the parties.” Veazey, 510 A.2d at 1189.
B. Policy Interests Underlying Each State‘s Statute of Limitation
Looking at the policies that underlie the respective state statutes of limitation that are in conflict in this case, we find that the District Court correctly identified the relevant policy concerns of both New Jersey and Delaware. With respect to the New Jersey statute, we have consistently “identified New Jersey‘s policies in a tort context as consisting primarily of compensation and deterrence.” Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493, 496 (3d Cir.1978). In addition, the New Jersey statute of limitations,
We can assume Delaware‘s statute of limitations,
C. Relevant Contacts and their Relationship to the Policy Interests of Each State
Having identified the governmental policies underlying each state‘s statutes of limitation, we must next determine “how those policies are affected by each state‘s contacts to the litigation and to the parties.” Veazey, 510 A.2d at 1189. “[I]f a state‘s contacts [with the transaction] are not related to the policies underlying its law, then that state does not possess an interest in having its law apply.” Id. This part of the inquiry involves an examination of whether the states’ contacts to the litigation align with the policies identified. Erny, 792 A.2d at 1216.
In evaluating the contacts in a choice of law context, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement“) (1971). Fu, 733 A.2d at 1152 (“Thus, New Jersey now adheres to the method of analysis set forth in Restatement ....“). Section 145(2) of the Restatement sets forth a list of contacts that are the most pertinent to the governmental-interest test: these are (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any between the parties is centered. In this case, those contacts as stipulated by the parties are as follows:
- Warriner‘s alleged injury occurred in Delaware.
- Dr. Stanton‘s alleged tortious conduct occurred in Delaware.
- Warriner is domiciled in New Jersey; The Nemours foundation is in-
- Warriner‘s ten-year patient-doctor relationship with Dr. Stanton was based at DuPont Children‘s Hospital in Wilmington, Delaware. Dr. Stanton never treated Robert in New Jersey.
Apart from those contacts listed in § 145(2), two additional contacts exist between the parties and the respective states:
- Dr. Stanton became licensed in New Jersey in 1995 in order to facilitate collection of payments from New Jersey, one year prior to the alleged malpractice. He did not see patients in New Jersey until two years after the alleged malpractice.
- In 1997, the year following the accident, The Nemours Foundation entered into a pediatric partnership with AtlanticCare in Southern New Jersey. Dr. Stanton was a pediatric specialist employed at the partnership from September 1998 through May 2001. He was listed in a professional staff directory as an orthopedic specialist available for appointments in New Jersey.
Examining these respective contacts, we find the District Court did not err in concluding Delaware law applied. It correctly placed special emphasis in this case on the fact that all of the contact between Warriner and Dr. Stanton occurred in Delaware. In personal injury cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court has counseled that “the place where the injury occurred is a contact that, as to most issues, plays an important role in the selection of the state of the applicable law.” Fu, 733 A.2d at 1142 (quoting Restatement, § 145 cmt. e). Furthermore, it has explained that “[w]hen both conduct and injury occur in a single jurisdiction, with only ‘rare exceptions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied’ to determine an actor‘s liability.” Id. (quoting Restatement, § 145 cmt. d). This general rule is followed because “a state has an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there.” Id. In this case, both the allegedly tortious conduct and injury occurred in Delaware. In fact, Warriner‘s entire treatment history—beginning a mere twelve days after his birth and extending over nearly a decade was based in Delaware and undertaken by a Delaware doctor. Each of these contacts is relevant to Delaware‘s stated public policy of providing a finite period of time for medical malpractice claims to require plaintiffs to file timely claims, particularly when those injuries occur within the State of Delaware. Most importantly, considering the interests of interstate comity, it is apparent that the application of New Jersey‘s statute of limitations in this case would directly contravene Delaware‘s clearly articulated interest in shielding its health care providers from liability for a claim that, under its own considered judgment, expressed through its statute of limitations, is unquestionably stale. See Erny, 792 A.2d at 1217 (“When considering the interests of interstate comity, a court must determine whether application of a competing state‘s law would frustrate the policies of other interested states.“) (quoting Fu, 733 A.2d at 1141).
