United States v. Charles LLewlyn, 879 F.3d 1291

Llewlyn pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida in 2000 and was sentenced to 110 months. He later received a separate 360‑month federal sentence in the Western District of North Carolina in 2001 to run consecutively to the Florida term.
Llewlyn completed the 110‑month Florida sentence around November 28, 2009, and has been serving the North Carolina sentence since; his projected release date is 2025.
Amendment 782 (lowering most drug Guidelines) took effect November 1, 2014. Llewlyn sought a § 3582(c)(2) reduction of his Florida 110‑month sentence in the Southern District of Florida in November 2014.
The Florida court denied the § 3582(c)(2) motion as moot because that sentence had already been completed; Llewlyn filed a traverse and later a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied; he appealed.
The district court and the Eleventh Circuit considered whether (1) Llewlyn’s appeal was timely and (2) whether a court may reduce a completed sentence under § 3582(c)(2) when a defendant is serving a later consecutive federal sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the appeal timely?	Traverse was a motion to reconsider and tolled appeal time.	The traverse was a Rule 35 motion which would not toll the appeal deadline.	Traverse was a motion to reconsider; appeal was timely.
Can § 3582(c)(2) reduce a sentence that has already been completed?	Yes — consecutive sentences should be aggregated so the court can grant relief affecting overall imprisonment.	No — § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) forbids reducing a term below what defendant already served; completed sentence is ineligible.	No; a completed sentence is ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) reduction.
Does § 3584(c) aggregate consecutive sentences for § 3582(c)(2) purposes?	§ 3584(c) treats multiple terms as an aggregate term; so courts should consider aggregate term for reductions.	§ 3584(c) is for BOP administrative purposes only and does not alter judicial authority under § 3582.	§ 3584(c) applies to administrative (BOP) functions, not to expand judicial authority under § 3582.
Do habeas doctrines ("in custody" aggregation) apply to § 3582(c)(2) motions?	Habeas precedents show sentences can be viewed in aggregate for challenges; should apply analogously.	Habeas "in custody" doctrine is sui generis; § 3582 is a narrow statutory exception and different.	Habeas aggregation does not control; § 3582 must be read narrowly.

United States v. Caraballo‑Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.) (Rule 35 does not apply where no resentencing has taken place)
United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir.) (distinguishes resentencing under § 3582(c)(2) from other motions; explains Rule 35 interaction)
United States v. Hall, 704 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.) (give Guidelines language its plain meaning)
United States v. Vaughn, 806 F.3d 640 (1st Cir.) (§ 3584(c) aggregation is for BOP administrative purposes and does not expand judicial authority under § 3582)
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (habeas: prisoner serving consecutive sentences is "in custody" under any one of them)
Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995) (habeas aggregation principle; sentences viewed in the aggregate for habeas relief)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582 provides a narrow exception to finality for sentence modification)