United States v. Randly Begay
934 F.3d 1033
9th Cir.2019Background
- On March 4, 2013, Randly Begay shot and killed Roderick Ben on the Navajo Nation; Begay was charged with second-degree murder (18 U.S.C. § 1111) and discharging a firearm during a “crime of violence” (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
- At trial Begay contested that he was the shooter and did not request manslaughter instructions or introduce provocation/heat-of-passion evidence; the parties submitted joint jury instructions and requested only second-degree murder instructions.
- The jury convicted Begay of second-degree murder and the § 924(c) offense; the district court imposed consecutive sentences and mandatory restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
- On appeal Begay argued (1) the district court erred by not instructing the jury that malice requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of absence of heat of passion, (2) second-degree murder is not a categorical “crime of violence” for § 924(c), and (3) mandatory restitution was improper.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the second-degree murder conviction (no plain error in jury instructions because the heat-of-passion theory was not properly presented), reversed the § 924(c) conviction (second-degree murder is not a categorical crime of violence), vacated the mandatory restitution order, and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Begay’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court plainly erred by failing to instruct that malice requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in heat of passion | District court should have instructed jury that absence of heat of passion is an element of second-degree murder (affecting malice) | No plain error because Begay’s defense did not present heat-of-passion or provocation and defense did not request manslaughter instructions | No plain error; conviction for second-degree murder affirmed |
| Whether second-degree murder is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause) | Second-degree murder should not qualify because it can be committed recklessly; therefore § 924(c) conviction invalid | Government contended second-degree murder falls within the elements clause (intentional use of force) | Second-degree murder is not categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause because it can be committed with a depraved-heart (reckless) mens rea; § 924(c) conviction reversed |
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) saves the § 924(c) conviction | N/A (begay relied on elements-clause argument and Davis invalidated residual clause) | Government relied on both clauses historically; residual clause challenged | Residual clause is unconstitutionally vague (Davis); conviction cannot stand under either clause; Count Two reversed |
| Legality of mandatory restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A | Mandatory restitution invalid because it applies only when the defendant is convicted of a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and second-degree murder is not a categorical crime of violence | District court applied § 3663A mandatory restitution after convicting for a crime labeled "crime of violence" at trial | Mandatory restitution vacated because second-degree murder is not categorically a crime of violence; remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (Due Process requires prosecution to disprove heat of passion when issue properly presented)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (limitations on using facts in categorical inquiry; divisible statute guidance)
- Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (crimes of violence require a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (reckless misdemeanor domestic violence covered under different statutory context; did not resolve § 16 question)
- Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (en banc) (reckless use-of-force offenses are not crimes of violence under § 16)
- Benally v. United States, 843 F.3d 350 (applies § 16 precedent to § 924(c); involuntary manslaughter not a crime of violence)
- Gomez-Leon v. Holder, 545 F.3d 777 (crime of violence requires intentional use of force or substantial risk that force will be intentionally used)
- Covarrubias Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049 (offense that can be committed recklessly is not a crime of violence)
- Pineda-Doval v. United States, 614 F.3d 1019 (explains malice aforethought includes depraved-heart/reckless indifference; examples of second-degree murder)
- Houser v. United States, 130 F.3d 867 (case discussing extreme-disregard/depraved-heart murder and jury instruction)
- United States v. JJ, 704 F.3d 1219 (contextual reference that prior decisions did not decide categorical crime-of-violence question for second-degree murder)