Lead Opinion
Opinion
Civil Code section 3333.4 (section 3333.4) was enacted through passage of Proposition 213 in the November 5, 1996 General Election. Known as The Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, Proposition 213 sought to restrict the ability of uninsured motorists, convicted drunk drivers, and convicted felons to recover for losses suffered in accidents.
In this case, an uninsured motorcyclist was injured in a single-vehicle accident while turning across an unmarked elevated “bus pad” on a public roadway. We shall address whether section 3333.4 bars the motorcyclist from recovering noneconomic losses in his premises liability action against the private construction company that maintained control over the roadway at the time of the accident We conclude that it does.
Factual and Procedural Background
The City of Los Angeles (the City) hired Sully-Miller Contracting Company (Sully-Miller) as the prime contractor for certain road construction work, including street widening and the installation of concrete bus pads on the road at bus stop locations. Sully-Miller, in turn, subcontracted with Daniel J. Lopez Concrete Construction (Lopez Construction) to construct the bus pads. Sully-Miller retained responsibility for providing traffic control at the construction sites, which entailed the installation and maintenance of road barriers and delineators to warn motorists and others of ditches and uneven road surfaces.
One of the bus pads constructed by Lopez Construction was not level with the asphalt surface of the street; it rose three inches above the street surface in some places. On the night of August 13, 1996, there were no barricades or delineators marking the differentiated height of the pad when Dacus Wade Allen (Allen), who was driving his motorcycle, attempted to make a right-hand turn across the pad. Allen’s tire caught on the elevated lip of the pad and his motorcycle fell, causing injuries to his knee.
Allen brought a negligence and premises liability action against the City, Sully-Miller, and Lopez Construction. On the day scheduled for trial, defendants moved to preclude the introduction of evidence of Allen’s noneconomic
At the close of Allen’s case, the trial court granted a nonsuit in favor of Lopez Construction. Subsequently, the jury found, by special verdict, that the public property in question was in a dangerous condition at the time of Allen’s accident. Although the jury found that the City was not liable because it had no actual or constructive notice of the condition, it evidently accepted Allen’s theory that Sully-Miller was negligent in failing to install barriers or delineators to warn of the elevated nature of the bus pad. Allen was not assessed with any comparative negligence. The jury awarded Allen $24,080 in economic damages for his medical expenses and lost earnings. The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict and denied Allen’s motion for a new trial.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial. Relying on Hodges v. Superior Court (1999)
We granted review and held the matter pending our decision in Day v. City of Fontana (2001)
After we decided Day, we ordered briefing limited to the issue whether section 3333.4 bars recovery of noneconomic losses in this premises liability action against a private construction company.
Discussion
Section 3333.4 provides in pertinent part: “(a) . . . [I]n any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages if any of the following applies: [TO • • • [TO (2) The injured person was the owner of a vehicle involved in the accident and the vehicle was not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state. [TO (3) The injured person was the operator of a vehicle involved in the
In this case, the question is whether an action to recover damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident caused by a private construction company’s negligent creation or maintenance of a dangerous road condition is an “action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” within the meaning of section 3333.4, subdivision (a).
Where, as here, the issue presented is one of statutory construction, our fundamental task is “to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” (Day, supra,
Applying these rules of statutory construction, we conclude that Allen’s action falls squarely within the terms of section 3333.4. First, Allen did not have liability insurance on his motorcycle at the time of the accident. Second, his action seeks to recover for damages that occurred when the tire of the uninsured motorcycle he was operating caught on an uneven street surface, causing his motorcycle to fall. The factual circumstances here raise no ambiguity or uncertainty as to the application of the statute, which precludes recovery of noneconomic damages “in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (§ 3333.4, subd. (a)), if the injured person was not insured as the owner or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident (id., subd. (a)(2), (3)). Accordingly,
We compare the instant action with the one at issue in Day, supra,
As in Day, the facts here establish “a necessary and causal relationship” between Allen’s operation of his uninsured motorcycle and the accident for which he claims Sully-Miller was responsible by virtue of its negligence in creating or maintaining a dangerous road condition. Just as in Day, then, Allen may recover for his economic losses, but he is statutorily barred from seeking noneconomic recovery.