Furthermore, the fact that all the contacts occurring in this case were in Delaware takes on even greater significance considering that they were not fortuitous but rather intentionally initiated by the Warriners themselves. Id. (“The place of injury becomes less important where it is simply fortuitous.“). Warriner elected to
We agree with the Warriners that the fact that Dr. Stanton was licensed in New Jersey prior to the accident is relevant to New Jersey‘s public policy goals of deterring tortious conduct and providing compensation for victims of such conduct. However, as stipulated by the parties, Dr. Stanton‘s New Jersey license was obtained at the instruction of his employer in order to facilitate payments rather than for the purpose of practicing medicine in New Jersey. And while Dr. Stanton did eventually begin to see patients in New Jersey, it was not until two years after the date of the alleged malpractice involving Warriner. Placed in proper perspective, Dr. Stanton‘s limited contact with New Jersey at the time of Warriner‘s injury pales in comparison to the overwhelming number of contacts with Delaware in this case, and the exceedingly strong and clearly articulated public policy interest of Delaware in having its law apply to those contacts.
In addition, Delaware‘s statute of limitations, like all tort rules, also implicitly reflects a policy interest in deterring tortious conduct and providing compensation to injured victims, and Delaware‘s own judgment is on equal footing with New Jersey‘s as to how long its health care providers should be exposed to liability to adequately serve the goals of compensation and deterrence. Fu, 733 A.2d at 1141 (“Rules ... that deny liability are entitled to equal consideration in choice-of-law determinations as are rules imposing liability.“). On balance then, it was not erroneous for the District Court to accord relatively little significance to the fact that Dr. Stanton has been licensed in New Jersey.4
It is certainly true that New Jersey has a policy interest in safeguarding the welfare of minors and ensuring they are compensated for their injuries. And while we agree with Warriner that this interest is very substantial, we do not agree that this interest should in effect trump all other factors in the governmental interest analysis. Warriner suggests that the substantial weight New Jersey affords this particular interest is “confirmed by the overriding weight our courts ascribe to a child‘s New Jersey domicile and residency in the choice of law analysis.” Br. of Appellant, at 17 (quoting Black v. Walker, 295 N.J.Super. 244, 244, 684 A.2d 1011, 1017 (App.Div.1996)).
Finally, appellants rely heavily on our decision in Schum v. Bailey, supra, arguing it is virtually indistinguishable from the case before us and should therefore light our way. While Schum does in fact confirm “New Jersey‘s strong interest in protecting the compensation rights of its domiciliaries” as well as New Jersey‘s interest in deterring tortious conduct on the part of medical practitioners, Schum, 578 F.2d at 496-97, we agree with the District Court that it is distinguishable from the case before us.
In Schum, a New Jersey resident filed a medical malpractice claim against her New York physician for tortious conduct occurring in New York. All of the defendant‘s services, including the surgery at issue,
Thus, the key to understanding Schum and how it is distinguishable from the case before us is that in Schum, there was no true conflict between the policies of the states of New York and New Jersey. Id. at 497 (“[S]ince [the] record reveals no conflict between New York and New Jersey insofar as the application of their substantive laws is concerned, and since the record also reveals that New Jersey has a substantial interest in the application of its own law, we conclude that New Jersey, as an interested forum, would apply its own law of liability.“) (emphasis added).7 Schum merely reaffirms that “[i]f a strong state policy or interest will be neither fostered by applying that state‘s law, nor frustrated by the failure to apply it, it is highly unlikely that that state has any interest whatsoever in blanketing that particular issue with its law.” White v. Smith, 398 F.Supp. 130, 134 (D.N.J.1975). See also General Ceramics v. Firemen‘s Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 656 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A multistate conflict of laws exists only when contacts are distributed such that more than one state wants to regulate the case.“) (citations omitted). By contrast, in this case, as already discussed at length, there is a clear and substantial conflict between the concerns of New Jersey‘s and Delaware‘s law with respect to the statute-of-limitations issue. The outcome in this case, therefore, is not prescribed by Schum, as Warriner has so persistently argued before the District Court and our own Court.
