1550 LAUREL OWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; STEPHEN MUNSHI, Real Party in Interest.
B288091
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
November 7, 2018
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. BS170721/16K12189
Law Offices of Joseph C. Watson and Joseph C. Watson for Petitioner.
Duane Morris and Michael L. Fox for Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
The Kneafsey Firm, Sean M. Kneafsey and Kurt A. Dreibholz for Real Party in Interest.
Law Office of Jon B. Eisenberg and Jon B. Eisenberg; Susan Brandt-Hawley, John A. Taylor, Michael G. Colantuono, Dennis A. Fischer, Robert S. Gerstein, Rex Heinke, Laurie J. Hepler, Robin B. Johansen, Robin Meadow and Richard A. Rothschild for California Academy of Appellate Lawyers as Amicus Curiae.
Petitioner 1550 Laurel Owner’s Association, Inc. (the Association), the plaintiff below, seeks a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order—which granted a petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to rule on the merits of a special motion to strike (
The essential issue presented is whether a special motion to strike may be brought in a limited civil case. Section 92 enumerates permissible pleadings and motions in limited civil cases. At subdivision (d), it provides that “[m]otions to strike are allowed only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Italics
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2016, the Association filed a limited civil case against Munshi for breach of a settlement agreement.
Munshi filed a special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16, contending that the Association’s claims arose out of his protected petitioning activity, and that the Association could not prevail on its claims. In opposition, the Association contended, inter alia, that the special motion to strike violated section 92(d), which states that in a limited civil case, “[m]otions to strike are allowed only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.”
The trial court denied Munshi’s speсial motion to strike, concluding that a special motion to strike is not permitted in a limited civil case.
The Association then petitioned this court for a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order. On April 10, 2018, we ordered a stay of trial court proceedings and issued an order to show cause why the Association’s petition should not be granted.3
The sole issue before us is whether a special motion to strike may be brought in a limited civil case.
I. Principles of Statutory Interрretation; Standard of Review
In determining whether special motions to strike are cognizable in limited civil cases, we apply well-established rules of statutory interpretation. ” ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) We begin by examining the statutory language because the words of a statute are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (People v. Watson (2007) 42 Cal.4th 822, 828; Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their statutory context. (People v. Watson, supra, at p. 828.) We harmonize the various parts of the enactment by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975; Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487.) ‘If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further.’ (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503, 508.)” (In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100.) ” ‘Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statutе.’ (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.)” (Shorts v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 709, 720.)
The meaning and construction of a statute is a question of law, which we examine de novo. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432; Nist v. Hall (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 40, 45.)
A. Overview of Procedural Rules Governing Limited Civil Cases
A limited civil case includes “[a] case at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less.” (
“(a) The pleadings allowed are complaints, answers, cross-complaints, answers to cross-complaints and general demurrers.
“(b) The answer need not be verified, even if the complaint or cross-complaint is verified.
“(c) Special demurrers are not allowed.
“(d) Motions to strike are allowed only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.
“(e) Except as limited by this section, all other motions are permitted.” (Italics added.)
B. The Appellate Division’s Analysis of Section 92(d)
The issue before us turns on the interprеtation of section 92(d), and specifically whether a special motion to strike brought pursuant to section 425.16 is a “motion to strike” within the meaning of section 92(d).
The appellate division concluded: “In subdivision (a) of the anti-SLAPP statute, the Legislature expressed its intent to curb a ‘disturbing increase in lawsuits’ brought to chill First Amendment rights and rights to petition. In that same provision, it mandated the anti-SLAPP legislation be ‘construed broadly’ to serve this purpose. Given this compelling language, and the absence of anti-SLAPP stаtutes when section 92 was passed, we harmonize the provisions and hold that section 92 does not bar a defendant to a limited civil complaint from moving to strike a cause of action on the ground that it violates section 425.16.”
The appellate division properly recognized that there are significant differences between the motions permitted by sections 435 and 436, and section 425.16. Section 435 provides that any party may serve and file a motion to strike the whole or any part of a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint. (
Section 425.16, in contrast, provides that a cause of action against a person is “subject to a special motion to strike” if it “aris[es] from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
The question before us, however, is not whether there are substantive differences among the various types of motions to strike, but rather whether the Legislature intended that section 92(d)’s limitation on the type of motions to strike that may be filed in limited civil cases would apply to special motions to strike under section 425.16. We now turn to that issue.
C. Section 92(d)’s Limitation on Motions to Strike That are Allowed in a Limited Civil Case Precludes a Special Motion to Strike Under Section 425.16
As originally enactеd in 1982, section 92, within the article entitled “Economic Litigation for Municipal and Justice Courts,” stated in relevant part: “(d) Motions to strike under Section 453
The following year, section 92 was amended to its current form, so as to permit motions to strike “only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supportеd by the allegations of the complaint.” (Stats. 1983, ch. 102, § 2.)6
Thus, in 1992, at the time the Legislature enacted section 425.16 authorizing special motions to strike, section 92(d) was already in place so as to bar motions to strike in limited civil actions except for motions to strike that are brought “on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (§ 92(d).) Under its plain meaning, section 92(d), by permitting only a particular type of motion to strike to be brought in a limited civil case, disallows all other motions to strike, including special motions to strike. The enactment of section 425.16, authorizing anti-SLAPP motions,
The Legislature “is presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it passes or amends a statute. [Citations.]” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 407.) Therefore, the Legislature was aware of section 92(d) at the time it enacted section 425.16. Had the Legislature intended to modify section 92(d) at that time to allow sрecial motions to strike in limited civil cases, it would have so specified. (See, e.g. People v. Albillar (2013) 51 Cal.4th 47, 56 [“The Legislature clearly knew how to draft language limiting the nature of the [conduct addressed by the statute] and could have included such language had it desired to so limit the [statute’s] reach“].)