Contrary to the assertions of Allen and the dissenting justices, neither Hodges, supra,
As explained in Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th 268, actions seeking damages for vehicular accidents caused by dangerous road conditions are an
And as Day emphasized, nothing in Hodges implied the contrary. (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 279-282.) Thus, while Hodges observed that a primary aim of Proposition 213 was to limit automobile insurance claims by uninsured motorists against insured motorists, that decision did not suggest it was the initiative’s exclusive aim. (Day, supra,
Allen points out that in Day, we observed in a footnote that some of the plaintiffs arguments in the case had assumed that section 3333.4 did not apply to premises liability actions against owners of private property. (Day, supra,
Seizing on that footnote, Allen contends there are several distinctions between his property-related action against Sully-Miller and the property-related action in Day. First, he argues, the fact that Sully-Miller’s negligence in maintaining the construction site was the sole legal cause of his accident distinguishes his action from the one in Day, wherein liability for the plaintiffs damages was apportioned between a second motorist (52 percent) and the two public entities responsible for the nuisance and dangerous condition (48 percent, cumulatively). (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.) Second, the legislative history of section 3333.4, he claims, offers no basis for concluding that the statute encompasses actions involving injury caused by the ownership, occupation, or maintenance of private, as opposed to public, property.
Upon careful review of Day and the statutory language and history, we perceive no legitimate basis for distinguishing Allen’s action from the action in Day in assessing section 3333.4’s application. Day’s holding did not turn upon the factual circumstance that a second motorist was partly at fault. Rather, its analysis focused on the particular action against the public entity
More importantly, we find no evidence of legislative intent supporting Allen’s proposal to carve out a private entity or private property exception to section 3333.4’s application. The statutory language makes no distinction between public entity and private entity defendants in precluding recovery for noneconomic losses. To the contrary, section 3333.4 explicitly bars recovery of such losses “in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (id., subd. (a), italics added), where the injured person was the owner of an uninsured vehicle involved in the accident or was the vehicle operator and cannot properly establish his or her financial responsibility (id., subd. (a)(2), (3)).
Likewise, nothing in the legislative history of the provision, as reflected in the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 213, suggests an intent to differentiate between public defendants and private defendants, or between dangerous conditions on public property and private property. Although Allen correctly notes that the ballot materials contained a specific reference to the initiative’s impact upon public entities (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) Legis. Analyst’s analysis of Prop. 213, p. 49), the broad statutory language (“in any action”) leaves no doubt that section 3333.4 applies in all actions where the statutory prerequisites are met, including those actions brought against private persons and entities. (§ 3333.4, subd. (a).) Conversely, the implication of Allen’s alternative construction is that the phrase “in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (ibid.) would have one meaning for the public entity that owned the uneven roadway and a different meaning for the private contractor that exercised control over it. Such an illogical and inconsistent reading of the statute cannot be what the voters intended.
In the final analysis, Allen stands in the same position as the plaintiff in Day. He drove his motorcycle in violation of the state financial responsibility law and got into an accident because of a roadway condition. He seeks to hold another financially responsible for his economic and noneconomic damages, even though he himself, as an uninsured motorist, could have avoided financial responsibility for any damages had he caused an accident while on the road. Even if Sully-Miller did not own the property where the elevated bus pad was situated, but merely occupied it, construing section 3333.4 to apply in circumstances such as these substantially advances, rather than defeats, the statute’s general purpose to restore balance to the justice
Disposition
We conclude that section 3333.4 bars Allen from recovering noneconomic damages in his action against Sully-Miller. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
George, C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.
Notes
Section 3333.4 additionally bars recovery of noneconomic losses if the injured person was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the accident and was convicted of that offense. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) The statute provides one exception to its bar on recovery of noneconomic losses whereby an owner of an uninsured vehicle may recover such losses if he or she was injured by a motorist who was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and was convicted of that offense. (Id., subd. (c).)
Strictly speaking, the action here does not involve private property. Rather, it involves a private party that occupied public property while making improvements to the property.
Dissenting Opinion
Civil Code section 3333.4, an initiative measure that the voters passed in 1996, precludes uninsured motorists who are injured in accidents from recovering noneconomic damages for their pain and suffering.
