United States v. Maumau
993 F.3d 821
10th Cir.2021Background:
- In Aug. 2008 Kepa Maumau (age 20) participated in three armed robberies; convicted by jury of RICO conspiracy, VICAR counts, a Hobbs Act robbery, and three § 924(c) offenses.
- At sentencing the then-governing § 924(c) “stacking” rule produced consecutive mandatory terms resulting in a 55‑year aggregate sentence (after an Alleyne-based resentencing).
- The First Step Act (2018) (1) narrowed § 924(c) stacking, (2) limited retroactivity of that change, and (3) allowed defendants to file compassionate‑release motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
- Maumau moved for compassionate release arguing extraordinary and compelling reasons (including that the First Step Act eliminated stacking); the district court reduced his sentence to time served plus three years supervised release.
- The government appealed, arguing the district court lacked authority to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons," that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 still controlled defendant‑filed motions, and that a court cannot override a mandatory statutory sentence; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
- The panel held district courts may independently find "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for defendant‑filed motions (subject to consistency with applicable policy statements), §1B1.13 does not bind courts deciding defendant‑filed motions, and this reduction rested on an individualized analysis (not mere disagreement with the mandatory sentence). The concurrence warned that stacking alone is usually insufficient without unique circumstances.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district courts may independently determine what counts as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" under § 3582(c)(1)(A) | Sentencing Commission (via 28 U.S.C. § 994) exclusively defines the phrase; courts must defer | District courts have authority to decide the standard for defendant‑filed motions and may consider changes like the First Step Act | Courts may independently determine extraordinary and compelling reasons for defendant‑filed motions, but that discretion is bounded by the requirement that any reduction be consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements |
| Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 remains binding on defendant‑filed compassionate‑release motions | §1B1.13 is the controlling policy statement and precludes relief based on disagreement with a mandatory sentence | §1B1.13 applies only to BOP‑filed motions; it does not constrain courts adjudicating defendant‑filed motions | §1B1.13 is applicable to BOP motions but is not binding on courts ruling on defendant‑filed § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions; the Commission has not issued an updated post–First Step Act statement |
| Whether the district court improperly reduced Maumau’s sentence by effectively overriding a mandatory stacked § 924(c) sentence | A court cannot use compassionate release to override a congressionally required mandatory sentence or evade Congress’s nonretroactivity choice | The reduction was based on an individualized review (youth, disproportionate stacked sentence, First Step Act context, disparities, rehabilitation) not mere disagreement | Affirmed: reduction was based on individualized extraordinary and compelling reasons including but not limited to the First Step Act; stacking alone would not suffice, but combined circumstances here did |
Key Cases Cited
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (addressing consecutive § 924(c) penalties)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (holding facts increasing mandatory minimums are elements for the jury)
- Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (explaining narrow exceptions to the rule barring modification of imposed sentences)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (discussing courts’ consideration of § 3553(a) factors for sentence reductions)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (noting interplay between statutes and the Guidelines)
- United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir.) (adopting a three‑step framework for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions)
- United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir.) (holding §1B1.13 does not constrain defendant‑filed motions)
- United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir.) (approving individualized § 3582(c)(1)(A) analyses considering First Step Act disparities)
- Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (statutory‑interpretation principles regarding ordinary meaning)
- United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984 (10th Cir.) (affirming Maumau’s convictions on direct appeal)