Case Information
*1 Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, PRYOR and HILL, Circuit Judges.
DUBINA, Chief Judge:
Appellant Erica Hall (“Hall”) pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count 1); conspiracy to commit identity theft and access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 2); and wrongfully obtaining and transferring individually identifiable health information for personal gain, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(2) (Count 3). When imposing Hall’s sentence, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because it found that the offense involved more than 50 but less than 250 victims. In objecting to the enhancement, Hall argued that the mere transfer or sale of identifying information unlawfully or without authority does not equate to the actual use of identifying information for a fraudulent purpose. Therefore, because the conspirators actually used only identifying information for 12 out of 141 individuals to obtain fraudulent credit cards, Hall argued that the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) was more appropriate because it applies to more than 10, but less than 50, victims. The district court rejected Hall’s argument, but we do not. Accordingly, we vacate Hall’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
Hall worked as an office assistant in a gynecological and obstetric health care office in Coral Springs, Florida. In her capacity as an office assistant, Hall was authorized to access patient files and copy patient information to fulfill her job duties. The sensitive information contained in the files included patient names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and medical information, which is protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Hall provided this information via text message to either Rufus Bethea (“Bethea”) or Hall’s sister-in-law, Bianca Cook (“Cook”), who gave the information to Bethea. After receiving the information, Bethea would relay it to Courtney Gissendanner, one of the organizers of the scheme. Cook informed Hall that she would receive $200 for each individual’s information or $1000 if they used the information to successfully create a fraudulent account. Hall received only $200 total in compensation, although she sent Cook or Bethea information for approximately 65 to 141 individuals.
Using the 2010 Guidelines Manual, the probation officer combined Hall’s counts of conviction into a single group and assigned her a base offense level of seven under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1). However, the probation officer recommended that Hall’s offense level be adjusted to 18 based on: (1) a six-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D) because the offense involved losses between $30,000 and $70,000; (2) a four-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because the offense involved more than 50 but less than 250 victims; (3) a two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(ii) because the offense involved the possession of five or more means of identification that were unlawfully obtained by the use of another means of identification; (4) a two-level increase under § 3B1.3 because Hall abused a position of public or private trust; and (5) a three-level decrease under § 3E1.1(a) and (b), based on Hall’s timely acceptance of responsibility. Hall had zero criminal history points, which placed her in criminal history category I. This corresponded with an advisory guidelines range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment.
After the probation officer prepared the presentence investigation report, the government notified Hall that she was responsible for unlawfully disclosing personal identifying information of 141 patients. The government also informed Hall that her co-conspirators used at least 12 of the patients’ personal identifying information to obtain fraudulent credit cards. The government advised Hall that, in its view, all of the 141 patients whose information was transferred were victims under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because the conspirators used their means of identification unlawfully and without the victims’ authority. Hall filed various sentencing pleadings and specifically objected to the four-level enhancement based on the number of victims. She argued that, at the most, she was responsible for the 12 victims whose identifying information was compromised when the conspirators used the information to obtain fraudulent credit cards. Hence, she urged the district court to apply the two-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A).
At Hall’s sentencing hearing, the district court addressed her objection to the four-level enhancement and concluded that the intentional transfer of information in exchange for consideration constituted actual use for the purposes of § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). Although it applied the four-level enhancement, the district court varied downward from 27 months to 14 months, based on factors related to Hall’s personal background and family situation. The district court commented that a 14-month sentence struck a balance between the seriousness of the offense and the need for deterrence, especially in light of Hall’s status as a first-time offender and her overall history of being a reliable and productive member of society. Thus, the district court imposed a sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment on Counts 1 and 3, to run concurrently, and 2 years of supervised release on Counts 1, 2, and 3, to run concurrently, plus a $300 assessment and restitution. Hall then perfected this appeal.
II. ISSUE
Whether the district court erred in imposing a four-level enhancement to Hall’s sentence because it determined that Hall’s offense conduct, the unauthorized transfer of more than 141 individuals’ identifying information, involved the actual use of that information for a fraudulent purpose such that all the individuals whose information was transferred were victims under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).
III. DISCUSSION
The question presented for our disposition is a novel one, and there is a
paucity of helpful case law to assist us in our decision-making.