The front tire of plaintiffs motorcycle caught on a three-inch high elevated lip of a bus pad defendants built on Bundy Drive at Santa Monica Boulevard for the City of Los Angeles. The motorcycle slipped and plaintiff fell on his kneecap. The majority bars recovery for the pain and suffering plaintiff experienced from the injury. But as Justice Mosk pointed out in Day, the voters who enacted section 3333.4 “did not intend to limit damages for injuries to motorists based on a dangerous condition of property . . . .” (Day, supra,
Drawing on this court’s earlier decision in Hodges v. Superior Court (1999)
I agreed with Justice Mosk’s dissent in Day that it “followed] ineluctably from our analysis in Hodges” that liability for a dangerous condition on public property did not come “within the purview of Civil Code section 3333.4.” (Day, supra,
So too in this case in which the duty to prevent or abate a dangerous condition on property fell to private contractors rather than public entities. The majority’s holding here weakens the incentive for such contractors to protect the motoring public from dangerous roadway conditions that the contractors themselves have created. Furthermore, the majority’s holding is contrary to the voters’ intent in enacting section 3333.4’s limitation on damages. Accordingly, I dissent.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
Dissenting Opinion
The majority’s expansive interpretation of Proposition 213, enacted as Civil Code section 3333.4 (section 3333.4), produces a result that surely was not contemplated by the voters who passed this initiative. According to the majority, a private contractor that maintains a dangerous condition on property is excused from bearing the cost of injuries caused by its negligent behavior when the injured party happens to be an uninsured motorist. Because there is no suggestion in either the language or the legislative history of section 3333.4 that it was intended to apply in the case of a negligent private contractor, I respectfully dissent.
The majority reaches its conclusion by relying on our decision in Day v. City of Fontana (2001)
I.
On August 13, 1996, Dacus Wade Allen was injured in a single-vehicle accident as he attempted to make a right turn across an elevated concrete bus pad, which was under construction. The front tire of his motorcycle caught on a three-inch raised lip of the concrete pad. Allen’s motorcycle slipped from under him and fell onto his knee, injuring him.
The City of Los Angeles had awarded Sully-Miller Contracting Company (Sully-Miller) a contract to perform certain road construction work at the site of Allen’s accident. Sully-Miller had entered into a subcontract with Daniel J. Lopez Concrete Construction (Lopez Construction) to provide concrete work, including the construction of bus pads. Sully-Miller, as the prime contractor, was responsible for traffic control, including the installation and maintenance of road barriers to mark uneven road surfaces to protect both motorists and pedestrians from injury. Prior to the accident in this case, the City of Los Angeles’s project inspector had issued three written warnings to Sully-Miller regarding deficiencies in its traffic control plan, including the lack of barriers necessary to protect vehicular and pedestrian traffic. On August 13, 1996, the date of the accident in this case, the disparity in height between the road surface and the bus pad had existed for at least 11 days.
Allen brought a personal injury and premises liability action against Sully-Miller, Lopez Construction, and the City of Los Angeles. On the day
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, to permit Allen to present evidence of his noneconomic damages. In a decision filed before we issued our opinion in Day, the Court of Appeal applied our analysis of section 3333.4 in Hodges. The Court of Appeal determined: “There is no indication either the electorate or the sponsors of Proposition 213 intended to protect from premises liability claims road construction companies who do not contribute to the automobile insurance pool and whose other insurance rates are not affected by the existence of uninsured motorists.” Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that section 3333.4 did not preclude Allen from recovering noneconomic damages from a private contractor.
II.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the present action falls squarely within the language of section 3333.4. Instead, as we have previously concluded in both Hodges, supra,
In Hodges, the first case in which we interpreted section 3333.4, we found that the language of section 3333.4, specifically the phrase “any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle,” was “not pellucid.” (Hodges, supra,
In Horwich, we again determined that the language in section 3333.4 was “ ‘not pellucid,’ ” this time with respect to the words “person” and “injured person.” (Horwich, supra,
In Day, a majority of this court found that the action in that case, in which an uninsured motorist sought to recover noneconomic damages from a public entity for nuisance and dangerous condition of property, fell within the terms of section 3333.4. (Day, supra,
I find that the “necessary and causal relationship” test developed by the court in Day and applied in this case broadens the reach of the statute beyond what is supported by either its language or its legislative history. The majority seeks to replace the ambiguous statutory language, “arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle,” by reading a “necessary and causal relationship” test into the statute. (§ 3333.4, subd. (a).) However, the majority provides no support, other than our statement in Day, to show why we should read such an expansive test into the statutory language. Moreover, the majority’s “necessary and causal relationship” test is just as indeterminate as the ambiguous statutory language it seeks to replace.