IV. Conclusion
The District Court did not err in its application of New Jersey‘s governmental interest choice of law rule. Nearly all of the relevant contacts in this medical malpractice case occurred in Delaware—the allegedly tortious conduct, the injury, and a decade long course of treatment involving numerous trips to a physician based in Delaware and operating out of Delaware. In addition, Delaware has a clearly articulated policy interest in regulating malpractice claims through its statute of limitations. These factors overwhelmed any interest New Jersey had in this case by virtue of Warriner‘s status as a New Jersey resident and the defendant‘s limited professional connection to the state at the time of injury. Performing the balancing act required by the governmental interest test, the District Court did not err in determining that Delaware‘s statute of limitations applied to the claim in this case. It therefore did not err in concluding the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s opinion because New Jersey‘s interest in providing a right of action for compensation to its resident child in this case justifies application of New Jersey‘s statute of limitations.
In this instance, the majority does not assign sufficient weight to New Jersey‘s compensation interest. A review of the cases in New Jersey and in this circuit shows one consistent result: New Jersey‘s statute of limitations, when longer, is applied in lawsuits for injuries occurring in another state when brought in New Jersey by New Jersey residents. For example, in Warner v. Auberge Gray Rocks Inn, Ltee., 827 F.2d 938, 942 (3d Cir.1987), this court applied New Jersey‘s statute of limitations when a New Jersey resident sued a Canadian entity for an injury that occurred in Quebec. Quebec‘s one-year statute of limitations had run prior to the commencement of the suit and New Jersey‘s longer statute of limitations had not. Id. at 940. When applying New Jersey‘s statute of limitations, the court focused on New Jersey‘s significant interest in providing a right of compensation for its residents. See id. at 941-42. Likewise, in Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir.1978),8 this court applied New Jersey law when a New Jersey plaintiff brought an action against a New York doctor for malpractice alleged to have occurred in New York. See id. at 497. Because New York did not have an applicable discovery rule (relating to when the statute of limitations begins to run) and New Jersey did, application of New York‘s law, as in the instant case with Delaware‘s law, would have been fatal to plaintiff‘s claim. See id. at 484-85.
Similarly, in Pine v. Eli Lilly & Co., 201 N.J.Super. 186, 492 A.2d 1079 (App.Div.1985), the plaintiff‘s residence constituted the only contact with New Jersey. Notably, the plaintiff had established residence in New Jersey after discovering his potential claim would be time barred in New York. Id. at 1081-82. The court determined that New Jersey‘s interest in compensating its own domiciliaries was paramount and outweighed other governmental interests, even though the “‘factual contacts’ prong of the governmental interest test alone would require the ‘borrowing’ of New York‘s limitations statute[.]” Id. at 1083; see also Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173, 176, 177 (3d Cir.1986) (New Jersey‘s longer statute of limitations applied despite significant California contacts because of New Jersey‘s substantial interest in compensating its own domiciliaries).
Moreover, the majority exaggerates the impact on Delaware‘s interest in shielding health care providers from stale claims by focusing on Delaware‘s statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims rather than on the relevant tolling provisions applicable to the claims of minors. Both Delaware and New Jersey have expressed
In this case, also, Stanton and the hospital parties maintained sufficient contacts with New Jersey residents to create an expectation that they might be subject to New Jersey laws. Notably, Stanton held a license to practice medicine in New Jersey at the time of the injury. The majority attempts to minimize these contacts by explaining that Stanton held a license only for the purpose of collecting payments from the state of New Jersey for medical treatments for New Jersey patients. Yet, this reason for Stanton‘s contacts does not diminish them.
Of particular concern is that the alleged malpractice in this case happened to a child. Both Delaware and New Jersey, by tolling their statutes of limitations as applied to minors, have expressed a policy to permit children an extended opportunity to recover for their injuries. Here, this policy expressed by both states requires a conclusion asserting the primacy of the longer New Jersey statute of limitations to protect the rights of the injured child.