United States v. Paris Hollingshed
940 F.3d 410
| 8th Cir. | 2019Background
- In spring 2015 Hollingshed sold firearms and ammunition to Chavonte Bragg; Bragg later cooperated with police and testified about purchases.
- After disturbance calls in August 2015 an eyewitness described a man with a gun; that witness later identified Hollingshed from a photo lineup at the police station but the witness never testified at trial.
- Police executed a warrant at Hollingshed’s residence and found a .38 revolver in a vacuum-sealed bag in a sock outside a basement window; an identical cut line matched a partial bag found inside the apartment; only Hollingshed’s fingerprints were on the vacuum sealer.
- A recorded jail call captured Hollingshed suggesting someone with a gun license could take the charge and urging his girlfriend to say the gun was hers.
- At trial the defense did not object when the detective testified that the eyewitness had identified Hollingshed from the photo lineup; the jury convicted on Count I (possession of the .38) and acquitted on Count II (possession of the 9mm).
- On appeal Hollingshed raised: (1) a Rehaif knowledge-of-status claim; (2) a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause challenge to the admitted photo-ID testimony; (3) sufficiency of the evidence; and (4) challenge to mandated anger-management and domestic-violence treatment conditions of supervised release.
Issues
| Issue | Hollingshed's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rehaif (knowledge-of-status under §922(g)) | Trial lacked instruction that jury must find Hollingshed knew he was a felon; conviction must be vacated or retried. | Any error was harmless because Hollingshed’s criminal history and statements show he knew his felon status. | Failure to instruct was clear error under Rehaif, but no plain-error reversal: Hollingshed’s record and statements show he knew he was a felon, so substantial rights not affected. Affirmed. |
| Confrontation Clause (photo-lineup ID through detective) | Admission of the eyewitness’s out-of-court identification was testimonial hearsay; admitting it without the witness violated the Sixth Amendment. | Defense opened the topic at trial and did not object; moreover, any error was harmless given overwhelming other evidence. | Even assuming plain error, admission did not affect substantial rights because other evidence strongly established possession. No reversal. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence | Evidence was insufficient to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt. | Physical evidence, Bragg’s testimony, matching vacuum-seal bags, fingerprints, and recorded call supported conviction. | Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sufficiency challenge fails. |
| Special conditions of supervised release (anger/domestic-violence treatment) | Conditions not supported by record; prior incidents were remote or dismissed and did not justify two overlapping programs. | PSR and probation officer recounted multiple domestic-violence–related incidents and a 2006 probation violation showing ongoing risk; conditions reasonably related to history and needs. | No abuse of discretion: district court permissibly relied on the 1996 assault and 2006 probation violation to impose anger-management and domestic-violence treatment. Affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (government must prove defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to a category barred from possession)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error review framework for unpreserved errors)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (testimonial statement test: primary purpose is to establish past events for prosecution)
- United States v. Taylor, 813 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2016) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless witness unavailable and defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (standard for showing a reasonable probability that error affected outcome)
- United States v. Mayo, 642 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2011) (district court has wide discretion to impose supervised-release conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d))
- United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2016) (when defendant objects to PSR facts, government must prove them by a preponderance)