[1]
We must decide
whether the unauthorized transfer of an individual’s identifying information to
another party involves the actual use of that information for a fraudulent purpose
such that the individual whose identifying information was transferred is a victim
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). Because the district court concluded that the
unauthorized transfer of a person’s identifying information did constitute the actual
use of that information, it applied the four-level enhancement pursuant to
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) to Hall’s sentence. On appeal, Hall challenges the district court’s
application of this enhancement to her sentence. Thus, we review the
reasonableness of Hall’s sentence.
See Gall v. United States
,
Pursuant to the 2010 Guidelines Manual, a two-level enhancement is applied if the offense involved ten or more victims, and a four-level enhancement is applied if the offense involved more than 50 but less than 250 victims. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A), (B). Thus, the appropriate enhancement calculation depends on the number of “victims” involved. In cases such as this, involving “means of identification,” [2] Application Note 4(E) provides that a “‘victim’ means (i) any victim as defined in Application Note 1; or (ii) any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without authority.” Id. , comment. (n.4(E)) (emphasis added).
The 12 individuals whose identifying information was used to obtain fraudulent credit cards are “victims” under (ii) of Application Note 4(E). It is not clear, however, that the remaining individuals whose identifying information Hall transferred are “victims” as explained in the commentary. These individuals are not “victims” under (i) of the commentary because they do not constitute victims under Application Note 1, which defines a victim as “(A) any person who sustained any part of the actual loss . . . or (B) any individual who sustained bodily injury as a result of the offense.” See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A), (B), comment. (n.1). Therefore, whether these remaining individuals are “victims” for purposes of the enhancement at issue depends on whether their identification “was used” as provided in (ii) of Application Note 4E. Id. , comment. (n.4(E)).
To interpret this sentencing guideline enhancement, we begin with the
language of the enhancement, and we apply traditional statutory construction rules
to interpret it.
See Fulford
,
We note that later in § 2B1.1 under the specific offense characteristics, the
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) stated that if the offense involved “the
unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce
or obtain any other means of identification,” the district court should enhance the
defendant’s base offense level by two. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10). The district court
also applied this enhancement in imposing Hall’s sentence. It is telling that the
Commission used the two terms “use” and “transfer” in this sentencing guideline.
We assume that the Commission “used two terms because it intended each term to
have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”
Bailey
,
Moreover, in the application note to § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i), the Commission
stated that the subsection “applies in a case in which a means of identification of an
individual other than the defendant . . . is used without that individual’s
authorization unlawfully to produce or obtain another means of identification.”
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, comment (n.9(C)(i)). As an example to which this subsection
applies, the Commission provided that when a defendant obtains an individual’s
personal identifying information and obtains a credit card in that individual’s
name, then the credit card is the other means of identification that has been
obtained unlawfully.
Id.
, comment (n.9(C)(ii)(II)). In this context, it is clear that a
defendant must use the unauthorized identifying information to obtain unlawfully
another means of identification.
See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez
,
We conclude the guideline, its commentary, and application notes indicate
that the mere transfer of unauthorized identifying information is not the equivalent
to the actual use of the identifying information for a fraudulent purpose. There is
nothing in the commentary or the application notes that contradicts this meaning of
the text of the guideline at issue.
See United States v. Wilks
,
The district court imposed an unreasonable sentence because it
misinterpreted the sentencing guideline enhancement. We are aware that a
misapplication of the guidelines will not ordinarily result in a reversal of an
otherwise reasonable sentence if it is clear from the record that the district court
would have imposed the same sentence absent any error.
See United States v.
Keene
,
VACATED and REMANDED .
Notes
[1] We note at least two cases addressing the enhancement for the number of victims
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2):
United States v. Vasquez
,
[2] “Means of identification” has the meaning given by 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7), see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.1), and includes “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any . . . name, social security number, date of birth, [and] official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7).
[3] Furthermore, an amendment to the Guidelines Manual provides clarification into the meaning of the word “use” in the sentencing guideline at issue. Amendment 726 amended portions of § 2B1.1, and it became effective in November 2009. It provides that the definition of “victim” includes an individual whose means of identification is used unlawfully or without authority. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 726 (Nov. 2009) (emphasis added). It clarifies that “[t]his new category of ‘victim’ for purposes of subsection (b)(2) is appropriately limited, however, to cover only those individuals whose means of identification are actually used.” Id .
