United States v. Sabetta
221 F. Supp. 3d 210
D.R.I.2016Background
- Seven Rhode Island defendants sentenced under the ACCA to mandatory 15+ years after § 922(g) convictions, based on having three prior predicate convictions each.
- Defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 post-Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), arguing the ACCA’s residual clause is void and that Rhode Island Assault with a Dangerous Weapon (ADW) no longer qualifies as an ACCA predicate.
- The Government contended the ADW convictions still qualify under the ACCA’s force clause because ADW “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.”
- The court applied the modified categorical approach (statute found divisible) and reviewed Shepard-approved documents showing ADW convictions for six defendants (and a functionally equivalent statute conviction for one defendant, Lee).
- The court concluded Rhode Island ADW may be committed with a recklessness/wantonness mens rea under state law, and recklessness is insufficient to satisfy the ACCA force clause; therefore six defendants lack three ACCA predicates and are entitled to hearings for resentencing. The court reserved further analysis for Young.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rhode Island ADW is divisible for the categorical/modified categorical analysis | N/A (court must decide) | ADW statutory alternatives mean multiple distinct offenses | Statute is divisible; modified categorical approach applies |
| Whether ADW has as an element the use/attempted use/threatened use of violent force (ACCA force clause) | ADW does not, because Rhode Island allows conviction on recklessness/wantonness | Government: ADW does have the force element and qualifies as an ACCA predicate | ADW does not categorically qualify: Rhode Island ADW can be committed with recklessness and recklessness is insufficient under the ACCA force clause |
| Whether wantonness in Rhode Island law equals recklessness (state-law question) | Defendants: wantonness == recklessness; ADW is a general-intent crime | Government: some RI cases suggest intent to harm may be required | Court: Rhode Island precedent supports equating wantonness with recklessness; ADW is a general-intent offense permitting reckless liability |
| Procedural default of Johnson challenge | N/A (burden on Government to assert) | Government: claims are procedurally defaulted because not raised at sentencing/appeal | Court: Johnson II was sufficiently novel; defendants showed cause and prejudice, so claims not procedurally defaulted for six defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson II announces a substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established categorical approach for prior convictions)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limited use of modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (identifies documents courts may consult under modified categorical approach)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (mens rea requirements for crime-of-violence definitions; negligence insufficient)
- United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding recklessness insufficient for §16 crime-of-violence; applied here to ACCA force clause)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguished elements versus means in divisible statutes)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (held reckless misdemeanor domestic violence can trigger firearm disability; Court explains this does not control ACCA force-clause analysis)
- United States v. Hudson, 823 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2016) (applied Fish to distinguish Massachusetts ADW and analyze mens rea sufficiency for ACCA)