A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist.
208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- A.M., a minor, alleged that fellow students sexually abused her at a Ventura elementary school in 2012–2013; her mother D.G. reported the incidents to school staff who allegedly did nothing to stop them.
- Appellant sued Ventura Unified School District, principal Tapia, and teacher Fields for negligent supervision and related claims; non-sexual common-law claims were dismissed for failure to file a government tort claim.
- Appellant did not present a tort claim to the District (she presented a claim to Ventura County, which rejected it); respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that she failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act claim-presentation requirement.
- Appellant conceded she did not file a tort claim but argued she was exempt under Gov. Code §905(m) because her action is a childhood sexual abuse claim governed by CCP §340.1, which removes the claim-presentation prerequisite for such claims arising on or after Jan 1, 2009.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, holding §905(m)/§340.1 applied only when the alleged perpetrator was an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent of the public entity.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding §340.1(a)(2) governs third-party liability claims like this one and §905(m) therefore exempts appellant from the government claim-presentation requirement for her childhood sexual abuse claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gov. Code §905(m) exempts childhood sexual-abuse claims from the government tort-claim presentation requirement | §905(m) applies because appellant’s claims arise under CCP §340.1 for childhood sexual abuse occurring after Jan 1, 2009 | §905(m)/§340.1 do not apply because §340.1(a)(2) and the §340.1(b)(2) revival language only apply when the perpetrator is an employee/volunteer/agent of the public entity | Held: §340.1(a)(2) applies to third-party defendants generally; §905(m) exempts appellant’s §340.1 childhood sexual-abuse claims from claim presentation. |
| Whether §340.1(a)(2) requires the perpetrator be an employee/agent of the defendant entity | §340.1(a)(2) covers liability of any person or entity who owed a duty of care and whose wrongful/negligent act was a legal cause of the abuse | §340.1 should be read to limit third-party recovery to situations where the abuse was committed by an employee/agent; otherwise §340.1(b)(2) would be meaningless | Held: The statute does not read §340.1(a)(2) as limited to employee/agent perpetrators; subdivision (b)(2) creates a narrow exception extending the age cutoff only for third-party defendants who had notice of unlawful sexual conduct by an employee/agent. |
| Whether appellant needed to plead she invoked §340.1 to rely on its statute-of-limitations protection | Appellant pleaded facts showing childhood sexual abuse discoverable before age 26, sufficient to invoke §340.1 for summary judgment purposes | Respondents argued she did not expressly allege §340.1 and cannot assert it first on summary judgment | Held: Allegations of facts bringing the claim within §340.1 are sufficient; plaintiff need not label the statute in the complaint to rely on it at summary judgment. |
| Whether §340.1 applies to minors who discover abuse before age 18 | §340.1 governs actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, regardless of whether discovery occurs in minority | Respondents argued §340.1 was intended mainly for adults and does not apply to minors | Held: §340.1 applies where claims are brought before age 26; nothing excludes minors who timely file under that provision. |
Key Cases Cited
- Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201 (public entity claim-presentation requirement is a condition precedent; pre-§905(m) rule requiring timely claim for childhood sexual-abuse suits against school districts)
- Quarry v. Doe I, 53 Cal.4th 945 (interpretation of §340.1 and legislative changes limiting/expanding coverage for third-party defendants)
- Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.4th 531 (§340.1(b)(2) extends the limitations period past age 26 for certain nonperpetrator defendants with notice of employee/agent misconduct)
- County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 127 Cal.App.4th 1263 (discussion of §340.1 as a special statute of limitations for childhood sexual-abuse claims and interaction with claim-presentation rules)