Recent enactments affecting motions to strike and motions for judgment on the pleadings, specifically excluding their application to special motions to strike under section 425.16, demonstrate that the Legislature knows how to specify when a statutory provision does not apply to a special motion to strike. For example, section 435.5, which imposes a meet and confer requirement before the filing of a motion to strike, states at subdivision (d)(3) that it does not apply to a special motion to strike brought pursuant to section 425.16. (Stats. 2017, ch. 273, § 1.) Similarly, section 439, which imposes a meet and confer
The Legislature’s approach to appeals from orders granting or denying special motions to strike is also instructive. In 1999, section 425.16 and section 904.1 werе amended to “provide that an appeal may be taken directly from an order granting or denying such a special motion to strike to the court of appeal, as specified.” (Stats. 1999, ch. 960, Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1675 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) Subdivision (i) of section 425.16 now states that “[a]n order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under Section 904.1,” and consistent therewith, section 904.1, subdivision (a)(13) provides that in an unlimited civil case, such an order may be appealed to the Court of Appeal. However, nothing in section 425.16 provides for an order on an anti-SLAPP
The absence of a statutory provision for an immediate appeal of an anti-SLAPP ruling in a limited civil case is significant for an additional reason. As the court observed in Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977 (Grewal): ” ’ [W]hat use is a mechanism to allow you to gеt out of a case early if it is undercut by an erroneous decision of the trial judge? The point of the anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a right not to be dragged through the courts because you exercised your constitutional rights. The right to appeal a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is important because it protects the interest validated by the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 1003.) Thus, without a statutory right to an immediate appeal of an anti-SLAPP ruling, any right
Further, the appellate division’s conclusion that a special motion to strike is not a motion to strike governed by section 92(d) is at odds with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376. Baral addressed mixed causes of action, i.e., causes of action that allege both protected and unprotected activity, and it concluded that section 425.16 may be used to strike discrete allegations of protected activity within a cause of action, without striking an entire cause of action. (1 Cal.5th at pp. 381–382.) Baral explained: “[T]he Legislature’s choice of the term ‘motion to strike’ reflects the understanding that an anti-SLAPP motion, like a conventional motion to strike, may be used to attack parts of a count as pleaded. (
Accordingly, Baral teaches that the drafters of section 425.16, in devising special motions to strike, were well aware that motions to strike are a way of attacking particular allegations within a pleading. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 393–394.) Further, as we have indicated, the Legislature “is presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it passes or amends a statute. [Citations.]” (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 407.) Thus, the Legislature was mindful of section 92(d)’s restriction on motions to strike in limited civil cases at the time it enacted section 425.16. Nonetheless, the Legislature did not insert language in section 425.16 to override section 92(d), nоr did it amend section 92(d) to broaden the scope of allowable motions to strike in limited civil cases.
It is for the Legislature, not the courts, to define the circumstances in which an anti-SLAPP motion be brought. (Urick v. Urick (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1182, 1195.) Section 425.16, subdivision (d), and section 425.17 set forth various actions to which section 425.16 does not apply. However, given that section 92(d)’s broad restriction on motions to strike in limited civil cases was already in place at the time section 425.16 was adopted, it was unnecessary for the Legislature tо add language to section 92(d) or to section 425.16 specifying that a special motion to strike is not permitted in a limited civil case.
Stated another way, at the time the Legislature enacted section 425.16, it declined to add language either to section 92 or to section 425.16 to expand the range of motions to strike that are allowed in limited civil cases. By refraining from doing so, the Legislature authorized special motions to strike to be filed in
D. Construing Section 92(d) as Barring Anti-SLAPP Motions in Limited Civil Cases is Also in Harmony With the Public Policy of Economic Litigation in Such Cases
We also make the observation that construing section 92(d) to preclude special motions to strike in limited civil cases is consistent with economic litigation procedures for such cases (Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 763, fn. 2; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Courts, § 250 et seq., p. 340 et seq.), presumably to keep litigation costs rationally related to the $25,000 jurisdictional limit on the amount in controversy. (§ 86.) To that end, various procedures available in unlimited civil cases are unavailable in limited civil cases, to further the public policy of handling such cases efficiently and economically. For example, the statutory scheme governing limited civil cases prohibits special demurrers (
In view of the potentially sizable expense of litigating an anti-SLAPP motion, as well as the statutory provision for attorney fees and costs to the prevаiling party (
For all these reasons, we conclude that section 92(d) precludes a defendant from bringing a special motion to strike in a limited civil case.
The order to show cause is discharged and the previously ordered stay is lifted. The Association’s petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptоry writ of mandate issue directing the appellate division to vacate its order of February 7, 2018 granting Munshi’s petition for writ of mandate, and to enter a new and different order denying Munshi’s petition. The Association shall recover its costs in this proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493.)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
LAVIN, J.
EGERTON, J.