Rather than reading additional language into the statute, we should look to the legislative history of Proposition 213 to determine the intent of the voters. As we said in Hodges: “We do not interpret the meaning or intended application of a legislative enactment in a vacuum. In the case of a voters’
Our opinions in Hodges, Horwich, and Day all cite extensively from Proposition 213’s statement of legislative purpose, as well as the ballot arguments for and against the initiative. It is clear from these statements that the principal intended beneficiaries of Proposition 213 were Californians who obey the financial responsibility laws. (Hodges, supra,
Proposition 213, then, was meant to “restore balance to our justice system” by remedying the unfairness that occurs between insured and uninsured motorists. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) text of Prop. 213, § 2, p. 102.) There is simply no suggestion in the legislative history that Proposition 213 was intended to bar an uninsured motorist from recovering damages from a negligent private entity. (See Hodges, supra,
III.
Even if this court in Day were correct in deciding that an uninsured motorist cannot recover noneconomic damages from a public entity, it does not follow that section 3333.4 should also apply to suits against a negligent private contractor. Instead, the present suit is similar to a suit against an automobile manufacturer, which in Hodges we determined fell outside the scope of section 3333.4. In Day, we found it significant that the negligent defendant was a public entity. We noted that “[p]ublic entities, many of which provide the transportation infrastructure for the motoring public, are among those directly affected by motorists who violate the financial responsibility law.” (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 275.) We further observed that “[m]otorists who drive in violation of [the financial responsibility] law and negligently cause damage to roadways and other public property, however, typically fail to compensate for the damage; in such circumstances, public
The negligent private contractor here is not directly affected by motorists who violate the financial responsibility law. Unlike public entities, private contractors have no obligation to maintain the state’s roadways. Additionally, unlike in Day, the private contractor in this case was the sole negligent party; the injured motorist was found not to be negligent and he did not damage any property in sustaining his injuries.
Further, while the legislative history of Proposition 213 does mention its potential effect on public entities, there is no discussion of the initiative’s effect on a private entity, such as a private contractor. The ballot materials indicate that voter approval of Proposition 213 would “result in fewer lawsuits filed against state and local governments”; the materials also refer to “unknown savings to state and local governments as a result of avoiding these lawsuits.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) analysis of Prop. 213, p. 49.) These same ballot materials make no mention whatsoever of private entities, indicating that this initiative was not intended to affect the liability of private entities.
In fact, the position of the private contractor in this case is quite similar to that of the automobile manufacturer in Hodges. In Day, we distinguished Hodges: “While Hodges placed emphasis on the absence of any effect on the particular defendant’s insurance costs, it must be remembered that the defendant there, in its capacity as a car manufacturer, faced no potential of direct harm to itself or its property from uninsured drivers who failed to comply with the state financial responsibility law. In that case, the consideration that car manufacturers also had no insurance rates affected by the existence of uninsured motorists was significant to our conclusion that manufacturers of defective cars were not among those whom the initiative was intended to protect.” (Day, supra,
Similar distinguishing facts are present here. The private contractor in this case, having negligently failed to erect safety barriers, was not harmed by the actions of the uninsured motorist. Additionally, requiring a private entity such as Sully-Miller to pay noneconomic damages when it is negligent will not impact either the public fisc or the insurance pool. For these reasons, even if public entities are protected under section 3333.4, damage suits against private contractors fall outside the purview of the statute.
IV.
There is no dispute in this case that Sully-Miller was negligent in failing to install and maintain safety barriers. Further, there is no disagreement that
As we articulated in Rowland v. Christian (1968)
Further, the result in this case does not further the “principle of fairness” that “fueled the initiative.” (Hodges, supra,
In Hodges, we found that “the express goal of the initiative statute was restoring balance to the system, not simple retribution.” (Hodges, supra,