United States v. Shawn Quinnones, 16 F.4th 414

Shawn Shannon Quinnones pleaded guilty to two counts of armed bank robbery and admitted a third robbery for sentencing; the PSR treated her as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on prior convictions.
The PSR counted four prior Pennsylvania convictions under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2703 (assault by a prisoner); Quinnones objected that three § 2703 convictions did not qualify as "crimes of violence."
The District Court overruled the objection, applied the career-offender designation, but departed downward and sentenced Quinnones to 132 months’ imprisonment.
The portion of § 2703 at issue criminalizes a prisoner’s causing another to contact blood, saliva, semen, urine, or feces (by throwing, spitting, etc.) when the defendant knew or should have known the fluid came from someone infected with a communicable disease.
The least culpable conduct under that provision is spitting or expelling fluid when the defendant should have known the fluid was infected.
Quinnones appealed the career-offender designation; the Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded, holding the § 2703 bodily-fluids offense is not a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.

Issue	Quinnones' Argument	United States' Argument	Held
Whether § 2703’s bodily-fluids prong is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (use of physical force)	The statute’s least culpable conduct—spitting/expelling infected fluid when one "should have known"—does not involve "use of physical force" capable of causing pain or injury.	§ 2703 involves intentional or knowing conduct (spitting), which should satisfy the force requirement; provocation or foreseeable violent reaction can supply the required force.	The Third Circuit held the bodily-fluids prong is not a "crime of violence" because spitting/expelling in its least form is not use of physical force as defined in precedent.
Whether the statute’s mens rea disqualifies it as a crime of violence	The statute permits conviction based on a negligence standard ("should have known") as to the fluid’s infection, and offenses satisfiable by negligence cannot be crimes of violence.	The Government argued that some elements require intentional conduct and other federal predicates include non-mental-state elements, so the presence of a lower mens rea for an attendant circumstance should not defeat classification.	The court held the negligence-level "should have known" fluid element matters: because § 2703 can be satisfied with negligence as to the dangerousness of the instrumentality, it is not a qualifying crime of violence.

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" as force capable of causing pain or injury)
United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2017) (applies Johnson in § 4B1.2 context; requires intentional employment of something capable of causing pain)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explains categorical approach and modified categorical approach)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (permissible records for the modified categorical approach)
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (offenses that can be committed recklessly are not crimes of violence)
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (offense that can be satisfied by negligence or less is not a crime of violence)
United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2018) (categorical-approach precedents in this circuit)
United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2016) (assessing least culpable conduct under a statute for categorical analysis)